State of New Jersey v. Mary Mellody ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1087-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. July 5, 2024
APPELLATE DIVISION
MARY MELLODY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued May 8, 2024 – Decided July 5, 2024
Before Judges Currier, Firko and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Sussex County, Municipal Appeal No. 04-03-
22.
Nicole Leigh Atlak argued the cause for appellant
(Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Nicole Leigh
Atlak, on the briefs).
Karen A. Lodeserto, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Carolyn Murray, Acting Sussex County
Prosecutor, attorney; Karen A. Lodeserto, of counsel
and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SUSSWEIN, J.A.D.
In this appeal we consider the circumstances in which a police officer may
enter a suspect's residence in connection with a drunk or careless driving
investigation. Under the Fourth Amendment and its analogue, Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, homes are accorded heightened
protections. While police have the authority to perform various "community
caretaking" functions—such as determining whether a suspected drunk driver
needs medical attention—they may not make a warrantless entry into a suspect's
home, including the garage, to execute an investigative detention without
consent or exigent circumstances.
Defendant Mary Mellody appeals from a November 18, 2022 Law
Division order affirming, on de novo review, the denial of her motion to
suppress evidence and her municipal court convictions for driving while
intoxicated (DWI) and careless driving. Defendant contends there were
insufficient grounds to initiate a DWI stop because the officer had not personally
observed her alleged erratic driving. She also contends the results of the field
sobriety tests should have been suppressed as fruits of the officer's u nlawful
entry into her garage at her home.
After carefully reviewing the record in light of the governing legal
principles, we conclude the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to
initiate a DWI stop based on a 9-1-1 call reporting defendant's erratic driving.
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However, we also conclude the officer unlawfully entered defendant's garage to
detain her. Viewed under an objective standard, the record shows the officer
did not render emergency aid justifying the warrantless entry under the exigent
circumstances exception. Rather, the officer conducted what might be
characterized as a routine investigation of the suspected DWI and careless
driving offenses, approaching the vehicle in the garage as if it were stopped on
the side of a public road, and administering standard field sobriety tests without
ever inquiring whether defendant needed medical attention.
Because the State failed to establish exigent circumstances, entering the
garage to detain defendant was unlawful, and the fruits of the ensuing
investigation must be suppressed. Therefore, we reverse and vacate defendant's
DWI conviction, since the finding she was intoxicated depends on the field
sobriety tests and observation of her demeanor made after the officer unlawfully
entered the garage. We remand for the Law Division judge to determine whether
the careless driving conviction—which is predicated on the way defendant drove
into her garage—can be sustained based on information learned before the
officer unlawfully crossed the threshold of defendant's home.
I.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record.
On November 1, 2019, defendant went to a tavern in Hardyston, where she saw
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her neighbor. Defendant and the neighbor left the tavern separately around
10:30 p.m. Around 10:44 p.m., Hardyston Police received a 9-1-1 call reporting
an erratic driver in the Crystal Springs development area. The caller reported
that the driver was swerving and going over curbs and described the car as a
black Jeep SUV. The caller provided the Jeep's license plate number.
An officer was dispatched to the Jeep's registration address in an attempt
to locate the erratic driver. Upon his arrival, the officer observed a Jeep in the
driveway matching the description from the 9-1-1 call. The Jeep's brake lights
were illuminated.
The officer activated his overhead lights to effectuate a stop. The Jeep
moved forward into the attached garage and stopped after the officer heard a
"bang." He surmised the Jeep struck a refrigerator located in the one-car garage,
which he characterized as "tight."
The officer entered the garage and saw defendant sitting in the driver's
seat.1 At the suppression hearing, the officer testified he asked defendant "what
she was doing, why she didn't stop when [he] activated [his] lights." He also
"asked her something in relation to why she crashed into her fridge." He noticed
1
The patrol vehicle's mobile video recorder (dashcam) was not activated at this
point in the encounter. It was subsequently activated and recorded the field
sobriety tests.
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defendant's movements were "fumbled" and "slow" and that her eyes were
"watery" and "bloodshot red." The officer smelled alcohol emanating from the
vehicle.
The officer instructed defendant to turn off her engine and exit the vehicle
so he could administer field sobriety tests. While performing the "walk and
turn" test, defendant lost her balance and took an incorrect number of steps. She
was also unable to perform the "one-leg stand" test.
Defendant was taken into custody and transported to the police station.
She was charged with DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-
97, and failure to comply with the direction of a police officer, N.J.S.A. 39:4 -
57.
A. MUNICIPAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
On December 9, 2021, a municipal court judge convened a hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The officer who initiated the stop and
made the arrest was the only witness. The State also introduced portions of the
9-1-1 call and dashcam recordings.
The municipal court judge determined:
[I]t is significant that when [the officer] arrives and puts
on his lights that [defendant] then, while her car is
operational drives into the garage and drives into a
refrigerator. At this point, he doesn't—he's not sure
what he's dealing [with] quite frankly, and I think he
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has an obligation, quite frankly, to investigate. Not
only because there's an indication that she's driving
erratically, but there may be a medical issue at stake.
