THOMAS VAN ARTSDALEN VS. FRED M. SCHIAVONE CONSTRUCTION(DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, DIVISIONOF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) ( 2017 )


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  •                          NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3392-15T1
    THOMAS VAN ARTSDALEN,
    Petitioner-Respondent,
    v.
    FRED M. SCHIAVONE
    CONSTRUCTION,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    ___________________________________
    Submitted September 6, 2017 – Decided October 5, 2017
    Before Judges Rothstadt and Vernoia.
    On appeal from the Department of Labor and
    Workforce Development, Division of Workers'
    Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2013-24264.
    Law Offices of Styliades and Jackson,
    attorneys for appellant (Timothy J. Mello,
    on the brief).
    Petro Cohen Petro Matarazzo, PC, attorneys
    for respondent (Steven S. Lubcher, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In   this      workers'    compensation      matter,     the    employer,
    respondent      Fred    M.   Schiavone    Construction,      appeals    from       the
    court's March 10, 2016 judgment finding its employee, petitioner
    Thomas Van Artsdalen, 47.5% permanently partially disabled as a
    result of a compensable injury.        On appeal, Schiavone contends
    that the judge's findings about Van Artsdalen's work history and
    his injuries being inoperable were not supported by "substantial
    evidence in the record."     It also contends the judge's assessment
    that Van Artsdalen suffered a 47.5% permanent partial disability
    constituted an abuse of her discretion because he could perform
    his daily activities, had conservative treatment and does not
    complain about his pain.
    The   judge   of   compensation   made   her   determination   after
    conducting a trial at which Van Artsdalen was the only witness as
    the parties agreed to the court's consideration of their experts'
    reports in lieu of testimony.      The parties also stipulated that
    Van Artsdalen suffered a compensable injury on January 26, 2012,
    when he fell while he was at work as a carpenter and carrying
    sixty to seventy pounds of plywood.
    Prior to the incident, Van Artsdalen, who was fifty-three
    years old at the time, worked as a union carpenter for thirty-four
    years, spending most of that time working for Schiavone.            Dating
    back to 1992, Van Artsdalen was treated for lower back discomfort
    for a few weeks by a chiropractor, and he suffered some symptoms
    of minor lower back discomfort again in 2008, but otherwise he had
    not experienced any persistent problems prior to his fall.
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    Despite his fall on January 26, 2012, and the related pain,
    Van Artsdalen completed his workday.    He consulted with a doctor
    after work and again two days after the fall.      He attempted to
    return to work the day after the incident, but there were no work
    assignments available.   When he did go back to work on January 30,
    2012, he could not finish his shift due to his lower back pain.
    In February 2012, Schiavone sent Van Artsdalen for medical
    treatment for his lower back.    The following month, he underwent
    an MRI and was prescribed physical therapy and pain management.
    Van Artsdalen continued treatment through May 5, 2012, when he was
    cleared to return to work.   Despite being cleared, Van Artsdalen
    did not return to work until July 12, 2012, due to the lack of
    available job assignments.      He worked from July 2012 through
    September 2013, when he retired because he could no longer endure
    the pain.
    Van Artsdalen underwent an additional MRI in 2013 and was
    evaluated by another physician who confirmed his continuing pain
    was due to his January 2012 injury.    After he filed his petition
    for compensation benefits, Van Artsdalen resumed treatment with
    the same physician that Schiavone had sent him to in 2012.        He
    received an additional MRI and more pain management, including an
    epidural injection.   The treatment terminated in September 2014
    and he never sought any additional treatment.
    3                         A-3392-15T1
    Van Artsdalen testified about his pain and the limitations
    caused by his injury.        He stated that he had difficulty lifting
    things, and suffered pain when he bent over while getting dressed
    or performing household chores.           He described how he was subject
    to   the   sudden   onset   of   sharp,    stabbing   pain   that   throbbed,
    especially in his groin area.        He treated his pain with over-the-
    counter medications and ice.         Van Artsdalen testified that his
    pain at times interfered with his ability to sleep and prevented
    him from lifting heavier objects.          Despite his pain, Van Artsdalen
    stated he was able to perform his daily activities that included
    household chores and transporting his grandchild to and from
    school.
