State of New Jersey v. Ordale R. Telfair ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2108-21
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ORDALE R. TELFAIR,
a/k/a ORDALE TELFAIR,
ODELL TELFAIR,
ODELL R. TELFAIR,
ORDDALE R. TELFAIR,
ORDALE R. BLITZ,
ORDALE BLITZ, and
BLITZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued February 6, 2024 – Decided February 23, 2024
Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 19-09-0335.
Lauren Stephanie Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer
Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Lauren
Stephanie Michaels, and James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Amanda Gerilyn Schwartz, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General, attorney; Adam David Klein, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ordale R. Telfair appeals from a September 9, 2021 judgment
of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1) and (2), possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(a)(1), and unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1),
and the consecutive sentences imposed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial judge to provide "an
explanation for the overall fairness of [the] sentence" as required by State v.
Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021).
I.
We summarize the pertinent facts adduced at the jury trial relevant to the
claims on appeal. On May 23, 2019, around 8:22 p.m., defendant fatally shot
Tayshon "Sapp" Hayward outside of a Penns Grove apartment complex. The
shooting transpired after Cleon Burden instigated an altercation against Keyshon
Davis, who Burden believed stole money from his wife's vehicle. Burden and
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Davis had fought earlier in the day requiring police intervention. Neither
Hayward nor defendant was involved in the earlier incident.
On the night in question, Burden went to the apartment complex to visit a
cousin and saw Davis there with other men. Feeling outnumbered, Burden left
and enlisted his cousin and a friend to return with him to confront Davis.
Burden's wife drove the men to the apartment complex. Burden's sister arrived
separately in her vehicle. Burden approached Davis and asked him to fight, but
Davis declined. During the exchange, Hayward, who was with Davis, walked
away. Defendant ran after Hayward and fatally shot him in the face.
At trial, Hayward's girlfriend, Porsha Williams, testified she had been
dating and living with Hayward for several months. She had joined him at the
apartment complex on the night in question. Williams witnessed a "dark-
skinned guy with like a mark underneath his eye [and] a bald head" follow
Hayward and shoot at him twice with a handgun. One shot missed, and the other
struck Hayward underneath his eye. She relayed hearing "boots hit the ground
from [the shooter] jumping out [of] the truck." After shooting Hayward, the
man "ran and jumped back inside the truck," and it "pulled off."
During Williams's testimony, the prosecutor, without providing defense
counsel notice, attempted to conduct an in-court identification of defendant.
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Defense counsel had filed multiple motions to suppress witnesses' "[i]n and [o]ut
of" court identifications, which were withdrawn. The identification exchange
was as follows:
Q. This person that shot [Hayward,] did you ever see
him before?
A. No.
Q. No. Do you see him in the courtroom today?
A. No.
Q. You don't see him in the court room today, this
person?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: Asked and answered . . .
[Defense Counsel]: Excuse me-
THE COURT: I said asked and answered.
[Prosecutor]: Judge, I thought she said yes.
THE WITNESS: I said yes.
....
Q. You do. Can you tell us where he's seated?
A. Right there.
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Defense counsel requested a sidebar and objected. He moved for "the
answer [to] be stricken" because Williams had previously "d[one] an array"
where "she picked a different person," and argued a trial could not "be more of
a suggestive atmosphere to do an identification." The judge inquired, "when
you say you want me to strike the answer, do you want me to strike both
answers? Because if I say that answer is stricken, will the jury know which one
I mean[?]" Defense counsel responded that he "assume[d] it would have to be
. . . both answers," though he clarified he was most "concerned about . . . the in -
court identification." The judge advised, "I'm going to say to the jury that the
last answer of the witness is stricken." Defense counsel requested no further
charge. The judge then instructed the jury: "the last answer of the witness is
stricken from the record and the jury will disregard it."
