Kingsley Aisewomhion v. Rahul Goel ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2550-22
KINGSLEY AISEWOMHION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAHUL GOEL,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted May 14, 2024 – Decided July 1, 2024
Before Judges Rose and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket Nos. L-1211-21, L-
716-21, DC-6683-21, L-3288-21, DC-16729-21.
Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Michael James Confusione, of counsel and on the
briefs).
Ofeck & Heinze, LLP, attorneys for respondent
(Patrick J. Jordan, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a bench trial in these consolidated cases, plaintiff Kingsley
Aisewomhion appeals from an April 17, 2023 Law Division order, denying
reconsideration of a March 3, 2023 order that denied his "motion to reinstate
trial," and a February 9, 2023 order that entered judgment for defendant Rahul
Goel. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the orders under review and remand
for the court to reopen the trial, limited to the presentation of plaintiff's
remaining witness, and closing statements unless waived.
I.
Although the record provided on appeal is incomplete, in view of our
disposition, we need only summarize the parties' allegations and pertinent
procedural history. In December 2020, plaintiff filed a self-represented
complaint against defendant in the Special Civil Part for wrongful distraint and
sought return of his property and monetary damages. Plaintiff asserted he was
wrongfully evicted from several residential properties in Newark owned by
defendant and leased to plaintiff who, in turn, subleased the properties as Airbnb
apartments. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim,
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claiming plaintiff failed to pay management fees that exceeded the Special Civil
Part's $15,000 then jurisdictional limit. 1 See R. 6:1-2(a)(1).
On defendant's motion, the matter was transferred to the Law Division.
According to plaintiff's merits brief, the court thereafter consolidated
"separately filed actions all involving the parties' claims against each other."
Notably, all of plaintiff's pleadings provided on appeal reflect his telephone
number; nearly all reflect his email address.
Trial apparently commenced on August 4, 2022, and continued on
September 7 and December 12.2 We glean from the September 7 transcript that
plaintiff represented himself at trial and defendant was represented by counsel.
According to the court's February 2, 2023 oral decision, as of December 12, four
witnesses had testified at trial until that point: both parties; plaintiff's sister; and
Kalu Kokor, who had a business relationship with defendant and knew plaintiff.
The court explained the posture of trial: "At the [December] 12 hearing, there
was one witness left. It was a non-party witness that [plaintiff] wanted to call,
a Mr. Idowu. And it was left off that the court would give a new date. And
1
Effective July 2022, the jurisdictional amount was raised to $20,000. Pressler
& Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.1 on R. 6:1-2 (2024).
2
Plaintiff only provided the 244-page, two-volume transcript of the September
7, 2022 trial date.
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other than Mr. Idowu's testimony the matter was concluded." About one week
later, the court scheduled the final trial date for February 2 at 9:00 a.m.
Although plaintiff had appeared remotely or in court on all prior trial
dates, he failed to appear on February 2. The court explained:
It's now 9:45. And [plaintiff] has . . . not appeared.
There was a notice that was sent out on December 20[],
2022, to all the parties and counsel that trial was
scheduled for February 2[], 2023, 9:00, for this court.
. . . [Plaintiff] didn't contact the court. The matter had
been tried already; the trial had commenced over
several days. So, all the parties were aware that this
was an ongoing trial and that the court would be setting
a date really for the presentation by [plaintiff] of his last
non-party witness.
Not only did the written notices go out and in
Docket [No.] L-0716-21, the notice was docketed in
transaction ID LCV20224387665. That was the one
that was mailed to [plaintiff]. Not only . . . was notice
sent by mail, but also [plaintiff] did not contact
chambers . . . to ask about the dates or to express any
issues with respect to the dates.
And certainly, where a trial has commenced and
in the presence of the parties and all . . . the trial days
in September and December were live, so [plaintiff]
was here, himself, when the court indicated that a new
date would be set. And in these circumstances – one,
there was a written – there was a notice from the Clerk's
Office sent with the new date, but it also would be
incumbent on the parties to make sure that they
contacted the court if there was some question or if they
hadn't heard about a date.
