TEN WEST CONDOMINIUM OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. LRGÂ REALTY, LLCCARL CERBONE VS. TEN WEST CONDOMINIUM OWNERS' ASSOCIATION,ET AL.(L-1197-12, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1991-15T1
    TEN WEST CONDOMINIUM OWNERS'
    ASSOCIATION, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    LRG REALTY, LLC, and CARL
    CERBONE,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ___________________________________
    TEN WEST CONDOMINIUM OWNERS'
    ASSOCIATION, INC.,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    LRG REALTY, LLC, its members, each
    Individually, and the owners of any
    Interest in Units CA 301-310 (Tax Lot
    1.14), Units CB 101-107 (Tax Lot
    2.01-2.07), Units p/o CB 110 (Tax Lot
    2.10), Units CB 201-201, 212-217
    (Tax Lot 2.11) and Units CB 301-317
    (Tax Lot 2.28), 2740 Route 10 West,
    Parsippany-Troy Hills, New Jersey, and
    CARL CERBONE, Managing Member of LRG
    REALTY, LLC,
    Defendants.
    ___________________________________
    LRG REALTY, LLC and TEN WEST
    CONDOMINIUM OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    RON REGAN, ALOK AGARWAL, NEIL BASS,
    FOSTER & BELL, LLC, SMARTAX, LLC,
    TRIAD TECHNOLOGY CORP., LLC, THE
    PROGRESSIVE COMPANIES, GEORGE DENMAN,
    OXFORD PROPERTIES, LLC, BRENT LYNCH,
    COVETED PROPERTIES, LLC,
    Defendants.
    ____________________________________
    CARL CERBONE,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    TEN WEST CONDOMINIUM OWNERS'
    ASSOCIATION, THE PROGRESSIVE COMPANIES,
    RON REGAN, ALOK ARAWAL, NEIL BASS,
    FOSTER & BELL, LLC, TRIAD TECHNOLOGY
    CORP., LLC, GEORGE DENMAN, OXFORD
    PROPERTIES, LLC, BRENT LYNCH,
    COVERED PROPERTIES, LLC.,
    Defendants.
    ____________________________________
    Argued June 1, 2017 – Decided July 17, 2017
    Before Judges Fuentes, Carroll and Farrington.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1197-12.
    Thomas C. Martin argued the cause for appellant
    (Price, Meese, Shulman & D'Arminio, P.C.,
    attorneys; Mr. Martin, of counsel and on the
    brief).
    2                          A-1991-15T1
    Richard D. Picini argued the cause for respondents
    (Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Mr. Picini,
    of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This case arises out of a judgment for counsel fees entered
    against defendant Carl A. Cerbone (Cerbone) and LRG Realty, L.L.C.
    (LRG), following plaintiff's successful prosecution of an action
    to compel LRG to pay maintenance fees.               However, an issue remained
    as to whether this liability was imposed against both Cerbone and
    LRG, or against LRG alone.      The court found that any determination
    of   this   issue   was   subject   to       a   piercing   the   corporate   veil
    analysis.     The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
    on this issue, which were denied by Judge Michael E. Hubner.                      A
    bench trial was held on this limited issue before Judge Robert J.
    Brennan on December 8, 2015, during which Cerbone moved for
    judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1.                Judge Brennan entered judgment
    in favor of Cerbone, dismissing plaintiff's complaint seeking to
    hold Cerbone personally liable for the sum of $89,457.91.                        We
    affirm.
    The Association filed a notice of appeal on January 19, 2016,
    and an amended notice of appeal on January 21, 2016.
    On appeal, plaintiff seeks to overturn Judge Brennan's order
    of judgment dated January 5, 2016, arguing the trial court erred
    3                                A-1991-15T1
    in   applying   the   incorrect   legal   standard   when   adjudicating
    Cerbone's motion for judgment. Plaintiff further seeks to overturn
    Judge Hubner's July 28, 2015 order denying plaintiff's motion for
    summary judgment.     Plaintiff argues the trial court erred because
    the undisputed material facts proved LRG was a mere instrumentality
    or alter-ego of Cerbone, did not maintain corporate formalities,
    was undercapitalized, and financed by sham promissory notes.