The prosecutor then questioned Williams regarding her out-of-court
identification from a photo array provided by the police of the person she
believed shot Hayward. Williams testified she was "[seventy-five] percent sure"
of her identification.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Williams on her
identification from the photo array. Claiming she "was still . . . kind of in shock"
and had not gotten any sleep, when asked whether the photograph she chose
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"was [of] the person who shot [Hayward]," Porsha responded "[n]o." The
prosecutor later introduced the video of Porsha's photo array through Detective
Salvatore Giuliano's testimony.
The State thereafter called Burden, who testified that after he asked Davis
to fight, a man—later identified as Hayward—walked away stating "he was
going to get a gun." Burden relayed defendant "ran after the . . . guy" who had
walked away, he heard gun shots, and defendant ran back into the car with
Burden. In the car, defendant stated he thought "he hit him in the head or . . .
face." Burden had known defendant since childhood and identified him in court.
Robinson, a woman defendant had recently begun dating, testified that on
the night of the shooting, defendant admitted to shooting Hayward "in the face."
She testified she was scared after learning that he had killed Hayward.
During summations, a central focus was the credibility of the eyewitnesses
at the shooting and the identification of defendant. Defense counsel argued the
importance of photo array identification guidelines, which police had followed,
and highlighted that Williams had not identified defendant as the shooter.
Defense counsel further argued:
Now on May 24, 2019[,] . . . Williams is brought
into the police station with the purpose – now this is
within [twenty-three] hours of her having seen – is
brought into the police station and they do a
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photographic array procedure with her. She's there
importantly because she saw the crime happen. And she
even said when she testified . . . that the person who did
the shooting [went] . . . by her. She saw . . . the person
commit the crime. And the person went . . . by her, but
it was like at [an] angle. But the bottom line is she was
there to make the identification because obviously the
police thought she could make an identification having
been there and seen the person who did it.
....
So, all you have now in this case right now is you
have . . . Williams who identified somebody else as
being the shooter was sure that it wasn't [defendant].
Defense counsel also commented to the jury regarding the veracity and
motive of different witnesses, positing for consideration: whether all of
Williams's testimony "was truthful"; that Robinson "ha[d] her own reasons for
not being truthful"; and whether Burden was "trying to get out of trouble . . .
himself."
The prosecutor, in summation, classified the witnesses at the shooting into
two groups: "people who knew and loved . . . Hayward when he died on May
23, 2019[,] and people who knew and cared about" defendant. The prosecutor
concluded his summation as follows:
[I]n order to find [defendant] innocent[,] you have to
completely discount the testimony of . . . Hayward's
girlfriend . . . Williams. You have to completely
discount the testimony of [Hayward]'s friend Jasmine
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Bell. You have to completely discount that for some
reason . . . [defendant's] long-time friend [(Burden)]
who knows his nickname, who knows his mom and . . .
lie[d] to the police and . . . lie[d] again on the stand.
You have to [for] some reason believe and discount the
testimony of [defendant's] lover on the day of May 23,
2019[,] that she would for some reason lie to the police
and then come to court and lie today on the stand. In
order for you to find [defendant] innocent[,] you have
to discount all that testimony.
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's closing statement.
The judge instructed the jury that "[r]egardless of what counsel and I may
have said recalling the evidence in this case, it is your recollection of the
evidence that should guide you as judges of the facts." She further instructed,
"[a]rguments, statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not
evidence and must not be treated as evidence." Regarding any testimony
stricken from the record, the judge charged, "[a]ny testimony that I may have
had occasion to strike is not evidence and shall not enter in your final
deliberations. It must be disregarded by you." She further instructed that "even
though you may remember the testimony you are not to use it in your discussions
or deliberations." Defendant did not object to the final jury charge.