And I think there's probably a community caretaker
function that is invoked under these circumstances.
The judge continued:
If [defendant] was stopped in her vehicle, the vehicle's
turned off and she exited her vehicle and went into her
home I think under those circumstances the argument
with respect to getting a search warrant has great
validity. I think under those circumstance[s] . . . the
police are obligated to get a search warrant. But not
here. She's still in her car. The idea that she's not going
anywhere, because that was an issue that was raised by
[defense counsel], assumes that she's not going to back
up, assumes she's not going to leave, and assumes that
[the officer can tell her to stop.] Well, obviously that
didn't work. When he put his lights on and she saw that
[his] lights were on, and he activated some siren she
then drove forward. I'm not going to say sped forward,
but she drove forward and in such a way that she hit
a . . . refrigerator.
The judge noted the dashcam video "speaks volumes" and "shows
somebody who's clearly intoxicated." The judge described defendant as
"wobbling," "zigzagging," and "crying . . . upset . . . [and] emotional." He
further stated, "her speech is slurred."
The judge found the officer credible. Although the judge acknowledged
there were issues with respect to what the officer recalled, he noted "this is a
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ticket that's now two years old." The judge denied defendant's motion to
suppress.
The municipal court trial was convened on March 10, 2022. The parties
stipulated they would use the testimony from the suppression hearing. The
State's sole witness was the officer who administered the field sobriety tests and
made the arrest. The defense called defendant's neighbor as a witness.
The neighbor testified that defendant did not appear to be under the
influence of alcohol or drugs at the tavern. Further, the neighbor picked up
defendant's towed car the next day and "didn't see a single scratch or a dent."
She testified "[e]verything was intact."
Defendant testified on her own behalf. She claimed she was in the process
of parking her car, and that the refrigerator is located directly in front of it. She
maintained she did not hit the refrigerator or hear a "crash sound." She did not
see any damage on the refrigerator when she looked at it after the incident.
Defendant testified, "I was putting my car in park. I noticed flashing lights
behind me, but I honestly did not think that the [l]ights were at my house. I
thought they were at my neighbor's home." She continued, "[T]he first
experience that I had was the officer came into my garage and was banging on
my window. And startled me." As to her performance on the field sobriety
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tests, defendant testified she has health issues that impacted her balance and
ability to perform the tests.
At the close of testimony, defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing
the State did not prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The
municipal judge denied the motion.
In rendering the verdict, the municipal judge found defendant's testimony
to be "[t]ruly incredulous." The judge nonetheless dismissed the failure to
comply with directions of a police officer charge.
The judge found defendant guilty of DWI based on the observational
evidence of defendant's intoxication. The judge also found defendant guilty of
careless driving "because the act of pulling that car forward under those
circumstances, was done without due caution." With respect to the lack of
refrigerator damage, the judge noted:
Now, you know, is there damage to her car, is there
damage to the refrigerator? I credit [the neighbor's]
testimony that there was no damage. But that doesn't
mean [defendant] didn't hit it . . . just because you hit
something doesn't mean there's damage to your vehicle
or to the . . . refrigerator.
Because this was defendant's second DWI conviction, she was sentenced
to a two-year suspension of driving privileges, a two-year installation of an
ignition interlock device after the driving suspension, forty-eight hours at the
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Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC), thirty days community service, and
fines and costs. Defendant appealed her convictions and sentence to the Law
Division.
B. LAW DIVISION PROCEEDINGS
On October 26, 2022, a de novo hearing was convened in the Law
Division. On November 18, 2022, the Law Division judge issued a written
opinion upholding the convictions and sentence. With respect to the motion to
suppress, the Law Division judge found the officer had reasonable and
articulable suspicion to effectuate a stop of defendant's vehicle, citing to State
v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205 (2003). The judge determined "the 9-1-1 caller should
not be treated as an anonymous tip based on the quality of information that he
provided to the operator."
The judge also concluded the officer lawfully entered the garage,
reasoning:
The combination of the erratic driving report coupled
with [d]efendant driving her car after the patrolman
engaged his lights and siren and then running into a
refrigerator all raise seri[ou]s concerns for the health,
safety and welfare of the driver that necessitate follow
up action. Here, [the patrolman] testified that he
observed a crash and that he was not sure if the
[d]efendant was okay or not which is why he entered
the garage. These facts provided [the patrolman] with
an "objectively reasonable basis to believe that a driver
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may be impaired or suffering a medical emergency."
State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. [20,] 39 [2016].
