JEFF CARTER VS. FRANKLIN FIRE DISTRICT NO. 1(GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL)Â ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5573-14T1
    JEFF CARTER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    FRANKLIN FIRE DISTRICT
    NO. 1 (Somerset),
    Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Argued October 5, 2017 – Decided November 20, 2017
    Before Judges Simonelli, Rothstadt and Gooden
    Brown.
    On appeal from Government Records Council,
    Compaint No. 2011-76.
    Jeff Carter, appellant, argued the cause pro
    se.
    Dominic P. DiYanni argued the cause for
    respondent Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Eric
    M. Bernstein & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Mr.
    DiYanni, of counsel and on the brief).
    Raymond R. Chance, III, Assistant Attorney
    General, argued the cause for respondent
    Government Records Council (Christopher S.
    Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Mr.
    Chance, of counsel; Debra A. Allen, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Complainant, Jeff Carter, appeals from the Government Records
    Council's (GRC) final decision adopting an Administrative Law
    Judge's (ALJ) finding that respondent, Franklin Fire District No.
    1 (District), did not knowingly and willfully fail to disclose
    records that Carter requested under the Open Public Records Act
    (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, even though it had violated the
    act.   Carter's primary claim on appeal is that the GRC's decision
    was not supported by the evidence.        He also argues the GRC failed
    to   properly   advise   him   of   its   rejection   of   a   supplemental
    certification he filed in support of his claim and that it should
    have imposed a civil penalty on the District's legal counsel who
    responded to his OPRA request.       We disagree and affirm.
    The facts gleaned from the record are undisputed and are
    summarized as follows.     On January 21, 2011, Carter submitted an
    OPRA request to the District for all annual financial disclosure
    statements (FDS) filed by its commissioners from 2000 to 2011.
    The District, through its attorney, William T. Cooper, denied the
    request on February 10, 2011, explaining that the FDS Carter sought
    were not maintained by its office and were instead available to
    Carter through the Franklin Township Municipal Clerk's office.
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    Carter filed an OPRA request with the town clerk and received
    all of the documents he requested from the District.                     He also
    submitted   a   second      OPRA   request    to    the    District   requesting
    different documents.        Among the documents he received in response
    to that request, Carter found a January 25, 2011 email from the
    District's administrative assistant, Debi Nelson, who is Carter's
    sister, to Melissa Kosensky, the commissioner who served as the
    District's custodian of records.             The email included some of the
    2007 FDS that were on file with Nelson's office, which were the
    documents Cooper stated were not in the District's possession.
    Carter     filed   a   complaint   with       the    GRC,   challenging   the
    District's denial of his first OPRA request and access to the
    requested records.       The District filed a Statement of Information
    (SOI) with the GRC, explaining the reasons it was delayed in
    responding to Carter's first OPRA request.                  The SOI stated the
    delay was the result of receiving about eighteen OPRA requests in
    ten days from Carter, its custodian being away for training during
    part of this time period, and the custodian referring the request
    to its counsel for advice on how to respond.                The District denied
    that the custodian's "actions r[o]se to the level of a knowing and
    willful violation of [OPRA]."           The SOI did not reveal that the
    District had copies of the 2007 FDS it included in its response
    to Carter's second OPRA request.             In response to the SOI, Carter
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    filed a certification with the GRC that attached the January 25,
    2011 email with the 2007 FDS that proved the District had in its
    possession some of the requested documents that it failed to
    disclose.
    On June 26, 2012, the GRC reviewed Carter's complaint and
    found that the custodian violated OPRA by not timely responding
    to Carter's OPRA request within seven business days, and by denying
    access to the FDS as evidenced by the January 25, 2011 email.      It
    issued an interim order requiring the custodian to disclose the
    responsive 2007 FDS to Carter, in addition to any other responsive
    statements it had on file from 2000 to the date the OPRA request
    was made.    It also ordered that if no other FDS existed, the
    custodian was to submit a certification attesting to that fact.
    On July 2, 2012, the District provided Carter with documents in
    response to the GRC's order.
    In anticipation of the GRC's scheduled review of the matter,
    Carter prepared a certification in which he included a copy of a
    January 27, 2011 email from Kosensky to Cooper transmitting the
    2007 FDS that she received from Nelson two days earlier.   In that
    email, Kosensky stated "[i]t looks like we only have copies from
    2007.   I am assuming that [Carter] can get the rest from the
    township."   Carter argued in the certification that the document
    established that when Cooper responded to Carter's OPRA request,
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    he and Kosensky knew the District was in possession of at least
    some responsive documents.
    Carter's counsel transmitted the certification by email to
    the GRC on August 24, 2012.         The GRC responded the same day by
    informing    Carter's    counsel   that    the   "submission    will   not    be
    reviewed    [by   the   GRC]"   because,   (1)   the   matter   was    already
    scheduled before the council for its review of the executive
    director's    "Findings     and    Recommendations";       and,       (2)    its
    regulations did "not include a provision for submissions in advance
    of the Council's meeting" where there is no hearing being held and
    the GRC made no request for additional information.             According to
    Carter, his attorney never informed him of the GRC's rejection of
    his submission.
