BENJAMIN B. TAYLOR VS. MARIA E. JONES (FD-07-3657-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3909-15T3
BENJAMIN B. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARIA E. JONES,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted April 5, 2017 – Decided August 29, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex
County, Docket No. FD-07-3657-15.
Benjamin B. Taylor, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this non-dissolution case,1 plaintiff appeals from the
March 30, 2016 order of the Family Part denying his motion for
1
The non-dissolution or FD docket provides a mechanism for parents
not married to each other to seek custody, parenting time,
paternity, and child support. R.K. v. D.L., 434 N.J. Super. 113,
131 (App. Div. 2014).
reconsideration. We affirm substantially for the reasons set
forth by Judge Michael C. Gaus in his comprehensive and well-
reasoned oral opinion.
Plaintiff (father) and defendant (mother) were unmarried but
lived together in plaintiff's Maplewood home for approximately two
years before their daughter was born in October 2014. In April
2015, the parties separated and plaintiff filed an order to show
cause claiming that he was being denied shared custody and
parenting time. Plaintiff's disagreement with defendant's breast-
feeding and attachment parenting philosophy became the overarching
issue in arranging for shared custody and parenting time after the
parties separated.
Thereafter, both parties filed dueling applications,
including defendant's application for child support. Effective
May 8, 2015, Judge Gaus established plaintiff's child support
obligation as $173 per week plus $17 towards arrears. As to
custody and parenting time issues, the parties agreed to
participate in private mediation. However, mediation failed and
Judge Gaus thereafter conducted a plenary hearing that spanned a
total of six non-sequential hearing dates from November 30, 2015
to January 28, 2016.
On February 9, 2016, Judge Gaus rendered a comprehensive oral
opinion. Preliminarily, the judge found defendant "to be highly
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credible based upon her demeanor, a consistency of her answers,
the straightforward manner in which she provided responses" and
"her sincere interest in what she believes is best for [their
daughter], including being fully supportive of moving the
custodial arrangement into a fully shared custody arrangement."
On the other hand, the judge found plaintiff's testimony "not
credible in many areas" noting:
[a]t times, he appeared to be disingenuous,
particularly based in his demeanor; his
hesitation in providing answers; his avoidance
during cross[-]examination; and most
importantly, the distortion of his intentions
as evidenced by his desire to drive this case
by economics and his efforts to avoid
financial responsibility wherever possible.
Also his belated offers to become more
accommodating to the defendant's continuing
need to breast[-]feed came way too late in the
process. Earlier in the proceeding it had
been his position that her breast[-]feeding
was simply another effort on her part to
control him, to control their family dynamic,
and to control the building of his
relationship with the child. It's that type
of inconsistent positions throughout the
proceedings that caused the [c]ourt to
consider [defendant's] testimony to be much
more credible than that of [plaintiff].
Next, applying the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c),
the judge ordered the parties to share legal and physical custody
of their daughter, with defendant being designated "the parent of
primary residence for purposes of establishing the child's legal
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domicile." The judge entered a detailed shared parenting plan
order incorporating the gradual implementation of equal parenting
time beginning in 2017 as the child was "weaned from her breast
feeding."
Utilizing the Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines) for a
shared parenting child support award, Judge Gaus increased
plaintiff's child support obligation to $192 per week, effective
February 9, 2016, based on an annual salary of $81,060 for
plaintiff and $52,000 for defendant. The judge ordered further
that on January 1, 2017, defendant's child support obligation
would be automatically reduced to $30.05 per week as a result of
the full implementation of the equal shared parenting time plan.
In assessing the parents' income, the judge determined that
plaintiff was "substantially [underemployed]" working as "a part-
time athletic trainer[,] . . . part-time desk manager of a gym
here and there[,] and then running his own wealth management
business on the side." Crediting defendant's unrebutted testimony
that plaintiff earned "six figures" when he worked "in New York
City" in the financial services industry "approximately [fifteen]
years ago[,]" the judge found that plaintiff's current "wealth
management duties, which he described as significantly involving
'reading newspapers and watching videos'" showed "a lack of desire
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. . . to work and supply as best he can through his financial[]
abilities for his family."
