State of New Jersey, Etc. v. 3.723-Acres of Land in the Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, Ocean County, Etc. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0608-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
by the DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
3.723-ACRES OF LAND IN THE
BOROUGH OF POINT PLEASANT
BEACH, OCEAN COUNTY, NEW
JERSEY, POINT PLEASANT
BEACH & SURF CLUB, INC., a
New Jersey corporation, fee owner.
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Argued February 12, 2024 – Decided February 21, 2024
Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-3077-17.
Peter H. Wegener argued the cause for appellant
(Bathgate, Wegener & Wolf, attorneys; Peter H.
Wegener, on the briefs).
Richard G. Scott argued the cause for respondent
(Rutter & Roy, LLP, attorneys; Brian Welch Keatts, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Point Pleasant Beach & Surf Club, Inc. appeals from: a July 1,
2022 order fixing just compensation for a taking by plaintiff New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) following a jury trial; an August
12, 2022 order denying defendant's judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), a new trial, or additur; and an October 5, 2022 final judgment. We
affirm.
This dispute concerns an eminent domain action commenced by the DEP
for a storm drain reduction easement (SDRE) on a 3.723 acre property with 540
feet of frontage located at the north end of the Manasquan Inlet to the Barnegat
Inlet Storm Damage Reduction Project in Point Pleasant. The DEP and the
United States Army Corps of Engineers created the project to protect the New
Jersey shoreline by constructing a dune and berm system.
Defendant is the owner of property on Point Pleasant Beach consisting of
sand beaches on two adjoining, unbuildable recreational beach lots that extend
to the mean high-water line. It has operated the property as a beach club and
sells memberships and beach badges to the public. An SDRE was proposed to
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encompass both of defendant's lots and the construction of a dune averaging 178
feet long and approximately twenty-two feet high. A dune or beach berm was
planned to extend the mean-high-water line and expand beach area.
In November 2017, the DEP filed a condemnation complaint under the
Eminent Domain Act, N.J.S.A. 20:3-1 to -47, against defendant. In December
2017, the court entered a final judgment declaring the DEP duly exercised its
power of eminent domain, and appointed commissioners to examine the land
and fix the compensation to be paid. Following a hearing, the commissioners
issued their report setting forth the fair market value of the property.
Defendant appealed from the report of the commissioners. The DEP filed
a notice of appeal from the report of commissioners and a jury demand. The
trial court granted the appeal from the commissioners' award and granted the
request for a jury trial.
Pre-trial, defendant moved to bar a portion of the DEP's appraisal expert's
testimony on net opinion grounds. The trial judge denied the motion because it
was the eve of trial and defendant had not filed a timely motion to bar.
The matter was tried over the course of four days. On the third day of
trial, the DEP served an updated appraisal report. On July 1, 2022, the jury
returned a verdict awarding defendant $75,245 in just compensation.
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The judge denied defendant's post-judgment motions for JNOV or
alternatively for a new trial or additur. He reasoned the only way he could grant
JNOV was if the DEP's expert testimony were denied in its entirety, and he had
already denied defendant's pre-trial motion to bar the expert's report and
testimony. The judge denied the motion for a new trial because both parties
presented expert testimony from their appraisers who both "gave lengthy,
detailed testimony as to . . . the value of the . . . property both before and after
the taking. Moreover, both experts explained and justified their respective
methodology in arriving at their opinions as to those values." And "both . . .
were extensively cross-examined whereby their methodology was challenged."
The judge concluded the experts' credibility was a matter for the jury to decide.
The trial judge noted the law requires clear and convincing evidence the
jury verdict constituted a miscarriage of justice to overturn the verdict. The
record lacked such evidence because "real estate appraisal is not an exact
science" and the appraisers, "in arriving at their values, make certain
adjustments based upon [an] assumption[] of facts they believe to be present.
