Estate of William Massi v. Bette Barr ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2005-21
ESTATE OF WILLIAM MASSI
and DENISE MASSI, his wife,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross- AS REDACTED
Respondents, June 28, 2024
APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
BETTE BARR, BARRY BARR,
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC
& GAS COMPANY, and
CENTER STATE ENGINEERING
ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Defendants,
and
TOWNSHIP OF MONROE and
TOWNSHIP OF CRANBURY,
Defendants-Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
and
ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________
Argued January 29, 2024 – Decided June 28, 2024
Before Judges Sabatino, Chase, and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-5579-18.
Abraham N. Milgraum argued the cause for
appellants/cross-respondents (Blume, Forte, Fried,
Zerres & Molinari, attorneys; Abraham N. Milgraum,
on the briefs).
Brian A. Bontempo argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant Township of Cranbury
(James P. Nolan and Associates, LLC, attorneys; Brian
A. Bontempo, on the briefs).
Sarah E. Fitzpatrick argued the cause for
respondent/cross-appellant Township of Monroe
(Schaffer Shain Jalloh PC, attorneys; Gregory B.
Pasquale, of counsel and on the briefs; Sarah E.
Fitzpatrick and May H. Wedlund, on the briefs).
Frederic J. Regenye argued the cause for respondent
Allstate Insurance Co. (Regenye Lipstein, LLC,
attorneys; Frederic J. Regenye, of counsel and on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SABATINO, P.J.A.D.
Bicycle riding has become increasingly prevalent on our public roadways.
That increased usage has heightened safety concerns about the condition of
roadway surfaces used by bicyclists as well as motor vehicles. Since the 1990s,
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the New Jersey Department of Transportation ("DOT") has published guidelines
for the safe condition of road surfaces used by both bicycles and motor vehicles. 1
This Tort Claims Act case arises from a now-deceased plaintiff's bicycle
accident on a two-lane public road that straddled two municipalities. The
accident occurred on a stretch of the road that was chronically pitted with
potholes, apparently due to drainage and freezing problems. According to the
deposition testimony of a local public safety director, potholes at that location
had to be patched and re-patched "hundreds" of times in the five years before
the accident. Several citizens periodically reported the road's poor condition
before the accident. The road had no full-sized shoulders or designated bike
lanes.
Plaintiff swerved his bicycle to avoid a passing truck, and lost control and
fell when his tires hit the potholes. Plaintiff's engineering expert opined that
incorrect methods had been used to patch the road. The expert further opined
that the persisting uneven surfaces were dangerous, not only for bicycles but
also for motorcycles.
1
See N.J. Dep't of Transp., Bicycle Compatible Roadways and Bikeways 61
(1996). We discuss these guidelines in detail within this opinion.
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This opinion clarifies and extends the principles of Polzo v. County of
Essex ("Polzo I"), 196 N.J. 569 (2008) and Polzo v. County of Essex ("Polzo
II"), 209 N.J. 51 (2012) concerning roadway surface conditions that endanger
the safety of bicyclists on public roads. In a fact pattern involving a bicycle
accident on a road's potholed shoulder, the Court held in Polzo II that the public
entity defendant had no duty to maintain the shoulder to an extent safe for
bicyclists. Id. at 70-75. The Court distinguished that no-duty-to-bicyclists
situation from a roadway condition that also happens to be unsafe for motorized
vehicles. Ibid.We apply the rationale of Polzo II here to this bicycle accident that
occurred in a vehicular lane, and to a record with an unrebutted expert opinion
that the road surface was unsafe for both bicycles and also motorcycles. We
conclude a public entity that is palpably unreasonable in failing to correct such
a known dangerous road condition may be liable to a bicyclist who is injured
because of that danger. In doing so, we also recognize that a plaintiff operating
a two-wheeled vehicle must use due care when confronting a visibly hazardous,
potholed surface.
Viewing this record in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, we vacate
summary judgment in favor of the two municipal defendants that maintained and
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patched the road. We remand for further proceedings, vesting the trial court
with discretion to permit further discovery and motion practice focused on the
legal principles we have clarified today.
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address other discrete
matters, including, among other things, issues of notice, causation, control, and
insurance coverage.
I.
The Accident
On April 27, 2017, plaintiff William Massi 2 was riding his bicycle alone
in the southbound travel lane of Wyckoff Mills Road. The road is on the border
between defendants Monroe Township and Cranbury Township, with the road's
center line dividing the two townships. As we noted above, the road has no full-
sized shoulder and no designated bike lane. Signage identifies a bike path in the
area, but plaintiff was unaware of that path.
Photos and testimony in the record show that the stretch of the road
between Halsey Reed Road and Brick Yard Road has had many persisting and
2
Massi died in 2023 while this appeal was pending, although there is no claim
his death was caused by the bicycle accident. His estate has been substituted
into this case. Massi's spouse, Denise Massi, is a co-plaintiff in this case on a
per quod claim. For simplicity, we use the term "plaintiff" to refer to William
Massi, unless the context suggests otherwise.
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large potholes. In a deposition, plaintiff testified he was an experienced cyclist
and had biked on this road at least twenty times in the past. He noticed on
previous occasions that there were rough patches and areas of potholes on the
stretch of road between Halsey Reed Road and Brick Yard Road, but he had not
complained about this to Monroe or Cranbury. Plaintiff said he generally
avoided uneven pavement by checking for cars and then moving left onto a
smoother area in the middle of the travel lane. He did so on April 27, and
continued riding at a speed of about fifteen miles per hour.