Turning to the de novo review of the municipal court convictions, the Law
Division judge determined the State proved defendant was guilty of DWI beyond
a reasonable doubt based on the municipal court record. The judge viewed the
dashcam video and found it corroborated the officer's description of defendant's
demeanor. The judge concluded:
[The patrolman] observed the [d]efendant crash her
vehicle into the refrigerator. [The patrolman] further
observed that the [d]efendant's movements were slow
and fumbling; her speech was slow and slurred; and her
eyes were bloodshot red and watery. Additionally, [the
patrolman] smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from
the [d]efendant's vehicle as she sat in it and the
[d]efendant admitted to drinking two glasses of wine.
Furthermore, when [the patrolman] attempted field
sobriety tests on the [d]efendant, she was unable to
follow instructions during the administration of the
walk and turn test and she failed the one-legged stand
test.
The Law Division judge also ruled the State proved defendant was guilty
of careless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge agreed with the
municipal court that defendant engaged in careless driving when she pulled the
car forward into the garage, finding "[d]efendant's intoxication rendered her
incapable of driving with due caution and circumspection, as evidenced by [the
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patrolman's] testimony that he heard and observed the [d]efendant crash her
vehicle into the refrigerator in her garage."
This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contentions for our
consideration:
POINT I
THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICER HAD THE
REQUISITE REASONABLE SUSPICION AND/OR
ACTED PURSUANT TO THE COMMUNITY
CARETAKER FUNCTION AS JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION.
POINT II
THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN ITS
UNSUPPORTED RELIANCE UPON THE
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT AND IN FAILING TO MAKE ITS
OWN DETERMINATIONS AS TO THE
CREDIBILITY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
PRESENTED.
POINT III
THE LAW DIVISION ERRED IN ADJUDICATING
[DEFENDANT] GUILTY AS THE
DETERMINATION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT
OF THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
II.
When a defendant appeals a municipal court conviction, a Law Division
judge conducts a de novo trial on the municipal court record. R. 3:23-8(a)(2).
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The Law Division judge must make independent findings of fact and conclusions
of law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings. State v.
Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017); State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999);
see also State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 382 (2015).
In an appeal from a de novo hearing on the record, we do not
independently assess the evidence. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471. Rather, our review
of a Law Division judge's decision is limited to determining whether the findings
made by the judge "'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible
evidence present in the record.'" Id. at 472 (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J.
599, 615 (1997)). "[T]he rule of deference is more compelling where . . . two
lower courts have entered concurrent judgments on purely factual issues." Id.
at 474; accord State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 49 n.2 (2012). "Under the two-court
rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings
of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very
obvious and exceptional showing of error." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474 (citing
Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952)). However, we owe no
deference to the Law Division judge or the municipal court with respect to legal
determinations. State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011) ("[A]ppellate review of
legal determinations is plenary.") (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
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Similar principles limit the scope of our review of the search and seizure
issues presented in this appeal. As a general matter, "[o]ur standard of review
on a motion to suppress is deferential." State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526
(2022). "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the
factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad,
246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "defer[] to those findings in recognition of the trial
court's 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the
case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Nyema, 249 N.J. at 526 (quoting
Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). In contrast, the trial court's interpretation of the law
and the legal "consequences that flow from established facts" are reviewed de
novo. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014); accord State v. Smith, 212
N.J. 365, 387 (2012).
Turning briefly to substantive legal principles, "'[t]he Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution, in almost identical language, protect against unreasonable searches
and seizures.'" State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156, 164-65 (2023) (quoting Nyema,
249 N.J. at 527). One of the bedrock principles under both Constitutions is that
warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively invalid. See State v.
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Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022); see State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19
(2004). "To justify a warrantless search or seizure, 'the State bears the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or
seizure falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.'" State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023),
certif. denied, 255 N.J. 506 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019)).
This fundamental principle applies to motor vehicle stops. In Nyema, our
Supreme Court explained:
When police stop a motor vehicle, the stop constitutes
a seizure of persons, no matter how brief or limited.
[Scriven, 226 N.J. [at] 33 []]. An investigative stop or
detention, however, does not offend the Federal or State
Constitution, and no warrant is needed, "if it is based
on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v.
Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Although reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause, "[n]either
'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's
subjective good faith can justify infringement of a
citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights." State v.
Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002) (Coleman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State
v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997)); accord State v.
Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 518 (2020). Determining whether
reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an
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investigatory stop is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that
demands evaluation of "the totality of circumstances
surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the
State's interest in effective law enforcement against the
individual's right to be protected from unwarranted
and/or overbearing police intrusions." State v. Privott,
203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010) (quoting State v. Davis, 104
N.J. 490, 504 (1986)).
[Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527-28.]
The same reasonable and articulable suspicion standard that applies to a "Terry"
stop to investigate suspected criminal activity also applies to stops based on
suspected motor vehicle offenses. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
(holding motor vehicle stops must be based on reasonable and articulable
suspicion to believe the vehicle is being operated in violation of law, typically,
an observed motor vehicle violation).
The vast majority of motor vehicle stops are conducted on public roads.