The judge imputed income to plaintiff based on his profession
as a Personal Financial Advisor, which "according to the Department
of Labor's Statistics category 13-2052 is someone who advises
clients on financial plans using knowledge of tax and investment
strategies, securities, insurance, pension plans and real estate"
and which "[d]uties include assessing clients' assets,
liabilities, cash flow, insurance coverage, tax status, and
financial objectives." However, the judge imputed to plaintiff
the "median income level" of $81,060 annually, rather than "the
mean annual wage" of $108,090 as "more consistent with what might
be realistically expected from [plaintiff]." Based on her tax
returns for 2012, 2013, and 2014, the judge also imputed income
to defendant, noting that while the court understood "her desire
to be home with her child, that is something that simply cannot
continue on an extended basis" as "[t]here is simply no reason why
she has not yet returned to work full time at this point."
When the child support guidelines were run, the judge also
provided other dependent deductions for both parties. Plaintiff
received an other-dependent deduction for his two older children
and defendant received an other-dependent deduction for her son
who was a full-time college student. Although over the age of
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eighteen, defendant's son was attending Rutgers University on a
full-time basis on an athletic scholarship. However, his
scholarship did not cover all of his needs.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that
defendant should not have been granted a dependent care deduction
because her son was an emancipated adult age child. Plaintiff
also argued that the court should not have imputed income to him
above what he actually earned. In the alternative, plaintiff
argued that the court should have imputed the income of a Financial
Analyst, rather than a Personal Financial Advisor.
The judge denied the motion for reconsideration and issued a
comprehensive and well-reasoned oral opinion rejecting plaintiff's
arguments. Judge Gaus began his analysis by citing Rule 4:49-2
and applying the well-settled legal principles for deciding a
motion for reconsideration. As framed by Judge Gaus, plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration claimed: (1) "defendant should not have
been granted another dependent deduction when the guidelines were
run" because her son was an "'emancipated adult age child[;]'" and
(2) "the [c]ourt should not have imputed income to [plaintiff]
above what he actually earns" and "if the [c]ourt did . . . impute
income to him, . . . it should have used Bureau of Labor Statistic
category 13-2051 Financial Analyst instead of 13-2052 a Personal
Financial Advisor."
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As to the propriety of the other-dependent deduction, Judge
Gaus explained:
There is no dispute but that this child
is in fact a full-time college student. He's
on an Athletic Scholarship at Rutgers. The
testimony was accepted by the [c]ourt that he
utilizes his mother's home as his primary
residence when he is not at school. That
entitles her to then seek out the other
dependent deduction.
If this was a matter of calculating child
support for that child, we would not use the
guidelines when it comes to determining what
would be appropriate child support for that
child, because we don't use the guidelines for
someone who is over [eighteen] years of age
and is living away at college on a full-time
basis.
But we were not calculating child support
for that child. We were simply factoring in
the other dependent deductions.
So the [c]ourt is satisfied, first, that
the child is not emancipated, which really was
the only argument that the . . . plaintiff
raised in his application. And then when he
rose to speak today, he also then started to
argue that in fact the child does not live
there. We've addressed that as well, a parent
is expected to keep a home for their child
available and there are ongoing expenses
associated not only with keeping the home
available, but also continuing to support a
child when they are a full-time live away
student at college, even one who is on an
Athletic Scholarship and who may well have a
stipend beyond that.
As to the propriety of imputing income to plaintiff rather
than accepting plaintiff's "actual income[,]" initially, Judge
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Gaus reiterated his finding that plaintiff was intentionally
underemployed because he "has the ability to work in the financial
field in a way that would bring much more money into the
household." Recounting plaintiff's trial testimony that his job
entailed "read[ing] newspapers" and "listen[ing] to podcasts[,]"
the judge determined that plaintiff "wanted to minimize what it
is that he does in order to try to justify the significantly lower
amount of income that he earns than what the Bureau of Labor
Statistics suggest[s] that he should be earning."
