STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DARIN HICKSON (92-12-1863, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1679-19
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    DARIN HICKSON, a/k/a
    DAARON HIXON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________
    Submitted March 21, 2022 – Decided March 30, 2022
    Before Judges Fasciale and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 92-12-1863.
    Darin Hickson, appellant pro se.
    Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
    respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, of
    counsel; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal Assistant, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from a September 30, 2019 order denying his seventh
    petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) and a November 22, 2019 order
    denying reconsideration.       Judge James X. Sattely entered the orders and
    rendered a written opinion concluding the petition is time barred. We affirm for
    substantially the reasons the judge gave and add these brief remarks.
    In an indictment filed December 30, 1992, defendant was charged with
    first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count one); first-degree
    robbery felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree armed
    robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count three); and third-degree possession of a
    weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count four). In January
    1994, a jury acquitted defendant of murder and instead convicted him of the
    lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter.        The jury convicted
    defendant of all other charges. After various mergers, the trial judge sentenced
    defendant to life imprisonment with thirty years of parole ineligibility. The
    convictions arose out of the May 1992 robbery of a jewelry store and the fatal
    stabbing of the store owner.
    We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in July 1996. State v.
    Hickson, No. A-6126-93T4 (App. Div. July 8, 1996), and the Supreme Court
    subsequently denied certification, State v. Hickson, 
    146 N.J. 570
     (1996).
    A-1679-19
    2
    Defendant filed his first petition for PCR on July 18, 1997. The first PCR
    judge denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed
    the denial, and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of
    jury taint based on an allegedly improper communication with a Sheriff's
    Officer. After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the first PCR judge denied
    defendant's petition, we affirmed, State v. Hickson, No. A-3901-99T4 (App.
    Div. Apr. 19, 2001), and the Court denied certification, State v. Hickson,
    
    169 N.J. 610
     (2001).
    We then affirmed defendant's second and third petitions for PCR. State
    v. Hickson, No. A-5329-01T3 (App. Div. Oct. 31, 2003) (denying second
    petition), certif. denied, 
    179 N.J. 373
     (2004); State v. Hickson, No. A-1741-
    04T3 (App. Div. Jan. 26, 2006) (denying third petition), certif. denied, 
    186 N.J. 607
     (2006). In 2009, we affirmed an order denying defendant's motion to correct
    an illegal sentence, amounting to a fourth petition for PCR. State v. Hickson,
    No. A-0249-07T4 (App. Div. Apr. 14, 2009), certif. denied, State v. Hickson,
    
