State of New Jersey v. Jessica S. Matrongolo ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1098-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. July 3, 2024
APPELLATE DIVISION
JESSICA S. MATRONGOLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Argued June 4, 2024 – Decided July 3, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown, Natali and Puglisi.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex
County, Accusation No. 23-08-0676.
Melissa L. Baskind, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N.
Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Melissa L.
Baskind, of counsel and on the briefs).
David M. Liston, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex
County Prosecutor, attorney; David M. Liston, of
counsel and on the brief).
Kaili E. Matthews, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General,
attorney; Kaili E. Matthew, of counsel and on the
brief).
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
Foundation, attorneys for amicus curiae American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Alexander
Shalom, Dillon Reisman, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NATALI, J.A.D.
In 2022, an estimated 7.4% of New Jersey adults—approximately
535,280 individuals—met the formal diagnosis criteria for abuse or
dependence on illicit drugs and/or alcohol. 1 In that same year, although 45,914
people were admitted to substance use treatment in New Jersey, the Division
of Mental Health and Addiction Services estimated the unmet demand for
treatment was nearly double that number, or approximately 79,750
individuals.2 And, in 2021, the State recorded a record high 3,144
unintentional drug overdose deaths. 3
1
Dep't of Human Servs., 2022 Inventory & Need Assessment for N.J.
Behavioral Health 6. See also U.S. Census Bureau, Table S0101 Age and Sex
– American Community Survey (2022) (calculating New Jersey's total adult
population at 7,233,502 people).
2
Dep't of Human Servs., 2022 N.J. Drug & Alcohol Use Treatment -
Substance Use Overview Statewide 3, 17.
3
Dep't of Health, 2022 N.J. SUDORS Overdose Mortality Data Explorer.
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The substance abuse epidemic occurring in our communities, and the
crime attendant to the disease of addiction led, in part, to the creation of
Recovery Court,4 a judicial program "which combats the hopelessness of
addiction with the hopefulness of treatment." State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super.
502, 510 (App. Div. 2021). Through "a highly specialized team process within
the existing Superior Court structure," the Recovery Court judge, attorneys,
probation representatives, and treatment professionals "work together to
support and monitor a participant's recovery." Admin. Off. of the Cts., N.J.
Statewide Recovery Court Manual (Jan. 2022) 3-4 (2022 Manual). Our
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the positive role of Recovery Court
in improving the lives of its participants and the community. See State v.
Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 429-30 (2007) and State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166, 174
(2010).
This appeal concerns defendant Jessica S. Matrongolo's 5 challenge to a
Law Division order which categorically excluded her from this crucial
resource because she was convicted of a petty disorderly persons (PDP)
offense. The court reasoned that as a matter of law, Recovery Court is only
4
Until 2022, Recovery Court was known as Drug Court. Our opinion uses the
earlier term when discussing authorities which pre-date the name change.
5
As noted infra, Jessica died during the pendency of this appeal. We refer to
her by her first name, intending no disrespect.
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3
available to those convicted of a "crime," which, under our Criminal Code,
disorderly persons (DP) and PDP offenses are not. 6 Finding no support in the
law for the court's decision, we reverse.
I.
Jessica was initially charged with third-degree attempt to defraud the
administration of a drug test, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-10(d), and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1),
and fourth-degree possession of a device to defraud the administration of a
drug test, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-10(e). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jessica pled
guilty to disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a)(2)—a PDP offense—in
exchange for dismissal of the criminal charges and with the understanding that
she would apply for Recovery Court. 7
The court initially summarily denied her application without providing
the parties an opportunity to present oral or written arguments. After we
granted leave to appeal and reversed, remanding for the court to "consider
6
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(1), a "crime" refers to an offense that carries
a term of at least six months imprisonment, or that is graded first-, second-,
third- or fourth- degree. "Disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly
persons offenses are petty offenses and are not crimes within the meaning of
the Constitution of this State." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1).
7
The record reflects, on the date of these offenses, Jessica was already
participating in Recovery Court. It is unclear whether she was discharged
from the program due to the filing of the new third- and fourth-degree
offenses.