    At its August 28, 2012 meeting, the GRC determined the
    custodian complied with the June 26 interim order. It again relied
    on the January 25, 2011 email and found that the District violated
    OPRA because it did not release documents it obviously had in its
    possession.       It also found that Carter was a prevailing party
    entitled to an award of counsel fees and directed that the matter
    be transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a
    hearing to determine the amount of the award and whether the
    District's denial of Carter's initial request was a knowing and
    willful OPRA violation.
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    The OAL scheduled a hearing before an ALJ.             At the hearing,
    Carter   and   Nelson   testified   on   behalf   of     Carter.1   Kosensky
    testified for the District.         Carter testified about the January
    25 and January 27 emails, and explained they proved that two weeks
    before Cooper responded to his initial request and explained the
    District   did   not    maintain   the   FDS,   Nelson    and   Kosensky   had
    exchanged an email that contained some of the requested FDS and
    Kosensky provided it to Cooper.            He argued that because the
    District possessed some responsive documents, it was required to
    disclose whatever it possessed, regardless of the town clerk
    serving as the repository for the FDS. Carter admitted he promptly
    made an OPRA request for the same documents from the town clerk,
    who complied and forwarded to him the FDS that he sought.
    Nelson testified that after receiving her brother's OPRA
    request, she spoke with Cooper and explained she had copies of the
    2007 FDS in the District's file and she assumed they were released
    to Carter.     Only later, upon receiving the GRC complaint, did she
    learn that the 2007 FDS were not disclosed.
    Kosensky testified she was the District's records custodian
    from 2010 to 2011.      She received some responsive documents to the
    OPRA request from Nelson and forwarded them to Cooper.                     She
    1
    By that time, Nelson no longer worked for the District.
    6                                A-5573-14T1
    admitted that she thought the 2007 FDS were responsive to Carter's
    request, but agreed with Cooper's response to Carter that advised
    him to direct his request to the Municipal Clerk's office, and did
    not feel that Cooper's response was an attempt to intentionally
    withhold documents.             It was her opinion, however, that Carter
    should have been given a copy of the 2007 FDS that the District
    had on file.        Finally, she stated that she received no training
    about   OPRA      when    she   was   appointed   to   the   year-long   interim
    position.
    On April 23, 2015, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision.                   The
    judge's comprehensive nineteen-page written decision specifically
    found that Nelson sent the January 25, 2011 email to Kosensky, who
    then sent the January 27, 2011 email to Cooper.                  Despite those
    emails, the ALJ concluded that the District's custodian did not
    knowingly and willfully violate OPRA and that her mistake in
    denying     the    OPRA    request     was    negligent.      Relying    on   the
    commissioner's demeanor during the hearing, the ALJ stated that
    the commissioner "did not impress [the ALJ] as anything other than
    a worker who was doing her job to the best of her ability without
    an ulterior motive of denying Carter to access to records he
    requested."        The ALJ recommended against assessing any civil
    penalties under OPRA.           The ALJ then determined the amount of the
    7                              A-5573-14T1
    counsel fees and costs to be awarded to Carter as directed by the
    GRC.
    On June 30, 2015, the GRC issued its final decision, adopting
    its Executive Director's supplemental findings and recommendations
    that were based upon the ALJ's Initial Decision.                               Addressing
    exceptions made by Carter to the ALJ's decision, the GRC explained
    again       its     reason     for   rejecting          Carter's    August         12,    2012
    certification.          This appeal followed.
    We begin our review of the GRC's decision by acknowledging
    that it "is governed by the same standards as review of a decision
    by any other state agency," Fisher v. Div. of Law, 
    400 N.J. Super. 61
    ,    70    (App.     Div.    2008),    and       is   therefore   limited.             In   re
    Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011).                      We "will not overturn an
    agency's          decision     unless     it       violates    express        or     implied
    legislative policies, is based on factual findings that are not
    supported         by   substantial      credible        evidence,   or   is    arbitrary,
    capricious or unreasonable."               Fisher, 
    supra,
     
    400 N.J. Super. at 70
    .
    "Our standard of review is plenary with respect to" the GRC's
    interpretation of OPRA.              Asbury Park Press v. Cty. of Monmouth,
    
    406 N.J. Super. 1
    , 6 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd, 
    201 N.J. 5
     (2010);
    see also O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 
    410 N.J. Super. 371
    , 379
    (App Div. 2009).              "[D]eterminations about the applicability of
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    OPRA and its exemptions are legal conclusions . . . and are
    therefore subject to de novo review."           Carter v. Doe, 
    230 N.J. 258
    , 273-274 (2017).     However, "under our deferential standard of
    review, we give weight to the GRC's interpretation of OPRA." McGee
    v. Twp. of E. Amwell, 
    416 N.J. Super. 602
    , 616 (App. Div. 2010).
