Siria Hernandez and Felix Pereyra v. La Fortaleza, Inc. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0367-22
SIRIA HERNANDEZ and FELIX
PEREYRA, her husband,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LA FORTALEZA, INC., 1
Defendant-Respondent,
and
JAMES ZANAKIS, GHI
CORPORATION, and GHI INC.,
Defendants.
_______________________________
Submitted November 14, 2023 – Decided January 5, 2024
Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2877-19.
1
We note defendant-respondent is identified in the record as both La Fortaleza,
INC. and La Fortaleza Restaurant, INC.
McHugh and Imbornone, PA, attorneys for appellants
(Salvatore Imbornone, Jr., on the brief).
Kenneth Lowell Rose, attorneys for respondent
(Kenneth L. Rose, of counsel and on the brief; Jeffrey
M. Zajac, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Siria Hernandez (Hernandez) and Felix Pereyra (Pereyra), her
husband, appeal from a September 26, 2022 order dismissing with prejudice
their complaint, and an October 17, 2022 order awarding defendant La
Fortaleza, Inc.'s attorney's fees and costs. We affirm.
We glean the facts and procedural history from the trial and motion
records. Hernandez alleges that she "was caused to slip and fall on an uneven
and raised defect [of] the walking surface" on defendant's property. The matter
proceeded to a virtual trial, with the issue of defendant's liability to be tried first.
The trial began on July 26, 2022. In discussing some of the mechanics of
the virtual trial, the attorneys and the trial judge reviewed where witnesses could
be seated and the presentation of exhibits. Hernandez' attorney stated "she
w[ould] be the first witness and [he] w[ould] not talk to her about her testimony
at any time during the testimony, even if [they] br[oke] for lunch."
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Hernandez was summoned as the first witness. The trial judge explained
to her "you must be alone in the room from where you provide your testimony,
except the co-plaintiff, your husband may also be in the room."
During Hernandez' direct testimony, her attorney showed a photograph of
the restaurant and "the area where the fall occurred." The following exchange
transpired:
Attorney: Now, do you see the area where you fell?
Hernandez: Yes. On my way to the bench, on my way
over there.
Attorney: And where - - where did you fall in
comparison to where the lady in red is standing?
Hernandez: It was more or less on my way - - on my
way to the bench, around there, right there.
Attorney: Now, are you able, Ms. Hernandez, to use
the cursor on your computer to point to the area where
you fell?
Hernandez: Let me see. Like that, on my way there, I
tripped on my way there and that's when I fell, on my
way.
At this point, the trial judge interjected:
Trial judge: Okay. No one can tell you anything in
your room. Is anybody speaking to you?
Hernandez: Give me a second. My husband.
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....
Trial judge: Okay. I need your husband to stand behind
you while you're doing this.
Hernandez: Okay.
Trial judge: And, Mr. Pereyra, you must remain quiet
and not say anything or - - we need you to stand back,
sir. Okay. Somebody is talking in the room that's not
visible on the screen. Nobody can be telling Ms.
Hernandez what to do.
Hernandez' attorney explained that Hernandez was having trouble manipulating
the cursor on the screen. Therefore, the court recessed the trial for lunch. The
trial judge instructed Hernandez' attorney to "straighten[] out" issues with the
exhibits and the utilization of the cursor.
Defense counsel raised an objection asserting "[o]n [the] critical issue of
liability of this nature, no coaching is tolerable, zero coaching." The trial judge
reiterated the point to plaintiffs' attorney:
Nobody else should be in the room but her husband. I
made that clear. That was the oath. If anybody else is
in that room, they must leave. Her husband must be
visible meaning behind her. He is not to open his
mouth, do you understand that, until it is his
opportunity to testify.