In this instance, the stop was initiated in defendant's driveway. The ensuing
investigation moved into her garage when she pulled into it and the officer
followed her inside on foot. Location matters. The constitutional rules of
engagement are especially strict when a police investigation intrudes on a
private residence. In State v. Vargas—a case we carefully analyze later in this
opinion—our Supreme Court invoked the often-repeated maxim, "[i]ndeed,
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
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Fourth Amendment is directed.'" 213 N.J. 301, 313 (2013) (quoting United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972).
III.
With those general principles in mind, we first address defendant's
contention that the officer did not have a lawful basis to initiate a stop of her
vehicle, which was stationary in her driveway before the officer made any
observations of erratic driving. 2 We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument.
The report made by the 9-1-1 caller was sufficiently detailed to provide
reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify a stop. Although the officer never
personally observed the vehicle operate erratically on a public roadway, he was
able to corroborate the 9-1-1 call by confirming the vehicle bearing the license
plate provided by the caller also met the description of the Jeep given by the
2
Defendant did not argue before the municipal court or Law Division judge,
and does not argue on appeal, that the officer breached the "curtilage" of her
home by entering onto her driveway. See State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 302
(2006) ("Curtilage is land adjacent to a home and may include walkways,
driveways, and porches. Whether the Fourth Amendment safeguards an area of
curtilage depends on a consideration of various factors.") (citation omitted)); see
Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) ("It is a well-settled
principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues
not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a
presentation is available."); see also Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648,
657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").
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caller. Furthermore, observing the vehicle in the driveway with its brake lights
on permits a reasonable inference it had very recently been operating on a public
road, again corroborating the 9-1-1 caller's report. Together, these facts satisfy
the test for initiating an investigative detention.
As the Law Division judge correctly noted, this case is governed by the
principles established by our Supreme Court in Golotta, 178 N.J. at 205, which
distinguishes 9-1-1 callers from other anonymous sources. See Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding as a general proposition, an anonymous tip
by itself is not sufficient to constitute a reasonable and articulable suspicion);
see also State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263 (2017) (reaffirming that an anonymous
tip, standing alone, inherently lacks the reliability necessary to support
reasonable and articulable suspicion because the tipster's veracity is largely
unknown, and unknowable).
In Golotta, the police received a 9-1-1 call from "a citizen informant"
reporting a pickup truck driving erratically. 178 N.J. at 209. The caller
described the vehicle, including its license plate number, and indicated the
direction the truck was traveling. Ibid. The caller's name was not obtained. Id.
at 209-10.
The 9-1-1 dispatcher relayed the information to two officers on patrol. Id.
at 209. The officers identified the pickup truck and initiated a stop, even though
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they had not personally observed any erratic movements. Id. at 210. The driver
submitted to a breathalyzer test and was charged with DWI. Ibid. The defendant
moved to suppress the breath test results. Ibid. He "argued that by not observing
the alleged erratic driving, the officer had lacked sufficient suspicion to stop the
vehicle and, as a result, any evidence gathered after that juncture was
inadmissible." Ibid.In rejecting the defense contention, our Supreme Court held:
We agree with those courts that have reduced the degree
of corroboration necessary to uphold a stop of a
motorist suspected of erratic driving in these
circumstances. Similar to the reasoning of those courts,
our rationale is threefold. First, by its nature, a call
placed and processed via the 9-1-1 system carries
enhanced reliability not found in other contexts.
Second, the conduct at issue is the temporary stop of a
motor vehicle based on reasonable suspicion, not the
more intrusive search of its contents or arrest of its
driver, which would be governed by different rules.
Third, an intoxicated or erratic driver poses a
significant risk of death or injury to himself and to the
public and, as such, that factor is substantial when
evaluating the reasonableness of the stop itself.
[Id. at 218.]
Since Golotta was decided, the United States Supreme Court also
embraced the distinction between 9-1-1 callers and other anonymous tipsters.
See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014). In Navarette, the Court upheld
a traffic stop based on an anonymous 9-1-1 call, holding police had reasonable
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and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle for DWI where the 9-1-1
caller provided an eyewitness account and the call was made shortly after the
incident. Id. at 398-400. The Court noted that "a reasonable officer could
conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using [the 9-1-1 system]"
given "technological and regulatory developments." Id. at 402.
Defendant argues that Golotta does not apply in the present circumstances
because our Supreme Court contemplated motor vehicle stops on public roads,
not stops where police intercept the subject vehicle on private property. We are
not persuaded by the distinction defendant asks us to draw. Nothing in the
rationale undergirding the Golotta holding limits its reach based on whether the
subject vehicle has reached its destination. The gravamen of Golotta—and now
Navarette—is that information provided by 9-1-1 callers is inherently more
reliable than information provided by other unknown informers. These
decisions thus augment the general rule that "an anonymous tip, standing alone,
inherently lacks the reliability necessary to support reasonable suspicion."
Rosario, 229 N.J. at 276.