    "We do not, however, simply rubber stamp the agency's decision."
    Bart v. City of Paterson Hous. Auth., 
    403 N.J. Super. 609
    , 618
    (App. Div. 2008) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 
    198 N.J. 316
    (2009).
    In our review, we are mindful of the public policy in these
    matters.    "Any analysis of OPRA must begin with the recognition
    that the Legislature created OPRA intending to make government
    records 'readily accessible' to the state's citizens 'with certain
    exceptions[] for the protection of the public interest.'" Gilleran
    v. Bloomfield, 
    227 N.J. 159
    , 170 (2016) (alteration in original)
    (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1).         OPRA expresses New Jersey's public
    policy    favoring   transparency    in   government   and   disclosure   of
    government documents.      See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.         It endeavors to
    "maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure
    an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a
    secluded process."      Times of Trenton Publ'g Corp. v. Lafayette
    Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 
    183 N.J. 519
    , 535 (2005) (citation omitted).
    9                             A-5573-14T1
    "[A]ny limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed
    in favor of the public's right of access[.]"     N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.
    We turn first to Carter's primary contention that the GRC
    should have imposed penalties on Kosensky and Cooper because the
    District's withholding of the 2007 FDS was knowing and willful.
    OPRA requires that a custodian or any other public official or
    employee "who knowingly and willfully violates [OPRA] . . . and
    is found to have unreasonably denied access under the totality of
    the circumstances, shall be subject to a civil penalty. . . ."
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11(a).   To determine whether a custodian knowingly
    and willfully violated OPRA, "the custodian must have . . . actual
    knowledge that his actions were wrongful, and . . . there [must]
    be a positive element of conscious wrongdoing."    Bart, supra, 
    403 N.J. Super. at 619
    ; see also Fielder v. Stonack, 
    141 N.J. 101
    (1995); Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. Corp., 
    37 N.J. 396
     (1962).
    If there is a knowing and willful OPRA violation by a public
    body or custodian of records, "and [they are] found to have
    unreasonably   denied   access     under   the   totality   of    the
    circumstances, the [GRC] may impose the penalties provided for in
    [OPRA]."   N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7(e).
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 provides a valuable means
    to compel compliance with OPRA by public
    officials, officers, employees and records
    10                         A-5573-14T1
    custodians who might otherwise flout OPRA's
    requirements and willfully and knowingly
    deprive the public of access to government
    records. The civil penalties permitted under
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 help ensure that records at
    all levels of government, including the
    highest levels of our State government, are
    not willfully and knowingly withheld in an
    effort to shroud possible wrongdoing from the
    public's view or deny access to government
    records to which every citizen is entitled.
    It is inconsistent with the plain language of
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11 and OPRA's purpose to shield
    the recalcitrance and obfuscation of public
    officials, officers, custodians and employees
    from the imposition of a civil penalty. . . .
    [N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. State Office
    of the Governor, 
    451 N.J. Super. 282
    , 309
    (App. Div. 2017) (emphasis added).]
    We conclude the GRC's determination that the District did not
    knowingly and willfully fail to disclose documents to Carter was
    supported by substantial evidence in the record of the hearing
    before the ALJ.   R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).   That evidence included proof
    that the custodian's decision to forward documents to its counsel
    to formulate a response to Carter lacked any indication that she
    intended to deprive Carter of responsive documents, and therefore
    did not warrant the imposition of civil penalties.         See Bart,
    
    supra,
     
    403 N.J. Super. at 619
     (finding no knowing and willful
    violation of OPRA where a parking authority "consulted with its
    counsel . . . to formulate a proper response").     In addition, it
    was undisputed that Carter was never deprived of the requested
    11                           A-5573-14T1
    documents because he received them from the municipal clerk as
    Cooper directed.      While Cooper's response on behalf of Kosensky
    clearly violated OPRA, there was no demonstration that it was a
    knowing and willful attempt to "shroud possible wrongdoing from
    the public's view or deny access to government records to which
    every citizen is entitled."          N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., supra,
    451 N.J. Super. at 309.
    We    find   Carter's   remaining    arguments   regarding       Cooper's
    liability for civil penalties, and the GRC's failure to consider
    his supplemental certification before it agreed with him that the
    District violated OPRA and referred the matter to the OAL, to be
    without    sufficient   merit   to   warrant   discussion   in    a    written
    opinion.    R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).       We only observe that Cooper acted
    at all times as counsel, not as the custodian, and was never named
    as a party to this action, see N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc., supra,
    451 N.J. Super. at 288 n.1. And, the certification the GRC refused
    to consider when it ruled in Carter's favor was admitted into
    evidence and testified to by Carter before the ALJ in support of
    his claim that the District's actions were knowing and willful.
    Affirmed.
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