Don Tiger v. New Jersey Racing Commission ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2653-22
DON TIGER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY RACING
COMMISSION,
Respondent-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted May 28, 2024 – Decided July 2, 2024
Before Judges Paganelli and Whipple.
On appeal from the New Jersey Racing Commission,
Department of Law and Public Safety, Agency Docket
No. NJRC-14-H-21-MD.
Gilberto M. Garcia, attorney for appellant.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Levi Klinger-Christiansen, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Don Tiger appeals from an April 11, 2023 Final Decision of the Executive
Director of the New Jersey Racing Commission (Commission) that rejected the
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) recommendation, and upheld the order of
finish in the 2021 Meadowlands Pace Race declared official by the Board of
Judges (Board). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We recite the procedural history and facts from the record. The
Meadowlands Pace Race was held on July 17, 2021. The winner of the race
received a substantial payment of money and an opportunity to qualify for
another prestigious harness race.
Tiger's horse, Charlie May, crossed the finish line first. However, an
incident occurred on the final turn and the Board posted an "inquiry" sign. 1 The
inquiry concerned whether Charlie May broke stride and "interfered" 2 with the
horses behind him.
In conducting the inquiry, the Board observed the race live and "looked at
all the different possible camera angles." The Board did not interview the
1
The Board is required to: "[p]ost the . . . inquiry sign, on the odds board in
the case of a . . . possible rule violation." N.J.A.C. 13:71-8.24(a)(7).
2
"'Interference' means any act, which by design or otherwise, hampers or
obstructs any competing horse or horses." N.J.A.C. 13:71-4.1(b).
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drivers of the other horses. Instead, the Board made "the call based on what [it]
s[aw] and what [it] s[aw] on the film." The Board unanimously determined that
Charlie May broke stride and interfered with the horses behind him. Thus,
Charlie May was disqualified and placed ninth.
Tiger filed a notice of appeal, and the Commission transmitted the matter
to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. The ALJ held
hearings on December 15, 2021 and January 27, 2022. Tiger testified on his
own behalf. Tiger indicated that Charlie May was initially declared the winner.
However, an inquiry was sent to the Board. Tiger explained that after a short
period of time—only six and a half minutes—the Board disqualified Charlie
May and placed him ninth.
Tiger summoned Arthur Gray, who was qualified by the ALJ as an expert,
to testify. Gray was a "licensed trainer" and served as a horse race judge in three
states, although not in New Jersey. Gray's testimony was limited to "the role,
duties and obligations of a race judge." Gray opined after viewing the race
several times together with other related materials, the track judges failed to
fulfill their responsibilities by not exhausting all means possible to safeguard
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3
the outcome of the race for its contestants and the public at large. 3 Further, Gray
opined the Board should have interviewed the drivers.
The ALJ found it of "interest" that Gray explained "at a meeting of
regional race officials that took place four months after Charlie May was
disqualified, the officials in attendance agreed and adopted something now
referred to as the 'Charlie May Rule.'" The purported rule provides that "race
officials in their due diligence when the outcome of a race is called into question
when interference is alleged, to interview as many drivers and others involved
before rendering a decision that may result in disqualification of a winning
horse."4 The ALJ found Gray was "very credible."
The Commission summoned Presiding Judge Peter Koch to testify. Koch
stated he was a racing official for forty years, including serving as a racing
secretary, associate judge, and presiding judge. He was the presiding judge at
the Meadowlands Racetrack since 2019. He stated his duties included enforcing
the rules and regulations of the Commission.
3
Gray relied on United States Trotting Association (USTA) Rules and
Regulations § 6.11(e) that provides: "It shall be the duty of the judges to:
Observe closely performance of the drivers and the horses to ascertain if there
are any violations . . . particularly, interference, helping, or inconsistent racing
and exhaust all means possible to safeguard the contestants and the public."
4
The Executive Director found there was no change in policy.
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4
Koch recalled the inquiry in the Meadowlands Pace Race focused on
whether Charlie May broke stride and interfered with the horses behind him. In
narrating the video during the hearing, Koch explained "when [Charlie May]
went around the [horse in front of him], he broke stride and he interfered with
three trailing horses. And that was the reason for the inquiry and that was why
[Charlie May] was disqualified." Koch testified "there was[ not] any doubt in
any of [the judges'] minds that [Charlie May] was off stride and the[] three
drivers behind him all had to alter their course and two of them ended up making
breaks. It[ wa]s as plain as day." Koch stated he "could[ not] be any more clear
on that."