On September 9, 2021, the jury found defendant guilty of purposeful
and/or knowing murder, possession of a handgun with an unlawful purpose, and
unlawful possession of a handgun. The State moved for an extended sentence
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based on defendant's eight prior convictions, including a prior firearms
conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2). After hearing argument, the judge
granted the State's motion providing "the extended term range of sentencing for
the crime of murder is [thirty-five] years to life and the statute requires that
[thirty-five years] be served without parole." The impact statements submitted
from Hayward's mother and brother were also considered. The judge found no
mitigating factors, but found aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3),
"risk that the defendant will commit another offense," six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(6), "extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of
the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted," and nine, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(9), "need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the
law." The judge found the aggravating factors predominated. Defendant was
sentenced to a fifty-year prison term for murder, subject to the No Early Release
Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, to be served consecutively to a ten-year
sentence with a five-year period of parole ineligibility for unlawful possession
of a firearm.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN
THE PROSECUTOR, APPARENTLY WITHOUT
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ANY NOTICE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL, ASKED
PORSHA WILLIAMS TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT
IN COURT, EVEN THOUGH SHE HAD SELECTED
ANOTHER MAN'S PHOTO IN A PRETRIAL PHOTO
LINEUP. THE ERROR WAS EXACERBATED BY
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE A
MEANINGFUL CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION.
A. Where An Eyewitness Has Failed To Identify
Defendant In A Pretrial Procedure, There Should
Be A Pretrial Hearing Before The Prosecutor Is
Allowed To Ask That Witness To Identify
Defendant In Court.
B. The Prejudice To Defendant Was Not
Rectified By The Trial Court's One-Sentence
Statement That "The Last Answer Of The
Witness Is Stricken From The Record And The
Jury Will Disregard It." The Judge Should Have
Instructed The Jury That Porsha Williams'[s] In-
Court Identification Was Unreliable And Could
Not Be Considered For Any Purpose.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN
SUMMATION THAT THE JURY WOULD HAVE TO
"COMPLETELY DISCOUNT" THE TESTIMONY OF
SEVERAL STATE'S WITNESSES IN ORDER TO
RETURN A NOT GUILTY VERDICT.
POINT III
IT WAS IMPROPER TO IMPOSE A CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCE FOR POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
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WITHOUT ANY ANALYSIS OF THE YARBOUGH1
FACTORS. MOREOVER, CONCURRENT
SENTENCES WERE CLEARLY WARRANTED
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT POSSESSED THE FIREARM OTHER
THAN DURING THE SHOOTING.
II.
Our Supreme Court has elucidated that trial courts confronted with a first-
time in-court identification must "take steps to guard against practices that pose
serious due process concerns—especially inside a court of law in front of a jury."
State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 586 (2023). "By conducting a suggestive
identification procedure in a courtroom, the State may implicate due process
concerns and deprive defendants of their due process rights in a way that neither
cross-examination nor jury instructions can adequately address." Ibid. The
Supreme Court prospectively held that "the State must file a motion in limine if
it intends to conduct a first-time in-court identification procedure" providing
defendants with "advance notice and an opportunity to challenge in-court
identification evidence before trial." Id. at 588. "Defendants can then challenge
an identification at a pretrial hearing and try to prevent the jury from learning
1
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
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about potentially tainted evidence." Id. at 586. Indeed, trial courts are to be
vigilant to exclude suggestive first-time in court identifications of a defendant.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Watson, and at the time of this
trial, an in-court identification was admissible so long as the suggestive
courtroom atmosphere did not "outweigh the reliability of the identification."
State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 328 (1990). Generally, "the ultimate burden
remain[ed] on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." State v. Burney, 471 N.J. Super. 297, 327 (App. Div. 2022)
(quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 289 (2011)), rev'd, State v. Burney,
255 N.J. 1 (2023).
We have long recognized "the importance of immediacy and specificity
when trial judges provide curative instructions to alleviate potential prejudice to
a defendant from inadmissible evidence that has seeped into a trial." State v.
C.W.H., 465 N.J. Super. 574, 595 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Vallejo,
198 N.J. 122, 135 (2009)). "Further, '[t]he adequacy of a curative instruction
necessarily focuses on the capacity of the offending evidence to lead to a verdict
that could not otherwise be justly reached.'" Id. at 596 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 647 (1984)). "That the jury will follow
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the instructions given is presumed." State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 415 (2017)
(quoting State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996)).
III.