    200 N.J. 471
     (2009) (but remanding for a technical correction to the judgment
    of conviction). In 2010, defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly
    discovered evidence surrounding a purported immunity agreement between the
    State and two witnesses. We affirmed the order denying the motion. State v.
    A-1679-19
    3
    Hickson, No. A-0171-10T1 (App. Div. Feb. 8, 2012), certif. denied, State v.
    Hickson, 
    211 N.J. 275
     (2012).
    Defendant filed a motion for a reduction of his sentence under Rule 3:21-
    10 in 2014. The motion judge denied the motion in an order entered August 5,
    2014, finding it was "in the nature of a PCR" and not a request for modification
    of sentence. We affirmed the order denying the motion, State v. Hickson, A-
    5907-13 (App. Div. Mar. 10, 2015), certif. denied, State v. Hickson, 
    223 N.J. 164
     (2015).
    In May 2016, defendant applied for assignment of a Public Defender in
    connection with his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-
    10(b)(5). Defendant argued that his sentence was illegal because the indictment
    was void. The Office of the Public Defender denied defendant's application for
    assignment of counsel and instructed defendant that his motion should be
    brought as a PCR petition.
    In 2018, defendant filed a sixth petition for PCR, claiming ineffective
    assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. On August 14, 2018, the judge
    dismissed the petition as time barred and because it did not allege any ineffective
    assistance by defendant's PCR counsel. On January 2, 2019, defendant re-
    submitted the petition, arguing that he received ineffective assistance from his
    A-1679-19
    4
    PCR counsel because PCR counsel failed to argue that his trial counsel should
    have challenged the jury instruction on felony murder and an allegedly void
    indictment. The PCR judge denied the petition as time-barred by Rule 3:22-12
    on September 30, 2019. Defendant moved for reconsideration, which the judge
    denied on November 22, 2019.
    On appeal, defendant asserts the following arguments:
    POINT ONE
    THE    [JUDGE]    ERRED    IN     DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S      PETITION   FOR       [PCR],
    RESULTING      IN    VIOLATIONS       OF . . .
    DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
    DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE SIXTH AND
    FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
    STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ART. I[,] P[AR]. 10
    [OF] THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
    POINT TWO
    [DEFENDANT] RELIES ON THE APPLICATION OF
    THE INJUSTICE EXCEPTION AS HIS [PCR]
    COUNSEL ON HIS FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT
    PETITIONS FOR [PCR] WAS INEFFECTIVE IN
    FAILING TO RAISE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
    OF     TRIAL    COUNSEL    RESULTING    IN
    VIOLATIONS OF . . . DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND
    FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS UNDER THE
    UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ART. I[,]
    P[AR]. 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF
    THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
    A-1679-19
    5
    A. [PCR] Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To
    Raise Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel
    Because Trial Counsel Did Not Challenge The
    Trial [Judge's] Failure To Charge The Jury On
    The Predicate Felony Of First-Degree Robbery
    Within The Felony Murder Charge Under Count
    Two Resulting In Prejudice And A Substantial
    Denial In The Conviction Proceedings Of
    Defendant's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment
    Rights Of The Constitution Of The United States
    And Art. I[,] Par. 10 Of The Constitution And
    Law[s] Of The State Of New Jersey.
    B. [PCR] Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To
    Raise Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel
    Because Trial Counsel Did Not Challenge The
    Fact That . . . Defendant Has Been Served, Tried,
    Convicted, And Sentenced Upon An[] Invalid
    And Void Indictment Thus Results In Denial Of
    Fundamental Fairness In A Constitutional Sense,
    Thus Resulting In Prejudice And Substantial
    Denial In The Conviction Proceedings Of
    Defendant's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment
    Rights Of The Constitution Of The United States
    And Art. I[,] Par. 8 And Art. I[,] Par. 10 Of The
    Constitution And Laws Of The State Of New
    Jersey.1
    POINT THREE
    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
    BECAUSE    TRIAL   COUNSEL    DID   NOT
    CHALLENGE THE TRIAL [JUDGE'S] ERROR
    WHERE [HE] DID NOT INSTRUCT THE JURY TO
    THE ELEMENTS OF THE PREDICATE FELONY OF
    1
    To comport with our style conventions, we have altered the capitalization of
    defendant's subpoints A and B but have omitted these alterations for readability.
    A-1679-19
    6
    FIRST[-]DEGREE   ROBBERY   WITHIN      THE
    FELONY MURDER JURY INSTRUCTION THUS
    VIOLATING     DEFENDANT'S   RIGHT        TO
    EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, A FAIR
    TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW RESULT IN
    PREJUDICE AND A SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL IN
    THE     CONVICTION    PROCEEDINGS        OF
    DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
    AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
    OF THE UNITED STATES AND ART. I[,] P[AR]. 10
    OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
    POINT FOUR
    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
    FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE FACT
    THAT . . . DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SERVED[,]
    TRIED, CONVICTED, AND SENTENCED UPON
    AN[] INVALID AND VOID INDICTMENT THUS
    RESULTS IN DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL
    FAIRNESS IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE, THUS
    RESULTING IN PREJUDICE AND SUBSTANTIAL
    DENIAL IN THE CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS OF
    DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
    AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
    OF THE UNITED STATES AND ART. I[,] P[AR]. 8
    AND 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF
    THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
    When a PCR judge does not conduct an evidentiary hearing—like here—
    we review the PCR judge's factual findings and legal conclusions de novo. See
    State v. Blake, 
    444 N.J. Super. 285
    , 294 (App. Div. 2016).
    A-1679-19
    7
    Applying that standard, we agree that the judge correctly denied
    defendant's petition for the reasons expressed in his written decision. We find
    no merit in any of defendant's contentions and conclude that he failed to
    establish that his petition was not time-barred, and in any event, that his
    contentions did not meet the two-prong test enumerated in Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984), which our Court adopted in State v.
    Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987).
    Rule 3:22-4(b)(1) requires that a second or subsequent PCR petition be
    dismissed unless it is timely filed in accordance with Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). A
    second or subsequent PCR petition that alleges ineffective assistance of counsel
    "that represented the defendant on the first or subsequent application for" PCR,
    must be filed no more than one year after "the date of the denial of the first or
    subsequent application for [PCR]." R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C).
    The one-year time limitation "is absolutely prohibited" by court rule from
    being enlarged for second or subsequent PCR petitions.         State v. Jackson,
    
    454 N.J. Super. 284
    , 292-93 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Aujero v. Cirelli,
    
    110 N.J. 566
    , 577 (1988)) (explaining the Court's recent rule amendments made
    evident "that 'no second or subsequent petition shall be filed more than one year
    after' the date one of the three claims accrued" (quoting R. 3:22-12(a)(2))); see
    A-1679-19
    
    8 R. 3
    :22-12(b) ("These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided
    herein."). And appellate review of a defendant's conviction or previous PCR
    petition does not toll the time limitation of Rule 3:22-12. State v. Dillard,
    
    208 N.J. Super. 722
    , 727 (App. Div. 1986) (finding the Court's omission of any
    provision in Rule 3:22-12 to toll the time limit while direct appellate relief is
    available to be intentional).
    Here, defendant is alleging ineffective assistance by his PCR counsel on
    his previous PCR petition. Defendant had one year from the denial of the August
    5, 2014 petition—August 5, 2015—to bring a timely PCR petition. See R. 3:22-
    12(a)(2)(c). Defendant filed this PCR petition first in August 2018 and re-
    submitted it in January 2019, more than three years after the previous PCR's
    denial. For that reason, his petition is time-barred.
    We are convinced that defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claims are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
    R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
    Affirmed.
    A-1679-19
    9