    In pursuit of his workers' compensation claim, Van Artsdalen
    was evaluated by two medical experts who issued reports about his
    injury and level of disability.           Van Artsdalen's expert, Dr. John
    L. Gaffney, found that Van Artsdalen sustained a 52.5% permanent
    partial disability.         Schiavone's expert, Dr. Mark E. Maletsky
    disagreed and found that Van Artsdalen experienced only a 2%
    permanent partial disability.         The experts based their opinions
    on their examination of Van Artsdalen, his reported history of his
    injury, treatment and current level of pain, medical records of
    his treatment and diagnostic imaging.
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    After considering the evidence, the judge of compensation
    placed her decision on the record, which she later amplified in a
    written statement filed under Rule 2:5-1.        In her oral decision,
    the judge considered the medical reports and found Schiavone's
    expert to be less credible than Van Artsdalen's and rejected his
    opinion as to the degree of permanent partial disability.              The
    judge found Maletsky's assessment of Van Artsdalen to be "not in
    line with the treatment, the loss of employment, the length of
    time [Van Artsdalen] was out of work and the diagnostic studies."
    Although the judge determined that Gaffney was more credible, she
    also "disregard[ed] his estimate of permanent partial disability."
    The judge found Van Artsdalen to be credible and found that he
    suffered a 47.5% permanent partial disability.
    The judge of compensation entered judgment on March 10, 2016,
    and Schiavone filed its appeal.      On June 7, 2016, the judge issued
    her   written   amplification   of   her   reasons.   In   her   detailed
    statement, the judge began by noting Van Artsdalen's lengthy work
    history and his lack of any prior "significant back injury or
    extensive back care" during that time.         She described how after
    the injury he was forced to miss work despite his attempts to
    "return to full time employment."          She found the fact that Van
    Artsdalen did not try to claim that he was totally disabled added
    to her finding that his testimony was credible, as did his "stoic-
    5                           A-3392-15T1
    ness, forthrightness . . . [and] his desire to return to the only
    employment that he has ever known."
    The judge described in detail the diagnostic imaging results
    that depicted injuries to various levels of Van Artsdalen's spine,
    recognized he did not have any surgery, and concluded the injuries
    were "inoperable [as n]o surgical intervention was available to
    relieve [Van Artsdalen's] pain due to the multiple levels and type
    of . . . disc pathology."      She also stated that Van Artsdalen
    "simply was inoperable due to his condition of multiple levels
    impeded in [his] lumbar spine.      Therefore, his disability rating
    is construed as worse than one who could obtain relief from a
    procedure or operation."
    Addressing    the   experts'   reports,   the   judge   described
    Gaffney's findings about Van Artsdalen's pain, the ineffectiveness
    of the epidural injections, and the doctor's conclusions that Van
    Artsdalen suffered from "chronic pain and lumbar fibromyositis
    syndrome" and that Van Artsdalen's injuries caused "restriction
    of function."     The judge concluded that Gaffney's findings were
    consistent with his examination of Van Artsdalen and the diagnostic
    studies.   She stated "it was understood that surgery could not be
    wisely undertaken in [Van Artsdalen's] condition to obtain an
    optimum result bettering his condition."
    6                         A-3392-15T1
    Turning to Maletsky's report, the judge stated that the report
    was not as credible as Gaffney's, finding Maletsky's rejection of
    Van Artsdalen's inability to return to work "when he worked his
    entire    life   with     few   out    days"   and   Maletsky's    reliance     on
    insignificant x-rays from 2008 undermined his credibility.                    The
    judge also observed that Maletsky "not signify[ing] the extent of
    the diagnostics and the effect of the multiple layers of discs now
    impaired . . . . discount[ed] [his] . . . understanding of [Van
    Artsdalen's] injuries and his permanent disability."                   She also
    found that Maletsky did not "adequately address [Van Artsdalen's]
    increased    symptomology       as     being   related   to   [the]   last   work
    incident."
    In conclusion, the judge "disregarded the numbers of both
    doctors     to   assess    [Van       Artsdalen's]   significant      permanency
    impairment and loss of functionality."               In reaching her finding
    of 47.5% permanent partial disability, the judge relied upon Van
    Artsdalen's testimony, the doctor's examinations and the objective
    evidence of his injuries.            She stated:
    The court does find that the progression of
    substantial injuries to [Van Artsdalen] and
    the multiple levels of disc pathology, along
    with the inability to operate on his lumbar
    spine condition resulted in his current
    symptomology resulting in a 471/2% permanent
    partial disability award. Specifically, for
    the orthopedic and neurologic residuals of the
    lumbar   spine   for  right   foraminal   disc
    7                             A-3392-15T1
    protrusion at L1-2; bulging disc at L2-3 and
    L3-4 with disc material bulging into the
    foraminal    regions    bilaterally,     right
    paracentral disc protrusion at L4-5 with disc
    bulge at L4-5 and bulging disc at L5-S1 status
    post   spinal   injection    with   persistent
    radiculopathy and chronic pain.