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[Jessica]'s application anew," it considered her application with the benefit of
written briefing and oral arguments. The court again denied Jessica's
application, this time explaining in an August 9, 2023 written decision that
Recovery Court is not a sentencing option for those convicted of a DP or PDP
offense, because neither are "crimes" as defined in our Criminal Code.
Jessica again sought interlocutory review, which we granted, prompting
the trial judge to submit two written amplifications of his August 9, 2023
decision, dated December 7, 2023 and February 20, 2024, pursuant to Rule
2:5-1(b). In ruling that Recovery Court is only available to those convicted of
a crime, the judge first drew support from a number of excerpts from the 2022
Manual. The first of which, the judge said, "sets out the program's mission:
'to stop the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and related criminal activity.'"
The judge reasoned the Manual's drafters "notably chose the word criminal"
and did so intentionally, as they repeated that term on page eight when they
wrote: "The purpose of [R]ecovery [C]ourt is to divert defendants facing
criminal charges with substance abuse problems into treatment." In the judge's
view, "[t]hese two statements cement[ed] the drafters' intent; namely recovery
courts are for people who commit crimes."
The judge recognized that the 2022 Manual also says that "a defendant is
legally eligible for recovery court if he or she qualifies for sentencing to
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special probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (Track One)[,] or regular probation
under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1 (Track Two)," 8 but reasoned to read this language as
permitting anyone eligible for probation to enter the program is to read the
statement out of context. In the judge's view, this language "simply contrasts
the two paths into the program: one through special probation and one through
regular probation," but "does not displace the program's explicit objectives."
The drafters further conveyed this intent, said the judge, by eliminating the
words "offense" and "offender" from the current version of the Manual
because those terms include DP and PDP offenses.
The judge further reasoned that since PDP offenses are most often heard
in municipal court, permitting PDP offenders to enter Recovery Court would
open the program to municipal court defendants, contrary to the Legislature's
and the Manual's drafters' intent. Finally, relying upon State v. Bishop, 429
N.J. Super. 533 (App. Div. 2013), aff'd, 223 N.J. 290 (2015), the judge
explained without the threat of imprisonment, which is not a sentencing option
for a PDP offense beyond thirty days in jail, a person with a non-criminal
conviction would have no incentive to comply with the conditions of Recovery
Court.
8
As detailed infra, an applicant may be eligible for Recovery Court through
two paths, known as Track One and Track Two, which have separate and
distinct eligibility criteria.
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6
We invited the Attorney General and the American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey (ACLU) to participate as amicus curiae, both of whom
submitted briefs contending the court erred in denying Jessica's application to
Recovery Court.
Subsequently, the parties informed us that Jessica tragically passed away
at age thirty-one due to a suspected drug overdose. The State moved to
dismiss the appeal as moot, which Jessica's counsel opposed, contending the
case presented an issue of significant public importance likely to recur. We
denied the motion "without prejudice to consideration of the issue by the
merits panel on plenary review." We therefore begin by considering whether
this appeal should be dismissed as moot, a question we answer in the negative.
II.
When a judicial decision "can have no practical effect on the existing
controversy," an issue is rendered moot. State v. Nieves, 476 N.J. Super. 609,
657 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015)). As
our Supreme Court explained, "the New Jersey Constitution does not confine
the exercise of the judicial power to actual cases and controversies," so
mootness does not necessarily end a case. State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 464
(1997). Generally, however, we "will not render advisory opinions or exercise
[our] jurisdiction in the abstract." Ibid.A-1098-23
7
Although "[t]he power to entertain a criminal appeal even after death
should be sparingly exercised," in certain circumstances, we nevertheless
adjudicate such a case. Id. at 465. "Our courts will entertain a case that has
become moot when the issue is of significant public importance and is likely to
recur." Id. at 464; see also State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 491 (2018)
(declining to dismiss as moot appeal involving deceased defendant because
case implicated reliability and admissibility of over 20,000 Alcotest breath
samples).