That was certainly done by both appraisers here. More importantly, . . . bo th
appraisers gave the 'why and wherefore' justifying their methodology." The
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judge also concluded there was "no basis for an additur . . . [because] the jury
verdict was in excess of [the DEP expert's] opinion as to value."
I.
Defendant argues the pre-trial ruling denying its motion to bar the expert's
testimony because it was untimely was wrong, because Rule 4:46-1's
requirement that the motion be returnable thirty days before trial or with twenty-
eight days' notice is permissive and not intended to allow unqualified net
opinions to reach the jury. Defendant asserts the trial judge should have
adjudicated the motion on the merits and ruled on its net opinion objection. 1
"Unless otherwise ordered or permitted by the court," Rule 4:25-8(a)(2)
directs that motions in limine be served seven days prior to trial with the pre-
trial exchange of information, pursuant to Rule 4:25-7(b). Pre-trial summary
judgment motions must be returnable no less than thirty days before trial unless
the court otherwise orders for good cause shown. R. 4:46-1.
At the outset we note, defendant's argument its pre-trial motion was not
dispositive is belied by the fact that it also argues the court should have heard
it, notwithstanding the timelines set forth under Rule 4:46-1. Whether a motion
states it is for summary judgment is not controlling. Rather, if the effect of the
1
We address the net opinion issue in section II.
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motion is to seek the termination of an action, adequate notice of the sort
envisioned by Rule 4:46-1 is required. Indeed, the filing or consideration of a
dispositive in limine motion is not permitted. R. 4:25-8(a)(1). As Rule 4:25-
8(a)(1) states: "A dispositive motion falling outside the purview of this rule
would include, but not be limited to, an application to bar an expert's testimony
in which such testimony is required as a matter of law to sustain a party's burden
of proof."
Defendant's pre-trial motion sought to strike the main conclusion of the
DEP expert's testimony, crippling the DEP's ability to carry its burden of proof.
This would leave defendant's appraisal expert as the only expert testimony on
value submitted to the jury. For these reasons, the trial court properly declined
to adjudicate the untimely motion.
II.
Defendant challenges the trial judge's post-judgment motion rulings. It
argues a new trial should have been granted because the DEP expert's testimony
was a net opinion, and it was a clear miscarriage of justice for the jury to rely
upon it without the judge first scrutinizing it.
Defendant cites several alleged flaws with the DEP expert's report. It
claims the expert's methodology was flawed because she based the after-taking
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value of the property on the presence of an "elevated beach berm," which
provided added protection to the property, but there was no such berm built.
The DEP expert claimed she calculated the value of the property using the
income approach yet did not account for defendant's argument the appraisal was
invalid, because it did not consider that N.J.A.C. 7:7-16.9 limits an owner's
ability to charge for access to the beach from its property to operating expenses.
In other words, the property was not a revenue generator for defendant, and it
was not a consideration for appraisal purposes.
Further, the DEP expert relied on paired sales using properties that were
not comparable to defendant's, namely, buildable beach lots that were not
subject to an easement. The expert considered the loss of exclusivity as a
function of how the property was being used by defendant, when she should
have viewed it as a property right that could no longer be transferred to a
prospective purchaser. And the DEP appraisal violated the Uniform Appraisal
Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (UASFLA) because it only addressed
"the current management practices of the present owners and not the loss of the
property interest conveyed." The UASFLA requires the assessor to consider the
price a prospective buyer is willing to pay before an easement is imposed ,
compared to the price they are willing to pay after.
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"A jury verdict, although not sacrosanct, is entitled to great deference."
Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 203 N.J. 464, 492 (2010). "The standard for
granting a [JNOV] is essentially the same as that applicable to the grant of a new
trial motion." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 4:40-
2 (2024). "A motion for a new trial or, alternatively, an additur, based on a
claim that a jury award was against the weight of the evidence, should not be
granted unless it 'clearly and convincingly appears' that the award was so
deficient that it constitutes a 'miscarriage of justice.'" Long Branch, 203 N.J. at
492 (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 596 (1977)); see also R.
