CAPITAL ENERGY, INC. VS. MOHANNAD K. TAHA, ETC. (C-000076-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3854-18T2
    CAPITAL ENERGY, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MOHANNAD K. TAHA, d/b/a
    TAHA ENTERPRISES, INC.,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Argued December 12, 2019 – Decided September 14, 2020
    Before Judges Suter and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C-
    000076-17.
    Eugene R. Licker (Ballard Spahr, LLP) of the New
    York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for
    appellant (Ballard Spahr, LLP, attorneys; Eugene R.
    Licker and Christopher J. Kelly, on the briefs).
    James T. McCarthy argued the cause for respondent
    (McCarthy, Galfy & Marx, LLC, attorneys; James T.
    McCarthy, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Capital Energy, Inc. appeals the March 29, 2019 decision that
    denied its motion to enforce a September 7, 2017 order, prohibiting defendant
    Mohannad K. Taha (d/b/a Taha Enterprises, Inc.) from soliciting business from
    a list plaintiff provided to defendant. We affirm the order denying enforcement.
    I.
    We glean these facts from the plenary hearing and record. Defendant is a
    former sales representative for plaintiff, a firm that brokers energy service
    agreements between end-user customers and electricity and natural gas
    suppliers. He was retained as an independent contractor. Plaintiff alleges that
    in 2014, defendant signed a Non-disclosure and Non-solicitation Agreement (the
    Agreement) with plaintiff. Under the Agreement, defendant agreed for a period
    of twenty-four months after termination of his engagement with plaintiff not to
    "directly or indirectly solicit, divert, initiate or accept any contact with any client
    or customer of [plaintiff] for the purpose of providing, directly or indirectly, any
    services that are provided by [plaintiff] pursuant to [plaintiff's] business."
    In 2015—as a sales representative for plaintiff—defendant brokered an
    energy contract between NextEra Energy Services and MWV Slatersville, LLC
    (MWV Slatersville) for its Slatersville facility. The contract was for twenty-
    A-3854-18T2
    2
    four months, extending to November 2017. Plaintiff claimed MWV Slatersville
    was its largest customer.
    In September 2015, MWV Slatersville merged with WestRock Company
    and changed its name to WestRock Slatersville, LLC (WestRock Slatersville).
    In January 2017—before the energy contract ended—WestRock's home, health
    and beauty marketing companies, which included WestRock Slatersville, were
    purchased by Silgan Holdings, Inc.          Thereafter, in May 2017, WestRock
    Slatersville amended its articles of incorporation, on file with the Rhode Island
    Secretary of State, to reflect its name as Silgan Dispensing Systems Slatersville,
    LLC (Silgan Slatersville).
    Defendant's business relationship with plaintiff ended on July 5, 2016.
    Plaintiff alleged defendant started a competing business, Northeast Energy
    Advisory, using plaintiff's proprietary client information.
    In March 2017, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against defendant in
    the Chancery Division, alleging he violated the Agreement. Plaintiff sought a
    declaratory judgment enforcing the Agreement, enjoining defendant from using
    its confidential information and client lists. Plaintiff also alleged breach of
    contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
    tortious interference with its business relationship. Finally, plaintiff demanded
    an accounting of profits, and damages.
    Ibid. A-3854-18T2 3 Counsel
    representing the parties appeared to reach a settlement in
    principle. However, defendant's attorney withdrew from representation in mid-
    June 2017, and after that defendant—who then was pro se—advised plaintiff's
    counsel he would not sign the settlement agreement.
    Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the settlement it claimed had been
    reached.   On September 7, 2017, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion,
    finding the parties reached a settlement on June 2, 2017, because they agreed on
    three key provisions: "(1) [d]efendant would not solicit plaintiff's customers,
    who were to be identified according to [p]laintiff's list; (2) [p]laintiff would not
    disparage [d]efendant; and (3) the parties would mutually release one another
    from further claims." The trial court found defendant "ratified the material terms
    by his later conduct" because on June 29, 2017, he revised a draft of the
    Agreement with his comments but "left [ ] intact" the three core concepts. The
    September 7, 2017 order provided:
    [u]pon the date of entry of this ORDER and continuing
    for THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIVE DAYS
    (365) thereafter, neither Taha nor any individual or
    entity acting at his direction or on his behalf will solicit,
    contact, or engage in business transactions of any kind
    with the individuals, entities, and/or businesses listed
    in the customer list provided by Plaintiff to Defendant
    in connection with this litigation. In addition, Taha
    shall keep the contents of this customer list
    confidential, and shall not share its contents or describe
    its contents to anyone. Violation of this provision by
    A-3854-18T2
    4
    Taha would cause Capital Energy irreparable harm, for
    which he and his enterprises will be jointly and
    severally liable.