Koch explained that it was not the normal practice for the Board to speak
with drivers during an inquiry. He testified that neither the Commission's
regulations—nor the USTA Rules and Regulations—required the Board to
interview drivers during an inquiry. 5 He acknowledged that judges were able to
speak with drivers if there was a need. However, Koch stated the judges make
"decision[s based] on what [they] observe[d] during the race and from the
camera angles." He explained that judges "feel that [when] talking to drivers
5
Contrary to Gray's testimony as to the purported "Charlie May Rule," Koch
testified that there was no change to the USTA Rules and Regulations after the
race requiring judges to speak with drivers during an inquiry.
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[they] often . . . g[o]t biased opinions and skewed opinions so . . . the fairest way
[wa]s to just make the decision based on camera angles and what [they] saw
during the race." Koch testified that the judges voted unanimously to disqualify
Charlie May.
The ALJ stated "Koch's years of experience in the racing industry [we]re
well respected." However, the ALJ found, "for reasons unknown it appeared
throughout his entire time testifying, even over a virtual Zoom platform that he
was uncomfortable, was looking away from the camera and several of his
answers were evasive." The ALJ noted "[f]or example, every time a question
was posed, [Koch] repeated the question before giving an answer, whereas most
witnesses who are confident in what they [we]re saying would simply go ahead
and answer the question."
The ALJ found Koch's answers—"that he did[ no]t believe the drivers
would give honest answers, or that their version of events would be biased "—
for "why he and other judges elected not to interview any of the drivers or
interested parties" or "conduct a more thorough investigation" was "[c]urious[]"
and "suspect."
The ALJ noted "Koch knew the purse in the race Charlie May initially
won was significant and disqualification would bar Charlie May from entering
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[an] even more lucrative . . . race . . . [but] he still did not deem it necessary or
spend more than six and a half minutes on the issue, before the [Board] . . .
issued its disqualification ruling."
Moreover, the ALJ found two aspects of Koch's testimony troubling.
First, Koch testified "he learned 'for the first time after the race, that his wife,
who was involved in a horse staking business, had an interest in the outcome of
the race with two other horses that had been entered.'" The ALJ found Koch's
explanation—"[t]hat's her business"—unconvincing and concluded "the
appearance of potential conflict should have been sufficient cause for him to
step aside as the chief judge handling the track side appeal."
Second, about two weeks after disqualifying Charlie May, Koch "called
for a panel investigation of Charlie May's driver . . . (who had never been the
subject of an investigation) to determine if he should be penalized or suspended
on top of the horse being disqualified."
The ALJ stated Koch was an expert, so he could not "disregard or throw
out his entire testimony," despite Koch's "obvious credibility challenges." 6
Nonetheless, noting Koch's "body language and manner of answering questions,
6
The Commission offered Koch as a fact, not an expert witness.
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coupled with the potential conflict of his wife having an interest in two other
horses in the race," the ALJ found the testimony of Koch, "who was the only
witness produced by the [Commission], was significantly diminished, and
devalued, by virtue of his lack of credibility."
The ALJ made the following factual findings:
A close and lengthy review of the tape of the entire race
which took over an hour during the hearing clearly
show[ed] that just before the alleged incident that gave
rise to the disqualification, the horse immediately in
front of Charlie May started slowing down [7], with its
driver looking back to see how many horses were
behind it.
Based on the video and the testimony of [Tiger] and
[Gray], I FIND that even if Charlie May did slightly
"break stride" at that point of the race, it was a safety
measure only to ensure that a major collision could be
avoided with several of the horses, which would have
been a catastrophe for everyone involved. Including
viewers watching this nationally televised race at home.
I FURTHER FIND that the actions of Charlie May's
driver, which had to be made in a split second as shown
on the video, were appropriate under the circumstances
and did not interfere with the progress of any other
horses in the race, which the track side judges
improperly determined.
....
7
In another part of his recommendation, the ALJ stated "[t]he tape . . . not only
does not show any interference by Charlie May, but in fact shows that the horse
in front of Charlie May slowed down drastically."
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I FURTHER FIND that the appeal conducted by the
track side judges was flawed, in that it was rushed, due
in part to the race being broadcast to a national
television audience . . . and, among other things, [the
Board] failed to follow protocols, including but not
limited to conducting interviews with several of the
parties involved in the race prior to determining that
Charlie May should be disqualified. With such a large
purse at stake, as well as eligibility for an even larger
purse through automatic entry in another . . . race, I
FIND the outcome of the short track side appeal, which
was upheld by the . . . Commission, was anything but
thorough, was arbitrary and capricious and fatally
flawed.