4:49-1.
The court shall give "due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon
the credibility of the witnesses" in deciding if "there was a miscarriage of justice
under the law." R. 4:49-1(a). A "'miscarriage of justice' can arise when there is
a 'manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding,' when
there has been an 'obvious overlooking or under-valuation of crucial evidence,'
or when the case culminates in 'a clearly unjust result.'" Hayes v. Delamotte,
231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc.,
206 N.J. 506, 521-22 (2011)). We review a trial court's denial of a motion for a
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JNOV or new trial applying the same standard as the trial court. Smith v.
Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 397 (2016).
"Our review of the trial court's evidential rulings 'is limited to examining
the decision for abuse of discretion.'" Ehrlich v. Sorokin, 451 N.J. Super. 119,
128 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7, 16 (App. Div.
2015)). On appeal, we do not substitute our judgment "for that of the trial court,
unless the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of
justice resulted." State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)).
Expert testimony must be grounded in "facts or data derived from (1) the
expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data
relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but
which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts . . . ." Polzo v. Cnty.
of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008) (quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473,
494 (2006)). "The net opinion rule . . . forbids the admission into evidence of
an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data."
Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53-54 (2015). "To avoid a net opinion, the
expert must 'give the why and wherefore' that supports the opinion." Ehrlich,
451 N.J. Super. at 134 (quoting Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54).
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The DEP expert opined the before-taking value of defendant's property
was $1,033,400 and the after value, with mitigation, was $1,020,700. Therefore,
defendant was entitled to the difference as just compensation for the taking of
$12,700. Her report noted she sent a certified letter of inspection to defendant
on September 26, 2016, advising she intended to inspect the property on October
12, 2016. However, defendant did not respond to the letter. Therefore, she
inspected the property on November 3, 2017, "from public areas." She also
looked at the property on September 28, 2016.
The expert reviewed market data including "deeds recorded at respective
counties, tax assessors' property data records, actual measurements . . . ,
inspection and photographs taken by [her], verifications with parties to the sale
including either the buyer, seller, attorney, or broker. Other sources include[d]
aerial photographs taken from either Bing.com or Google.com websites." She
confirmed all the relevant data "to the fullest possible extent, with buyers and
sellers, real estate brokers or appraisers, and attorneys, and also through analysis
of deeds and mortgage documents." She summarized the data she analyzed as
follows:
A) Demographic Information regarding the
subject County and Municipality spanning 2007
to 2017. Geographic area included all of the
State of New Jersey from 2007 to 2017.
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B) Point Pleasant Beach Borough Market
Information including average home sale prices,
days on the market and number of homes sold for
the time period including 2007 to 2017.
C) Site Specific Information
1) Site Inspection
2) Land Area
3) Site Improvement information
a) Square Footage
b) Site Description and Use
4) Zoning
5) Assessment Data
D) Sales Data
1) Beach Land Sales along the New Jersey
Shoreline from 2007 to 2017.
The expert explained she considered the cost, sales comparison, and the
income approaches to valuation. Under the cost approach, "[a] reproduction or
replacement cost new for the improvements is first determined, then total
depreciation and obsolescence from all causes is deducted in order to determine
an improvement value." Because defendant's property is recreational beach
land, there were minor improvements to the subject property.
The expert defined the income capitalization approach as deriving value
based on a property's "earning capability . . . calculated by the capitalization of
[the] property['s] income." She concluded the income capitalization approach
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was not a proper methodology because defendant's property is privately owned
and defendant does not have a permit to sell beach badges. She also declined to
employ this valuation method because defendant did not provide her with its
financial records until April 2022.