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During the recess the following conversation between Hernandez,
Pereyra, and their attorney was recorded2:
[Attorney]: This is the important part of the case. You
show this picture, okay? Okay? and I'm going to say,
I don't know if we got this far already but do you
recognize this picture? Yes. This side of the
restaurant? Does it show – does it fairly and accurately
show the way the restaurant looked on the day that you
fell? Yes. You must say that or the picture cannot be
good. Okay? So, I want you – and the answer has to
be, yes, because if you say, no, we can't do it. But you
will say the same thing, I'm going to ask you the same
question later.
Anyway, okay. Do you see – do you see the bench that
you were going to at the time you fell? You're going to
answer, yes, right. And I will say to you, I'm going to
move the cursor – and I will say I'm going to move the
cursor. You tell me where is the bench? So, when I get
up here, just, right there. Okay? The bench, right next
to the lady. Okay? Okay.
Now in this picture, do you see where you fell and I'm
going to put it right where the – where the bench – from
where the bench it, where did you fall?
I will move the map. It's out of the (indiscernible). So,
after we identify the bench, I'm going to put the [cursor]
right here now and say, do you see the area where you
fell? Yes. Okay. Now, how do I have to move the –
you – because it has to be her voice. How do I move
2
The judge explained "Courtsmart . . . was not running . . . . [h]owever because
judiciary staff was in the courtroom, the[] back-up recording system . . . [was]
running . . . . [and] record[ed] the dialogue between [p]laintiff[s'] . . . trial
counsel . . . and [p]laintiffs."
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the cursor to find the place where you fell? So you
should - -
Pereyra: Back.
[Attorney]: Okay. So, down, right, like that?
[Attorney]: So, you say, move down. So, I'm going to
move it, move it, move it. You have to tell me when to
stop. Right there, right? Okay. How about this
distance from the curb? Would it be right this way or
further here? It would be in the middle?
Pereyra: Yeah.
[Attorney]: Okay. So, we're going to – first we find
the bench. That's the easy part. Then I'm going to say,
okay, I'm going to put the cursor right in front of the
bench. Now, tell me how to move the cursor to show
how you fell and what you would have to say, you have
to move – you could either say down or to the camera,
okay, which you prefer.
(Plaintiffs speaking in Spanish).
[Attorney]: Okay. So, you're saying down? So, I'll
say, okay, I'm going to start to move it down and tell
me when to stop. I'm going to go down, down, down,
down, down.
Hernandez: Stop.
[Attorney]: Okay. How about this way now, from
curb?
(Plaintiffs speaking Spanish).
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[Attorney]: Well, here or further? Right in the middle?
Okay. Good.
Pereyra: You don't have to say exactly in the middle.
When we move it like this, you say, stop. Stop right
there like this here. It doesn't have to go exactly in the
middle –
[Attorney]: Okay.
Pereyra: -- because the middle, how come she
(indiscernible) exactly in the middle. She don't know
After the recess, the trial judge reiterated her instructions that Pereyra "remain
behind [Hernandez] in a chair" and "he should not be opening his mouth to say
anything."
Defense counsel "continu[ed the] objection about coaching." Further,
defense counsel advised that plaintiffs' attorney's microphone was on during
recess and he "listened to [plaintiff's attorney] coaching the witness with the
witness' husband." Defense counsel requested a mistrial.
In response to the trial judge's question regarding whether "there was any
additional coaching to the witness" "during the . . . break," plaintiffs' attorney
stated that he "did show the witness the scenario of moving the cursor along the
exhibit."
The trial judge polled the jurors, to make certain they had not overheard
the recess conversation. The judge concluded the "jury itself was not tainted."
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The parties returned to virtual court the following day. Defense counsel
renewed his request for a mistrial or, alternatively, a dismissal of plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice. The trial judge, after listening to the recording, found:
(1) plaintiffs and their counsel had already been warned against coaching; (2)
she "had to direct plaintiffs not to offer each other advice or direct each other
how to answer"; (3) she "had to direct th[e] litigants to sit together on screen
so[] as to remove any resemblance of impropriety"; and (4) plaintiffs' attorney
"exacerbated the concerns of coaching by sharing his screen unmuted during a
recess and revealing conversations . . . to be coaching the witnesses, to direct as
to where the slip and fall occurred in the liability only portion of a bifurcated
trial."