We reject defendant's argument that despite the judge's curative jury
charge striking from consideration Williams's unnoticed in-court identification,
he was denied a fair trial. "The simple response to defendant's argument is that
the judge sustained the objection, struck the testimony, and the jury
presumably followed the instruction." State v. Castoran, 325 N.J. Super. 280,
287 (App. Div. 1999); accord State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 256 (2009).
Undisputedly, the prosecutor sought to have Williams identify defendant for the
first time in court without notice to defense counsel. We recognize, as defendant
concedes, that at the time of trial, the Supreme Court had not yet held that a
prosecutor was required to give notice to a defendant before asking a witness to
make a first-time in-court identification; thus, a pretrial hearing on reliability of
the in-court procedure was not required.
Here, when Williams was first asked if she could identify the shooter in
the courtroom, she responded "no." The prosecutor again asked, "You don't see
him in the courtroom today, this person?" she stated "Yes." The judge then
intervened and stated, "Asked and answered," to which the prosecutor
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responded, "I thought she had said yes." The witness stated, "I said yes" and the
prosecutor asked where he was seated and Williams stated, "Right there," which
was immediately followed by a side bar conference, defense counsel's objection,
and his request that the identification be stricken.
We are satisfied the judge sufficiently instructed the jury that Williams's
last statement identifying defendant was stricken from the record and they were
not to consider it. The judge issued the curative instruction immediately after
hearing from counsel. We observe that before the judge gave the charge, after
she inquired of defense counsel what he was requesting, she advised that she
was going to instruct the jury that the "last answer of the witness is stricken,"
and defense counsel did not object. A judge's "decision to provide a curative
instruction and the content of that [instruction] is left to the discretion of the
trial judge." State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 497 (2015). Where defense
counsel "d[oes] not object to the jury instruction at trial," we "review[] the
charge for plain error." Id. at 494.
Having concluded the charge striking the identification was not in error,
we further note that in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt,
if deficient, it did not have the potential to cause an unjust result. See State v.
Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 327 (2005) ("[T]he strength and quality of the State's
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corroborative evidence rendered harmless any deficiency in the instruction [on
identification] and precludes a finding of plain error."). In particular, the
substantial trial evidence against defendant included the eyewitness testimony
of defendant's lifelong friend Burden, the corroborating testimony of Bell, and
Robinson's testimony that defendant admitted shooting Hayward in the face. As
the identification was immediately stricken, there is no "reasonable doubt as to
whether the jury reached a result it otherwise might not have." Watson, 254 N.J.
at 590-91.
IV.
Generally, "[p]rosecutors are afforded considerable leeway in closing
arguments as long as their comments are reasonably related to the scope of the
evidence presented." State v. Patterson, 435 N.J. Super. 498, 508 (App. Div.
2014) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 332 (2005)). Prosecutorial
misconduct justifies reversal where the misconduct was "so egregious" as to
"deprive[] the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181 (2001)
(quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)). "In deciding whether
prosecutorial conduct deprived a defendant of a fair trial, 'an appellate cou rt
must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of
both counsel and the court to improprieties when they occurred.'" State v.
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Williams, 244 N.J. 592, 608 (2021) (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at 83). Reversal is
appropriate only where the prosecutor's actions are "clearly and unmistakably
improper." Patterson, 435 N.J. Super. at 508 (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190
N.J. 397, 437-38 (2007)).
As defendant failed to object to the remarks at the time of trial, we review
the prosecutor's comments for plain error. See R. 2:10-2. We observe defense
counsel in summation questioned the credibility of the witnesses present at the
shooting. He questioned the veracity of Burden's testimony that defendant ran
after Hayward, two shots were heard, and that defendant ran back entering the
vehicle with Burden before admitting he shot Hayward in the face. Defense
counsel further challenged the truthfulness of Robinson and Williams's
testimony. The prosecutor's comment "to find [defendant] innocent, you have
to completely discount the testimony" of the State's witnesses was followed by
a recitation of the testifying witnesses who were present at the shooting and
responded to defense counsel's challenges to their credibility. We conclude the
prosecutor's remarks were not "'clearly and unmistakably improper,' and [did
not] substantially prejudice[] defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly
evaluate the merits of his defense." Smith, 167 N.J. at 181-82 (quoting State v.
Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999)). Further, defendant failed to
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establish the remarks constituted plain error. State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 312
(2008).
We are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments that the prosecutor's
remarks "flipped the burden of proof" and "undermined the presumption of
innocence." Notably, the prosecutor, immediately prior to the challenged
comments in his summation, acknowledged that the State's "standard of proof
here is beyond a reasonable doubt." In reviewing the prosecutor's statements,
we evaluate the remarks not in isolation but in the context of the summation as
a whole. State v. Atwater, 400 N.J. Super. 319, 335 (App. Div. 2008) (citing
State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 105 (1982)). We conclude the remarks were not "so
egregious that [they] deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State v. McGuire,
419 N.J. Super. 88, 139 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J.
123, 322 (1987)).
Further, in the final jury instruction after summations, the judge charged
the jury that a defendant on trial "is presumed to be innocent and unless each
and every essential element of an offense charged is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defendant must be found not guilty of that charge." She instructed,
"[t]he burden of proving each element of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt
rests upon the State and that burden never shifts to the defendant." We note the
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challenged remarks are to be "viewed in the context of the entire record." State
v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 622 (1992). We discern the prosecutor's statements were
not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
V.
Finally, we address defendant's contention that his sentence should be
vacated and remanded for resentencing. Defendant argues because there was no
evidence he possessed a handgun prior to or after the murder, and the crimes
stem from one incident, the convictions militate to a concurrent sentence. He
further argues because the judge failed to provide reasons for imposing the
consecutive sentences, a remand is mandated for resentencing. We agree a
remand is warranted.
The judge imposed a fifty-year term of imprisonment for murder, subject
to NERA, and a ten-year term with a five-year period of parole ineligibility for
unlawful possession of a firearm without a permit, to be served consecutively.
Regarding the consecutive sentences, the judge's sole statement was, "[t]he
sentences will run consecutively to each other, which results in an aggregate
sentence of 60 years—47.5 years without parole." The judge did not engage in
a complete analysis and address the required findings under the Yarbough
factors. Further, the judge did not consider the overall fairness of the sentence
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imposed. See Torres, 246 N.J. at 268. The State has acknowledged a remand is
required. We add only the following comments.
Applying an abuse of discretion standard, we maintain a limited scope of
review when considering sentencing determinations on appeal. See id. at 272.
Ordinarily, our review is deferential and we do not "substitute [our] judgment
for that of the sentencing court." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).
However, our deference applies "only if the trial judge follows the [Criminal]
Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion." State v.
Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 46, 65
(2014)). In imposing a sentence, the sentencing judge is required to make
individualized assessments based on the facts of each case and the aggravating
and mitigating sentencing factors. See State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 121-22
(2014). The judge must provide its reasons for the sentence and "the factual
basis supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors
affecting [the] sentence." R. 3:21-4(h); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) (requiring
sentencing court to state on the record the reasons for imposing a sentence and
the "factual basis supporting its findings of particular aggravating or mitigating
factors affecting sentence").
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When sentencing a defendant for multiple offenses, "such multiple
sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the
time of sentence." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). In Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 642-44, our
Supreme Court established criteria that a sentencing judge must consider when
deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences. "The Yarbough factors are
qualitative, not quantitative; applying them involves more than merely counting
the factors favoring each alternative outcome." State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 348
(2019). A "sentencing court must explain its decision to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences in a given case." Ibid. "When a sentencing court properly
evaluates the Yarbough factors in light of the record, the court's decision will
not normally be disturbed on appeal." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 129 (2011).
An explanation of the "overall fairness" is necessary "to 'foster[] consistency in
. . . sentencing in that arbitrary or irrational sentencing can be curtailed and, if
necessary, corrected through appellate review.'" Torres, 246 N.J. at 272
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 166–67 (2006)).
Consistent with our Court's holding in Torres, we therefore remand for the
judge to provide reasons for the consecutive sentences with "[a]n explicit
statement, explaining the overall fairness" of defendant's aggregate sentence.
Id. at 268.
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Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
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