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Noting the court had asked the sheriff's officer to see whether plaintiff
was present in the hallway and the rotunda – and that plaintiff had not called
chambers – the court found plaintiff was "given notice"; "aware that a new date
would be set"; and "sent notice of the new date." The court further noted: "The
. . . issue for trial today was . . . [plaintiff's] last witness."
Turning to the merits, the court detailed its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In essence, the court found Kokor testified credibly that the
parties had "a management-type relationship," not a landlord-tenant relationship
as plaintiff asserted. On February 9, 2023, the court entered judgment for
defendant in all consolidated matters.
In his self-represented motion to reinstate trial, plaintiff asserted he never
received notice of the February 2 court date. Plaintiff claimed he "reached out
to the Ombudsman['s] office and was informed that the court stopped/don't
sending email and/or phone call on court updates, only via postal mail." Plaintiff
explained that as stated in court on or around November 23, 2022, 3 he had moved
"due to constant harassment" from defendant and his family. Plaintiff
3
Plaintiff did not provide a transcript of any hearing held in November 2022.
Nor did the court reference a hearing or trial date held during that month.
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acknowledged he "forg[o]t to update [his] address with the court clerk/customer
service desk."
Plaintiff further explained that "at the beginning of the trial[, he] often
receive[d] updates on the scheduled next court date via email and/or phone call."
Stating he received no such notice for the February 2 return date, plaintiff
nonetheless acknowledged his "obligat[ion] to update [his] contact information
with the court." Noting the two-year pendency of the matter, plaintiff stated he
"never missed a court date/hearing." Maintaining he proved his case based on
the testimony adduced at trial "and more testimonies to come that he was treated
inhumanely," plaintiff asserted he "ha[d] no reason . . . whatsoever to abandon
the trial after almost two years." Plaintiff did not request oral argument.
In its March 3, 2023 order denying plaintiff's motion to reinstate the trial,
the court found, in full:
The matter was tried over several days with
multiple witnesses. Litigants were responsible for
maintaining communication to be aware of court dates.
No basis was shown for reinstating this matter. The
court had placed on the record its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. No request for adjournment or
continuance had been made.
In his ensuing self-represented motion for reconsideration, plaintiff
requested "at least [two] hours oral argument to discuss" Kokor's testimony, the
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credibility of defendant and plaintiff, and the court's factual findings and legal
conclusions. Plaintiff asserted the court's conclusion that the evidence adduced
at trial counters the court's conclusion that plaintiff was "a squatter."
In its April 17, 2023 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration,
the court incorporated its statement of reasons from the March 3 order. Citing
Rule 4:50-1, the court also noted: "Movant has not shown any basis for the court
to reconsider that ruling, which denied relief after entry of a final judgment."
Now represented by counsel, plaintiff argues the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to reinstate trial. Plaintiff argues defendant
failed to demonstrate he would be prejudiced if the matter were reinstated and
the "court made no finding of prejudice." To support his position, plaintiff
primarily cites case law underscoring pretrial motions to reinstate a complaint.
For the first time on appeal, plaintiff claims he should be permitted "to present
his two additional non-party witnesses." (Emphasis added). Although in his
opposition to plaintiff's motion to reinstate trial, defendant urged the court to
deny plaintiff's motion under Rule 4:50-1(a), defendant abandons that argument
before us now. Instead, defendant argues plaintiff's appeal is untimely, he only
sought to call one remaining witness at trial, and plaintiff failed to make a
proffer as to Idowu's testimony.
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II.
As a threshold matter, we reject defendant's timeliness argument.
Plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed on April 27, 2023, ten days after the court
filed the April 17 order denying his motion for reconsideration. See R. 2:4-3
(providing an appeal must be filed within forty-five days of the final order's
issuance).