    Cerbone and LRG argue in response that Judge Hubner was
    correct in denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment which
    was essentially based upon the same evidence plaintiff presented
    at trial. They further argue that Judge Brennan correctly directed
    a verdict because LRG was not a mere instrumentality or alter ego
    of Cerbone, there was no evidence of fraud or injustice, the
    promissory notes issued by LRG were not sham transactions, and the
    failure of LRG to maintain corporate formalities did not constitute
    sufficient grounds to pierce its corporate veil.
    Cerbone formed LRG in August, 1995, and he has been the
    company's sole member and manager since that date.          Through LRG,
    Cerbone hoped to develop, lease, and sell commercial condominiums,
    thereby creating a "legacy" for his children and grandchildren.
    LRG remained inactive until September 16, 2004, when it purchased
    approximately eighty percent of Ten West's units from a foreclosure
    4                            A-1991-15T1
    proceeding1.       At this time, LRG assumed the role of Ten West's
    sponsor     and    responsibility    for    selling   the   Association's
    condominium       units.   LRG   retained    exclusive   control   of   the
    Association as the majority owner.          Cerbone operated LRG out of
    his home in Parsippany which was the company's principal place of
    business.     Cerbone's daughter and personal accountant maintained
    LRG's books and records as well as the books and records of
    Cerbone's other companies.          LRG obtained a tax identification
    number, filed annual income tax returns, and paid the requisite
    annual limited liability fee to the State of New Jersey, but held
    no formal meetings, kept no minutes, and observed minimal business
    formalities.      Cerbone, in his individual capacity, owned the land
    upon which Ten West was located.            Pursuant to an arrangement
    described in the parties' Ground Lease and Amended By-laws, LRG
    paid its share of condominium maintenance fees to Ten West and Ten
    West in turn paid monthly rent to Cerbone in his individual
    capacity.
    Between 2004 and 2013, LRG renovated and "built out" three
    units, obtained certificates of ownership, and sold the units to
    their present owners.      According to the record, proceeds from the
    three sales are the only income LRG produced.
    1
    LRG financed this purchase with funds it borrowed from Valley
    National Bank.
    5                             A-1991-15T1
    In addition to the three sales, LRG built tenant "fit-outs"
    in the remaining space it owned in Ten West, hoping to sell or
    lease this space for profit.      It financed the "fit-outs" with
    loans from Cerdel Construction, another entity wholly owned and
    operated by Cerbone.     Although the record contains evidence of
    Cerbone's attempts to market these units, the trial judge found
    the failure to attract lessees or purchasers was due to the
    "downturn in the commercial real estate market."   Cerbone reported
    LRG's losses on his personal income tax returns.      Cerbone, both
    personally and through his other companies, loaned LRG the funds
    necessary to pay its condominium maintenance fees, construction
    expenses, and other obligations.      The loans were documented by
    promissory notes, approximately 125 in total, in amounts ranging
    from $19.45 to $372,901.75.   He testified he neither demanded, nor
    received interest or payments on these notes which lacked default
    terms.
    Over the years, several disagreements arose between Cerbone
    and the other Ten West unit owners.      Those disagreements caused
    Cerbone to resign from the Association's Board of Trustees in
    2009.    In 2012, LRG stopped paying its maintenance fees.   Cerbone,
    however, demanded that the Association continue to pay him rent.
    When the Association refused, LRG commenced suit in a complaint
    6                           A-1991-15T1
    filed May 11, 2012,2         alleging violation of the amended bylaws,
    misappropriation of funds, retaining and paying counsel without
    prior authorization, failing to properly document finances, and
    keeping inadequate records of meetings. LRG further alleged breach
    of     fiduciary    duty,    fraud,    unjust     enrichment,    self-dealing,
    criminal racketeering, negligence, breach of business judgment,
    conversion of assets, breach of contract, and breach of covenant
    of good faith and fair dealing.               The complaint also alleged Ten
    West owed "a pro-rated share of the fixed rent, which collectively
    amounts to $7,975.83 per month."
    The Association brought a separate action against Cerbone and
    LRG for the non-payment of condominium maintenance fees and sought
    to pierce the corporate veil, alleging Cerbone "wrongfully and
    fraudulently exploit[ed] the corporate form for his own personal
    gain to the substantial detriment of the Association and [its]
    owners[.]"