    On appeal, Schiavone contends the judge's findings regarding
    Van Artsdalen's work history–—that he worked for that length of
    time without missing many days–—and Van Artsdalen's injury being
    inoperable were important to her conclusion but unsupported by the
    evidence.    It also argues that the judge's determination of 47.5%
    permanent partial disability was similarly unfounded because Van
    Artsdalen stopped receiving treatment in 2014, does not take daily
    pain medications, is not under any restrictions, and "[n]one of
    the physicians, the treating physicians . . . or either parties[']
    medical expert, found that [Van Artsdalen] was in need of a
    surgical consult or surgery."
    Our review of decisions in workers' compensation cases is
    "limited to whether the findings made could have been reached on
    sufficient credible evidence present in the record . . . with due
    regard also to the agency's expertise." Hersh v. Cty. of Morris,
    
    217 N.J. 236
    , 242 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Sager
    v. O.A. Peterson Constr., Co., 
    182 N.J. 156
    , 164 (2004)); see also
    Renner v. AT&T, 
    218 N.J. 435
    , 448 (2014), and "to the opportunity
    of   the   one   who   heard   the   witnesses   to   judge   .   .   .   their
    8                              A-3392-15T1
    credibility."       Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep't, 
    175 N.J. 244
    , 260 (2003) (quoting Reinhart v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours,
    
    147 N.J. 156
    , 163-64 (1996)).            We give those factual findings
    "substantial deference."       Bellino v. Verizon Wireless, 435 N.J.
    Super. 85, 94 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Ramos v. M & F Fashions,
    Inc., 
    154 N.J. 583
    , 594 (1998)).          "We may not substitute our own
    factfinding for that of the [j]udge of [c]ompensation even if we
    were inclined to do so."      
    Ibid. (alterations in original)
    (quoting
    Lombardo v. Revlon, Inc., 
    328 N.J. Super. 484
    , 488 (App. Div.
    2000)).     Deference must be accorded "unless . . . 'manifestly
    unsupported    by    or   inconsistent    with    competent     relevant    and
    reasonably    credible    evidence   as   to     offend   the   interests    of
    justice.'"      
    Ibid. (quoting Lindquist, supra
    , 
    175 N.J. at 262
    (2003)).    Where "[i]t is the legal consequences flowing from those
    facts that form the basis of [the] appeal[, w]e owe no particular
    deference to the judge of compensation's interpretation of the
    law."     Sexton v. Cty. of Cumberland/Cumberland Manor, 404 N.J.
    Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P.
    v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995)).
    A compensation judge is considered to have expertise in
    weighing the testimony of competing experts and assessing the
    validity of the claim.       
    Ramos, supra
    , 154 N.J. at 598.        The judge
    is "not bound by the conclusional opinions of any one or more, or
    9                               A-3392-15T1
    all of the medical experts."       
    Bellino, supra
    , 435 N.J. Super. at
    95 (quoting Kaneh v. Sunshine Biscuits, 
    321 N.J. Super. 507
    , 511
    (App. Div. 1999)).      We will not reverse a judgment simply because
    the judge gave more weight to the opinion of one physician over
    the other.     Smith v. John L. Montgomery Nursing Home, 327 N.J.
    Super. 575, 579 (App. Div. 2000).
    Applying these standards, and based upon our careful review
    of the record and applicable legal principles, we are constrained
    to vacate the judgement and remand for reconsideration as we
    conclude there was no evidence to support the findings that Van
    Artsdalen's injury was inoperable or that he took few days off
    during his years of employment.      While these findings were central
    to the judge of compensation's decision, as demonstrated by her
    conclusion that Van Artsdalen's "disability rating is construed
    as   worse"   because   his   injuries   were   inoperable,   neither   Van
    Artsdalen nor the experts stated these facts or opinions, nor was
    there any other evidence presented from which the judge could have
    logically inferred them.
    Judgement vacated and remanded for reconsideration.            We do
    not retain jurisdiction.
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