We are convinced the issue presented in this appeal holds "significant
public importance and is likely to recur." Gartland, 149 N.J. at 464. The
matter is one of first impression with a significant impact on applicants to
Recovery Court and judges who preside over those matters. As noted,
hundreds of thousands of New Jersey citizens suffer with substance abuse or
dependence, many of whom are involved in the criminal legal system, and
overdose deaths reached a record high in 2021. At the same time, and as the
ACLU has ably argued in its merits brief, access to potentially life-saving
treatment is severely limited. The question of whether a person convicted of a
DP or PDP offense is eligible to seek that treatment through Recovery Court is
one with a significant effect far beyond Jessica. Further, because the court's
decision was based not on Jessica's individual circumstances but on the
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classification of her conviction, it is likely to recur whenever an individual
with only a DP or PDP conviction seeks to enter Recovery Court. Therefore,
we conclude this case is justiciable and address the merits.
III.
Jessica argues the court erred in concluding she was ineligible for
Recovery Court solely based on her PDP conviction. She maintains the court's
decision was not supported by the legal eligibility provisions in the 2022
Manual nor the trend toward expanded access to Recovery Court. The
Attorney General as amicus agrees, noting those convicted of DP and PDP
offenses in Superior Court are eligible for probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:45 -1
and therefore for Recovery Court under a proper reading of the 2022 Manual
and relevant case law. Amicus ACLU concurs but emphasizes Recovery Court
and similar programs may redirect resources away from quality community -
based treatment untethered to the criminal legal system.
Jessica and both amici also maintain the court incorrectly concluded
PDP offenders lack an incentive to complete Recovery Court because they do
not face a lengthy prison sentence. Jessica argues an alternative sentence is
not required under the 2022 Manual, and the court "fails to appreciate" the
numerous other motivations for Recovery Court participants, such as the
genuine desire to overcome substance abuse, the opportunity to expunge one's
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criminal records, or the structure and support provided by the program. The
Attorney General points out the court's reliance on Bishop was misplaced, as
that case considered Track One Recovery Court applicants "who, by definition,
face an alternative prison sentence." The ACLU adds no empirical studies
reflect the threat of incarceration has any effect on drug court participation or
success.
In requesting we affirm, the Prosecutor argues the court correctly found
Recovery Court was not intended for PDP offenders despite conceding "neither
the [2022 Manual] nor the governing statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, expressly
disqualifies from [R]ecovery [C]ourt a defendant who has only been found
guilty of a [PDP] offense." It agrees with the court the "carrot-and-stick
approach" used in Recovery Court would not function as effectively without
the "stick" of an alternative prison sentence. Further, the Prosecutor contends
expanding Recovery Court to DP and PDP offenses would "open the
proverbial flood gates" to municipal court defendants and "far more
participants than recovery courts were created to handle." For the following
reasons, we disagree with each of the Prosecutor's points and reverse.
We briefly address the standard governing our review. Because the
appeal asks us to construe the Recovery Court eligibility criteria as set forth in
the 2022 Manual, a question of law, our review is de novo. State v. Figaro,
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462 N.J. Super. 564, 571 (App. Div. 2020); State v. Amer, 471 N.J. Super.
331, 355 (App. Div. 2022). Accordingly, we give "no deference to the trial
court's 'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from
established facts.'" State v. Maurer, 438 N.J. Super. 402, 411 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting State v. Bradley, 420 N.J. Super. 138, 141 (App. Div. 2011)).
As noted, we find no support for the judge's decision in the historical
development of Recovery Court as conveyed in statute, the Manual, and court
decisions interpreting both. As a full understanding of the development and
evolution of Recovery Court informs our decision, we detail that history.
Recovery Court is not a creature of the Legislature, but of the judiciary,
and was developed in accordance with the Court's "exclusive authority under
the New Jersey Constitution to administer the courts" and "execute[] its
policies through the Administrative Office of the Courts" (AOC). Meyer, 192
N.J. at 430 (citing N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3 and In re P.L. 2001, Chapter
362, 186 N.J. 368, 381-82 (2006)). While Recovery Court is a sentencing
option, and thus rooted in legislative enactment, it is "a subpart of the criminal
part of the Law Division," and its eligibility criteria are a matter of judicial
policy expressed through AOC Directive and the Manual. Meyer, 192 N.J. at
430-31; see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R.
