Georganne Youngclaus v. Residential Home Funding Corp. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1404-22
GEORGANNE YOUNGCLAUS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RESIDENTIAL HOME FUNDING
CORP., its agents, servants and/or
employees, TOM MARINARO,
ROBERTO LUPI, and FRANK KURI,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
Submitted February 26, 2024 – Decided March 5, 2024
Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0402-22.
Law Offices of Rosemarie Arnold, attorneys for
appellant (William R. Stoltz, Crystal Elaine Dozier, and
Paige R. Butler, on the briefs).
Carmagnola & Ritardi, LLC, attorneys for respondents
Residential Home Funding Corp., Roberto Lupi, and
Frank Kuri (Domenick Carmagnola, of counsel and on
the brief; Stephanie Torres, on the brief).
Fox Rothschild, LLP, attorneys for respondent Tom
Marinaro (Kenneth Aaron Rosenberg, of counsel and
on the brief; Sara Hale Bernstein, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Georganne Youngclaus appeals from two November 28, 2022
orders dismissing her complaint against defendants Residential Home Funding
Corp. (RHFC), Tom Marinaro, Robert Lupi, and Frank Kuri for failure to state
a claim. We reverse and remand for the reasons expressed in this opinion.
RHFC is a mortgage lending firm. In May 2016, plaintiff was hired by
RHFC as a marketing manager and director of marketing. Marinaro owned
RHFC, Lupi was the company CEO, and Kuri the vice president of branch
development.
In September 2021, plaintiff sued defendants, alleging: gender
discrimination and sexual harassment under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12; emotional distress; and a per quod
claim on behalf of her husband. The complaint set forth twenty-one instances
of alleged discrimination that took place between 2016 and 2020. In January
2022, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim because the allegations were time barred under the LAD's
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two-year statute of limitations. The court's order noted the dismissal was
without prejudice.
On March 4, 2022, plaintiff filed a second lawsuit. Her complaint
contained one count alleging gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and
wrongful termination. The complaint alleged twenty-five acts of discrimination,
including all the acts asserted in her first complaint in greater detail, and added
that the discrimination culminated in her wrongful termination on July 20, 2020.
The allegation related to plaintiff's termination read as follows:
On or about July 20, 2020, [p]laintiff was wrongfully
terminated by . . . [RHFC] due to her female gender, to
wit: while [p]laintiff was on maternity leave, the
company relocated from Morris County . . . to White
Plains, New York. Since that was very far from
[p]laintiff's home, she asked to work remotely like the
similarly situated male employees of the company were
permitted to do. Plaintiff was informed that she would
not be permitted to work from home and was abruptly,
wrongfully terminated.
Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the statute of
limitations, and argued the lawsuit was barred by the entire controversy doctrine.
Following oral argument, the trial court issued the November 2022 orders
and a written opinion dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court
rejected defendants' entire controversy doctrine argument. However, it held
plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts occurring within the statute of
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limitations because, although she had alleged "one or more discrete acts of
discriminatory conduct . . . throughout her employment . . . [she did] not provide
specific incidents, but rather repeats that the conduct happened 'on occasions too
numerous to list,' or occurred, 'constantly and continuously.'"
The court noted this was the same deficiency it had highlighted when it
dismissed the original complaint. It reasoned plaintiff's assertion the
discrimination "happened 'on several occasions' or 'on occasions too numerous
to list' is not sufficient to assess whether the continuing violation doctrine
applies. Particularly, there is no identifiable 'allegedly discriminatory act'
within the statutory period." Rather, the second complaint "simply extended the
time period within which these 'continuous' allegations occurred so that they
now have an end-date of July 20, 2020. In the [o]riginal [c]omplaint, the
timelines for these claims ended such that each claim took place outside the
statutory period." Plaintiff's complaint was barred because "all identifiable acts
occurred outside the statutory period." Moreover, citing Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J.
555, 564 (2010), the court ruled plaintiff's termination was a discrete act and not
a continuing violation. Therefore, it was "immaterial" whether her claims were
based on discrete acts or the continuing violation doctrine.
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I.
Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are reviewed
de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing
Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237
N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). We utilize the same standard as the trial court and
"examine 'the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint,'
giving the plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid.(quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). We review the adequacy of a
pleading to determine "whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the facts."
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)
(quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). "[I]f
the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will not give
rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J.
at 107.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court applied a higher standard than
the liberal one required by Rule 4:6-2(e). She asserts the court should not have
dismissed the complaint because the wrongful termination by itself was well
within the two-year statute of limitations, considering her complaint was filed
on March 4, 2022. Plaintiff also claims her termination was part of a continuing
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violation, which brought the events preceding it within the statute of limitations,
because the termination was a part of a pattern of discriminatory conduct. 1
A wrongful termination claim accrues on the date that an employee is
terminated. Holmin v. TRW, Inc., 330 N.J. Super. 30, 46 (App. Div. 2000). To
establish a prima facie case for wrongful termination, a plaintiff must show: "(1)
[they are] a member of a protected class; (2) [they were] performing [their] job
at a level that met [defendant's] legitimate expectations; (3) [they were]
terminated; and (4) [they were] terminated under circumstances that give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination." Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 385 N.J.
