STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. EMMANUEL RUIZ PAGANÂ (13-05-1143, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3516-15T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    EMMANUEL RUIZ PAGAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________
    Submitted July 5, 2017 – Decided September 15, 2017
    Before Judges Nugent and Accurso.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No.
    13-05-1143.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant (Margaret McLane, Assistant
    Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    Robert D. Laurino, Acting Essex County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank
    J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney
    General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Emmanuel Ruiz Pagan pled guilty to first-degree
    robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and second-degree unlawful possession
    of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b.       Pursuant to a negotiated plea
    agreement, he reserved his right to challenge the denial of his
    motion to dismiss the indictment based on the State's failure to
    preserve the hard drive of the surveillance system that
    supposedly captured the crime.    The judge sentenced defendant in
    accordance with the plea agreement to an aggregate prison term
    of fifteen years subject to the periods of parole ineligibility
    and supervision required by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.
    2C:43-7.2.   Defendant now appeals, raising the following issues:
    POINT I
    DUE TO THE STATE'S LOSS OF THE SURVEILLANCE
    VIDEO HARD DRIVE, THE INDICTMENT MUST BE
    DISMISSED.
    POINT II
    THE FIFTEEN-YEAR SENTENCE, WITH 85% TO BE
    SERVED WITHOUT PAROLE, IS MANIFESTLY
    EXCESSIVE.
    Finding no error in defendant's conviction or sentence, we
    affirm.
    Defendant and a confederate, both armed with handguns,
    entered the El Bachatipico restaurant in Newark at about one
    o'clock in the morning on September 11, 2012.      Defendant drew
    his gun and announced to the several people present, "This is a
    stick up."   One of the patrons identified himself as a police
    officer and drew his service weapon.      Defendant and his partner
    2                          A-3516-15T1
    shot at the officer, and he returned fire.       The robbers fled
    outside, where more shots were exchanged.       Although the officer
    shot defendant in his shoulder, leg, low back and left hand, he
    managed to escape.    He was later apprehended at a local
    hospital.     No one else was injured.    The police took statements
    from several witnesses relating those events and the off-duty
    officer identified defendant as the robber he shot.
    The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on defendant's
    motion to dismiss the indictment three years after the robbery.
    The owner of the restaurant testified it had a surveillance
    system.   When he went to retrieve the video of the incident
    shortly after the robbery, however, he found nothing had been
    recorded.     A detective with the crime scene/technical services
    unit of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office testified he
    likewise tried to retrieve video from the system later that same
    night without success.
    The following day, the owner called the man who installed
    the system to inspect it.    The owner testified the technician
    advised the hard drive had malfunctioned and swapped it out for
    a new unit.    The owner took the old hard drive to the
    prosecutor's office that afternoon.       The technical services unit
    detective again tried to retrieve video from the unit but could
    not even get it to fully power up.       Determining the unit was
    3                          A-3516-15T1
    damaged and of no evidential value, the supervising detectives
    claim they immediately returned it to the restaurant owner.      The
    owner claimed he left it with the prosecutor's office and never
    got it back.
    After hearing the testimony, the judge found "no concrete
    evidence . . . that the hard drive was returned to [the
    restaurant owner]."   The judge found the State had an obligation
    to preserve the hard drive for inspection by defendant and
    negligently failed to do so.   She found defendant had produced
    no evidence of bad faith.   Although finding no question but that
    defendant was deprived of the opportunity to inspect the unit
    and determine for himself that no images were captured, the
    court found the absence of the unit made it impossible to
    determine "whether any images that may have been captured on
    that hard drive would have been a value to the defense."
    Rejecting defendant's claim that the evidence supported
    dismissing the indictment, the judge determined the appropriate
    sanction was an adverse inference charge against the State at
    trial.
    "[D]ismissal of an indictment due to loss of discoverable
    evidence is a drastic remedy that should be sparingly employed."
    State v. Montijo, 
    320 N.J. Super. 483
    , 490 (Law Div. 1998).      The
    decision is addressed to the discretion of the trial court,
    4                          A-3516-15T1
    State v. Feliciano, 
    224 N.J. 351
    , 380 (2016), and the exercise
    of its authority will not be disturbed in the absence of clear
    abuse, State v. Hogan, 
    144 N.J. 216
    , 229 (1996).