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1:1-1 (2024) (discussing the Court's authority over practice and procedure of
the courts).
In the mid-1990s, the AOC developed the first Drug Court pilot program
to be administered through probation in certain counties "on an experimental
basis." Meyer, 192 N.J. at 430. The program was intended to create a better
way of dealing with the rising number of prison-bound drug offenders than the
traditional approach of "incarceration and more incarceration," which "was not
working." 2022 Manual at 3-4. People of color were "hit the hardest" as "a
disproportionate percentage of inmates in the New Jersey state prison system
have been and are minorities." Id. at 4. In addition to the "skyrocket[ing]"
cost of incarcerating drug offenders, the "devast[ing]" effect of drug abuse and
related crime on families and communities was evident in "drug addicted
newborns, children in foster care, violence in neighborhoods, unsafe streets
and unpaid child support." Id. at 3.
The pilot program proved beneficial, and in May 2000, the Conference
of Criminal Presiding Judges recommended its adoption as a "best practice"
within the Criminal Division statewide. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Manual for
Operation of Adult Drug Courts in N.J. (July 22, 2002) 6 (2002 Manual).
Subsequently, the Judicial Council adopted Drug Courts as best practices and
"called for a comprehensive statewide proposal," which was drafted in
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December 2000 and implemented through legislation enacted in September
2001. Ibid. By 2004, Drug Courts were operating in every vicinage. Id. at 8.
Initially, the pilot program's target population was "nonviolent substance
abusing defendants." Id. at 5. To ensure "equal access" to the program,
however, "the Presiding Judges recommended that the [D]rug [C]ourt caseload
consist of prison-bound and other cases." Id. at 6. As the "primary focus of
the funding" for Drug Court was to provide "an alternative to prison," the 2002
Manual contemplated caseloads would consist of 73% prison-bound cases and
27% non-prison-bound cases. Id. at 8.
In accordance with those goals, the 2002 Manual set forth eligibility
criteria for two tracks for admission into the program. See Meyer, 192 N.J. at
432-33 (discussing the "two tracks" to Drug Court; one through special
probation and the other through regular probation). Consistent with their
present eligibility criteria, Track One was available to defendants "subject to a
presumption of incarceration" who were eligible for "special probation" under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, and Track Two was available to defendants who were not
prison-bound, but faced a sentence to regular probation or fewer than 365 days
in a county jail. 2002 Manual at 9-10. Those who pled guilty to a probation
violation or were terminated from the Pretrial Intervention program were also
eligible for Track Two. Id. at 9. The 2002 Manual permitted application to
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Drug Court "at any time following an arrest and up until plea cutoff," but
encouraged intervention as early as possible in the process. Id. at 19.
Pursuant to the 2002 Manual, in order to be sentenced to Drug Court on
Track Two,9 an applicant must have met the following criteria: (1) a
diagnostic assessment determined the applicant had "a drug or alcohol
dependence"; (2) the program would be "likely to benefit" the applicant; (3)
the applicant had no pending charges or previous conviction or adjudication
for murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, robbery, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, or sexual assault; (4) the charges
included no first- or second-degree crime; (5) the applicant did not "possess a
firearm" during the underlying crime or any prior offense; and (6) the
applicant would not pose a danger to the community while serving a term of
Drug Court. Id. at 16-17. These requirements largely tracked those found in
the special probation statute at the time. See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (2001). Aside
from the enumerated disqualifying crimes, eligibility was not limited by the
nature or classification of the charges.
After the AOC released the 2002 Manual, it did not amend the Manual
until 2019. In the intervening years, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -
9
Because it is undisputed Jessica was not subject to a presumption of
incarceration and thus ineligible as a Track One participant, we focus our
discussion exclusively on Track Two eligibility.
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14 four times, with two of those expanding the class of those eligible for
special probation and thus Recovery Court. See L. 2008, c. 15 (removing
automatic exclusion for those with multiple prior third-degree convictions); L.
2012, c. 23 (removing robbery and burglary from list of disqualifying offenses
and limiting exclusion based on prior convictions to first-degree offenses).