The ALJ concluded the Board "did the expedient thing, instead of
conducting due diligence." He found it was "undisputed the judges failed to
question any drivers, or other parties involved in the race for that matter, and
after conferring for only a few minutes, disqualified Charlie May."
In addition, the ALJ concluded "that the decision of the [Board] . . . was
fatally flawed due to a conflict of interest that existed on the part of . . . Koch. "
The ALJ found "it strain[ed] credibility and common sense that [Koch] was
completely unaware [his wife's] company had an interest in other horses who
were racing that day."
Thus, the ALJ ordered:
That the determination of the [Board] . . . must be
REVERSED, as it was arbitrary, capricious and unjust,
and violated [Tiger's] fundamental due process rights,
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and the rights of the wagering public, whose interests
the track side judges, and the . . . Commission [we]re
supposed to protect . . . .
He further ordered "that Charlie May should be reinstated as the winner
of the Meadowlands Pace [Race]." The Commission filed exceptions and Tiger
filed a reply to the exceptions.
The Executive Director rejected the ALJ's recommendation, including his:
(1) credibility determinations; (2) application of the law; and (3) findings of fact.
As to the ALJ's credibility determinations, the Executive Director acknowledged
"the deference that [wa]s usually afforded to an [ALJ]'s determination of
credibility." However, the Executive Director rejected the ALJ's credibility
findings "because they [we]re arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and they
[we]re not supported by sufficient, competent and credible evidence in the
record."
First, the Executive Director accepted that Koch "may have appeared
'uncomfortable' testifying." The Executive Director noted there was no video
recording of the Zoom hearing, so she could not review Koch's appearance.
Nonetheless, the Executive Director found the ALJ "clearly erred when he
asserted that . . . Koch repeated the question 'every time a question was posed.'"
Instead, the Executive Director found, through her review of the transcript of
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Koch's testimony, he "was asked more than 250 questions at the hearing" and
"repeated a question only six times and he asked to have a question clarified ten
times." Moreover, the Executive Director did "not find . . . Koch's answers to
be evasive."
Second, the Executive Director stated "[t]he video recordings of the race
. . . g[a]ve[] [her] the ability to directly assess the truth and accuracy of . . .
Koch's testimony." In this respect, the Executive Director found "Koch's
testimony regarding the break and interference was clear, truthful, and
accurate."
Third, the Executive Director determined Koch "accurately explained the
procedures utilized by the [Board] and why there was no need to interview a
driver." The Executive Director accepted Koch's testimony that the Board
"officiate[s] a race on the basis of what they see in the race and on the video
recordings and they do not believe that the opinions of the drivers involved in
the incident 'should have a bearing on the way they see it.'"
Fourth, the Executive Director rejected the ALJ's "finding that the services
of staking company, even if . . . Koch's spouse performed them for two horses
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in the race, created a real or apparent conflict of interest." 8 The Executive
Director explained:
A staking company processes necessary paperwork on
behalf of horses' owners and forwards nominating and
sustaining fees paid by the owners to the entity that
own[s] the rights to the stakes race. The staking
company does not own an interest in the horse, enter
the horse into the stakes race nor receive any payment
should the horse win purse money in the race. An
owner pays the staking company a fee to take
administrative actions to ensure that a horse is
nominated to and remains eligible for one or more
stakes in the horse. By way of example, a staking
company has no more financial or other interest in a
particular horse than a hired transportation service that
transports a horse to the racetrack prior to a race has in
the horse. Accepting a fee to facilitate a horse's
ultimate participation in a race in those tangential ways
does not give the facilitator an interest in the horse.
In addition, the Executive Director found that "Koch only learned of th[e
apparent conflict of interest] on cross-examination at the [ALJ's] hearing."
Therefore, she "reject[ed] the ALJ's conclusion that . . . Koch was required to or
should have recused himself" on the day of the race.
8
The Executive Director noted "the OAL record d[id] not establish that . . .
Koch's wife's company did, in fact, process stakes paperwork and submit fees
on behalf of the owners of two horses in the race." Instead, the Executive
Director stated the "uncorroborated assertion was proffered by [Tiger]'s
counsel" during cross-examination of Koch.
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Fifth, the Executive Director rejected the ALJ's finding that the hearing
regarding Charlie May's driver, held two-weeks after the race, was "troubling."