According to the lengthy report of plaintiff's expert engineer, Dr. Wayne
Nolte, the potholes stem from the construction of a gas main by the Public
Service Enterprise Group, Inc. ("PSEG") in 2006. Dr. Nolte opined that the road
was not properly repaired after the gas main was installed. Water repeatedly
seeped in below the asphalt and, when it froze and refroze, it produced cracks
that created many uneven surfaces and potholes.
Cranbury's Director of Public Works, Jerry Thorne, estimated at his
deposition that repair crews from his town had patched potholes in this portion
of the road "a couple hundred times" in the five years before plaintiff's accident.
In addition, maintenance records show that Monroe also had repaired the road
about seven times in the six months before the accident.
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Nolte opined that the repairs should have used a "hot patch" rather than a
"cold patch" method, citing to standards within a publication from the Asphalt
Institute. Defendants contend, however, that during the time period at issue, hot
patch ingredients were unavailable in the market.
Both townships had received numerous complaints about this road's
potholes before the accident. However, there were no records of previous
accidents at that location.
Plaintiff's accident occurred when he was bicycling in the middle of the
road to avoid passing over potholes and uneven surfaces. A pickup truck driven
by codefendant Barry Barr approached plaintiff from behind. With his wife
Bette3 in the front passenger seat, Barr spotted plaintiff ahead of him and
lowered his speed to follow "at a safe/far distance."
Barr testified at his deposition that he did not honk his horn or otherwise
attempt to alert plaintiff to the truck's presence, and just assumed plaintiff heard
him coming. After following plaintiff for a moment, Barr decided to pass him
on the left by moving into the northbound lane of the road "as far left as [his
truck] could go" and at an estimated speed of fifteen miles per hour.
3
We will refer to Ms. Barr by her first name, to distinguish her from Barry Barr.
No disrespect is intended.
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Plaintiff and the Barrs agree that Barr's truck never struck plaintiff or his
bicycle as it passed. Nevertheless, plaintiff was startled by the appearance of
the truck next to him and swerved to the right to avoid it. This motion put him
on a rough, potholed patch of the road, which made his handlebars vibrate and
caused him to lose control of his bicycle and fall.
After Barr pulled ahead of plaintiff, he moved his vehicle back to the
right-hand lane. Barr checked his rear mirror and did not see plaintiff anymore
but saw "an object on the roadway." When Bette turned around to look, she saw
plaintiff on the ground and told Barr. Barr pulled the truck over, and Bette got
out and approached plaintiff. Bette called 9-1-1 and then used plaintiff's phone
to help him call his wife.
Monroe Police and Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") responded to
the scene. An EMS report stated that plaintiff had an abrasion on his neck and
reported numbness, tingling, and an inability to move his arms and legs.
Plaintiff was taken to a local hospital.
Plaintiff, who was then sixty-five years old, sustained serious injuries
because of his fall and required emergency spinal surgery and extensive post-
operative physical therapy. He testified that he initially remained mostly
paralyzed in his limbs and would faint if he tried to stand or sit upright . As of
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the time of his deposition in December 2019, plaintiff still required a walker or
cane, could not drive or bathe himself, needed special eating utensils, and felt a
"tingling numb" sensation in his hands "all the time."
In an expert medical report dated April 12, 2019, the surgeon opined that
plaintiff would suffer from "central cord syndrome," manifesting through pain,
impairment of movement, and loss of full sensation in his arms, hands, and legs,
"for the remainder of his life."
The Tort Claims Notices and This TCA Lawsuit
After serving a tort claims notice on Monroe, and then amending it to
correct certain facts, plaintiffs filed this personal injury lawsuit—initially
against Barr and Monroe—in the Law Division. Plaintiffs invoked the Tort
Claims Act ("TCA"), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :12-3, alleging that Monroe's poor
maintenance of the roadway created a dangerous condition that was a proximate
cause of the accident.
During motion practice, plaintiffs allegedly learned for the first time that
the accident happened on the Cranbury side of Wyckoff Mills Road.
Consequently, plaintiffs served a delayed tort claims notice on Cranbury and
then added Cranbury as a codefendant.
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Plaintiffs settled with Barr for Barr's insurance policy limits and served a
Longworth4 subrogation letter on their own auto insurer, Allstate Insurance Co.
("Allstate"). Plaintiffs sought underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits through
their Allstate policy. After their lawyers interacted with Allstate's adjusters for
about four years, Allstate invoked a "step-down" provision within the policy,
contending that it drops UIM coverage down to the mandatory minimum of
$15,000 because plaintiff was not a passenger in a motor vehicle or a person
getting in or out of one.
After a series of rulings by a succession of assigned Law Division judges,
the trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to both townships and, on
the coverage issues, to Allstate.
This Appeal and Cross-Appeals
In this appeal, plaintiffs challenge the grant of summary judgment to
Monroe and Cranbury on the merits, arguing that the trial court erred by finding
that the road was not dangerous to expected users and that the townships' actions
in repeatedly fixing potholes at the site were not "palpably unreasonable."
4
Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J. Super. 174 (App. Div. 1988). The letter
gives an insurer notice of its right to intervene in the underlying case before a
plaintiff settles with a third party.
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Plaintiffs also challenge the grant of summary judgment to defendant
Allstate, asserting that the court erred by finding that Allstate appropriately
denied coverage for any part of Massi's damages by applying a step-down
provision in his UIM policy.