The trial judge concluded that she was compelled to declare a mistrial.
She determined a mistrial was necessary because Hernandez was in the middle
of her testimony and there was a "possibility of taint as to a critical issue in a
liability only bifurcated trial—where . . . Hernandez fell." Moreover, "[t]he
prejudicial effect in this circumstance [wa]s far too great and balance weigh[ed]
too heavy in [the] misadministration [of] justice, that there [wa]s nothing that
c[ould] be done other than to order a mistrial . . . ."
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The trial judge ordered "[p]laintiffs and/or their [c]ounsel . . . to reimburse
the [c]ourt for the costs of the interpreter and court services, which is the
transcription . . . ." Further, the judge permitted defendant to file a "motion for
dismissal with prejudice . . . . due to the issues of fundamental prejudice . . . ."
On September 23, 2023, the judge heard the parties' arguments on
defendant's motion for dismissal with prejudice. As part of her review, she noted
that her court clerk and two bilingual paralegals from defense counsel's office
heard the recess conversation. Therefore, in addition to the transcript of the
conversation, she considered the that "the court clerk confirmed that [plaintiffs'
attorney] was attempting to facilitate a response to generate a factual possibility
of liability." Moreover, she noted one of the paralegals certified that
"Hernandez state[d] that she thought she tripped by the bench when shown a
photo by [plaintiffs' attorney] pointing out where she fell." Further, the other
paralegal certified that she "heard [Hernandez] state that it had been so long she
didn't remember where she fell, which had not been interpreted by the court
supplied interpreter."
In considering plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss, the judge
noted plaintiffs did not rebut the paralegals' statements. Further, plaintiffs'
argument that "it was clear from [Hernandez'] deposition testimony and her
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meeting with the expert that she was aware of the location of her fall" was
unavailing because Hernandez testified that she "did not go to where the incident
happened with the expert."
On September 26, 2023, the judge entered an order dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice; accompanied by a thoughtful and well-reasoned
written opinion. The judge explained:
The record before this court is unambiguous, and this
court finds cause to dismiss this action with prejudice.
The conduct of the attorney here to invite a client to
state that an accident occurred in a particular place
when she had no independent recollection to resolve the
issues of liability where she was the only witness to the
fall itself introduces prejudice too great to present to the
finder of fact. The well of information that could be
presented to the jury has been forever poisoned. There
is no way to sufficiently determine that [p]laintiff can
testify, especially considering that [p]laintiff had no
recollection of her own fall and her attorney invited her
to perpetuate a falsity at his direction to create an issue
of liability.
Moreover, [p]laintiff and her counsel, as well as
[p]laintiff's husband, had previously been corrected to
refrain from coaching this witness during testimony.
This court saw it appropriate at that juncture to provide
a limiting instruction and then to direct [p]laintiff and
her counsel that further coaching would not be
tolerated. The directive from her trial attorney was
clear: "this is where you fell." The directive was not
for [p]laintiff to testify as to "where you know that you
fell or answer that you do not know." The directive was
to create a falsity and commit fraud on this court. Such
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is not tolerable. The bell cannot be unrung;
[p]laintiff[s'] testimony will be forever tainted by the
directive of [p]laintiff[s'] trial counsel.
The judge required "[p]laintiff[s]' counsel to pay [defendant's] attorney's fees
and costs associated with trial and th[e] motion of [d]efendant." The judge
instructed defendant's attorney "to submit an affidavit of attorney's fees within
[fourteen] days and permitted [p]laintiff[s]' trial counsel . . . to file an objection
to the affidavit within [ten] days after its filing." Defense counsel filed an
affidavit in support of attorney's fees, which plaintiffs did not oppose.
Therefore, on October 17, 2022, the judge ordered plaintiffs' attorney to pay
defense counsel the sum of $20,640 within thirty days. 3
Here, Hernandez argues the trial judge erred in the exercise of her
discretion because: (1) there was no fraud on the court and (2) the sanction of
dismissal is "too severe." We disagree.