"[T]urning to the issue of whether the [c]ourt should have
used [the] category [of] Financial Analyst or Personal Financial
Advisor[,]" Judge Gaus determined that he "properly concluded that
the Personal Financial Advisor category was more appropriate
because the plaintiff does much more than simpl[y] analyze the
numbers, which is . . . the main description for Financial
Analyst." Judge Gaus reasoned that plaintiff
actually manages money on behalf of his
clients. And that seems to fit much more into
the Personal Financial Advisor category, even
if you cut out the insurance component.
But beyond that, the [c]ourt imputed
income to the defendant at the median level
. . . and that income is $81,060. Even if I
had use[d] the Financial Analyst category, I
still would have stayed at the [fifty] percent
category and that income is $78,620. So it's
certainly not in any way materially different
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than the amount of income that was imputed to
the [plaintiff].
. . . .
[T]his is somebody who is in fact in the
. . . midst of the prime part of his career.
He started doing this work back in the late
'90s, the early 2000's. Although, he didn't
submit at trial his W-2s and his taxes from
when he worked at Lehman Brothers. He did
testify that he was there in the late '90s,
the early 2000's . . . .
So the [c]ourt is satisfied that whether
it should have been the Financial Analyst
category or the Personal Financial Advisor
category, the [fifty] percent level was
appropriate for somebody who has been at this
job and this career area for [fifteen],
[sixteen], [seventeen] years. And whether it
was [$]81,000 or [$]78,000 is not material.
Although, the [c]ourt is satisfied that the
Personal Financial category was the more
appropriate.
Judge Gaus entered a memorializing order on March 30, 2016 2 and
this appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff renews the same arguments he presented
to Judge Gaus. Because plaintiff's notice of appeal identified
only the March 30, 2016 order denying reconsideration, our review
is limited to that order. See R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(A); Pressler, Current
N.J. Court Rules, comment 6.1 on R. 2:5-1 (2016) (citing Sikes v.
2
As of the entry of the March 30, 2016 order, plaintiff's arrears
totaled $4,329.13.
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Twp. of Rockaway, 269 N.J. Super. 463, 465-66 (App. Div.), aff'd
o.b., 138 N.J. 41 (1994).
Turning to the court's denial of plaintiff's reconsideration
motion, such motions are governed by Rule 4:49-2. "Reconsideration
. . . is 'a matter within the sound discretion of the Court, to
be exercised in the interest of justice[.]'" Palombi v. Palombi,
414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting D'Atria v.
D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)). "A litigant
should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction
with a decision of the [c]ourt." D'Atria, supra, 242 N.J. Super.
at 401. Reconsideration is only appropriate if "1) the [c]ourt
has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or
irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did
not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of
probative, competent evidence[.]" Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.
Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria, supra, 242 N.J.
Super. at 401).
Reconsideration is not appropriate as a vehicle to bring to
the court's attention evidence that was available but not presented
in connection with the initial argument. Fusco, supra, 349 N.J.
Super. at 463. Rather, a motion for reconsideration is designed
to seek review of an order based on the evidence before the court
on the initial motion, R. 1:7-4, not to serve as a vehicle to
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introduce new evidence in order to cure an inadequacy in the motion
record. Cummings, supra, 295 N.J. Super. at 384. Similarly,
reconsideration cannot be used to merely "reargue a motion[,]"
Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super.
299, 310 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 (2008), but
rather to point out "the matters or controlling decisions which
[the litigant] believes the court has overlooked or as to which
it has erred[.]" R. 4:49-2.
We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration under
the abuse of discretion standard. Cummings, supra, 295 N.J. Super.
at 389 (citing CNF Constructors, Inc. v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 57
F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 1995)). An abuse of discretion occurs
"when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209
N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).
We have carefully considered the record in this matter and
affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the thorough and
thoughtful opinion of Judge Gaus.
Affirmed.
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