Super. 448, 463 (App. Div. 2005).
"To state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a . . .
plaintiff must allege conduct that occurred because of [their] sex and that a
reasonable [person] would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment." Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587, 603 (1993). A
1
Both parties raise arguments regarding the entire controversy doctrine and
plaintiff further asserts defendants are liable as supervisors for aiding and
abetting others in discriminating against her. We decline to address either
argument because the trial court's ruling is not based on them. Moreover, we do
not need to reach the aiding and abetting argument to decide this appeal , and
defendants have not cross-appealed from the court's entire controversy ruling.
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plaintiff must "show that the complained-of conduct (1) would not have
occurred but for the employee's protected status, and was (2) severe or pervasive
enough to make a (3) reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of
employment have been altered and that the working environment is hostile or
abusive." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 24 (2002)
(citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-04).
The statute of limitations for LAD claims is two years. Montells v.
Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 292 (1993). However, "a judicially created doctrine
known as the continuing violation theory has developed as an equitable
exception to the statute of limitations" for LAD claims. Bolinger v. Bell Atl.,
330 N.J. Super. 300, 306 (App. Div. 2000). The doctrine provides that when an
individual experiences a "continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases."
Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999). The continuous and
cumulative nature of the conduct is what makes it actionable. Ibid.In Roa, our Supreme Court proscribed a plaintiff's ability to revive time-
barred discrete acts under a continuing violation theory. 200 N.J. at 561. There,
the plaintiff alleged two discrete discriminatory acts: (1) wrongful termination
that occurred outside of the statute of limitations; and (2) post-discharge
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retaliation that fell withing the statute of limitations. Id. at 565. The plaintiff
argued the retaliation was a continuing violation that revived his time-barred
claim of wrongful termination. Ibid.The Court rejected this argument and held "individually actionable
allegations cannot be aggregated" under the LAD. Id. at 567 (quoting O'Connor
v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006)). The Court explained,
the continuing violation theory was developed to allow
for the aggregation of acts, each of which, in itself,
might not have alerted the employee of the existence of
a claim, but which together show a pattern of
discrimination. In those circumstances, the last act is
said to sweep in otherwise untimely prior non-discrete
acts.
[Id. at 569.]
The Court concluded the plaintiff could not use the timely filing of the
claim for post-discharge retaliation to revive the time-barred claim for wrongful
termination. Id. at 570. However, he could pursue the retaliation claim because
it was not time barred. Id. at 576. Moreover, the Court held the time-barred
claims could be relevant in the underlying suit as "evidence of other 'wrongs' to
prove 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue
in dispute.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.R.E. 404(b)).
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Pursuant to these principles and viewing plaintiff's claims, as we must,
through the liberal lens of Rule 4:6-2(e), we conclude the wrongful termination
action should have survived dismissal because it was clearly not time barred.
This claim qualified as a discrete alleged act of discrimination under LAD,
which states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an
employer, because of the . . . sex . . . of any individual . . . to discharge . . . from
employment such individual . . . ." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). Moreover, pursuant to
Roa, the other acts of discrimination preceding plaintiff's termination, which the
court ruled were time barred, are potentially relevant under N.J.R.E. 404(b).
Furthermore, we reverse the trial court's rulings the acts preceding the
alleged wrongful termination qualified as discrete acts, rather than a continuing
violation. Without repeating each allegation, we note the alleged conduct
directed at plaintiff, including: demeaning, abusive, and coarse language and
conduct; sexual advances and innuendo; gender stereotypes; retaliation; and
unequal treatment based on plaintiff's gender. We need not declare whether
these acts are discrete or a continuing violation, except to note that given the
liberal standard we must apply at this juncture, plaintiff's complaint pled a
plausible basis for a continuing violation. Indeed, each of the pre-termination
acts, if proved, would constitute a pattern of sexual harassment and gender
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discrimination that was severe or pervasive, and created a hostile or abusive
work environment.
It appears to us that the trial court, having previously dismissed plaintiff's
first complaint as time barred, continued to separate the pre-termination acts
from the termination itself, accepting defendants' claims plaintiff's second
complaint was an attempt to resuscitate the first one. However, the wrongful
termination claim was a substantial event, and we are unconvinced it was merely
a means to bootstrap plaintiff's time barred discrimination claims. Whether the
pre-termination claims are discrete and therefore barred, or part of a continuing
violation, is a matter that should abide discovery and further motion practice.
For these reasons, we reverse and remand both November 28, 2022 orders.
To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on the appeal, it is
because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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