Instead, the Executive Director accepted Koch's "accurate explanation" that "the
judges must send the driver a written notice of the hearing, it cannot be done on
the day of the race and it [wa]s not unusual to conduct a hearing [ten] to
[fourteen] days after a race for a driver."
As to Gray, the Executive Director rejected as speculation, his opinion
that "the television broadcast of the race 'created additional pressure on the
judges to make a fast decision.'" In addition, the Executive Director found that
Gray erred in relying on USTA Rule 6.11(e).
Moreover, the Executive Director rejected the ALJ's legal determinations.
First, the Executive Director found "there [wa]s no due process requirement in
New Jersey which mandate[d] that the judges must interview the drivers or any
other licensee during an inquiry."
Second, the Executive Director found "N.J.A.C. 13:71-8.23 set[] forth the
duties of the [Board] and N.J.A.C. 13:71-8.24 set[] forth the procedures the
[Board] must follow." She determined the Commission's rules "only require[d]
the judges to speak to a driver if the driver lodge[d] an objection after the race
. . . . [and n]o objection was lodged after th[e] race."
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Third, the Executive Director found the Board "may speak with the drivers
during an inquiry if they believe it might assist them in their determination."
Here, she determined "there was no need to interview the drivers during the
inquiry . . . . [because a]ll material and relevant facts [we]re documented clearly
and obviously on the video recordings of the race."
Fourth, the Executive Director found "the OAL record d[id] not support
the ALJ's conclusion that 'well recognized industry and regulatory standards'
require[d] judges to interview drivers during an inquiry."
Fifth, the Executive Director "reject[ed] the ALJ's finding that 'the
outcome of the short track side appeal[] . . . was anything but thorough, was
arbitrary, capricious and fatally flawed.'" Instead, the Executive Director found
the "clear preponderance of the credible evidence in the OAL record
establishe[d] that the [Board] followed the proper procedure during the inquiry
and reached the correct determination."
Sixth, the Executive Director rejected the ALJ's conclusion that the
decision of the Board was "fatally flawed" because of Koch's alleged conflict of
interest. The Executive Director "reject[ed] the finding that [Koch's wife] held
an interest, financial or otherwise in two horses that were entered in the race."
Moreover, she concluded even if Koch's wife's company "[a]ccept[ed] a fee to
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facilitate a horse's ultimate participation in a race in . . . tangential ways [it]
d[id] not give the facilitator an interest in the horse."
Lastly, the Executive Director found "[t]he video recordings d[id] not
support" the ALJ's factual finding. Instead, the Executive Director found the
video recording:
establishe[d] that although the [horse in front] was
beginning to tire, it did not slow down drastically or
nearly cause an accident. It was not unusual or
improper for the driver of Charlie May to move the
horse out to go around the [horse in front]. When
Charlie May moved out, the horse broke stride and
impermissibly interfered with the [horses behind].
Tiger appeals, arguing the Executive Director's decision was arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable. Tiger contends the Executive Director failed to:
(1) identify the factual errors in the ALJ's recommendation; (2) set forth "with
particularity . . . new or modified findings supported by sufficient, competent,
and credible evidence"; (3) respect and "arbitrarily rejected" the
recommendation that "the appeal conducted by the track judges was flawed, in
that it was rushed"; and (4) find that due process required the track judges to
interview the other drivers. We disagree.
We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our
analysis. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c):
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All hearings of a State agency required to be conducted
as a contested case under this act or any other law shall
be conducted by an [ALJ] . . . . A recommended report
and decision which contains recommended findings of
fact and conclusions of law and which shall be based
upon sufficient, competent, and credible evidence shall
be filed[] . . . with the agency . . . and an opportunity
shall be afforded each party of record to file exceptions,
objections, and replies thereto, and to present argument
to the head of the agency or a majority thereof, either
orally or in writing, as the agency may direct.
....
The head of the agency, upon a review of the record
submitted by the [ALJ], shall adopt, reject or modify
the recommended report and decision . . . . In reviewing
the decision of an [ALJ], the agency head may reject or
modify findings of fact, conclusions of law or
interpretations of agency policy in the decision, but
shall state clearly the reasons for doing so. The agency
head may not reject or modify any findings of fact as to
issues of credibility of lay witness testimony unless it
is first determined from a review of the record that the
findings are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or are
not supported by sufficient, competent, and credible
evidence in the record. In rejecting or modifying any
findings of fact, the agency head shall state with
particularity the reasons for rejecting the findings and
shall make new or modified findings supported by
sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the
record . . . .
Thus, "[i]t is the agency head's responsibility to decide adjudicated matters
brought before the agency." Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 586 (1988).