    A court considering whether a defendant's due process
    rights have been violated by the State's failure to preserve
    physical evidence must focus on "(1) whether there was bad faith
    or connivance on the part of the government, (2) whether the
    evidence . . . was sufficiently material to the defense, [and]
    (3) whether [the] defendant was prejudiced by the loss or
    destruction of the evidence."   State v. Hollander, 
    201 N.J. Super. 453
    , 479 (App. Div.) (internal citations omitted),
    certif. denied, 
    101 N.J. 335
     (1985).   "Without bad faith on the
    part of the State, 'failure to preserve potentially useful
    evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.'"
    George v. City of Newark, 
    384 N.J. Super. 232
    , 243 (App. Div.
    2006) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 
    488 U.S. 51
    , 57, 
    109 S. Ct. 333
    , 337, 
    102 L. Ed. 2d 281
    , 289 (1988)); see also State v.
    Marshall, 
    123 N.J. 1
    , 109 (1991) (applying Youngblood bad faith
    standard); State v. Mustaro, 
    411 N.J. Super. 91
    , 103-05 (App.
    Div. 2009) (same).1
    1
    We reject defendant's argument that we can dispense with the
    bad faith requirement of Youngblood by resort to our own State
    Constitution. Our Supreme Court follows Youngblood, and we are
    (continued)
    5                        A-3516-15T1
    Our review of the record satisfies us the trial judge was
    correct in finding defendant failed to adduce any evidence of
    bad faith.   The detective from the technical services unit was
    not the only witness to testify the restaurant's surveillance
    system had not recorded the incident.   The restaurant owner also
    testified there was nothing recorded and further claimed the
    technician who installed the system made the same finding.
    Defendant offered no reason why police would deliberately
    suppress or destroy a hard drive an independent witness
    testified had not recorded anything.
    Although defendant was deprived of the opportunity to
    confirm the absence of a video recording of the events in the
    restaurant, we have no basis to believe the video would have
    undermined, as opposed to supported, the witnesses' statements
    identifying defendant as the robber.    Indeed, defense counsel
    never proffered how the video might exculpate his client.
    Because defendant did not establish the videotape had
    exculpatory value apparent to the State when it was lost or
    destroyed or that the State failed to preserve its potentially
    (continued)
    not free to deviate from its direction. See Marshall, 
    supra,
    123 N.J. at 109
    ; Mustaro, 
    supra,
     
    411 N.J. Super. at
    103 n.4
    (declining to follow other states eschewing bad faith as a
    matter of state constitutional law in light of Marshall and
    State v. Reynolds, 
    124 N.J. 559
    , 569 (1991)).
    6                         A-3516-15T1
    exculpatory value in bad faith, defendant could not establish a
    due process violation or any entitlement to relief.2
    We have considered the arguments defendant has offered to
    establish his aggregate fifteen-year sentence is excessive and
    determined they present no basis for reversal.    Defendant was
    sentenced in accordance with his negotiated plea agreement.        The
    judge characterized his violent stick up of the restaurant, "a
    brazen crime, more in the fashion of a high noon at the O.K.
    Corral.   Committed in a manner showing utter disregard for the
    safety or sensibilities of the public."
    The judge found aggravating factors three, the risk that the
    defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3); and
    nine, the need for deterring the defendant and others from
    violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9), and no mitigating factors.
    She further noted defendant had completed an eight-year prison term
    in Puerto Rico for robbery and weapons offenses within a year of
    committing this offense.
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude defendant's fifteen-
    year sentence is neither inconsistent with sentencing provisions of
    the Code of Criminal Justice nor shocking to the judicial
    2
    As defendant failed to establish a due process violation, we
    surmise the adverse inference against the State was a sanction
    for a discovery violation under Rule 3:13-3, although that is
    not clear from the record.
    7                            A-3516-15T1
    conscience.   See State v. Fuentes, 
    217 N.J. 57
    , 70-71 (2014); State
    v. Bieniek, 
    200 N.J. 601
    , 608 (2010); State v. Cassady, 
    198 N.J. 165
    , 180-81 (2009).
    Affirmed.
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