Richard Finaldi v. Matthew Knight ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0315-22
RICHARD FINALDI and
BONNIE FINALDI, h/w,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MATTHEW KNIGHT and EAN
HOLDING, LLC,
Defendants,
and
CORNUCOPIA LOGISTICS, LLC,
AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., and
AMAZON FULFILLMENT
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________
Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided January 3, 2024
Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2209-18.
Corey A. Dietz argued the cause for appellants (Brach
Eichler, LLC, attorneys; Edward P. Capozzi and Corey
A. Dietz, on the briefs).
Richard Francis Connors, Jr. argued the cause for
respondent Cornucopia Logistics, LLC (Tompkins,
McGuire, Wachenfeld & Barry LLP, attorneys; Richard
Francis Connors, Jr., and Kimberly Dawn McDougal,
on the brief).
Ahmed J. Kassim argued the cause for respondents
Amazon Logistics, Inc., and Amazon Fulfillment
Services, Inc. (Sills Cummis & Gross, PC, and Wilson,
Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, attorneys;
Beth S. Rose, Ahmed J. Kassim, and Gina Calabria, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
During the early morning hours of January 27, 2017, plaintiff Richard
Finaldi was driving through an intersection in Linden. At the same time, a man
driving a delivery van nodded off and drove through the red light, colliding with
Richard. Richard was seriously injured.
Plaintiffs Richard and Bonnie Finaldi appeal from the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the van's lessee, defendant Cornucopia
Logistics, LLC (Cornucopia), denial of their motion for reconsideration, and
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Amazon Logistics, Inc., and
Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc. (collectively, Amazon). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
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Since 2014, Cornucopia had an agreement with Amazon to deliver
groceries ordered through Amazon Fresh as an independent contractor. Under
its agreement, Cornucopia had exclusive responsibility for its personnel and
exclusive control over its policies relating to wages, hours, working conditions ,
and other employment conditions. Delivery vans—leased to Cornucopia by
defendant EAN Holdings, LLC (EAN)—were stored at the Amazon Fulfillment
Center facility in Avenel, where Cornucopia also had an office. Under the
agreement, Cornucopia would provide, operate, maintain, and be responsible for
all motor vehicles.
In 2017, Cornucopia had several employees at the Avenel facility,
including a senior operations manager, Richard Bello; an operations manager,
Carlos Gonzalez; a fleet coordinator; four dispatchers; and around thirty drivers
each for the morning and night shifts.
There was one dispatcher for each shift. The drivers would report to work
and clock in using their fingerprints, and the dispatcher would take attendance
and assign the drivers their routes. Each time a driver clocked in, the dispatcher
would give them a handbag containing a key to a van, an EZPass, vehicle
registration and insurance, and a "rabbit." The rabbit was a scanner, provided
by Amazon, that allowed drivers to scan each package in and out; it also acted
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as a GPS, a camera, and calling support. The rabbit additionally allowed
supervisors to see where each driver had dropped off their last package.
When the vans were not in use, the keys were kept in a cabinet behind the
dispatch table. The dispatcher was supposed to lock the cabinet after checking
in the drivers and giving them their handbags. Each dispatcher had a key to the
cabinet, as well as Gonzalez and Bello. It was standard operating procedure for
the dispatcher to log each key that was given to the drivers and take inventory
of those keys. The dispatcher would again count the keys after the drivers
returned. Ultimately, the fleet coordinator was responsible for knowing where
each of the vehicles was at a given time.
If a dispatcher discovered a key was missing after taking inventory, they
would see if the vehicle was in the parking lot. If it was not, they would notify
Gonzalez or Bello.
Matthew Knight, one of Cornucopia's dispatchers, fell asleep driving the
Cornucopia delivery van that he stole and went through a red light, injuring
plaintiff. Knight initially worked for Cornucopia as a driver, but then, after his
license was suspended, he moved to dispatcher—a position which did not
require driving—so he could continue to work at Cornucopia.
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Knight had stolen the van the day before the accident to assist his mother
in moving. His plan was to return the van to the facility in time for the next
shift. Knight entered the facility as if he was going to work, found the cabinet
with the keys to the vans unlocked, and took one of them. Had the cabinet been
locked, he testified, he would not have taken the van because ordinarily Knight
only had access to the key when he was on duty as a dispatcher. He drove the
van off the lot, through the main gate guarded by Amazon security workers.
Only after the accident did Knight inform Gonzalez that he took the van. Thus,
no one at Cornucopia knew the van was missing until after the accident.
According to Bello, this was the first time, as far as he knew, that an employee
had used a van for personal use.