"Findings by [a] trial judge are considered binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort,
Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Therefore,
our appellate function is a limited one: we do not
disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so
3
On May 4, 2023, we ordered a stay of the payment of attorney's fees pending
appeal. Plaintiff posted a supersedeas bond in accordance with Rule 2:9-5.
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manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice, and the appellate
court therefore ponders whether, on the contrary, there
is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's
findings and conclusions.
[Ibid. (internal citations omitted).]
The concept of fraud on the court applies to "a scheme to interfere with
the judicial machinery performing the task of impartial adjudication, as by
preventing the opposing party from fairly presenting his [or her] case or
defense." Hyland v. Kirkman, 204 N.J. Super. 345, 374 (Ch. Div. 1985)
(quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.
1976)). "A finding of fraud on the court is justified only by the most egregious
misconduct directed to the court itself, such as . . . fabrication of evidence by
counsel . . . ." Ibid. In Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J.
Super. 237, 251 (App. Div. 2007), we held:
[a] fraud on the court occurs "where it can be
demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has
sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme
calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability
impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly
influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the
presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense."
Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st
Cir. 1989); Perna Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F.Supp.
388, 397 (D.N.J. 1995). Unlike common law fraud on
a party, fraud on a court does not require reliance.
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Separate and distinct from court rules and statutes,
courts possess an inherent power to sanction an
individual for committing fraud on the court. See e.g.
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Perna,
916 F.Supp. at 388.
We conclude there is "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence" to
support the judge's finding that plaintiffs and their attorney committed a fraud
on the court. Rova, 65 N.J. at 484. Initially, Pereyra failed to comply with the
judge's instruction on coaching Hernandez. Ultimately, the judge required
Pereyra to stay in screen view by standing behind Hernandez. The judge
admonished plaintiffs' attorney that Pereyra "should not be opening his mouth
to say anything."
Moreover, plaintiffs' attorney, after indicating he would "not talk to
[Hernandez] about her testimony at any time during the testimony, even if we
break for lunch," proceeded "to perpetuate a falsity" by inviting, indeed
directing, Hernandez to create an issue of liability by "stat[ing] that an accident
occurred in a particular place when she had no independent recollection ."
This conduct "set in motion [an] unconscionable scheme calculated to
interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by
improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the
opposing party's claim or defense." Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118.
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A dismissal with prejudice is a drastic remedy, to be employed "only
sparingly." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253 (1982). In determining
whether a trial court has abused its discretion4 in dismissing an action with
prejudice, we are guided by the manner in which the trial court has balanced the
following factors:
(1) the degree of the wrongdoer's culpability; (2) the
extent of the client's blameworthiness if the wrongful
conduct is committed by its attorney, recognizing that
we seldom dismiss claims against blameless clients; (3)
the prejudice to the judicial process and the
administration of justice; (4) the prejudice to the
victim; (5) the availability of other sanctions to rectify
the wrong by punishing culpable persons,
compensating harmed persons, and deterring similar
conduct in the future; and (6) the public interest.
[United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462
(4th Cir. 1993)5]
In employing this standard, we find no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision
to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.
4
Abtrax Pharms. v. Elkins-Sinn, 139 N.J. 499, 517 (1995) ("[T]he standard of
review for dismissal of a complaint with prejudice . . . is whether the trial court
abused its discretion, a standard that cautions appellate courts not to interfere
unless an injustice appears to have been done.")
5
The factors identified in Shaffer were relied upon in Perna which we cited
with approval in Triffin, and thus serve as a useful guide here.
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In determining culpability, the judge described the evidence as
"unambiguous." She found plaintiffs' attorney provided a directive to
Hernandez, regarding the location of the accident despite Hernandez having "no
independent recollection" of where she fell. Moreover, the attorney's actions
followed the judge's warnings and corrective instruction involving Pereyra's
coaching Hernandez on this same subject. Plaintiffs' and their attorney's
culpability are firmly established.