    In    its   answer    to   LRG's   Second    Amended     Complaint,    the
    Association alleged LRG and/or Cerbone were "in breach of the
    agreement sued upon and therefore [had] no right or remedies."
    LRG,    in   its   answer,    denied   Cerbone     used   the   corporation    to
    perpetuate a fraud, evade the law, or defeat the ends of justice.
    2
    LRG amended its Complaint and Jury Demand on June 4, 2012 and
    August 29, 2012.
    7                             A-1991-15T1
    Both sides accused the other of filing frivolous and meritless
    claims.      The parties' actions were consolidated and the Law
    Division    entered    a   judgment    against   LRG   for   $224,997.18      in
    delinquent maintenance fees.          LRG satisfied that judgment on May
    6, 2013.
    Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 46:8B-21, Sections 5.04 and 10.2 of the
    master deed, and provisions of the bylaws, Ten West filed a motion
    to compel Cerbone and/or LRG to reimburse the Association for its
    counsel fees and litigation costs. Judge Thomas V. Manahan granted
    the Association's motion for summary judgment on March 20, 2014.
    Cerbone moved to dismiss himself from the case alleging LRG
    was   a   separate    entity.   Judge      Manahan   ruled   the   motion   was
    premature because discovery was not complete.           He specifically did
    not consider whether the Association was entitled to pierce LRG's
    corporate veil and recover from Cerbone individually.              Judge Jared
    D. Honigfeld denied LRG's motion for reconsideration on June 11,
    2014.     On July 18, 2014, he entered an order setting counsel fees
    in the amount of $89,457.91, specifying Cerbone and LRG were
    "jointly and severally liable[.]"             On October 2, 2014, Judge
    Honigfeld entered an order clarifying his previous order.                     He
    stated,
    This [c]ourt, upon a re-reading of the
    Statement  of   Reasons  portion   of  Judge
    Manahan's [o]rder[,] . . . is satisfied that
    8                               A-1991-15T1
    said [o]rder did not render defendant Carl
    Cerbone liable for counsel fees.          Such
    liability, if any, would have to be predicated
    upon a piercing of the corporate veil between
    Cerbone and LRG Realty, a matter which Judge
    Manahan expressly did not adjudicate, and
    indicated would require the completion of
    discovery.
    Between the dates of Judge Manahan's two orders, Cerbone
    convened a meeting of the Association's Board of Directors.       The
    Association alleges, and Cerbone in his trial testimony did not
    materially dispute, Cerbone taunted the Board by brandishing a
    check for counsel fees before returning it to his pocket.    He then
    informed the Board LRG was filing for bankruptcy, which it did on
    July 25, 2014.    The Association filed a proof of claim in LRG's
    bankruptcy proceedings for $89,457.91, representing the amount of
    the judgment for counsel fees entered by Judge Honigfeld.         The
    list of creditors in LRG's bankruptcy also included Cerbone, Cerdel
    Construction, Cerbone Enterprises and Valley National Bank.         On
    September 23, 2014, LRG's ownership interest in Ten West was sold
    for $500,000.    The sale proceeds were insufficient to satisfy all
    of the claims presented by LRG's creditors.
    The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment which
    were denied by Judge Hubner who found substantial issues of
    material fact.   The matter proceeded to a bench trial before Judge
    Brennan on December 7 and 8, 2015.    The Association called Cerbone
    9                          A-1991-15T1
    as a witness in its direct case, as well as Ten West President,
    Ronald Regan, before resting.   Cerbone moved for judgment pursuant
    to Rule 4:40-1.   Judge Brennan granted the motion finding:
    Now, ordinarily the Court is not to weigh
    witness credibility in determining a motion
    for judgment, and the motion should ordinarily
    be denied or a question of credibility as to
    a material fact has been raised, we have the
    slightly unusual circumstance here that, as I
    say, the defendant was called on -- Mr.
    Cerbone was called as a witness on the
    plaintiff's case, and we are involved in a
    non-jury or bench trial. And so the court has
    had the opportunity to consider the testimony
    of the two witnesses called by plaintiff, and
    that would be Mr. Ronald Regan, who is the
    president   of   the   plaintiff   association
    incorporated, as well as Mr. Cerbone, the
    individual defendant here.