"[T]he agency head must explain why the ALJ's decision was not supported by
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sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary." Cavalieri v. Bd. of Trs. of
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 368 N.J. Super. 527, 534 (App. Div. 2004) (citing N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10(c); S.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 349 N.J. Super. 480,
485 (App. Div. 2002)).
"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of
Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re Herrmann,
192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision
will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Ibid. (quoting Herrmann,
192 N.J. at 27-28).
We examine:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative polices, that is, did the agency
follow the law;
(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and
(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
of the relevant facts.
[Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re
Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007)).]
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"In assessing those criteria, a court must be mindful of, and deferential to, the
agency's 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors,
Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting
Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). "We have
upheld the strict and close regulation of the racing industry; we recognize and give
deference to the Racing Commission's expertise." Moiseyev v. N.J. Racing
Comm'n, 239 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 1989) (citing De Vitis v. N.J. Racing
Comm'n, 202 N.J. Super. 484, 490-91 (App. Div. 1985)). "We understand that the
overriding goal in the regulations is to insure the public's confidence in the integrity
of horse racing." Ibid. (citing Dare v. State, 159 N.J. Super. 533, 537 (App. Div.
1978)). We do not "substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's." Circus Liquors,
199 N.J. at 10 (quoting Carter, 191 N.J. at 483).
However, we are "in no way bound by [an] agency's interpretation of a statute
or its determination of a strictly legal issue." Allstars, 234 N.J. at 158 (alteration in
original) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
The party challenging the final administrative action has the burden to
demonstrate grounds for reversal. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)
(quoting In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 2013)). Applying these
well-established principles, we are satisfied Tiger failed to meet his burden.
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The Executive Director satisfactorily conducted her review of the ALJ's
recommendation under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). The Executive Director rejected
the ALJ's findings of fact; clearly stated her reasons for doing so; provided
particular reasons for rejecting the ALJ's findings; and made new findings
supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record. Ibid.Given our deference to the Executive Director's expertise and superior
knowledge in the field, we do not substitute our judgment for hers.
In addition, while we are not bound by the Executive Director's
interpretation of the law, we are convinced neither the Commission's nor the
USTA's Rules and Regulations required the Board to interview the drivers
during the inquiry. Considering the video evidence, we are satisfied driver
interviews were not necessary.
The regulations provide that the judges shall "[i]nvestigate any apparent
or possible interference or other violation of the rules whether or not a complaint
has been made by a driver," N.J.A.C. 13:71-8.23(a)(2); and "[o]bserve the
performance of the drivers and the horses closely to ascertain if there are any
violations of the[] rules. They shall exhaust all means possible to safeguard the
contestants and the public," N.J.A.C. 13:71-8.23(a)(5). Gray cited to the USTA
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standard but acknowledged the Commission's regulations and the USTA
standard were functionally the same.
Gray interpreted "exhaust all means" to require the Board to interview the
drivers in conducting the inquiry. However, "exhaust" is defined as: "to
consider or discuss (a subject) thoroughly or completely." Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 437 (11th ed. 2020). In this respect, Koch testified that
the Board watched the race live and reviewed all of the video of the race. Koch
stated the video made it "plain as day" and it "could[ no]t have been any more
clear" that Charlie May broke stride and interfered with the horses behind him.
The Board did not interview the drivers based on the clarity of the video and
their concern that drivers would provide biased or skewed opinions. Under these
circumstances we are satisfied that the investigation was exhaustive.
In addition, we are convinced that Koch's wife's ownership of a staking
company—that purportedly staked horses in the race—did not create a conflict
of interest for Koch. The regulations provide that "[n]o race official shall be
qualified to act as such at any meeting or race where he [or she] is . . . the owner
or otherwise interested in the ownership of any horse participating at such
meeting or race." N.J.A.C. 13:71-8.14(b). Even assuming Koch's wife's
company staked horses in the race, we are not persuaded that was enough to
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create an ownership interest in those horses or imbue Koch with that interest.
Again, we defer to the Executive Director's expertise and superior knowledge of
the horse staking industry; and find no conflict of interest.
Lastly, the Executive Director rejected the ALJ's credibility findings. The
Executive Director recognized that ordinarily she would defer to the ALJ on this
issue, but detailed why the ALJ's credibility findings were arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable and not supported by sufficient, competent, and credible
evidence in the record, namely the race videos. We find no error in this
determination.
To the extent we have not addressed any of Tiger's remaining arguments, we
conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(D).
Affirmed.
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