The Finaldis1 filed suit on June 25, 2018, against Knight, EAN, 2 and
several fictitiously named individuals and corporations. Plaintiffs amended
their complaint to add Cornucopia as a defendant, clarifying its position as
Knight's employer. In a second amended complaint, plaintiffs included Amazon
as defendants. They asserted five claims: negligence against Knight, EAN,
1
Bonnie asserts a per quod claim.
2
The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Knight and EAN as defendants on
October 19, 2022.
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Cornucopia, and Amazon; negligent hiring, retention, and training against
Cornucopia and Amazon; negligent entrustment and negligent supervision
against EAN, Cornucopia, and Amazon; and loss of consortium.
Amazon moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs consented to the
dismissal of the negligent hiring, retention, and training claim and negligent
entrustment and supervision claims against Amazon, since there was no
evidence Knight was an Amazon employee. As to the general negligence claim,
plaintiffs argued Cornucopia was an independent contractor over which Amazon
retained enough control to render it liable for Cornucopia's actions. The court
denied summary judgment as to the general negligence and loss of consortium
claims.
Cornucopia moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs consented to
dismissal of vicarious liability claims under the theory of respondeat superior.
On March 29, 2022, the court granted summary judgment to Cornucopia as to
the negligence and negligent hiring and retention claims. Addressing the general
negligence claim, the court concluded Cornucopia owed no duty to plaintiffs
because Cornucopia "had [no] reason to know . . . that there was an enhanced
risk of harm to a third party by hiring Knight to work as a dispatcher." The court
also found "at the time of the accident, there was no . . . history of Cornucopia
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employees stealing vehicles." Further, Cornucopia had adequate security
measures in place.
The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Cornucopia's
actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The court explained
"Knight was not working at the time of the accident[,]" nor was he using the
vehicle with permission. Cornucopia "took reasonable precautions to prevent
against such actions." The court declined to set a precedent where "employers
would be liable for all of the senseless and unanticipated actions of their
employees."
The court found it too attenuated to link the administrative suspension of
Knight's license with the January 2017 accident and, thus, rejected the negligent
hiring and retention claims. Knight's license suspension did not put Cornucopia
on notice that he would disregard its policies and take one of its vehicles for his
own personal use.
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, asserting the court failed to consider
probative, competent evidence, particularly the expert report of Joseph
Vanderslice who opined defendants substantially breached their duty to
undertake reasonable care to provide a safe facility and community in which
their employees operated. Plaintiffs also argued the policies and procedures
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Cornucopia had in place were ineffective because they were not followed, and
to find in Cornucopia's favor would be contrary to public policy.
The court rejected these arguments, noting it was not the expert's function
to determine whether there was a duty, but the court's, and the court
subsequently found Cornucopia owed no duty. Further, the court reiterated its
earlier stance that finding in favor of plaintiffs would also be contrary to public
policy because it would render employers liable for all the "senseless and
unanticipated actions of their employees." Finding no basis to grant
reconsideration, the court denied plaintiffs' motion.
Thereafter, Amazon moved for reconsideration of the November 2021
order denying summary judgment. Amazon argued that, because the court
granted Cornucopia's motion for summary judgment, finding no basis for
liability as to Cornucopia, the court must also dismiss the case against Amazon.
The court agreed, found the motion was not untimely, and granted it. This
appeal followed.
We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration under the abuse of discretion standard. Kornbleuth v. Westover,
241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020). We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Templo Fuente De Vida
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Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (citing
Mem'l Props., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 524 (2012)).
"To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four
elements: '(1) a duty of care[;] (2) a breach of that duty[;] (3) proximate cause[;]
and (4) actual damages.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting
Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). The plaintiff must establish
those elements "by some competent proof." Ibid. (quoting Davis v. Brickman
Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014)).
The threshold question is whether Cornucopia owed a duty to plaintiffs.
"The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law." Franco v. Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ., 467 N.J. Super. 8, 25 (App. Div. 2021) (citing Robinson v.
Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014)). "Any common law duty imposed by [a
c]ourt must 'satisf[y] an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the
circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.'" Est. of Narleski v.
Gomes, 244 N.J. 199, 213 (2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993)). In order for a court
to impose a duty, "there must be a foreseeable risk of harm." Franco, 467 N.J.
Super. at 26 (citing J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337 (1998)).
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When determining whether a party owed a duty to another, foreseeability
refers to
the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended.
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of
apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken
into account in determining the existence of the duty to
exercise care.
[Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J.
496, 503 (1997) (quoting Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139,
144 (1977)).]