Monroe and Cranbury cross-appeal from the denial of earlier motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment. Monroe argues the court should have
dismissed the claims against it, based on an inaccuracy in plaintiffs' notice of
claim or on the fact that Massi's fall occurred on the side of the road owned by
Cranbury. Cranbury argues that dismissal should have been granted on the
ground that plaintiffs did not submit a notice of claim upon it within the deadline
set by the TCA.
II.
A.
We begin the published portion of our analysis by reviewing the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant townships on the substance
of plaintiffs' negligence claims against them under the TCA. In doing so, we
adhere to familiar standards for summary judgment motions. A court must view
the motion record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, here
plaintiffs. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 528-29 (1995);
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see also R. 4:46-1 to -6. On appeal we apply the same perspective. Statewide
Ins. Fund v. Star Ins. Co., 253 N.J. 119, 124-25 (2023). We review a grant of
summary judgment de novo. Ibid.A fundamental premise of the motion judge's reasoning was that the
townships owed no duty to plaintiff, as a bicyclist traveling on the paved non-
shoulder portion of a public roadway, to assure the road surface was reasonably
safe for travel by bicyclists. Before examining that premise in depth, we briefly
summarize various core principles under the TCA.
General Policy of the TCA
"The Legislature passed the TCA after this Court abolished the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . ." Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 249 N.J.
642, 655 (2022) (citing Vincitore ex rel. Vincitore v. N.J. Sports & Exposition
Auth., 169 N.J. 119, 124 (2001)). "In doing so, the Legislature provided that
public entities could only be held liable for negligence 'within the limitations of
[the TCA].'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:1-2). "[T]he
'guiding principle' of the [TCA] is 'that "immunity from tort liability is the
general rule and liability is the exception."'" D.D. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry
of N.J., 213 N.J. 130, 134 (2013) (quoting Coyne v. State Dep't of Transp., 182
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N.J. 481, 488 (2005) (quoting Garrison v. Twp. of Middletown, 154 N.J. 282,
286 (1998))).
"Dangerous Condition" Liability
Subject to the terms of the TCA, a public entity may be liable for a
personal injury caused by the "dangerous condition" of its public property.
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. The applicable standards for dangerous condition liability
under the TCA are well established. To recover for an injury under the general
liability section of the TCA, N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, a plaintiff must prove several
elements. As the statute prescribes:
A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition
of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the
property was in dangerous condition at the time of the
injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the
dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of
injury which was incurred, and that either:
a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of
his employment created the dangerous condition;
or
b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice
of the dangerous condition under [N.J.S.A.] 59:4-
3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have
taken measures to protect against the dangerous
condition.
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose
liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition
of its public property if the action the entity took to
protect against the condition or the failure to take such
action was not palpably unreasonable.
[N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.]
The TCA defines a dangerous condition of property as a condition that
"creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in
a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." N.J.S.A.
59:4-1(a). A "substantial risk" is "one that is not minor, trivial or insignificant."
Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985) (quoting Polyard v. Terry, 160
N.J. Super. 497, 509 (App. Div. 1978)).
The "used with due care" portion of the TCA's definition of a dangerous
condition "requires analysis of the 'objectively reasonable' conduct of those who
use the property." Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 125 (quoting Garrison, 154 N.J. at
291). The phrase "refers not to the conduct of the injured party, but to the
objectively reasonable use by the public generally." Garrison, 154 N.J. at 291.
The standard is "whether the property poses a danger to the general public when
used in the normal, foreseeable manner." Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 126.
For example, in Atalese v. Long Beach Township, 365 N.J. Super. 1, 3-6
(App. Div. 2003), we concluded that a block-long, three-quarter-inch-deep
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differential in the pavement of a designated pedestrian and bicycle lane on a
road "could be accepted by a jury as . . . a dangerous condition" since the
plaintiff, who tripped into the depression while walking, was an expected user
of the lane and was proceeding in an otherwise normal, safe manner when a
vehicle approached and prompted her to move sideways.
If it can be shown that public property is safe unless foreseeable users fail
to exercise due care, there is no dangerous condition for purposes of the TCA.
Garrison, 154 N.J. at 290. Further, where the "physical characteristics" of the
property themselves would reasonably notify prospective users that their
proposed activity will be hazardous, then the plaintiff's engagement in that
activity is not an exercise of due care under N.J.S.A. 59:4-1 and -2. Ibid.
(quoting Fredette v. City of Long Beach, 231 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Ct. App.
1986)). "[N]o member of the public may ignore the notice which the condition
itself provides." Ibid. (quoting Fredette, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 603). Nevertheless,
a plaintiff may still establish that the property was in a dangerous condition
through evidence that it "pose[d] a danger to all users," even those who act with
appropriate care. Id. at 292.
"Whether property is in a 'dangerous condition' is generally a question for
the finder of fact." Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 123. Even so, "like any other fact
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question before a jury, [that determination] is subject to the court 's assessment
whether it can reasonably be made under the evidence presented." Black v.
Borough of Atl. Highlands, 263 N.J. Super. 445, 452 (App. Div. 1993). When
deciding a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in a case where the
plaintiff has alleged a dangerous condition of a roadway, the judge must examine
the issue "pragmatically" to determine whether the particular irregularities
complained of "were such that reasonable minds could differ as to whether they
manifested that the [roadway] was in a dangerous condition." Polyard, 160 N.J.