Nor are we persuaded by defendant's fact-sensitive contention the State
failed to present evidence concerning the specific registration details of the
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vehicle observed by the 9-1-1 caller.3 That contention is belied by the record
and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record. It is obvious
the 9-1-1 caller provided the license plate number of defendant's vehicle,
otherwise, the officer could not have driven to the specific address associated
with her vehicle's registration. Furthermore, the officer testified in pertinent
part:
OFFICER: The dispatcher sent me to Warren Circle for
an erratic driver complaint.
....
PROSECUTOR: Okay, but you were told Warren
Circle, specifically the address?
OFFICER: The address and also the vehicle's
registration was provided to me.
In sum, the information provided by the 9-1-1 caller and forwarded to the
patrol officer by the police dispatcher was comparable to the information found
to constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion in Golotta. Accordingly, the
officer had a sufficient basis to initiate a stop to investigate the erratic driving
reported by the 9-1-1 caller.
IV.
3
Defendant contends, "the record is barren of any specific 'registration' details
or license plate information pertaining to the subject vehicle of the [9-1-1] call."
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We turn next to defendant's contention the municipal court and Law
Division judges overextended the community caretaking doctrine by relying on
it to justify police entry into her garage. The Law Division judge expressly
relied on our Supreme Court's decision in Scriven to support his finding that the
officer "was not sure if the [d]efendant was okay" after he "observed a crash,"
adding that "running into a refrigerator . . . raise[d] [serious] concerns for the
health, safety and welfare of the driver that necessitate[d] follow up action."
The judge concluded those concerns provided an "'objectively reasonable basis
to believe that a driver may be impaired or suffering a medical emergency.'"
(quoting Scriven, 226 N.J. at 39).
The judge's reliance on Scriven is misplaced. Scriven dealt with
community caretaking in the context of a roadside encounter. See id. at 27. It
did not address the qualitatively distinct privacy intrusion that attends police
entry into a private residence. Specifically, the Scriven Court held, "[i]n their
community-caretaker role, police officers, who act in an objectively reasonable
manner, may check on the welfare or safety of a citizen who appears in need of
help on the roadway without securing a warrant or offending the Constitution."
Id. at 38 (emphasis added). The Court further explained, "Police officers who
have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that a driver may be impaired or
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suffering a medical emergency may stop the vehicle for the purpose of making
a welfare check and rendering aid, if necessary." Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
Scriven did not address "welfare checks" made in private residences. This
distinction is critical. The rules governing the community caretaking doctrine
are very different for homes as compared to vehicles, as made clear in other
State and federal precedents.
To provide a foundation for the remainder of our analysis of the
community caretaking doctrine's boundaries, we take a step back to
acknowledge the distinctive protections accorded to private residences by the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.
In Florida v. Jardines, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that the '"very
core'" of the Fourth Amendment is "'the right of a [person] to retreat into [their]
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'" 569
U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
In State v. Evers, our Supreme Court stressed, "[t]he privacy interests of
the home are entitled to the highest degree of respect and protection in the
framework of our constitutional system." 175 N.J. 355, 384 (2003). Applying
this core Fourth Amendment principle, in New York v. Payton, the United States
Supreme Court held that police cannot make a routine felony arrest in the
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arrestee's own home without an arrest warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement, such as exigent circumstances. 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
The special protections accorded to the home apply to defendant's garage.
The attached garage is part of her home, or at the very least, part of the home's
protected curtilage. For constitutional privacy analysis purposes, a garage is not
just a place to shelter vehicles from the elements. Personal "effects" protected
under the literal terms of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 4
might as easily be stored in a garage as in a basement, an attic, or, for that matter,
a bedroom walk-in closet. In this instance, the record shows defendant kept a
refrigerator in her garage.
It makes no difference, moreover, that the garage door was open when the
officer crossed the threshold. A large open door does not invite police to enter
a garage without a warrant or recognized exception to the warrant requirement
any more than an open sliding-glass patio or lanai door invites police to enter a
4
Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the papers and
things to be seized.
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family room. While an open door may, depending on fact-sensitive
circumstances, expose to "plain view" certain contents of a garage, even then,
police may not enter the garage based solely on the plain view observation of
contraband inside. See State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 21 (App. Div. 2023)
("[T]he plain view exception does not authorize police to cross the threshold of
a constitutionally protected place. The plain view doctrine does not apply, for
example, when the officer has no right to enter a private residence.") (citing
State v. Lewis, 116 N.J. 477, 485 (1989)).
Nor does it matter that the officer acted in good faith and may not have
appreciated that entering the open garage was an act of constitutional
significance qualitatively different from walking up to a vehicle stopped on the
highway. We focus solely on the officer's conduct, not his or her subjective
thoughts. See Terry, 232 N.J. at 245-46; cf., State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 237
(2001) (holding, in the context of drawing blood for blood alcohol content
testing, "[b]ecause the test is an objective one, '[a]n officer's evil intentions will
not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of
force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use
of force constitutional'") (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).
