LIENNA SHAIR VS. MASARU TSUBOI AND TOKIKO TSUBOI(L-0173-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4503-15T1
LIENNA SHAIR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MASARU TSUBOI and TOKIKO TSUBOI,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________________
Submitted September 26, 2017 – Decided November 14, 2017
Before Judges Sumners and Moynihan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
0173-16.
Lienna Shair, appellant pro se.
Charles Michael Damian, LLC, attorneys for
respondents (Rebecca L. Eckert, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff sued defendants for damage to her home resulting
from when defendants had a tree trimmed on their property
approximately twenty years earlier. Defendants counterclaimed
seeking attorney fees and costs for filing a frivolous suit.
Summary judgment was eventually granted in favor of defendants
dismissing plaintiff's complaint and awarding defendants' attorney
fees and costs. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated
by Judge Rachelle L. Harz in her opinion placed on the record on
April 18, 2015. We add the following comments.
This action involving next-door neighbors originated in the
Special Civil Part. Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging
defendants hired Cherokee Tree Services to trim a tree on their
property and authorized Cherokee to park its truck on her property,
which caused extensive damage to her property. Following the
service of the complaint, defendants' counsel served a notice of
a frivolous claim in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule
1:4-8, advising plaintiff to withdraw her complaint within twenty-
eight days because "your potential claims are barred by the
[s]tatute of [l]imtations and you offer no facts to support your
outrageous and unfounded allegations." When plaintiff did not
comply, defendants counter-claimed seeking attorney fees and costs
for filing a frivolous lawsuit.1
1
The counter-claim also alleged defamation, libel per se, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon
plaintiff's posting of signs on her property stating in Japanese,
"Hit and Run Liar" and "Hit and Run Neighbor." These claims are
not a subject of this appeal as plaintiff agreed in court to remove
the signs at the conclusion of the Law Division case.
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On the trial date, plaintiff failed to appear resulting in
the dismissal of her complaint and entry of default judgment to
defendants on their counter-claim. Plaintiff, in turn, filed a
second complaint raising the same allegations as her first
complaint. The court subsequently reinstated plaintiff's first
complaint and dismissed the second complaint, due to the entire
controversy doctrine.
After the Special Civil Part sua sponte transferred the matter
to the Law Division, plaintiff successfully moved to vacate the
default judgment on defendant's counter-claim, and was permitted
to file an answer to the counter-claim and reopen discovery to
serve interrogatories. Following completion of discovery, the
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on April 18,
2016, dismissing plaintiff's complaint and awarding defendants
attorney fees and costs on their counter-claim.
In her oral decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint, Judge
Harz reasoned:
There has been no evidence presented by the
plaintiff that defendants actually caused any
alleged damage to plaintiff's property. The
plaintiff has . . . stated in her complaint[]
that a tree company, Cherokee, hired by
defendants, is believed to have hit her home
and cause damage. She does not allege that
the defendants directly damaged the property.
Not only has the plaintiff been unable to
prove that any damage that exists on her
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property was actually caused by a truck
hitting her home, but she has failed to prove
the defendants were the actual or proximate
cause of any alleged damage.
Defendants do not currently and never have
worked for Cherokee Tree Service[s]. They are
not an agent of nor are they in any way
affiliated or associated with Cherokee Tree
Service[s]. Defendants only hired Cherokee
in or around 1995 to trim some branches on
their property. Plaintiff's claims should,
therefore, be brought against Cherokee for any
damages she alleges.
Summary judgment is entered as to all of
plaintiff's claims, because the plaintiff has
failed to bring her claim within the stated
statute of limitations. While this [c]ourt
is saying that today it appears, from what
plaintiff has said herself, that she has been
told this before by [the Special Civil Part
Judge] and has been told this by [L]egal
[A]id. There is a six-year statute of
limitations of this type of cause of action.
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.
In granting summary judgement on defendants' counter-claim
for attorney fees and costs, Judge Harz determined the frivolous
litigation statute was enacted to prevent suits such as this,
especially where a litigant was well aware of the time bar to her
claims. Although the judge found that the hourly rate sought by
defendants' counsel was reasonable, she ordered counsel to submit
another certification of services regarding legal fees pursuant
to the N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. A month later, Judge Harz entered an
order, and placed her reasons on the record, requiring plaintiff
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to pay defendants' attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$15,738.07.2
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that her complaint
alleging defendants damaged her property in 1995 is still
actionable because she is the victim of a crime and that under
N.J.S.A. 52:4B-64, a crime victim has the right to bring civil
action for damages without the restriction of the six-year statute
of limitations. She further argues Judge Harz erred in finding
her claim was frivolous because she established defendants, by way
of Cherokee Tree Services, damaged her property in 1995, as
supported by the defendants' affirmative defenses. We are
unpersuaded.
Appellate review of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment
is de novo, applying the same standard governing the trial court.
Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014).
Thus, we consider, as the motion judge did, "whether the competent
evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a
rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor
2
Before the proceeding to determine the amount of attorney fees
and costs, plaintiff wrote to Judge Harz to advise that she would
not be submitting opposition to defendants' application and did
not participate in the proceeding as she intended to appeal the
April 18 order.
5 A-4503-15T1
of the non-moving party." Id. at 406 (quoting Brill v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "If there is no
genuine issue of material fact," an appellate court must then
"decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law."
DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430
N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted). We
accord no deference to the trial judge's legal conclusions.
Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (citing Zabilowicz
v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 512-13 (2009)).
In light of the undisputed material facts presented in
defendants' motion, Judge Harz' decision to grant summary judgment
is legally unassailable. Plaintiff's appellate arguments are
without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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