DANNY GLENN VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENTÂ SYSTEM(PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5271-14T1
    DANNY GLENN,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
    PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Submitted February 28, 2017 – Decided July 21, 2017
    Before Judges Messano and Espinosa.
    On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the
    Public    Employees'    Retirement  System,
    Department of Treasury.
    Danny Glenn, appellant pro se.
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton
    Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
    counsel; Robert E. Kelly, Deputy Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    For the period from May 1, 1985 until October 12, 2006,
    petitioner Danny Glenn was employed as a Public Works Inspector
    for the Township of Irvington (Irvington) and was a member of the
    Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS).                    Pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    43:15A-38, an employee who has completed ten years of service but
    separates    from    employment     before     reaching         retirement      age    may
    receive retirement benefits, provided the employee's separation
    is   "not    by    removal    for   cause     on   charges       of     misconduct      or
    delinquency."       Petitioner's application for deferred retirement
    was denied on that ground and he now appeals from that decision.
    We affirm.
    I.
    In    July   2006,     Irvington   issued         a    preliminary      notice    of
    disciplinary action seeking petitioner's removal on charges of
    incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties, N.J.A.C.
    4A:2-2.3(a)(1);        insubordination,            N.J.A.C.           4A:2-2.3(a)(2);
    inability to perform duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(3); conduct
    unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); neglect of
    duty, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7); and other sufficient cause: false
    swearing     related    to    the   issuance       of       summonses   and    feigning
    sickness, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11).
    The charges were based on allegations that petitioner "issued
    improper summonses and was not truthful about his actions; failed
    to answer a summons to appear in court; refused to complete and
    submit reports; called out sick in order to meet with a contractor
    2                                       A-5271-14T1
    at his house; was untruthful to his supervisor; and was guilty of
    false swearing of summonses."
    The    hearing   officer   found   all    of    Irvington's     factual
    assertions were sustained and recommended petitioner be terminated
    from his position as housing inspector.             Petitioner appealed to
    the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).               Following a plenary
    hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an opinion
    sustaining all of Irvington's allegations except the charges of
    false swearing and feigning sickness and sustained petitioner's
    removal.     Although its findings varied somewhat from the ALJ's,
    the   Civil     Service    Commission       (CSC)    adopted    the     ALJ's
    recommendation to uphold petitioner's removal, effective October
    12, 2006.1
    In    February   2014,   petitioner    filed    an   application     for
    deferred retirement.      The Board of Trustees of PERS (Board) denied
    the application, finding petitioner had been removed "for cause
    on charges of misconduct or delinquency," rendering him ineligible
    for retirement benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38.
    Petitioner appealed the Board's decision, thereby requesting
    a hearing before the OAL.        Finding there were no disputed issues
    1
    Petitioner's appeal from the CSC's determination, Docket No. A-
    3094-09T1, was dismissed for failure to prosecute the appeal and
    his motion to vacate the dismissal was also dismissed.
    3                                A-5271-14T1
    of fact and that the issue was a purely legal question, the Board
    denied petitioner's request for a hearing in the OAL and again
    concluded     N.J.S.A.      43:15A-38    prohibited      deferred      retirement
    benefits to petitioner.
    II.
    In     his   appeal,    petitioner       argues    the   Board    erred     in
    interpreting N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38 because he "did not commit an act
    of 'misconduct' or 'delinquency.'"            He contends the behavior that
    led to his removal was not criminal, and therefore does not
    constitute "misconduct or delinquency" under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38.
    We disagree.
    N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38 provides:
    Should a member of [PERS], after having
    completed 10 years of service, be separated
    voluntarily or involuntarily from the service,
    before reaching service retirement age, and
    not by removal for cause on charges of
    misconduct or delinquency, such person may
    elect   to   receive   [deferred    retirement
    benefits.]
    [(Emphasis added).]
    The    plain   language    of   this     statute    leaves   no    room   for
    discretion by the Board: any member removed as a public employee
    for charges of misconduct or delinquency is ineligible to receive
    benefits from PERS as a matter of law.            The terms "misconduct" or
    "delinquency" are not defined.           There is, however, no support in
    4                                A-5271-14T1
    the statute for the interpretation urged by petitioner that the
    "charges" must involve acts of criminality, misconduct in office
    or egregious conduct.
    Significantly, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-17(a) authorizes the Board to
    interpret and implement N.J.S.A. 43:15A-38.    Courts generally give
    deference "to the interpretation of statutory language by the
    agency charged with the expertise and responsibility to administer
    the   scheme . . .    'unless   the   interpretation   is   "plainly
    unreasonable."'"     Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    224 N.J. 213
    ,
    229, 230 (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No.
    01-2008, 
    201 N.J. 254
    , 262 (2010)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
    
    137 S. Ct. 85
    , 
    196 L. Ed. 2d 37
     (2016).       "If there is any fair
    argument in support of the course taken [by the agency] or any
    reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and
    conscientious officials, the decision" should not be disturbed.
    Lisowski v. Borough of Avalon, 
    442 N.J. Super. 304
    , 330 (App. Div.
    2015) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting City
    of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 
    82 N.J. 530
    , 539, cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 983
    , 
    101 S. Ct. 400
    , 
    66 L. Ed. 2d 245
     (1980)), certif. denied, 
    227 N.J. 374
    , and certif. denied
    and appeal dismissed, 
    227 N.J. 380
     (2016).
    In this case, the CSC relied on recommendations by the OAL
    and the CSC's independent evaluation to determine petitioner had
    5                          A-5271-14T1
    violated numerous subsections of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a) that are
    general causes for which an employee is subject to discipline,
    including removal.    N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2(a)(1).          The Board concluded
    that petitioner's persistent violations of the Administrative Code
    constituted     "misconduct       or     delinquency."          The    Board's
    interpretation of those words to include the grounds for which
    petitioner was removed is not "plainly unreasonable," and as a
    consequence,   is   entitled   to      our    deference.    Petitioner       was
    therefore properly denied retirement benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    43:15A-38.
    III.
    Petitioner     also   argues:      the    final   agency   decision       is
    premature, imposes an unduly harsh penalty and subjects him to
    double jeopardy; the Board violated his due process rights by
    denying him a plenary hearing before the OAL; and his removal in
    2006 violated his constitutional rights and the Conscientious
    Employees'    Protection   Act,     N.J.S.A.     34:19-1   to   -14.      These
    arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), beyond the following brief comments.
    Petitioner's challenge to his 2006 removal, which would, in
    any event, be untimely, is not properly before this court. Because
    his appeal from that decision was dismissed, petitioner's argument
    that the final agency decision is premature lacks merit.               Although
    6                               A-5271-14T1
    petitioner presents a legal argument that his conduct did not
    constitute "misconduct" or "delinquency" under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-
    38, there is no dispute of material fact that the grounds relied
    upon    for    his   dismissal   were   job-related   misconduct   and
    delinquency.    As a result, his argument regarding the denial of a
    plenary hearing before the OAL also lacks merit.
    Affirmed.
    7                          A-5271-14T1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5271-14T1

Filed Date: 7/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/21/2017