In State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58 (1987), our Supreme Court, relying
on Article I, Paragraph 7, firmly rejected a "good faith exception" to the
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exclusionary rule. And recently, in State v. Smith, our Supreme Court
reaffirmed that "an investigative stop 'may not be based on . . . the officer's
subjective good faith.'" 251 N.J. 244, 258 (2022) (quoting Chisum, 236 N.J. at
546).
We add that this was not a fleeting or de minimus entry into defendant's
home. Here, the officer entered the garage to execute an investigative detention,
that is, to seize defendant. See ibid. (noting a motor vehicle stop, "no matter
how brief or limited" is a seizure of a person). Even a brief entry of a home to
effectuate the seizure of a resident is a significant constitutional intrusion.
In Payton, the United States Supreme Court held "the warrantless arrest
of a person is a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be
reasonable." 445 U.S. at 585. The Court ultimately ruled the Fourth
Amendment "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual
entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." Id. at 576.
The home-protection rationale underlying the Payton rule logically
applies as well to investigative detentions. Although an arrest is "the most
significant type of seizure by police." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272, an investigative
detention is also "a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to
be reasonable." Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21; see
also Smith, 251 N.J. at 258. We therefore hold the same home-protection
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25
principle that undergirds Payton prohibits police from making a warrantless and
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effectuate a routine investigative
detention. Put another way, police cannot conduct a warrantless entry into a
home to detain a resident without consent or a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances.
V.
That brings us to our Supreme Court's decision in Vargas, which
addressed "whether the community-caretaking doctrine authorizes the police to
conduct a warrantless entry and search of a home to check on the welfare of a
resident in the absence of the resident's consent or an objectively reasonable
basis to believe that there is an emergency." 213 N.J. at 305. The Court
concluded, "[w]e now hold that, based on the United States Supreme Court's and
this Court's jurisprudence, the community-caretaking doctrine is not a
justification for the warrantless entry and search of a home in the absence of
some form of an objectively reasonable emergency." Ibid.
The Vargas Court carefully examined the origins and rationale of the
community caretaking doctrine, which was developed to apply to vehicles. The
Court noted that in State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 143 (2012), it "articulated
limits to the community-caretaking doctrine in the context of a home search."
Vargas, 213 N.J. at 320. In Edmonds, the Court stressed the community-
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26
caretaking doctrine is "not a roving commission to conduct a nonconsensual
search of a home in the absence of exigent circumstances." 211 N.J. at 143.
Importantly, for purposes of the present appeal, the Vargas Court
commented, "[t]he present case comes before us because our state case law has
blurred the distinction between the community-caretaking and emergency-aid
doctrines. We now must bring clarity to our jurisprudence." Id. at 323. To that
end, the Court explained:
Police officers perform both law enforcement and
community-caretaking functions. When they are
engaged in either activity, they must conform to the
dictates of the Constitution. The right of privacy in the
sanctuary of one's home is protected whether a
government officer is acting in a law enforcement or
community-caretaking capacity.
[Id. at 328-29.]
At bottom, the Vargas Court "decline[d] the State's invitation to expand
the [community caretaking] doctrine in a way that was never conceived by the
United States Supreme Court." Id. at 321. "Without the presence of consent or
some species of exigent circumstances," the Court stressed, "the community -
caretaking doctrine is not a basis for the warrantless entry into and search of a
home." Ibid.
The same reasoning that buttresses Vargas was subsequently embraced by
the United States Supreme Court in Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021). In
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27
Caniglia, the Court acknowledged that police officers are often called upon to
discharge noncriminal "'community caretaking functions.'" Id. at 196 (quoting
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). The Court framed—and
definitively answered—the issue before it as whether "these 'caretaking' duties
create[] a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in
the home. It does not." Ibid. The Court emphasized that its previous
recognition "that police officers perform many civic tasks in modern society was
just that—a recognition that these tasks exist, and not an open-ended license to
perform them anywhere." Id. at 199.
In sum, after Vargas and Caniglia, it is clear that under both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7, performing a community caretaking
function does not constitute a standalone exception to the warrant requirement
for purposes of authorizing police to enter a private residence. Rather, any such
warrantless, nonconsensual entry is justified, if at all, only under the exigent
circumstances exception.
VI.
We therefore turn our attention to the exigent circumstances exception,
which is comprised of several analytically distinct varieties. As our Supreme
Court explained in State v. Zalcberg:
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There is no defined formula for determining whether
there are exigent circumstances, and the term may take
on different shape and form depending on the facts of a
given case. State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 632 (2001).
Absent a precise definition, applying the exigency
doctrine "demands a fact-sensitive, objective analysis"
based on the totality of the circumstances. Ibid.[232 N.J. 335, 345 (2018).]