    "MWV Slatersville, LLC" was on the list of companies provided by
    plaintiff to defendant; Silgan Slatersville was not. The list was prepared by
    plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer Caleb Berger, who testified the list was to
    include every business to which defendant was introduced while working for
    plaintiff to create broad protection for the company. Reference to "individuals,
    entities and/or businesses" was to "prevent [defendant] from benefiting from
    calling any of the clients, lists or information that he had taken from [the] firm."
    Raymond Frenette, a Silgan manufacturing technology and systems
    manager, said that defendant reached out to him prior to November 2017, "to
    see if I wanted to engage his new firm to broker an energy contract for Silgan,
    since the existing, Capital-brokered contract was expiring and he was the broker
    on the original contract." Defendant denied this indicating Frenette contacted
    him. Frenette designated defendant's company as the "exclusive intermediary
    to manage, represent and assess all related electricity matters on behalf of Silgan
    Holdings[,] Inc." Defendant brokered a contract between Silgan Slatersville and
    Agera Energy.      Silgan Slatersville was issued a new and separate tax
    identification number separate from WestRock Slatersville.
    A-3854-18T2
    5
    In February 2018, plaintiff filed a motion in aid of litigant's rights,
    alleging that defendant violated the September 7, 2017 order by brokering a
    contract with Silgan Slatersville. Although not included in the list of companies,
    the motion alleged Silgan Slatersville was the same business as MWV
    Slatersville, which was on the list. Claiming defendant was in contempt of the
    September 7, 2017 order, plaintiff sought to enjoin further violation and to
    impose a constructive trust on all of defendant's associated brokerage
    commissions. The court conducted a plenary hearing, describing the "sole issue"
    as "whether the defendant's relationship with Silgan violated the settlement
    agreement as described in the order of . . . September 7th, 2017."
    On March 29, 2019, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion finding there
    was "no dispute that the customer list attached to the September 7 order does
    not include Silgan's name," and "the [o]rder, which was prepared by Capital's
    counsel, did not include a provision which provided that it applied to successors
    and/or assigns of the persons, entities or businesses identified on the customer
    list." The trial court found that "[u]pon the purchase of WestRock's business by
    Silgan . . . , MWV's account numbers for electric service at the Rhode Island
    facility were terminated and new account numbers were issued to Silgan."
    Further, "new tax [identification] numbers for Silgan were associated with the
    new accounts." Although "[t]here [was] conflicting testimony" as to whether
    A-3854-18T2
    6
    Taha contacted Frenette first or the other way around, the court found Taha
    contacted Frenette "[four to five] months before the Nextera [c]ontract was due
    to expire in November 2017." The court observed it was not clear "whether
    [defendant] was aware of the transactions between MWV and WestRock and
    then WestRock and Silgan," but noted defendant's testimony was "rambling and
    less than credible." Nonetheless, the court found there was "no dispute that the
    customer list attached to the September 7 Order does not include Silgan's name,
    even after Silgan acquired WestRock."        The court explained that "simply
    because Silgan may have conducted the same type of business (packaging and
    plastics manufacturing) as did MWV does not mean that Silgan is covered by
    the non-solicitation provisions of the September 7 Order." And, without a clause
    including "successors and/or assigns," the court could not supply one because
    "[t]o do so would, in effect, allow the court to write a better agreement for
    Capital than it did for itself. Such an action by the court would be improper."
    On appeal, plaintiff raises these issues:
    I.   THE    TRIAL COURT   ABUSED   ITS
    DISCRETION IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT
    WAS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF THE SEPTEMBER 7,
    2017 ORDER.
    II. THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
    ABSENCE OF "SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS"
    LANGUAGE WAS FATAL TO PLAINTIFF'S
    MOTION[.]
    A-3854-18T2
    7
    II.
    We afford a deferential standard of review to the factual findings of the
    trial court on appeal from a plenary hearing. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs
    Ins. Co., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 483-84 (1974). These findings will not be disturbed unless
    they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
    relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]"
    Id. at 484
    (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 
    78 N.J. Super. 154
    , 155
    (App. Div. 1963)). However, our review of a trial court's legal determinations
    is plenary. D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 
    216 N.J. 168
    , 182-83 (2013) (citing
    Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378
    (1995)).