The expert explained the sales comparison (paired sales) approach derives
value by "comparing sales of similar properties to the properties being
appraised, identifying appropriate units of comparison, and making adjustments
to the sale prices . . . of comparable properties based on relevant, market-derived
elements of comparison." She noted this approach "may be used to value
improved properties, vacant land, or land being considered as though vacant
when an adequate supply of comparable sales are available . . . ." However, this
approach depends on "(a) the availability of comparable sales data, (b) the
verification of sales data, (c) the degree of comparability of extent of
adjustments necessary for time differences, and (d) the absence of nontypical
conditions affecting the sales prices . . . ." The expert concluded the sale
comparison method was "a relevant and good method of valuation" for
defendant's property because it is a private recreational beach and there was an
"availability of recreational beach land sales in New Jersey."
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The expert searched for comparable properties, which had a dune to
discern if the dune added value. She explained how she found two beach front
homes in Point Pleasant and compared the respective heights of their dunes. She
further adjusted for the number of bathrooms, square footage, central air, beach
square footage, land size, and a garage. She found that after "all the
adjustments . . . , it shows . . . there's a [ten] percent benefit to a property with a
higher dune. . . . [I]f you have a dune out on the beach in front of you, you're
willing to pay a little bit more because you know your property's protected."
The expert concluded there was a five percent loss of value because of the
loss of exclusivity by virtue of the fact the public could access the property.
However, this factor did not have much weight because "hotel guests are on the
site, [and] seasonal pass[] members are on the site. You have the public trust
doctrine and you also have the boardwalk right of way." The expert testified the
taking did not affect defendant's rights to occupy the property, lease it to local
motels, mortgage, sell, or gift it.
In addition to the height of the dune, the DEP expert considered the "beach
blanket" depth, meaning the impact of the dune on the area of sand used by
beachgoers. She noted that before the taking defendant "had 238 feet that you
could lay your blanket down on. . . . And then . . . after they put the dune on[,]
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. . . you can't put your blanket on the dune, they'll have 120 feet." She noted
"[t]he front of the property and the ocean frontage is where everyone goes.
That's where it's used. That's where the value is." Even though defendant "lost
some beach blanket area. [She] also took into consideration the extra [fifty-five]
feet that the Army Corps or the State was going to create of more beach blanket
depth." Therefore, the area added by the Army Corps "offset any value lost
because they would have a right to . . . use of that extra [fifty-five] feet that was
created." The expert further adjusted the value by the fact defendant would have
to purchase a tidelands license to use the fifty-five-foot stretch of land created
by the Army Corps. The license would cost $5,300.21 over a period of fifty
years.
It is readily apparent the DEP's appraisal nowhere near approximated a
net opinion. The expert methodically explained the factors she considered and
rejected, the data sources she relied upon, and how she balanced the facts against
the data to arrive at an opinion of value. We discern no error in admitting the
DEP expert's opinion.
Defendant's attack on the expert's methodology and the value judgments
she made in appraising the just compensation was explored by the thorough
cross-examination conducted of the expert by defense counsel. However, the
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alleged flaws in the appraisal the defense identifies on appeal do not convince
us the expert's opinion was inadmissible. Indeed, paired sales methodology, the
loss of exclusivity, and the height of the beach berm were all legitimate
considerations for the appraisal, and all were explained by the expert. It was for
the jury to accept or reject the expert's methodology rationale, and the
thoroughness of the appraisal. These issues were not only explored during the
defense's cross-examination, but also by adducing testimony from defendant's
appraiser.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the DEP expert's
opinion. Likewise, he did not err in denying defendant a JNOV, a new trial, or
additur. Defendant's remaining arguments on this issue, including the UASFLA
argument, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
III.
Defendant claims DEP counsel's summation invited the jury to speculate
about facts not in evidence because counsel claimed DEP's expert could not use
an income approach for valuation because she did not have defendant's financial
information—implying defendant withheld it. Further, DEP's counsel misled
the jury by defining the income valuation approach as income or revenue, rather
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than net profit. Defendant emphasizes the expert never conducted an income
approach valuation, yet DEP counsel led the jury to conclude that "data supplied
by the operating statements would support a conclusion under the income
approach consistent with [the expert's] after value opinion."