    And so to the extent that there may be
    certain credibility issues, I think it would
    be appropriate for me to go ahead and resolve
    them on this motion, since the plaintiff has
    offered all the evidence it intends to offer,
    and the defense has offered more limited
    testimony in the form of cross-examination of
    Mr. Cerbone by his attorney.
    Judge Brennan went on to find (referring to promissory notes):
    But I think the point is made that there is--
    and of course, the [c]ourt is to view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff. But after all, this is not a jury
    trial, and I've heard from both sides, and I'd
    only be hearing -- taking more evidence from
    the defendant.
    And so it's clear to me that the notes
    are not supportive of the notion that the
    corporate veil pierced; that Mr. Cerbone did,
    in fact, keep his finances separate and apart
    10                            A-1991-15T1
    from that of LRG. And that's reflected in the
    documents . . . .
    But as a general proposition I find that the
    notes reflect obligations of LRG to Carl
    Cerbone, and that's why they were done. And
    there was nobody else to sign o[n] behalf of
    LRG because Mr. Cerbone was the sole member
    and the sole owner.
    The court noted that Cerbone testified:
    [w]ithout contradiction that LRG was -- it had
    expenses.
    . . . .
    So on the under-capitalization point, we
    have the ownership of property in this
    condominium association, as well as a source
    of funds that were advanced to LRG in the hopes
    of a turnaround in the real estate market . .
    . .
    There was testimony that eventually its
    space was sold for approximately $500,000,
    which is much less than the company's
    obligations.
    Judge Brennan found:
    [t]here's no proof that Mr. Cerbone violated
    any tax laws or accounting principles in
    treating these losses this way. This was his
    company, and he took the losses on his tax
    returns. It's -- I think it makes the point
    that there is a separation here, and that he
    did as a taxpayer is entitled to do, which is
    balance what limited income he had with the
    losses from his investment in LRG.
    . . . .
    So I have considered all of these tax returns,
    but I don't find them supportive of the
    argument that the plaintiff makes.
    11                           A-1991-15T1
    The     court     also     considered    plaintiff's    contentions       that
    defendant      did    not    observe    corporate     formalities,     "So     the
    formalities were not kept in their entirety.                    I find that the
    finances were kept separate.            But the fact that one person -- or
    that an LLC owned by one person does not have minutes is not
    persuasive in a matter involving proof of -- clear and convincing
    proof."     After      further    consideration      of   the    certificate    of
    formation of LRG "which goes back to 1995," the listing agreement
    dated   June    11,    2010,    the    marketing    brochure     assignment    and
    assumption of the ground lease agreement, the court concluded:
    [LRG] was -- it was not a shell corporation.
    It had an interest in this building, a
    considerable interest, more than half the
    space.   And there was considerable funding,
    in excess of a million and a half dollars,
    just from Mr. Cerbone and his companies, not
    to mention Valley National Bank, which is also
    listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy
    proceeding, owed hundreds of thousands of
    dollars . . . .
    And Cerbone himself certainly did not
    derive any benefit from the failure of LRG to
    pay its condominium fees at all. That wasn’t
    something that made his life or his finances
    any better.
    And certainly, the plaintiff has recourse
    against LRG, but it's in the Bankruptcy Court
    . . . .
    Nevertheless, there is nothing illegal
    about going into bankruptcy. And as much as
    Mr. Regan might resent it and be financially
    put upon by that legal action, it doesn’t mean
    that LRG was a sham, was an instrumentality
    of Mr. Cerbone, or that the corporate form was
    ignored abused, or otherwise used fraudulently
    12                               A-1991-15T1
    in an illegal way or in a way that would
    deprive Ten West of its rights.
    . . . .
    Even under the standard of Rule 4:40 --
    and this -- there is no proof that makes out
    here entitlement to a piercing of the
    corporate veil, even giving the plaintiff the
    benefit of all favorable inferences and
    looking at the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff.
    In determining whether the trial judge properly granted a
    motion for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, this court applies
    the same standard of review as the trial court.           Frugis v.
