BANK OF NORTH CAROLINA (BNC BANK), ETC. VS. LITCHFIELD DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND GEORGE STEPHANIS (DJ-116272-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1949-16T2
BANK OF NORTH CAROLINA (BNC BANK)
AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO BEACH
FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LITCHFIELD DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Defendants,
and
GEORGE STEPHANIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
Submitted October 18, 2017 – Decided November 16, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, DJ-
116272-16.
George Stephanis, appellant pro se.
Ferro Labella & Zucker, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Russell T. Brown, of counsel and
on the brief; Bonnie C. Park, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant George Stephanis1 appeals from a December 19, 2016
order denying reconsideration of an October 28, 2016 order
rejecting defendant's objection to the domestication under New
Jersey's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, N.J.S.A.
2A:49A-1 to -33, (UEFJA) of a March 29, 2011 South Carolina
judgment against defendant. We affirm. Although defendant appeals
only the order denying reconsideration, we briefly review and
affirm the underlying October 28 order as well.
In 2010, plaintiff Bank of North Carolina (BNC) filed an
action in South Carolina against defendant and Litchfield, seeking
repayment of a $2,500,000 commercial loan. Defendant had
unconditionally guaranteed the loan.
A South Carolina Master-in-Equity issued an "Order and
Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale" on March 29, 2011, containing
in its caption the words "Deficiency Demanded," entering judgment
against defendant under his guaranty for $3,073,714.86 plus 14%
interest. The March 29 order and judgment also ordered the sale
of property in Horry County, South Carolina, put up as collateral
1
Litchfield Development, LLC (Litchfield) was not involved in the
New Jersey litigation, and plaintiff does not claim to be owed
money by the defunct company. We refer to Stephanis alone as
defendant.
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by Litchfield. Plaintiff purchased the property at a sheriff's
sale for $909,695.
After the sale, the Master-in-Equity issued a June 15, 2011
"Master's Report on Sale, Order of Distribution, and Order
Confirming Sale" containing in the caption the words "Deficiency
Waived." Defendant argues that this June order conflicts with the
March judgment, and thus the March judgment should not have been
domesticated in New Jersey. Plaintiff argues that the judgment
demanding the deficiency remains accurate with regard to
defendant, the loan guarantor, while the June order waiving the
deficiency relates to Litchfield, the mortgagor, alone. Plaintiff
states that the waiver as to Litchfield sped up the process under
South Carolina's foreclosure sale process.
Whether the South Carolina judgment "may be registered in New
Jersey implicates the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United
States Constitution, which mandates 'Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.'" Ewing Oil, Inc. v. John T.
Burnett, Inc., 441 N.J. Super. 251, 259 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1). "The clause requires a foreign judgment
'properly entered in accordance with local procedure is entitled
to full faith and credit in any other state provided . . . the
judgment is not entered in violation of due process of law.'"
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Ibid. (quoting Sec. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. TFS Ins. Agency, Inc.,
279 N.J. Super. 419, 424 (App. Div. 1995)).
The narrow issue on appeal is whether defendant raised due
process issues appealable under the UEFJA, or instead made
collateral attacks on the judgment that must be raised in South
Carolina. Defendant does not argue on appeal that South Carolina
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or failed to
provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. See
Sonntag Reporting Serv., Ltd. v. Ciccarelli, 374 N.J. Super. 533,
538 (App. Div. 2005) (finding a foreign judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit unless the defendant is denied one of these
enumerated due process rights). We affirm substantially for the
reasons expressed by Judge James J. DeLuca in the "riders" to the
October 28, 2016 order and December 19, 2016 order denying
reconsideration.
Defendant raised no specific reason why reconsideration was
appropriate. "Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule
4:49-2, which provides that the decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440
N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).
Reconsideration is appropriate in those limited number of
cases where: "(1) the Court has expressed its decision based upon
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a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious
that the Court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate
the significance of probative, competent evidence." Granata v.
Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting
Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002)), certif. granted, 228 N.J.
516 (2017). A trial court's decision should be "left undisturbed
unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Pitney Bowes
Bank, Inc., supra, 440 N.J. Super. at 382 (citing Hous. Auth. of
Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)).
Judge DeLuca correctly rejected defendant's objection to
domesticating the South Carolina judgment and did not abuse his
discretion in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration.
Affirmed.
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