JACQUELINE NGUYEN VS. ESTELLE FLYNN LORD (L-4382-13, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0128-15T2
    JACQUELINE NGUYEN and
    DENNIS NGUYEN,1
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    ESTELLE FLYNN LORD,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Submitted January 11, 2017 – Decided October 19, 2017
    Before Judges Fuentes and Simonelli.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-4382-
    13.
    Jacqueline   Nguyen         and     Dennis      Nguyen,
    appellants pro se.
    Estelle Flynn Lord, respondent pro se.
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
    1
    Although Dennis Nguyen appears in the caption, only Jacqueline
    Nguyen signed and filed the Notice of Appeal required by Rule 2:5-
    1(a).   We are also guided by the information required to be
    provided by an appellant pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(f)(3)(A).
    This    case    originated      in   the       Law    Division   as    a     legal
    malpractice action filed pro se by plaintiff Jacqueline Nguyen
    against her former attorney, defendant Estelle Flynn Lord.                              On
    June 14, 2015, Judge Kenneth J. Grispin granted defendant's motion
    for   summary      judgment    and   dismissed       with    prejudice      the    legal
    malpractice action.         Judge Grispin found that the October 24, 2014
    report submitted by plaintiff's expert, attorney Peter A. Ouda,
    was a net opinion.             Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for
    reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 which was heard and denied
    in an order dated August 21, 2015.                    Judge Grispin placed his
    reasons for denying the motion for reconsideration on the record
    as required by Rule 1:7-4(a).
    Plaintiff now appeals from the August 21, 2015 order denying
    her motion for reconsideration.                We affirm.
    Consistent with the limited scope of the appeal, plaintiff
    has provided the transcript of the reasons placed on the record
    by Judge Grispin on August 21, 2015, in support of his decision
    to deny the motion for reconsideration.                    We will thus limit our
    review accordingly.           Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway, 
    269 N.J. Super. 463
    , 465-66 (App. Div.) (declining to review trial ruling not
    identified in notice of appeal), aff'd o.b., 
    138 N.J. 41
     (1994).
    At     the     oral     argument         for    plaintiff's      motion         for
    reconsideration, Judge Grispin noted that plaintiff submitted a
    2                                     A-0128-15T2
    supplemental report from attorney Ouda2 dated June 14, 2015. Judge
    Grispin characterized this submission as a
    belated response to the motion filed by the
    defendant, because in the second report it
    specifically refers to the motion which had
    been decided two days earlier.     The . . .
    second report, mentions the motion papers
    filed on behalf of the defendant and takes
    some pains to disagree with the motion and as
    to why the first opinion, Mr. [Ouda's] first
    opinion . . . was not a net opinion.
    In   response   to   Judge   Grispin's   request,   plaintiff   expressly
    declined to offer any oral argument in rebuttal.
    The record shows Judge Grispin thereafter articulated the
    standard of review applicable to a motion for reconsideration and
    reached the following conclusion:
    The [c]ourt ruled that the first report, the
    October 24, 2014 report, by Mr. [Ouda] was
    insufficient.   Ms. Nguyen, although she is
    self-represented,   has    litigated   several
    different matters here and apparently also in
    other counties. I believe she has a matter
    pending in Middlesex County, and she obviously
    had the matter in Somerset County, which was
    the   predicate   for   the   allegations   of
    malpractice against the defendant here, Ms.
    Lord.     But even though she is self-
    represented, she is required, and I have made
    that clear to her on every occasion, to
    comport with all of the rules.     She took a
    risk by submitting Mr. [Ouda's] report. It's
    not necessarily her fault.     She didn't - -
    she’s not an expert, but she hired Mr. [Ouda]
    2
    The transcript of the oral argument session misspelled Mr. Ouda's
    name. We will disregard this typographical error.
    3                             A-0128-15T2
    as her expert. If he submitted a deficient
    report, she lives or dies with that.
    . . . .
    [T]he entire process would be thrown into
    chaos if reports could be amended, if
    deficient   reports   could  be  amended   to
    hopefully comport with what would be a
    satisfactory opinion once the expert or
    putative expert determines that there is soon
    to be a decision rendering his or her report
    as a net opinion.    It is clear, as I said
    before, that Mr. [Ouda's] second report
    specifically addressed the motion filed by
    [defense counsel]. That is unacceptable, that
    does not comport with fair play. This matter
    the [c]ourt believes was filed a day late.3
    And even if it weren't, on its merits there
    is no reason to reconsider the [c]ourt's
    opinion that Mr. [Ouda's] October 24, 2014
    report was a net opinion and, consequently,
    the motion is denied.
    Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, we are bound to
    uphold    a    trial     court's    decision    to   deny    a   motion      for
    reconsideration        concerning   the    admissibility    of   an   expert's
    report.   Townsend v. Pierre, 
    221 N.J. 36
    , 52-53 (2015).              An "abuse
    of discretion only arises on demonstration of 'manifest error or
    injustice[,]'" Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 
    194 N.J. 6
    , 20 (2008) (quoting
    3
    A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 "shall be
    served not later than 20 days after service of the judgment or
    order upon all parties by the party obtaining it."   Pursuant to
    Rule 1:3-4(c), "[n]either the parties nor the court may . . .
    enlarge the time specified by . . . [Rule] 4:49-2."     See also
    Eastampton Ctr., LLC v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Eastampton, 
    354 N.J. Super. 171
    , 187 (App. Div. 2002).
    4                                A-0128-15T2
    State v. Torres, 
    183 N.J. 554
    , 572 (2005)), and occurs when the
    trial judge's "decision is 'made without a rational explanation,
    inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
    impermissible basis.'"   Milne v. Goldenberg, 
    428 N.J. Super. 184
    ,
    197 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 
    171 N.J. 561
    , 571 (2002)).      Furthermore, as our colleague Judge
    Jonathan Harris made clear nearly three decades ago:
    Reconsideration should be utilized only for
    those cases which fall into that narrow
    corridor in which either 1) the Court has
    expressed its decision based upon a palpably
    incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is
    obvious that the Court either did not
    consider,   or  failed   to  appreciate   the
    significance    of    probative,    competent
    evidence.
    [D'Atria v. D'Atria, 
    242 N.J. Super. 392
    , 401
    (Ch. Div. 1990).]
    As the record we have taken the time to quote evidently shows,
    there are no legal grounds to interfere with or modify Judge
    Grispin's well-reasoned opinion.
    Affirmed.
    5                          A-0128-15T2