    Bracigliano, 
    177 N.J. 250
    , 269 (2003) (citing Luczak v. Twp of
    Evesham, 
    311 N.J. Super. 103
    , 108 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    156 N.J. 407
    (1998)).    The standard is identical to that used to
    consider a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, R.
    4:40-2 or a motion for involuntary dismissal, R. 4:37-2(b).     Rena,
    Inc. v. Brien, 
    310 N.J. Super. 304
    , 311 (App. Div. 1998).         This
    court "must accept as true all evidence supporting the position
    of the non-moving party" and "accord[] that party the benefit of
    all legitimate inferences that can be deducted from such evidence."
    
    Ibid. We will affirm
    the trial court's judgment only if plaintiff
    has shown no right to relief, R. 4:37-2(b).    See R. 4:40-1, and
    "no rational [fact-finder] could conclude from the evidence that
    13                             A-1991-15T1
    an essential element of . . . plaintiff's case is present."                Perez
    v. Professionally Green, L.L.C., 
    215 N.J. 388
    , 404 (2013) (quoting
    Pron v. Carlton Pools, Inc., 373 N.J Super. 103, 111 (App. Div.
    2004)).    If there is any legitimate view of the evidence that
    would sustain a judgment in plaintiff's favor, or if reasonable
    minds could differ, this court must reverse.               Verdicchio v. Ricca,
    
    179 N.J. 1
    , 30 (2004) (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc. 
    164 N.J. 598
    , 612 (2000)); Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 
    125 N.J. Super. 239
    , 243 (App. Div. 1973).
    Plaintiff asserts on appeal that Judge Brennan based his
    determinations     in    part   on   credibility    findings.       Ordinarily,
    credibility findings have no role in a motion for judgment pursuant
    to Rule 4:40.      However, where, as here, the trial judge was the
    finder    of   fact,    and   plaintiff     had   rested    after   calling   the
    president of the Association and Cerbone, the court was entitled
    to make findings of credibility and his determinations regarding
    same are entitled to substantial deference on appeal.                "[B]ecause
    a trial court 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses,
    [and] hears them testify,' it has a better perspective than a
    reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of the witnesses" and
    the quality of the evidence.           Twp. Of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg,
    
    150 N.J. 111
    , 132-33 (1997) (quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 
    113 N.J. 20
    , 33 (1998)).
    14                                A-1991-15T1
    As   to    the   issue   of   whether    the   court   erred   in   its
    determination    that   plaintiff    failed    to   prove   by   clear   and
    convincing evidence that LRG's corporate veil should be pierced
    on account of fraud, injustice or otherwise circumventing the law,
    we begin with the fundamental proposition that a corporation is a
    separate entity from its shareholders.          Lyon v. Barrett, 
    89 N.J. 294
    , 300 (1982).        A primary reason for incorporation is the
    insulation of shareholders from the liabilities of the corporate
    enterprise.    Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity,
    47 Colum. L. Rev. 343 (1947); Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil:
    The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
    853, 854 (1982); H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 146, at 250 (2d
    ed. 1961).      Even in the case of a parent corporation and its
    wholly-owned subsidiary, limited liability normally will not be
    abrogated.     Mueller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 
    5 N.J. 28
    , 34
    (1950).
    Except in cases of fraud, injustice, or the like, courts will
    not pierce a corporate veil.        
    Lyon, supra
    , 89 N.J. at 300.         The
    purpose of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is to
    prevent an independent corporation from being used to defeat the
    ends of justice, Telis v. Telis, 
    132 N.J. Eq. 25
    , 26 (E. & A.
    1942), to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or otherwise
    to evade the law, Trachman v. Trugman, 
    117 N.J. Eq. 167
    , 170 (Ch.
    15                              A-1991-15T1
    1934); State, Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.,
    
    94 N.J. 473
    , 500-01 (1983).
    Personal    liability       may    be    imposed      upon       a    controlling
    stockholder     of   a   close     corporation          where    the       controlling
    stockholder    disregards    the       corporate        form    and       utilizes   the
    corporation as a vehicle for committing equitable or legal fraud.
    Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Intern., 
    264 N.J. Super. 276
    , 283,
    (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    134 N.J. 480
    (1993);                          Marascio v.