Super. at 510. If the evidence is inadequate to meet that standard, the motion
should be granted. Ibid.Actual or Constructive Notice
A personal injury claimant also must prove under Section 4-2 of the TCA
that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition. The plaintiff must demonstrate in this respect:
a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his
employment created the dangerous condition; or
b. [the] public entity had actual or constructive notice
of the dangerous condition under [N.J.S.A.] 59:4-3 a
sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
[N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.]
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Actual notice is proven if the public entity had "actual knowledge of the
existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous
character." N.J.S.A. 59:4-3(a). Alternatively, constructive notice is satisfied if
the plaintiff shows "the condition had existed for such a period of time and was
of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care,
should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character." N.J.S.A.
59:4-3(b). See, e.g., Chatman v. Hall, 128 N.J. 394, 418 (1992) (explaining that
the length of time a pothole existed, along with its alleged size, could support a
reasonable inference that the defendant had either actual or constructive notice).
Evidence that previous complaints have been made about a particular
problem on public land, or that there have been other accidents in the same area
due to the same cause, may help to establish actual or constructive notice of that
dangerous condition. Schwartz v. Jordan, 337 N.J. Super. 550, 565 (App. Div.
2001). In Schwartz, for example, there had been three previous accidents
involving pedestrians on a poorly lit stretch of highway, and the township that
owned it had received many complaints about the hazardous crosswalks. Id. at
555-56. Given those facts, we concluded the township "long had notice" of the
dangerous condition of the roadway. Id. at 565.
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"Palpably Unreasonable"
Another requirement of dangerous condition liability under the TCA is
that a plaintiff must prove that the public entity's failure to protect against the
danger was "palpably unreasonable." N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. The term "palpably
unreasonable" is not defined in the Act. The Supreme Court has explained "the
term implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given
circumstance." Kolitch, 100 N.J. at 493. "[I]t must be manifest and obvious
that no prudent person would approve of [the public entity's] course of action or
inaction." Ibid. (quoting Polyard, 160 N.J. Super. at 216); see also Gonzalez by
Gonzalez v. City of Jersey City, 247 N.J. 551, 576 (2021).
The burden of proving a public entity defendant acted in a palpably
unreasonable manner is on the plaintiff. Coyne, 182 N.J. at 493. The palpable
unreasonableness of an entity's conduct is ordinarily a fact question for the jury.
Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 130. But in "appropriate circumstances," the question
may be decided by the court as a matter of law, upon an application for summary
judgment. Polzo II, 209 N.J. at 75 n.12.
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B.
Potholes and Other Road Surface Irregularities
The present case arises out of a claim that a road surface was dangerous
because of potholes and other irregularities. In the context of potholes, "not
every defect in a highway, even if caused by negligent maintenance, is
actionable." Polyard, 160 N.J. Super. at 508. "Travelers on highways must
expect some declivities and some areas of imperfect surfaces." Id. at 509. Thus,
evidence that a car traveling on a road "might be unstable momentarily by reason
of the condition of the highway" or that drivers may "experience[] a dipping or
bumping sensation" may be insufficient, particularly if the same evidence
demonstrates that cars "were able to maintain their position" on the road
nevertheless. Ibid.Polzo I and II: A Bicycle Accident on a Road's Shoulder
The Supreme Court's two successive opinions in Polzo are especially
relevant to the TCA liability analysis here because Polzo also involved a bicycle
accident on a public roadway, albeit on the shoulder of that roadway. 196 N.J.
at 574-76. The plaintiff in Polzo was injured in an eventually fatal bicycle
accident, in which she fell after riding over a two-foot-wide and one-inch-deep
"depression or declivity in the shoulder of [a] roadway" owned by Essex County,
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a public entity. Ibid. (emphasis added). The record showed the county "had
examined and repaired potholes and depressions/declivities along the roadway,"
but did not establish that it had "identified or repaired" the specific depression
at issue on the shoulder. Id. at 580. The Court noted there was no conclusive
evidence that the county had ever made repairs to any part of the road's shoulder
in the past. Ibid.In support of a claim that the county had constructive notice of the
depression, the plaintiff in Polzo—the bicyclist's widower—submitted "only" an
expert engineering report, which the Court found insufficient to demonstrate that
the issue was so obvious and had been present for a sufficient length of time that
the county should have discovered and repaired it. Id. at 581. Yet, because the
trial court had not fully addressed the element of notice to the county, the Court
in Polzo I remanded the matter to the Law Division "for its consideration of that
issue." Id. at 586.
On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment to the county,
and this court again reversed. Polzo II, 209 N.J. at 56. The Supreme Court
granted further review in Polzo II and concluded this court had erred by finding
that the county had created a dangerous condition on the shoulder of its roadway
"by failing to have a routine road inspection program in place." Id. at 66. The
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Court noted that repairs were made to county roads generally "when complaints
were received from the police, town officials and residents, and motorists," and
that a pothole on the road in question had been repaired just five weeks before
the victim's accident. Id. at 58-59. County workers repairing any complained-
of defect would also "inspect other portions of a roadway" nearby and make any
further repairs needed. Id. at 69.