The trial court determined Cornucopia owed no duty to plaintiffs because
it was not foreseeable Knight would steal a van from Cornucopia. Cornucopia
had procedures in place to prevent and detect theft. The delivery vans were
parked in a lot with a security gate, and—according to standard procedure—the
dispatcher took inventory of the keys twice each shift, locking the cabinet when
not in use. Further, there was no prior history of employees stealing vans or
borrowing them for their own personal use.
Plaintiffs do not dispute these procedures were in place but assert, because
Cornucopia's employees did not follow these procedures, it owed a duty to
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue they are not seeking to impose any duty on
Cornucopia that Cornucopia had not already imposed on itself by securing the
keys and taking inventories of the keys multiple times throughout the shift.
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Plaintiffs rely on Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139 (1977); however, that case is
distinguishable. There, the plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while pursuing
a car stolen from the parking lot of one of the defendants, a Camden parking lot
operator. Id. at 140. Every day at 5:00 p.m., the parking lot closed and the
attendant left. Id. at 141. The lot's policy was that, if a customer had not
returned to pick up their car by that time, the car would be left unlocked , and
the keys placed under the floor mat or above the visor. Ibid. A patron familiar
with this procedure, also a defendant, left her car in the lot and did not return
until 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. Ibid. When she realized her car was not in the parking
lot, she reported the car stolen. Ibid. The plaintiff spotted the car the next day
and a chase ensued, resulting in the collision that injured him. Id. at 140-41.
The Supreme Court found that the grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants was improper. Id. at 145.
As to [the parking lot operator], while we accept the
proposition that a lot operator has the right to fix the
hours of business, we cannot lose sight of the fact that
this lot was located in a high[-]crime area and had
experienced a history of vandalism. Under these
special circumstances the unreasonably enhanced
hazards attendant upon the defendant lot's method of
operation are clear. [The parking lot operator] had a
duty, which a jury might determine from all the
evidence was breached, to protect users of the highways
from the action of a thief who uses the keys left in the
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vehicle to mobilize it and then to operate it in a
negligent fashion, resulting in plaintiff's injuries.
[Id. at 146.]
The Court found the patron owed a similar duty, as "the likelihood of theft and
the subsequent unhappy occurrence was [not] any the less foreseeable by [her]
than by her co-defendant." Id. at 147.
In Hill, the defendants' liability was based on the foreseeability that an
unlocked car with keys inside would be stolen in a high-crime area, thereby
increasing the risk of harm to others. The parking lot operator's policy and other
circumstances were the reasons the defendants owed a duty. But here,
Cornucopia's policy was to keep the keys in a locked cabinet and have the
dispatcher on duty take inventory of them twice every shift. The record contains
no suggestion the Avenel facility is in a high-crime area. The other extenuating
circumstances present in Hill are not present here.
The fact the van was taken by an employee with access further
distinguishes this case from Hill. Cornucopia had even less reason to suspect
an employee would take a van for their own personal use—presumably it would
not have hired the employee if it had had that suspicion. Cornucopia's policies
prohibited employees from taking the delivery vans for their own use, and an
employee could be terminated for violating that policy.
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We decline to follow plaintiffs' argument that the unauthorized use of the
van and the accident were sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty upon
Cornucopia. According to Bello, this was the first time an employee had used a
delivery van for his own use. Further, even if it was foreseeable an employee
would steal one of the vans, Cornucopia could not have known Knight —who
had no prior accidents as a driver for the company and was presumably
accustomed to driving during early morning hours—would doze off at the wheel
and collide with Richard. See Johnson v. Usdin Louis Co., 248 N.J. Super. 525,
530 (App. Div. 1991) (finding it was unforeseeable an employee would steal
nitric oxide from his employer and throw it on his family members).
We also reject plaintiffs' argument Cornucopia was negligent in
promoting Knight to a dispatcher position after his license was suspended and
he could no longer work as a driver. A license suspension alone does not suggest
an employee is deceitful or prone to theft. The mere fact Knight had his license
suspended would not put Cornucopia on notice that he would use its vehicle in
violation of company policy. Knight's disciplinary record at Cornucopia was
unblemished, and he had never before been accused of theft or similar conduct.
We also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Amazon.
Plaintiffs asserted a theory of vicarious liability, arguing that, although
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Cornucopia was an independent contractor of Amazon, Amazon retained control
of the manner and means of Cornucopia's operations, subjecting it to liability
for Cornucopia's actions. Because we agree Cornucopia is not liable for the
accident—this theory falls apart.
Any remaining arguments raised by plaintiffs are without sufficient merit
to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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