Over the years, the United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts have
identified several classifications of exigency that fall under the rubric of the
exigent circumstances exception. These include, for example, hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, see State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579 (1989), and preventing the
imminent destruction of evidence, including blood alcohol content evidence, see
Zalcberg, 232 N.J. at 335. In the matter before us, the State does not argue hot
pursuit or the need to prevent the destruction of evidence. Rather, the State
contends the entry into defendant's garage was lawful because the officer needed
to determine whether the driver required "emergency aid," which is another
well-delineated species of exigent circumstances.
In Vargas, our Supreme Court explained that:
Under the emergency-aid doctrine, a police officer can
enter a home without a warrant if [they have] "'an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency requires that [police] provide immediate
assistance to protect or preserve life, or to prevent
serious injury'" and there is a "'reasonable nexus
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29
between the emergency and the area or places to be
searched.'"
[213 N.J. at 323 (emphasis added) (citing Edmonds,
211 N.J. at 132) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586,
600 (2004)).]
In Edmonds, the Court stressed both the seriousness and imminency of the
danger to life and limb that is required to satisfy the emergency-aid species of
exigent circumstances, explaining:
In sum, if police officers "possess an objectively
reasonable basis to believe" that prompt action is
needed to meet an imminent danger, then neither the
Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Paragraph 7 demand
that the officers "delay potential lifesaving measures
while critical and precious time is expended obtaining
a warrant."
[211 N.J. at 133 (emphasis added) (quoting Frankel,
179 N.J. at 599).]
In State v. Garbin, we upheld the defendant's DWI conviction, concluding
the warrantless entry into a home garage was lawful under the community
caretaking doctrine. 325 N.J. Super. 521, 526-27 (App. Div. 1999). We did not
then have the benefit of later New Jersey and United States Supreme Court
decisions that clarify in the context of a home entry, the community caretaking
doctrine is not a standalone exception to the warrant requirement. Our decision
in Garbin nonetheless demonstrates the type and degree of emergency that is
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30
needed to justify a warrantless entry into a garage for community caretaking
purposes.
In Garbin, an officer was dispatched to the defendant's home "to
investigate a report of a possible fire." Id. at 524. When the officer arrived, he
smelled burning rubber and noticed smoke coming from the defendant's garage.
Ibid. The garage door started to open, closed, then opened all the way up. Ibid.The officer saw a person sitting in the driver's seat of a pickup truck. Ibid. The
door closed again. Ibid. The officer "pounded on the garage door and said,
'police department, open up the door.'" Ibid. When the door opened, the two
officers entered and observed "tires of defendant's truck spinning, creating
smoke, and the front bumper pushing against the rear of the garage." Ibid. On
those facts, we held:
[The officers'] observations of smoke emanating from
the garage and the wheels of defendant's truck rapidly
spinning provided a reasonable basis for concern that
there was something wrong with the vehicle or its
driver. Those observations could have indicated that
the car was stuck in a driving gear, that the driver was
unconscious or attempting to commit suicide or, as
turned out to be the case, that he was highly intoxicated.
Under these circumstances, the police officers would
have been remiss in the performance of their
community caretaking responsibilities if they had failed
to investigate further.
[Id. at 526-27.]
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VII.
It remains for us to apply the foregoing legal principles to the facts of the
present matter. As we have noted, the Law Division judge concluded the
combination of circumstances "raise[d] [serious] concerns for the health, safety
and welfare of the driver that necessitate[d] follow up action." The judge also
found that the officer "was not sure if [] [d]efendant was okay or not which is
why he entered the garage." These facts, the judge concluded, provided the
officer with an objectively reasonable basis to believe defendant "may be
impaired or suffering a medical emergency."
While we defer to the judge's credibility assessment and fact-finding, we
view the determination of whether those facts established an emergency
sufficient to satisfy the emergency-aid doctrine to be a legal conclusion to which
we owe no special deference and instead review de novo. See Gamble, 218 N.J.
at 425 ("A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences
that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.").
In conducting our review, we focus on the officer's conduct—rather than
his subjective beliefs—as required by Edmonds. 211 N.J. at 132. There, our
Supreme Court admonished, "we do not believe that the elusive attempt to plumb
the subjective motivations of an officer will meaningfully advance either the
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32
privacy interests of an individual or the ultimate determination of whether a
particular search or seizure was unreasonable under state law." Id. at 133.
Although we do not have the benefit of a dashcam recording of the initial
stages of the encounter between the officer and defendant, the officer's
testimony, found to be credible by two judges, does not suggest he acted with
any special urgency consistent with rendering emergency aid. See Locurto, 157
N.J. at 474. To the contrary, his testimony suggests he approached defendant's
stationary (but running) vehicle in much the same way an officer would
approach any vehicle stopped on a roadway on suspicion of drunk driving.