The 2019 Manual formally identified the two paths as Track One and
Track Two and amended the eligibility criteria such that they were far less
restrictive. Admin. Off. of the Cts., N.J. Statewide Drug Court Manual (June
2019) 9 (2019 Manual). Specifically, it removed the six requirements
enumerated in the 2002 Manual and instead provided a defendant is "legally
eligible for [D]rug [C]ourt if he or she qualifies for sentencing to special
probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 (Track One) or regular probation under
N.J.S.A.2C:45-1 (Track Two)." Ibid. It also clarified a "defendant who
initially is not eligible for [D]rug [C]ourt could become eligible by way of a
plea agreement that dismisses the non-[D]rug [C]ourt eligible charges" or
"upon acquittal of a charge that initially rendered the applicant ineligible."
Ibid. Further, prior entry to the program would no longer result in automatic
rejection. Id. at 10. Again, the criteria made no mention of ineligibility based
on a defendant's conviction only for a DP or PDP offense.
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The AOC again amended the Manual in 2020, reiterating Track One
applied to special probation candidates, while Track Two applied to regular
probation candidates, but making no substantive change to the eligibility
requirements. Admin. Off. of the Cts., N.J. Statewide Drug Court Manual
(Dec. 2020) 9 (2020 Manual). In 2022, the AOC published the current version
of the Manual, which changed the name of the program to Recovery Court but
again made no change to the legal eligibility provisions of the 2019 and 2020
Manuals. 2022 Manual at 9.
While the Manual defines eligibility for regular probation by reference
to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1, that statute does not detail which defendants may be
sentenced to probation but rather sets forth permissible conditions of
probation. In doing so, it uses the term "offense" rather than crime, and
specifically carves out DP offenses when discussing split sentences to
probation and incarceration. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1. Other provisions of our
Criminal Code make clear defendants convicted of DP or PDP offenses
generally may be sentenced to probation. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2), (g)
(permitting court to sentence "a person who has been convicted of an offense"
to probation, except certain sex offenses). Further, the special probation
statute expressly provides "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit a person who is eligible for probation in accordance with N.J.S.A.
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2C:45-1 due to a conviction for an offense which is not subject to a
presumption of incarceration . . . from applying for treatment for substance use
disorder as a condition of probation." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).
Our case law similarly demonstrates a repeated intent to expand access
to Recovery Court. In Meyer, the Supreme Court rejected the State's argument
that only those eligible for special probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -14 could
enter Recovery Court. 192 N.J. at 423-24. In Maurer, we modified the
eligibility criteria for Track Two applicants in the 2002 Manual to conform to
the 2012 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 which expanded access for Track
One applicants. 438 N.J. Super. at 417-18. In Figaro, we concluded the
statutory criteria and exclusions for Track One applicants did not govern Track
Two applicants, but could be considered in the court's discretion. 462 N.J.
Super. at 578-79. And in Harris, we noted an interpretation of the 2012
amendment to the special probation statute "that would have the practical
effect of restricting access to Drug Court contravenes the legislative purpose,"
the "overarching goal" of which was "to enlarge, not reduce, the pool of
defendants who could participate in Drug Court." 466 N.J. Super. at 545.
We are satisfied the foregoing reveals a lack of support for the court's
conclusion a defendant is ineligible for Recovery Court if the underlying
conviction is for a DP or PDP offense. The eligibility requirements for the two
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tracks are clear and simple: Track One applies to those eligible for special
probation and Track Two applies to those eligible for regular probation. 2022
Manual at 9. As we recently explained:
Every candidate falls under one of two distinct and
mutually exclusive tracks. To determine legal
eligibility, the trial court must first determine whether
the defendant is a Track One or Track Two candidate.
A defendant is a Track One candidate if, and only if,
he or she is presently subject to the presumption of
imprisonment in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) or to a
mandatory term of parole ineligibility. If the
defendant is not presently subject to the presumption
of imprisonment as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) or
to a mandatory term of parole ineligibility, he or she is
a Track Two candidate.
[Harris, 466 N.J. Super. at 551.]