Counsel has "broad latitude in closing arguments." Tartaglia v. UBS
PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 83 (2008) (citing Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J.
411, 431 (2006)). "Comments during summation, however, should be centered
on the truth and counsel should not 'misstate the evidence nor distort the factual
picture.'" Ibid. (quoting Bender, 187 N.J. at 431).
"[W]hen a lawyer observes an adversary's summation, and concludes that
the gist of the evidence has been unfairly characterized, an objection will be
advanced." Fertile v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 169 N.J. 481, 495 (2001). If no
objection was advanced we review for plain error. Id. at 493. Under that
standard, we "disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as to have
been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Funderburg, 225
N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2).
Defendant cites the following passages from DEP counsel's summation as
evidence of impropriety:
We talked about some of the money. I know
[defense counsel] said in the closing he didn't want to
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call it profit. It's a profit. It doesn't matter, it's on the
profit approach, the income approach so the income
that matters that allows you to do the approach. We
looked at the book, right, the appraiser Bible there and
what did we learn? . . . Any property that has the
potential to earn income can be utilized for the income
approach, right?
And there seemed to be some confusion
when . . . [defendant's expert] was up here, as to
whether the club was a nonprofit, it's not a nonprofit.
We also learned it doesn't matter. He can apply the
income approach to a nonprofit or for profit, it doesn't
matter. Nonprofit to try to make it zero out after
revenue, to stay nonprofit. But as the numbers showed,
there is a profit moreover there's revenue, there is
income every year before and after.
....
[DEP's expert] didn't have that information and couldn't
have possibly done one. The[re's a] reasonable
inference as to why someone may have not done it or
not supplied the information.
The defense did not object to this portion of the summation.
Defendant also cites to the following portion of the summation:
Revenue . . . income before six figures every year
$145,000, the company was earning income every year
even after expenses, they're making a profit every year,
several thousand dollars. Now, while this doesn't
include taxes the way we made this chart . . . the taxes
were about [forty percent], and you['re] still going to be
like [sixty percent] . . . profit. Again[,] not necessarily
a profit income.
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So, . . . these other charts will show you the same
thing in essence . . . [The i]ncome approach wasn't
available to [our expert]. Didn't use it. I would submit
to you based on everything you heard you absolutely
should have done it, the way she appraised things, and
the testimony she was able to give it to you when she
finally got it, just supports the position you heard from
her.
....
They're still making money right, right? Six
figure profits every year.
....
Hotel revenue, forty-one grand, in the [forties]
before and after again a little less in this example
because it's Covid. But you can see the motels
confirmed it. The motels are still using the property,
right. They're still paying to use the property. And this
talk about, I'm not talking about a code but talks about
only charging operating expenses and the like. That
relates as we got a witness to admit to the public
(indiscernible) beach badge. It doesn't relate to what
(indiscernible)—
At this point defense counsel objected and there was a sidebar, which was not
recorded.
We are unconvinced the unobjected to portion of the summation was
clearly capable of producing an unjust result. The facts show the expert did not
receive defendant's books and records to do a more complete analysis under the
income approach. The portion of the summation the defense did object to does
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not rise to reversible error because DEP's counsel was commenting on
defendant's financial records, which defendant had a witness testify about, and
was addressed in the defense's summation.
Finally, assuming this aspect of the summation was prejudicial, it was
alleviated by the fact the trial judge gave the jury the model charge instructing
them the attorneys' summations were not evidence, and the jury were the judges
of the facts. "Indeed, '[o]ne of the foundations of our jury system is that the jury
is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.'" Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc.,
467 N.J. Super. 42, 79 (App. Div. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State
v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007)). Our review of the record, including the
verdict, which awarded defendant multiples of the just compensation amount the
DEP argued was appropriate, does not convince us the jury ignored the
instruction or that the summation prejudiced the outcome requiring us to reverse
the jury verdict.
Affirmed.
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