Importantly, the officer did not begin the encounter by asking defendant
if she needed medical assistance, either because of a medical condition
explaining her erratic driving, or because of injury resulting from the "crash"
into the refrigerator. 5 Indeed, so far as the record before us shows, at no time
during the encounter was defendant asked if she was alright. The officer
testified as follows with respect to his actions after he activated his overhead
lights and the Jeep struck the refrigerator:
5
We note the impact with the refrigerator as described by the officer was not
of a nature that would produce injury, much less serious injury. Nothing in the
encounter—including the administration of the field sobriety tests—suggests the
officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe defendant had been injured
by the impact.
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PROSECUTOR: And did you get out of your patrol
car?
OFFICER: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And did you make contact with the
person [who was] operating the vehicle?
OFFICER: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And who was that?
OFFICER: [Defendant.]
....
PROSECUTOR: And after you observed this—you
made contact with her. Where did you make contact
with her?
OFFICER: Inside the garage, she was sitting in her
vehicle still.
PROSECUTOR: And did . . . you have a conversation
with her?
OFFICER: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And what was that conversation?
OFFICER: Well, I had asked her what she was doing,
why she didn't stop when I activated my lights. And I
asked her something in relation to why she crashed into
her fridge.
PROSECUTOR: Did she answer you?
OFFICER: I don't recall exactly what—what she said.
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34
PROSECUTOR: And did you—you don't recall what
she said, but was the vehicle still on when you made
contact with defendant?
OFFICER: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And did you eventually tell her to turn
the car off?
OFFICER: I did, yes.
PROSECUTOR: And so after you made contact with
her do you recall—you had a conversation with her
what did you do?
OFFICER: I informed her of the complaint received.
And asked her why she did not stop, why she crashed
into her fridge. And then I asked her to exit her vehicle.
PROSECUTOR: And she exited her vehicle?
OFFICER: Yes.
The officer's account does not suggest he rendered "immediate" assistance
as contemplated in Vargas. 213 N.J. at 323. Rather, his candid testimony shows
he entered the garage to conduct a DWI and careless driving investigation. We
therefore hold that on this record, applying an objective test, the State failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer lawfully entered the
garage to render emergency aid. Because the warrantless, nonconsensual entry
into the garage portion of the private residence does not satisfy the exigent
circumstances exception, the entry was unlawful.
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35
VIII.
We next consider the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation,
and its impact on defendant's two convictions. "Under the exclusionary rule,
evidence obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional rights will be
excluded as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" State v. Roman-Rosado, 462 N.J.
Super. 183, 197 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Faucette, 439 N.J. Super.
241, 266 (App. Div. 2015)). "Those 'fruits' include not only 'tangible materials'
seized, but also 'testimony as to matters observed' in the course of a Fourth
Amendment violation." State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005) (quoting
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)). "Even evidence
indirectly acquired by the police through a constitutional violation is subject to
suppression." Ibid.The field sobriety tests and the officer's electronically recorded
observation of defendant's physical appearance and demeanor occurred after the
unlawful entry. Thus, they are fruits of that constitutional violation and must be
suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate defendant's DWI conviction.
The careless driving violation, in contrast, was committed by defendant
and observed by the officer before he entered the garage. In reaching its de novo
decision on this offense, however, the Law Division judge not only considered
the officer's testimony "that he heard and observed [] [d]efendant crash her
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36
vehicle into the refrigerator," but also considered evidence of her inebriation
learned after the unlawful entry. Specifically, the judge found "[d]efendant's
intoxication rendered her incapable of driving with due caution and
circumspection."
Because the evidence of defendant's intoxication arose after the officer
unlawfully entered the garage, it cannot be considered in rendering a decision
on the careless driving charge. We remand for the Law Division judge to
determine whether the evidence developed before the unlawful entry was
sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
careless driving. If the Law Division judge finds the evidence obtained before
the unlawful entry is not sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the judge shall vacate the careless driving conviction.
IX.
Because we remand for the Law Division judge to reconsider the careless
driving conviction, we briefly address defendant's contentions the Law Division
judge erred by relying on the municipal court's credibility findings and by failing
to make his own determinations. The gravamen of defendant's fact-sensitive
argument is that the officer was not in a position to see and hear the impact with
the refrigerator, and that the State introduced no evidence establishing the
refrigerator or Jeep were damaged to verify the impact occurred. Relatedly,
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37
defendant notes the dashcam was not activated at the outset of the encounter,
further undermining the officer's credibility that he perceived a crash inside the
garage. Thus, defendant argues, the Law Division judge should not have
accredited the fact and credibility findings of the municipal court judge.
We reject that argument. The Law Division judge acted well within his
discretion in accepting the municipal court's credibility findings with respect to
the officer's testimony. See Robertson, 228 N.J. at 147 ("It is well-settled that
the [Law Division] judge 'giv[es] due, although not necessarily controlling,
regard to the opportunity of the' municipal court judge to assess 'the credibility
of the witnesses.'") (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)).
Finally, in light of our decision to vacate the DWI conviction and remand
for reconsideration of the careless driving conviction, we need not address
defendant's contention the guilty verdicts were against the weight of the
evidence.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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38