The Prosecutor points to no law, decision, or directive, nor has our
independent research uncovered any, that adds to the Track Two criteria the
condition that the person be sentenced for a "crime."
Further, contrary to the court's decision, a plain reading of the legal
eligibility provision of the Manual demonstrates it was not "simply
contrast[ing] the two paths into the program." Rather, the Manual's drafters
clearly titled the section "Legal Eligibility" and declined to condition
eligibility on any other requirements. The fact that the program originated
from a desire to reduce the number of prison-bound drug offenders does not
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negate the clearly defined legal eligibility requirements for the two tracks,
eligibility for special or regular probation, which have remained consistent.
As noted, since its inception, Recovery Court has always encompassed both
prison-bound and non-prison-bound defendants.
The court also placed undue emphasis on the conviction for which the
person is being sentenced. As the Manual makes clear, early intervention is
encouraged and the court may admit a person to Recovery Court without a
guilty plea in place. Here, Jessica was charged with third- and fourth-degree
crimes and she could have applied for Recovery Court based on these charges.
As the Manual makes clear, a defendant may plea bargain to become eligible
for Recovery Court, conveying an intent to permit more—not fewer—
applicants. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jessica reduced her charge to a PDP
offense. It is inconsistent with the spirit of Recovery Court that someone who
is eligible for Track Two based on their initial charges would become
ineligible because the State agrees to accept a plea to a lesser charge.
The court's reliance on the removal of the term "offender" in
amendments to the Manual is also misplaced. The drafters replaced "offender"
with "defendant," a more neutral term which clearly describes anyone charged
with a criminal or non-criminal offense. We fundamentally disagree with the
conclusion the drafters sought to convey an intent to exclude DP and PDP
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offenders based on such a subtle change in the face of clearly expressed
eligibility criteria which included no such provision.
We are similarly unpersuaded by the court's and the Prosecutor's
concerns that permitting DP and PDP offenders to enter Recovery Court would
unduly expand eligibility to municipal court defendants. Jessica was within
the jurisdiction of the Superior Court and was not being sentenced in
municipal court. Thus, whether she, or anyone else, could enter Recovery
Court in municipal court was plainly not at issue, and should not have
impaired the court's analysis.
Finally, we reject the court's conclusion that defendants not subject to
incarceration would have no incentive to succeed in Recovery Court. Bishop,
upon which it relied, made clear that it "d[id] not deal with those admitted to
Drug Court under the regular probation track" but rather "only with offenders
sentenced to special probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14, whose probation is
subsequently permanently revoked." 429 N.J. Super. at 540. To accept the
court's rationale would essentially negate Track Two eligibility and the
historical composition of Recovery Court as both prison-bound and non-
prison-bound defendants, instead limiting the program to those facing a
presumption of incarceration. That is contrary to the explicit eligibility
criteria, the case law, and the spirit of Recovery Court.
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Not only was Jessica not a Track One applicant, but the court also failed
to consider the various behavioral modification techniques and rewards for
progress that Recovery Court uses to encourage compliance. 2022 Manual at
25-26 ("The most effective and successful drug courts utilize a varied and
creative range of intermediate-magnitude responses to participants' behavior
that can be adjusted up or down in intensity in response to continued violations
or successes. Sanctions and rewards tend to be least effective at the lowest and
highest levels."); see also Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #03-20,
Drug Court – State of N.J. Adult Drug Court Program – Participant Incentive
& Sanction Charts (Jan. 3, 2020) (providing matrix for identifying level of
behavior and necessary response, such as increasing or decreasing required
contacts with probation or community service hours). While sanctions were
initially stressed to address violations, the approach has changed over the years
to encourage positive behavior as opposed to punishing negative behavior. As
Jessica explained in her merits brief, people entering Recovery Court may
have various reasons for doing so, including the possibility of expungement or
a true desire to overcome substance abuse.
Jessica's untimely death highlights the pressing need for life-saving
resources to combat substance abuse in New Jersey. Our opinion clarifies
individuals convicted of DP and PDP offenses in Superior Court are not
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categorically barred from seeking those resources. The court erred in holding
otherwise.
Reversed.
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