A trial court's order on a motion for reconsideration will not be set aside
unless shown to be a mistaken exercise of discretion. Granata v. Broderick, 446
N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016). Governed by Rule 4:49-2,
reconsideration is appropriate for a "narrow corridor" of cases in which either
the court's decision was made upon a "palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or
where "it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to
appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." Fusco v. Bd. of
Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria,
242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)). An abuse of discretion arises when
a decision was "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from
established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Servs., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). In the present
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matter, the trial court summarily denied plaintiff's reconsideration motion under
Rule 4:50-1, without specifying the applicable subsection. Rule 4:50-1 provides
various avenues for relief from a judgment or order and, in relevant part, permits
the court to
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment or order for
the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered
evidence which would probably alter the judgment or
order and which by due diligence could not have been
discovered . . .; (c) fraud[,] . . . misrepresentation, or
other misconduct . . . ; (d) the judgment or order is void;
. . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment or order.
"The rule is 'designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of
judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should
have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case.'" U.S. Nat'l Bank
Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (quoting Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J.
330, 334 (1993)). Equitable principles should guide the court's analysis
regardless of the subsection. MTAG v. Tao Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324,
333 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003)).
As to subsection (a), our Supreme Court has underscored, "[i]t would
create a rather anomalous situation if a judgment were to be vacated on the
ground of mistake, accident, surprise or excusable neglect, only to discover later
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that the defendant had no meritorious defense. The time of the courts, counsel
and litigants should not be taken up by such a futile proceeding." US Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 209 N.J. at 469 (quoting Schulwitz v. Shuster, 27 N.J. Super. 554, 561
(App. Div. 1953)).
Assuming subsection (a) of the rule was implicated here because plaintiff
was not afforded the opportunity to present his final witness, it is not readily
apparent on this record whether he had a meritorious defense. In any event,
although plaintiff candidly acknowledged he failed to update his residential
address with the court, his pleadings reflect his email address and telephone
number. It is therefore unclear from the record why he was not contacted via
those channels – at the very least – on the February 2 return date. As plaintiff
asserts, and defendant does not dispute, the court had contacted plaintiff earlier
in the proceedings via email or telephone regarding upcoming court dates.
Moreover, notwithstanding plaintiff's failures to advise the court of his
address change and contact the court regarding the final trial date, our courts are
committed to, among other things, fairness and quality service. The Judiciary
strives to follow a policy in favor of generally deciding contested matters on
their merits rather than based on procedural deficiencies. See Woodward-Clyde
Consultants v. Chem. & Pollution Scis., Inc., 105 N.J. 464, 472-74 (1987).
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"Cases should be won or lost on their merits and not because litigants have failed
to comply precisely with particular court schedules, unless such noncompliance
was purposeful and no lesser remedy was available." Irani v. K-Mart Corp., 281
N.J. Super. 383, 387 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Connors v. Sexton Studios, Inc.,
270 N.J. Super. 390, 395 (App. Div. 1994)).
We well understand the Law Division's need to control its schedule and
enforce its scheduling orders. Based on the circumstances presented here,
however, we conclude the court mistakenly exercised its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion to reconsider the final judgment. Instead, the court should
have permitted plaintiff to call his remaining witness – and present a closing
statement, if requested.
However, we agree with defendant that plaintiff only sought to present
one final witness before the trial court. As such, plaintiff did not preserve his
right to call the second witness for our review. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 339 (2010) (reiterating "issues not raised below
will ordinarily not be considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in
nature or substantially implicate the public interest"). Notably, plaintiff neither
identified the second witness by name nor provided a proffer of the witness's
anticipated testimony.
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Accordingly, we vacate the orders under review and remand the matter for
the limited purpose of continuing the trial for presentation of Idowu's testimony
and summations, unless waived by the parties. See R. 1:7-1(b). We leave to the
trial court's discretion whether plaintiff need provide defendant a proffer of
Idowu's testimony. In exercising its discretion, the court should be consistent
with its prior rulings. The trial shall be concluded within sixty days of our order.
Finally, the court's credibility findings in this matter ordinarily might
prompt us to remand the matter to another judge. See R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J.
285, 306 (2009). However, in the interest of judicial economy in this case –
where four witnesses have testified over the course of several months – we
decline to do so. We are confident the same judge will comply with our remand
instructions and render a fair and just decision after the close of all evidence and
closing statements.
Reversed and remanded in part. Jurisdiction is not retained.
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