The Court observed in Polzo II that it "[did] not have the authority or
expertise to dictate to public entities the ideal form of road inspection program,
particularly given the limited resources available to them." Ibid. It then found
that "the absence of a more systematic program" of inspection and repairs by the
county did not violate the TCA, "particularly when [the] plaintiff [had] not
provided . . . any recognized standard of care that demands otherwise." Ibid.The Court further considered in Polzo II whether, despite not "creating" a
dangerous condition, the county was instead on notice of such a condition such
that liability under the TCA could attach. Id. at 70. It began by stating that as
defined in N.J.S.A. 39:1-1, a "'roadway' is 'that portion of a highway . . .
ordinarily used for vehicular travel,'" and a "'vehicle' is defined as 'every device
in, upon or by which a person or property is or may be transported on a highway,
excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary
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rails or tracks or motorized bicycles.'" Ibid. (emphasis added). The Court
commented that "roadways generally are built and maintained for cars, trucks,
and motorcycles—not bicycles." Id. at 71. It went on to find that "[p]ublic
entities do not have the ability or resources to remove all dangers peculiar to
bicycles" and are thus not required to make all of the roadways for which they
are responsible "completely risk-free for bicyclists." Ibid.There was no evidence that the shoulder of the road in question in Polzo
II was designated as a bicycle lane, and that even if it was routinely being used
as one, there were no reports of other accidents caused by or complaints about
the specific depression that caused the victim's accident. Id. at 74. The Court
thus concluded that the plaintiff had not and could not show that the depression
was "of such an obvious nature" or existed for a sufficient period that the county
could be charged with constructive notice. Id. at 74-75.
Finally, the Court found that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude
that the county acted in a palpably unreasonable manner by failing to protect
against the depression on the shoulder. Id. at 78. It observed the county was
"responsible for maintaining an extensive network of roads," and that, again,
there were "no prior complaints or reports of injuries" on that particular stretch
of road. Id. at 77. The Court noted the relatively small size of the declivity, and
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found that even if the county had been on notice of its presence, it might
reasonably have been viewed "as a maintenance item of low priority." Ibid.Ultimately, the Polzo II Court concluded that even when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact
could not conclude that the county was on constructive notice of any dangerous
condition on the shoulder of its roadway or that its failure to fix the depression
that caused the victim's fall was palpably unreasonable. Id. at 56. It therefore
reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 78.
The Present Case Compared with Polzo
Plaintiffs in the present case argue that the many potholes and "trenches"
on Wyckoff Mills Road created a dangerous condition and that Monroe and
Cranbury had actual or constructive notice of that condition. They assert the
"defect" in the road was "massive" and rendered it unsafe for cars and bicycles
alike. They further argue that bicyclists were "expected in the area" because of
the proximity of a local bike path marked by signage on Wyckoff Mills Road.
Plaintiffs stress that employees of the townships stated in their depositions
their respective workers had repaired potholes at the accident location multiple
times, which plaintiffs assert demonstrates knowledge that "the roadway was
not safe for reasonably foreseeable users." Plaintiffs contend that the repairs the
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townships conducted were negligent and palpably unreasonable because they
"continually failed" to render the road safe. Hence, summary judgment in favor
of the municipal defendants was not appropriate, and that instead, these issues
should have been decided by a jury.
Although plaintiff in his deposition first described the potholes that caused
his fall as "on the right shoulder of that lane," he clarified that the potholes were
on the outer half of the lane, where the road contained no shoulder. Indeed,
photos and other descriptions of the accident location indicate the paved surface
next to the travel lane appears to be narrower than a full shoulder. In places, a
shoulder appears to be completely non-existent. In addition, the potholes and
irregular surfaces depicted in the exhibits appear to extend into the lanes of the
road used by motor vehicles. Plaintiffs' expert described the road in his report
as lacking "shoulders but with a white fog line on each side."
At the very least, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff's
loss of balance occurred, at least in part, because of a dangerous condition of
the surfaces in the driving lanes of the road, in contrast to any "shoulder."
Because plaintiffs were the non-movants on the townships' summary judgment
motion, they are entitled to all reasonable inferences of fact. Brill, 142 N.J. at
528. Hence, subject to causation questions we discuss infra, we assume in our
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analysis, without deciding, that plaintiff's accident occurred because of potholes
and irregularities on the motor vehicle lanes and not completely on any shoulder.
If that assumption is proven to a jury to be true, this case is markedly
distinguishable from the facts of Polzo involving a shoulder accident and the
Supreme Court's analysis of that case.
The Court emphasized in Polzo II the legal importance of the fact that the
bicycle accident there occurred on the road's shoulder—emphasizing the word
in the following passage:
Even looking at the evidence, as we must, in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, we cannot conclude that the
County was on either actual or constructive notice of a
dangerous condition on the shoulder of Parsonage Hill
Road.
[209 N.J. at 70.]
Later in that same paragraph, the Court repeated the fact that the accident took
place on the shoulder, which we underscore below:
Thus, the question really boils down to whether the
County—five weeks before the accident—should have
discovered the two-foot wide depression on the
shoulder of the road that reached a maximum depth of
one-and-one-half inches and determined that it was a
'dangerous condition [that] created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of' causing death. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
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Within its legal analysis that followed, the Court then highlighted the
distinction between a roadway and a shoulder, as affecting a public entity 's
potential liability for a dangerous condition:
[W]e begin with some basic principles of law governing
our roadways. The 'roadway' is 'that portion of a
highway . . . ordinarily used for vehicular travel,'
whereas the 'shoulder' is 'that portion of the highway,
exclusive of and bordering the roadway, designed for
emergency use but not ordinarily to be used for
vehicular travel.' N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 (emphasis added);
see also Hochberger v. G.R. Wood, Inc., 124 N.J.L.