Further, plaintiffs share the blame in the fraud. Pereyra, despite
instructions from the judge, coached Hernandez during trial and recess regarding
the purported location of her fall. In addition, neither Pereyra nor Hernandez
resisted their attorney's coaching. Instead, they were willing participants in a
scheme to provide false testimony in an ongoing trial.
Moreover, plaintiffs' and their attorney's actions "prejudice[d] . . . the
judicial process and the administration of justice." Ibid. Prejudice is self-
evident when an attorney directs a client to testify to the location of an accident
when the client has no independent recollection. From that point forward,
Hernandez' every utterance was suspect and her case, the "judicial process," and
"the administration of justice" were "poisoned" and "tainted" as a result.
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Similarly, defendant was prejudiced by the coaching and "falsified"
testimony. From its opening statement, defendant asserted that Hernandez'
testimony was "very inconsistent" and she "did not know where she fell."
Therefore, defendant suffered prejudice as a result of adverse counsel coaching
Hernandez and directing her testimony as to the location of the fall in a liability
only trial when Hernandez had "no independent recollection."
Under these circumstances, plaintiffs' and their attorney's actions
compelled the judge to impose the ultimate sanction of a dismissal with
prejudice. As the judge explained, "the bell cannot be unrung; [p]laintiff's
testimony will be forever tainted by the directive of [p]laintiff[s]' trial counsel."
We find no monetary sanction or further corrective instructions could remove
the "taint," permeating throughout plaintiffs' claim.
Plaintiffs' suggestion the "[t]rial [c]ourt could have imposed lesser
sanctions such as barring [Hernandez] from further testifying at trial and
allowing her case to proceed with the testimony of [Pereyra] and [the] expert to
prove liability," is unavailing. Pereyra was already implicated in the fraud, as
he coached Hernandez during trial and during the recess. Also, his testimony
was similarly tainted by his attorney's "directive." Further, Hernandez testified
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that she "did not go to where the incident happened with the expert," so the
expert's testimony is similarly untrustworthy.
Lastly, the public interest is served by a dismissal with prejudice. "A
misrepresentation to a tribunal 'is a most serious breach of ethics because it
affects directly the administration of justice.'" In re Forrest, 158 N.J. 428, 437
(1999) (quoting In re Johnson, 102 N.J. 504, 510 (1986)). Therefore, dismissal
warns plaintiffs and their attorney that their behavior will not be tolerated and
that their conduct was so egregious as to cause them to suffer a "drastic
remedy"—the loss of their cause of action. Moreover, it informs other litigants
that they risk dismissal if they commit a fraud on the court. Finally, it confirms
for the public's benefit that the judicial system, while adversarial, requires
truthfulness and candor above all else. See RPC 3.3 (Candor Toward the
Tribunal). The public is served by nothing less.
Plaintiffs argue the judge abused her discretion in ordering them to pay
defendant's attorney's fees and costs. We note plaintiffs did not oppose the fee
application and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. "[A]ppellate courts
will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial
court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available . . . ." J.K. v. N.J.
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State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200
N.J. 1, 20 (2009)).
Nonetheless, Rule 2:10-2 provides:
Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the
appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have
been clearly capable of producing an unjust result, but
the appellate court may, in the interests of justice,
notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial
or appellate court.
"Relief under the plain error rule, R[ule] 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is
discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank,
161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)).
Further, the rule sets "a 'high bar,' requiring reversal only where the possibility
of an injustice is 'real' and 'sufficient . . . .'" State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 527
(2020) (first quoting State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019); and then
quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 326 (1971)).
Since plaintiffs failed to oppose the application before the trial judge and
failed, here, to address "plain error," we decline to consider their arguments on
the award of defendant's attorney's fees and costs.
Affirmed. We hereby vacate our order of May 4, 2023 staying the
payment of the attorney's and costs.
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