    There was substantial, credible evidence to support the court's findings
    and to deny plaintiff's motion to enforce the September 7, 2017 order.
    Generally, contract terms are to be given their "plain and ordinary meaning."
    M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 
    171 N.J. 378
    , 396 (2002). "If the
    terms of a contract are clear, they are to be enforced as written." Malick v.
    Seaview Lincoln Mercury, 
    398 N.J. Super. 182
    , 187 (App. Div. 2008) (citing
    Cty. of Morris v. Fauver, 
    153 N.J. 80
    , 103 (1998)).
    A-3854-18T2
    8
    There was no dispute that Silgan Slatersville was not included in the list
    of companies in the September 7, 2017 order. Defendant was not restrained
    from brokering for a company that was not listed in the order. Thus, under a
    plain reading of the September 7, 2017 order, defendant was not restrained from
    brokering the contract with Silgan Slatersville.
    Plaintiff contends Silgan Slatersville is the same legal entity as MWV
    Slatersville and that only the entity's name changed.     However, there was
    evidence that when Silgan purchased WestRock's home, health and beauty
    business (formerly MWV) and became Silgan Slatersville, MWV's account
    numbers for electric service at the Rhode Island facility were terminated and
    new account numbers were issued to Silgan. New tax identification numbers
    for Silgan Slatersville were associated with the new accounts.        Frenette's
    testimony was that when MWV merged with WestRock, the business was not
    issued new account numbers by National Grid, but was provided a new account
    once Silgan Holdings purchased WestRock. Silgan Holdings altered the
    company's internal structure, changing it from "member managed" to "manager
    managed."       Two individuals from Silgan Holdings were identified as the
    managers. Therefore, although Silgan Slatersville continued to produce the
    same types of products, there was a change in governance and "operational
    differences."
    A-3854-18T2
    9
    The trial court found significant that the list of companies did not include
    a successor and assigns clause although plaintiff included that language in its
    form of order submitted to the trial court that became the September 7, 2017
    order. That order contained the following language: "[t]he [p]arties, on their
    behalf and on behalf of their successors, officers, heirs, partners, shareholders,
    employees, legal representatives, agents, assigns, and any person or entity acting
    actually or apparently on their behalf . . . hereby release and forever discharge
    each other . . . ." We agree this language is an additional factor the court could
    consider in concluding whether the companies listed in the September 7, 2017
    order were also to include their successors and assigns. See Evoqua Water
    Techs., LLC v. M.W. Watermark, LLC, 
    940 F.3d 222
    , 246 (6th Cir. 2019)
    (Bush, J., concurring) (explaining that "the absence of [a] successors -in-interest
    or assigns clause 'is the functional equivalent of the parties' express intent to
    exclude language of assignment' and '[e]qually as telling is that the consent
    judgment specifies successors and assigns when listing' the defendant's
    obligations" (quoting Thatcher v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 
    397 F.3d 1370
    , 1375
    (Fed. Cir. 2005) (alteration in original))). A similar factual situation existed
    here. A portion of the order expressly referenced successors and assigns, but
    there was no such reference in the list of companies.
    A-3854-18T2
    10
    As a general rule, a court has no right to "remake a better contract for the
    parties than they themselves have seen fit to enter into, or to alter it for the
    benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other." Karl's Sales & Serv., Inc.
    v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 
    249 N.J. Super. 487
    , 493 (App. Div. 1991); see Globe
    Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 
    436 N.J. Super. 594
    , 602 (App. Div. 2014) (holding "the
    court may not re-write a contract or grant a better deal than that for which the
    parties expressly bargained"), rev'd on other grounds, 
    225 N.J. 469
    (2016).
    Plaintiff was aware of Silgan Holdings' acquisition of WestRock prior to the
    September 7, 2017 order but did not incorporate the name into the list provided
    to defendant. There is no indication contemporaneous with the September 7,
    2017 order that Silgan Slatersville was supposed to be included.
    Plaintiff argues that Silgan Slatersville is the same legal entity because
    the Rhode Island Secretary of State used the same number for the entity despite
    its merger or sale. It contends the business is in the same location, has the same
    employees, the same phone numbers and does the same business. It cites no
    authority, however, to support the argument that Rhode Island's system of record
    keeping should be determinative here. The arguments also give no recognition
    to the fact the company was sold, is under new management, and has different
    governance. On this record, we do not agree these are the same legal entities.
    Affirmed.
    A-3854-18T2
    11