518, 520 (E. & A. 1940) ('The shoulder is not designed
nor constructed for general traffic uses but is rather for
emergency uses such as parking of vehicles disabled or
otherwise.'); Sharp v. Cresson, 63 N.J. Super. 215, 221
(App. Div. 1960) ('It is clear that the Legislature did not
intend that the shoulder of a road be used for ordinary
travel.'). A 'vehicle' is defined as 'every device in, upon
or by which a person or property is or may be
transported upon a highway, excepting devices moved
by human power or used exclusively upon stationary
rails or tracks or motorized bicycles.' N.J.S.A. 39:1-1
(emphasis added).
[Id. at 70-71.]
The Court then underscored this roadway/shoulder distinction as it relates to
bicycle travel:
By the Motor Vehicle Code's plain terms, roadways
generally are built and maintained for cars, trucks, and
motorcycles—not bicycles. Even the Pothole Primer—
relied on by plaintiff—defines a pothole as a 'pavement
defect' that will 'cause significant noticeable impact on
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vehicle tires and vehicle handling.' Pothole Primer,
supra, at 6 (emphasis added).
[Id. at 71.]
The Court added:
A bicycle rider on a roadway is vested with all the
'rights' and 'duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle'
under Title 39, chapter four of our Motor Vehicle Code.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.1. Under the Motor Vehicle Code,
'[e]very person operating a bicycle upon a roadway [is
required to] ride as near to the right side of the roadway
as practicable.' N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.2. Bicyclists do not
have special privileges on a roadway's shoulder.
Indeed, a bicycle rider is directed to ride on the furthest
right hand side of the roadway, not on the roadway's
shoulder. The Motor Vehicle Code does not designate
the roadway's shoulder as a bicycle lane.
[Ibid.]
In footnote 9 connected to this passage, the Court explained the public
entity's duties of care relating to designated bicycle lanes:
A public entity's designation of a portion of the
roadway as a bicycle lane would alter the generally
intended use of that part of the road and would require
the public entity to maintain it in a reasonably safe
manner for those purposes. See Atalese, supra, 365 N.J.
Super. at 6 (holding that three-quarter inch depression
on bicycle/pedestrian lane could be found by jury to be
dangerous condition given path's intended uses).
[Id. at 71 n.9.]
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Apart from such designated bicycle lanes, the Court acknowledged in
Polzo II that bicyclists travel on roadways and, at times, their shoulders, but that
public entities generally do not have a duty to keep their surfaces "completely
risk-free for bicyclists":
We understand that many bicyclists may be inclined to
ride on a roadway's shoulder to stay clear of vehicular
traffic and out of concern for their safety. Nevertheless,
inherent dangers confront bicyclists who travel on
roadways that are not faced by operators of motor
vehicles. A tree branch, a stone, and even a pothole or
depression might destabilize a bicycle that a car would
harmlessly pass over.
Public entities do not have the ability or resources to
remove all dangers peculiar to bicycles. Roadways
cannot possibly be made or maintained completely risk-
free for bicyclists.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
Based on this reasoning, the Court declared that "Roadways generally are
intended for and used by operators of vehicles." Ibid. In support, the Court
cited the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of its own state's tort immunity
statute in Boub v. Township of Wayne, 702 N.E.2d 535 (1998), in which the
Court "held that although bicycle riders are permissive users of roadways, those
riders should not 'be considered intended users.'" Id. at 72.
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Applying these principles to the facts in Polzo II, the Court concluded
"[t]he evidence viewed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiff reveals a
failure of proof." Id. at 74. "The depression, located on the roadway's shoulder,
was, at best, just one-and-one-half inches in depth, and the generally intended
purpose of a roadway is for vehicular use and the generally intended purpose of
the shoulder is for emergency use." Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added).
The record in the present case, viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiffs, is markedly different from Polzo. As we noted above, plaintiff's
accident, consistent with his markings on the photographs at his deposition,
occurred on the travel lanes of the road, not on a shoulder. Unlike Polzo, a
public safety director here testified that maintenance crews had gone to this road
"hundreds of times" in the five years preceding plaintiff's accident to repair
potholes and depressions. Even if that estimate (which was not suggested by
the wording of counsel's question) was possibly exaggerated, it bespeaks a
chronic and persisting dangerous condition that required continuous
maintenance. As we noted, both townships had received numerous complaints
about the road's poor condition, albeit no reports of accidents.
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Furthermore, plaintiff's engineering expert did not confine his opinion
about the road's hazardous condition to bicyclists. He explicitly stated as
follows:
The roadway surface at [plaintiff's] accident location
was a hazardous condition. The condition of that
roadway was not appropriate for bicycle or even
motorcycle traffic given the number of potholes, the
number of failed repairs to potholes, the settlement of
the trench pavement with respect to the roadway
pavement and the crack that developed between the two
surfaces. The Townships each had actual notice of this
failed condition through their patrolling of the
roadways, looking for dangerous and hazardous
conditions and their hundreds of repairs to this roadway
in the area where [plaintiff's] accident took place. Their
failure to analyze the condition of this roadway, to
make the proper repair of the roadway, to restore [it] to
a reasonably safe condition for the vehicles expected on
that roadway was palpably unreasonable and the cause
of this accident.
....
[The townships] failed to conclude that the repairs they
were making were improper and only causing further
deterioration to the roadway placing it in a condition
hazardous to bicyclists and motorcyclists on this
roadway.
[(Emphasis added).]
