STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. TERRANCE MITCHELL (93-03-1244, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4278-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TERRANCE MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted February 28, 2022 – Decided March 10, 2022
Before Judges Rose and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 93-03-1244.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (John V. Molitor, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Terrance Mitchell appeals from an October 8, 2019 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm because the petition was untimely filed and otherwise lacked
merit.
Following a jury trial in 1993, defendant was convicted of multiple crimes
charged in an Essex County indictment, including murder, felony murder,
robbery, and weapons offenses for bludgeoning to death a stranger in her car
near defendant's East Orange home. The State's proofs at trial included
defendant's post-arrest statement to police, explaining the victim had
approached him, looking to purchase drugs. Defendant detailed the manner in
which he killed the victim, including her fruitless struggle to escape his clutches.
He also confessed to his girlfriend and her stepbrother, who both testified on
behalf of the State at trial. Defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the
incident.
Defendant was sentenced in December 1993 to an aggregate term of life
imprisonment with a forty-year parole disqualifier. We affirmed defendant's
convictions and sentence, State v. Mitchell, No. A-1052-94 (App. Div. June 5,
1997), and the Supreme Court denied certification, No. 44,371 (Sept. 8, 1997).
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Nearly twenty-five years after the judgment of conviction (JOC) was
entered, defendant filed a petition for PCR, asserting trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to: (1) permit defendant to testify on his own behalf at
the pretrial Miranda1 hearing; and (2) secure a plea agreement to an aggregated
thirty-year prison term with a fifteen-year parole disqualifier. Acknowledging
his petition was untimely, defendant generally claimed "various" mental health
issues and loss of legal documents while incarcerated excused his two-decade
delay in filing for PCR. Thereafter assigned counsel filed a supplemental
submission, expounding upon defendant's assertions. No documents or
transcripts were appended to defendant's petition.
Following argument, Judge James W. Donohue reserved decision. Shortly
thereafter on October 8, 2019, the judge issued a cogent written opinion, denying
PCR as time barred and otherwise lacking in merit. Judge Donohue squarely
addressed the issues raised in view of the requirements set forth in Rule 3:22-
12(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting the filing of a PCR petition five years after entry of the
JOC unless the defendant demonstrates "excusable neglect" and "a reasonable
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true[,]
enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice").
Because defendant failed to "provide any documentation in support of his
assertions" regarding his "mental health concerns and location transfers," the
judge found defendant failed to establish excusable neglect for the lengthy delay
in filing for PCR. The judge further found "the State would be severely
prejudiced by being required to recall witnesses to testify as to matters that took
place over two decades ago." See State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)
("The court should consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to
the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in determining whether
there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits."); see also State
v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997).
Notwithstanding the time bar, the PCR judge also denied defendant's
petition on the merits under the framework established in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant seeking PCR on
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds to demonstrate: (1) the particular
manner in which counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that the
deficiency prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial); see also State v. Fritz, 105
N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).
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Citing controlling precedent, Judge Donohue first rejected defendant's
contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call defendant as a
witness at the Miranda hearing. Referencing State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super.
273, 323 (App. Div. 1983), the judge found "whether [defendant] should have
testified at the suppression hearing," was a "deferential matter[] of trial strategy,
well within the province of trial counsel." The judge was persuaded defendant's
"uncorroborated testimony that he had used illicit drugs prior to giving his
statement would have been unlikely to persuade the trial court to suppress."
The PCR judge also found unavailing defendant's argument that trial
counsel "failed to secure a plea agreement" to reduce his exposure at trial. The
judge found compelling the State's contention that defendant failed to support
his claims with "a transcript, written plea offer, or affidavit of trial counsel."
Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case on either claim,
the PCR judge concluded defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
See e.g., State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 310-11 (2014); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J.
451, 462 (1992). This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR]
COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD THE
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DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WAS TIME
BARRED.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR]
COURT'S DECISION THAT THE DEFENDANT'S
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE WHEN
HE FAILED TO CALL THE DEFENDANT AS A
WITNESS AT HIS SUPPRESSION HEARING.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE [PCR]
COURT'S DECISION TO HOLD THE
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS NOT
INEFFECTIVE DURING PRE-TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
We have considered defendant's arguments in view of the applicable law
and the record, and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the
reasons articulated by Judge Donohue in his well-reasoned decision.
Affirmed.
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