    Campanella, 
    298 N.J. Super. 491
    , 502 (App. Div. 1997).                         A party
    seeking to pierce the corporate veil must establish: (1) that the
    entity was "dominated" by the individual owner, and (2) "that
    adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would
    perpetrate a fraud or injustice, or otherwise circumvent the law."
    Verni ex rel. Burstein v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 
    387 N.J. Super. 160
    , 199-200 (App. Div. 2006) (citing 
    Ventron, supra
    , 94 N.J. at
    500-01).
    The first prong of the analysis, "domination" requires a
    showing that the closely held corporation or limited liability
    company had "no separate existence" from its owner, and acted
    merely as the owner's "conduit," "instrumentality," or "alter
    ego." 
    Id. at 200
    (citing 
    Ventron, supra
    , 94 N.J. at 501). Relevant
    factors include undercapitalization, insolvency, the extent of the
    owner's    day-to-day    involvement         in   the    entity's         affairs,   the
    16                                      A-1991-15T1
    absence or presence of separate records and accounts, and the
    entities compliance or non-compliance with business formalities.
    Canter v. Lakewood of Voorhees, 
    420 N.J. Super. 508
    , 519 (App.
    Div. 2011) (quoting 
    Verni, supra
    , 387 N.J. Super. at 200); 18 Am.
    Jur. 2d Corporations § 54 (2004).
    To establish a fraud, an injustice, or other circumvention
    of the law, the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must
    show the entity had "no independent business of its own," and the
    owner deliberately undercapitalized the entity, thereby rendering
    it judgment-proof.     OTR Assocs. V. IBC Sec'ys, Inc., 353 N.J.
    Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 2002) (citing 
    Ventron, supra
    , 94 N.J. at
    501).     Although Cerbone was LRG's sole member and manager and
    retained exclusive control over its day-to-day activities, and was
    solely responsible for its capitalization through his personal
    assets and loans; and further, although he failed to hold meetings
    or keep minutes, the plaintiff produced no evidence upon which the
    fact finder could base a finding that Cerbone utilized LRG to
    commit fraud, cause an injustice or otherwise circumvent the law.
    To   the   contrary,   Judge   Brennan   found   Cerbone,   with   the
    exception of failing to conform with corporate formalities, abided
    by the law, adequately capitalized LRG, did not personally profit
    and had established LRG long before the events which provoked the
    17                             A-1991-15T1
    litigation, having operated LRG for the purpose of developing,
    leasing and selling commercial real estate.
    Similarly, N.J.S.A. 42:2C-30 provides that:
    [t]he debts, obligations, or other liabilities
    of a limited liability company . . . are solely
    the debts, obligations, or other liabilities
    of the company[,]and [they] do not become the
    debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a
    member or manager solely by reason of the
    member acting as a member or manager acting
    as a manager.
    [N.J.S.A. 42:2C-30.]
    Nevertheless, the power to look beyond the corporate form is
    well established.    Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v. DiDomenico, 
    236 N.J. Super. 388
    , 393 (App. Div. 1989).          Piercing the corporate
    veil is a doctrine designed to address an otherwise enforceable
    judgment that is rendered unenforceable because the defendant is
    a corporate entity without sufficient assets to pay it. See 
    Verni, supra
    , 387 N.J. Super. at 199.       It is an equitable remedy whereby
    "the protections of corporate formation are lost" to eliminate the
    "fundamental    unfairness"   that    would   otherwise   result   from    a
    "failure to disregard the corporate form."            
    Ibid. (citations omitted). The
    doctrine's purpose is to prevent a corporation or
    limited liability company "from being used to defeat the ends of
    justice, . . . to perpetrate fraud, to accomplish a crime, or
    otherwise to evade the law[.]"        
    Ventron, supra
    , 94 N.J. at 500.
    18                            A-1991-15T1
    We are satisfied from our careful study of this matter that
    there is substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole
    which reasonably warrants the findings and conclusions of the
    trial court.     Therefore, we discern no sound reason or legal
    justification    for   disturbing   these   findings   and   conclusions.
    Leimgruber v. Claridge Associates, Ltd., 
    73 N.J. 450
    , 455-56,
    (1977); Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484,
    (1974); State v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 161-62, (1964).          See also
    R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).
    Affirmed.
    19                            A-1991-15T1