This unrebutted expert opinion attests that the road surface was hazardous
not only to bicycles, but also motorcycles. A motorcycle is defined as
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"motorcycles, autocycles, motor bikes, bicycles with motor attached and all
motor-operated vehicles of the bicycle or tricycle type," except electric scooters
and low-speed electric bikes. N.J.S.A. 39:1-1.5 As the Court noted in Polzo II,
under "the Motor Vehicle Code's plain terms, roadways generally are built and
maintained for cars, trucks, and motorcycles—not bicycles." Id. at 71 (emphasis
added).
The trial court's oral decision on summary judgment did not address this
important facet of plaintiffs' engineering expert's report. Defendants have not
identified in their appellate submissions any counterevidence showing that the
road was, in fact, safe for motorcyclists.
We discern no analytic reason why a road surface that is unsafe for
motorcyclists, on which a bicyclist sustains an injury due to that same hazardous
condition, cannot support potential liability of the public entity that maintains
the roadway in a "palpably unreasonable" manner. There is nothing in Polzo I
or Polzo II that contradicts that proposition. At the very least, the expert report
provides ample grounds to raise genuine—and legally material—questions of
fact concerning the condition of the roadway and the townships' corresponding
5
We need not address here low-speed electric scooters. See Goyco v.
Progressive Ins. Co., 257 N.J. 313, 316 (2024).
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duties of care.6 We recognize, as in Polzo II, that the road surfaces do not have
to be "completely risk-free" for two-wheeled vehicles, 209 N.J. at 71, but
plaintiffs' expert and the associated regulations do not advance such an absolute
duty.
We can take judicial notice that since Polzo was decided more than a
decade ago, bicycling has become more prevalent across the nation and in our
densely populated state. Some of that increase is attributable to the COVID-19
pandemic and its aftermath. A recent Rutgers University study reports that
approximately 34% of over 2,400 surveyed New Jerseyans increased
recreational bicycling during the pandemic. 7 According to United States Census
data, the proportion of New Jersey commuters who bicycle to work increased by
13% from 2019 to 2022.8 Such increased bicycling has amplified the risks of
6
We do not address here whether any objections or in limine motions might
render the expert's opinions inadmissible, in full or in part, under the net opinion
doctrine or other grounds.
7
Hannah Younes, et al., Insight Hub: Working From Home Increases Cycling
in New Jersey, ZAG Daily (Nov. 17, 2023)
https://www.zagdaily.com/opinion/insight-hub-working-from-home-increases-
cycling-in-new-jersey.
8
The League of Am. Bicyclists, Changes in Biking and Walking to Work,
https://data.bikeleague.org/data/states-rates-of-active-commuting/#3 (last
visited June 20, 2024).
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accidents. From 2012 to 2021, the decade following Polzo II, bicyclist fatalities
from crashes with motor vehicles increased nationally by 27.1% from 2012 to
2021.9 Indeed, in 2022, approximately 1,105 bicyclists nationally died in
crashes with motor vehicles, and 46,195 cyclists were injured. 10 Although the
present case did not involve a direct collision between a bicyclist and a motor
vehicle, the combined involvement of Barr's truck and the dangerous road
surface is alleged to have produced plaintiff's severe injury.
Frequently, as here, bicyclists use public roadways also traveled by motor
vehicles. In some instances, designated bicycle lanes have been created to
separate bicycles from other traffic. However, in locations where no such lanes
have been designated, the importance of safe roadways does not end. If the
roadway is unsafe for both motor vehicles (such as motorcycles) and bicycles,
the government's duty of care may extend fairly to both categories of plaintiffs.
Even though, as the Court noted in Polzo I and Polzo II, the state of Illinois
has concluded that bicyclists are not intended users of roadways for purposes of
its tort immunity statute, several other states have embraced more expansive
9
Nat'l Ctr. for Stat. Analysis, Bicyclists and Other Cyclists: 2021 Data 2 (2023).
10
Nat'l Ctr. for Stat. Analysis, Bicycle Safety,
https://www.trafficsafetymarketing.gov/safety-topics/bicycle-safety (last
visited June 20, 2024).
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liability.11 Our Court in Polzo was not confronted with the present scenario of
a bicycle accident occurring on the non-shoulder portion of a roadway that an
engineering expert has found to be unsafe for both bicyclists and motorcy clists.
As we previewed in the introduction, DOT guidelines also address the
need to maintain road surfaces in a safe manner for roadways on which "bicycles
normally operate":
The condition of the roadway surface is an important
element in both bicycle safety and level of service. In
general, due to their high pressure, narrow profile tires,
lack of suspension, and need to maintain balance,
bicycles require a higher standard of road maintenance
than motor vehicles. Potholes, bumps, seams, and
debris—which can be of minor annoyance or no
consequence whatever to motor vehicles—are potential
hazards to bicycle traffic as these obstacles can cause
loss of control of the bicycle, or cause the bicyclist to
risk conflict with motor vehicle traffic by swerving to
avoid the obstacle.
For the above-mentioned reason, the roadway surface
on which bicycles normally operate should be
maintained free of potholes, bumps, corrugations,
11
Benjamin J. Vernia, State and Local Governmental Liability for Injury or
Death of Bicyclist Due to Defect or Obstruction in Public Roadway or Sidewalk,
12 A.L.R.6th 645 (2006). See also O'Neill v. City of Port Orchard, 375 P.3d
709, 772 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (supporting potential liability of a public entity
to a bicyclist); Himmelstein v. Twp. of Windsor, 39 A.3d 1065, 1067 (Conn.
2012) (same); Caraballo v. City of Yonkers, 54 A.D.3d 796, 796-97 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (same). But see Alave v. City of Chicago, __ N.E.3d __, __ (Ill.
2023) (slip op. at 53) (rejecting such liability and reaffirming Boub, 702 N.E.2d
at 535 (cited by Polzo II, 209 N.J. at 71-72)).
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seams, unravelled pavement edges, gravel, glass
fragments, and any other debris or obstacles that mar a
smooth riding surface. The area involved includes the
right portion of the outside travel lane plus any
additional space. Typically, this portion of the roadway
gets less attention as maintenance efforts are
concentrated on the portion of the roadway used by
motor vehicles.
Maintenance repairs in this area should be carried out
with the needs of the bicycle in mind; i.e., they should
be done in a workmanlike fashion with particular
attention to providing a smooth pavement surface.
The following actions are recommended by the 1991
AASHTO Guide for the Development of Bicycle
Facilities as requirements in the operation and
maintenance of bicycle facilities.
• Create a smooth surface free of potholes and debris.
• Eliminate dropoffs from pavement edges.
• Inspect pavement conditions—do not allow
unravelled pavement edges.
....
Maintenance of roadways to accommodate bicycle
traffic does not usually require changes in the types of
maintenance activities that are carried out; rather it
requires changes in the focus of maintenance practices.
Where possible, maintenance, repair and litter removal
activities should be shifted to include not to ignore,
roadway margins and shoulders.
[N.J. Dep't of Transp., Bicycle Compatible Roadways
and Bikeways 61 (1996) (emphases added).]
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These governmental standards, although evidential and not conclusive of
tort liability, 12 spotlight the importance of addressing dangerous road surfaces
used by bicycles and motorcycles, particularly on the aforementioned "right
portion of the outside travel lane." Ibid. To be sure, motorcycles generally are
heavier and more stable than bicycles, but it stands to reason that a surface
condition hazardous to a motorcycle would often also be hazardous to a
bicyclist.
The trial court erred in its analysis by apparently presuming that the
townships had no duty to maintain the road surface in a condition that was not
dangerous to both motorcycles and bicycles. We appreciate that a condition that
might not be hazardous for a truck or an automobile might be unsafe for a two-
wheeled vehicle such as a motorcycle. But the Court in Polzo II expressly
included motorcycles within its analysis of the legal duties at stake. 209 N.J. at
71.
12
See Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.10I, "Evidence of and Per Se Negligence"
(Apr. 2016) (explaining whether violation of an administrative regulation can
support a finding of negligence); Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc., 254 N.J. 446, 472-75
(2023) (discussing the non-dispositive evidential value of FDA approval of a
medical device in assessing the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct);
Horbal v. McNeil, 66 N.J. 99, 103 (1974) (traffic regulations constitute
standards of conduct, violation of which is non-dispositive evidence for jury's
consideration in assessing reasonableness of driver's conduct).
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We recognize the maintenance burden on public entities, but that burden
is justified when liability is confined to limited situations where the non-
shoulder portion of a road is proven to be dangerous to both motorcycles and
bicycles, there is no designated bicycle lane, and the condition is so extreme and
persisting that the failure to make it safe after repeated notice is pa lpably
unreasonable. We further underscore that the plaintiff operating the two -
wheeled vehicle must use due care when confronting a visibly hazardous
potholed surface.
These road maintenance principles align with those the Court set forth in
Polzo. The Court in Polzo did not confine the public entity's duties of care to
only those bicyclists who are pedaling on designated bike lanes. As a practical
matter, although bike lane designations are growing, bicyclists most often must
"share the road" with motorized vehicles. And sometimes bicyclists must veer
out of those designated lanes due to parked cars or other obstructions. If a
known road surface condition is so treacherous that it poses a palpably
unreasonable danger to motorcycles, then, as we noted above, it is most likely
treacherous to bicyclists as well. Public entities bear no additional maintenance
costs by addressing those mutually dangerous conditions, which they already
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37
must repair or warn about under present case law. Consequently, our holding
fairly can be and is effective immediately.
C.
Palpably Unreasonable?
We complete this analysis with a brief discussion of whether the summary
judgment record presents a jury question of whether the townships' actions and
inactions were "palpably unreasonable." The issue of palpable
unreasonableness is typically one for the jury. Vincitore, 169 N.J. at 130.
However, it may be decided by the court as a matter of law in "appropriate"
cases. Polzo II, 209 N.J. at 75 n.12.
Viewing this record in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, and subject to
additional testimony and evidence that may emerge at trial, the conduct of the
township defendants could logically be deemed by a jury to have been palpably
unreasonable. The chronically poor condition of the roadway, and the failure of
hundreds of attempted repairs and patches to cure the defect, plus the numerous
complaints received, are enough to present a triable issue. At trial, the townships
are free to present evidence weighing against such a finding of extremity, such
as the alleged unavailability of "hot patch" material. But it would be premature
on this record to dismiss the TCA claims as a matter of law.
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Due Care by Plaintiff?
We also reject the townships' argument that it is clear that plaintiff, a very
experienced bicyclist, operated his bicycle in a dangerous manner by choosing
to bicycle on this stretch of road at all, and in pedaling near the center of the
road to avoid the potholes. These issues of plaintiff's conduct and due care
likewise raise factual assessments suitable for trial, not summary judgment.
For these many reasons, we vacate the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the townships on the substantive TCA issues.
III.
[At the court's direction, the published version of
this opinion omits Part III pursuant to Rule 1:36-3.]
IV.
For the reasons noted above in Part II, summary judgment in favor of the
defendant townships is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. We affirm on all other issues. Jurisdiction is not retained.
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