State of New Jersey v. Reggie Jackson ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2262-17
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REGGIE JACKSON, a/k/a
SINCERE ALLAH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted on February 28, 2024 – Decided March 14, 2024
Before Judges Susswein and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 96-
11-1121.
Reggie Jackson, appellant pro se.
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Leandra L. Cilindrello,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Reggie Jackson continues to serve a prison term of life plus
forty years for murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault and a multitude of
weapons offenses. In 1999, defendant was convicted for shooting a rival drug
dealer and his rival's friends, and killing a fifteen-year-old boy who was sitting
on a bicycle in front of the house where the shootout occurred. Defendant
appeals the December 8, 2017 order denying his second petition for post-
conviction relief (PCR). In this second PCR appeal, defendant asserts he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on his direct appeal, and in his
first PCR petition, raising new trial errors that he argues necessitate reversal of
his conviction. Most of defendant's arguments are precluded under Rules 3:22-
4 and -5. For those arguments that are not procedurally barred, we affirm for
substantially the same reasons set forth by Judge Marilyn C. Clark in the
thorough twenty-four-page decision accompanying the December 8, 2017 order.
The salient facts and procedural history were previously recounted in our
decisions on plaintiff's direct appeal, State v. Jackson (Jackson I), No. A-5416-
98 (App. Div. Mar. 21, 2001), and first PCR appeal, State v. Jackson (Jackson
II), No. A-0028-11 (App. Div. June 20, 2014). We briefly set forth only the
facts material to our determination of defendant's second PCR appeal.
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On July 15, 1996, defendant and co-defendant, Emir Outlaw, arrived at a
private residence in Paterson and began shooting bullets toward the home's
porch. Prior to the incident, defendant and Outlaw had several altercations with
the resident of the home, Kevin Jackson, 1 including armed confrontations that
turned violent, stemming from disputes regarding overlapping territories for
drug sales and a stolen "stash" of drugs. In addition to Jackson, Deshon Brisbon,
David Staggers, and Antwan Wilson were on or around the porch at
approximately eleven o'clock in the evening. Gloria Sexton, another resident,
was inside the home, and Tyeem Price, a fifteen-year-old who lived in the
neighborhood, was sitting on his bike in front of the residence talking to another
individual.
Jackson went to an alley beside the house to retrieve drugs. When he
emerged, he saw two men dressed in black approaching the house. Both men
were hooded, and one wore a mask. The men pulled out guns, one a handgun,
the other a shotgun, and started shooting. Price died at the scene. Staggers lost
vision in one eye, suffered severe injury to his other eye, and suffered other
injuries that permanently impaired his cognitive and neurological functions.
1
Defendant and Kevin Jackson share a surname but are not otherwise related.
For clarity to the reader, we will refer to Kevin Jackson as "Jackson" and Reggie
Jackson as "defendant."
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3
Jackson suffered injuries to his abdomen that resulted in the removal of his
spleen and portions of his liver, kidney and pancreas. Brisbon and Sexton
suffered less severe injuries.
On November 19, 1996, defendant and Outlaw were charged in a thirty-
one-count indictment with crimes including murder, aggravated assault, and a
multitude of weapons charges. The jury trial commenced on January 27, 1999,
after defendant's case was severed from Outlaw's, and continued through
February 4.2 As we have previously set forth in our prior opinion, although the
facts of the case "were essentially uncontested, defendant disputed that he was
one of the gunmen." Jackson II, slip op. at 4. "The State presented both
circumstantial and direct evidence that defendant and . . . Outlaw[] were the
shooters." Ibid.
On February 3, 1999, the trial court granted defendant's motion to
suppress evidence that was collected during a search of defendant's sleeping area
in the jail where he was detained. 3 State v. Jackson, 321 N.J. Super. 365, 383
2
Outlaw was tried before defendant, was convicted of various crimes, and
received an aggregate life sentence with forty years of parole ineligibility.
3
The court rendered its decision on defendant's motion on February 3, 1999,
during the pendency of the trial. The court issued a supplemental written
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(Law Div. 1999). The court determined that the search was pretextual and "at
the specific request of the prosecutor, who sought to recover incriminating
evidence, including letters and writings believed to be in defendant's possession"
regarding a possible alibi defense. Id. at 367, 369-71. This court concluded
"that a cell search of a pretrial detainee implicates Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures" and, accordingly, it
suppressed any "evidence seized by the jail authorities without the benefit of a
warrant." Id. at 367.
On February 5, 1999, defendant was convicted of knowing and purposeful
murder, conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of attempted murder, two
counts of aggravated assault and ten counts involving weapons offenses . As to
the remaining counts, the jury either acquitted defendant or found defendant
guilty of lesser included offenses. 4
On April 7, 1999, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison
term of life plus forty years with fifty years of parole ineligibility. Defendant
opinion on April 6, 1999. The opinion was approved for publication on May 6,
1999.
4
On February 3, 1999, the court dismissed count four – third-degree unlawful
possession of a sawed-off shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 –
because of insufficient evidence.
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appealed his conviction, and we affirmed on March 21, 2001. Jackson I, slip
op. at 20. On February 11, 2002, the Supreme Court denied certification. State
v. Jackson, 171 N.J. 338 (2002).
On May 14, 2003, defendant filed his first PCR petition. The PCR court
held a hearing on the PCR petition over five days. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the PCR court denied defendant's request for relief. Defendant
appealed, arguing primarily that his trial counsel was deficient for not presenting
an alibi defense and for failing to request a hearing to challenge the reliability
of the witnesses' identification of his tattoo pursuant to United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
On June 20, 2014, after careful consideration of defendant's arguments,
the record and controlling law, we affirmed. Jackson II, slip op. at 1. We agreed
with the trial court that "[b]ased on the evidence presented by defendant and the
State at the PCR hearing, . . . defendant had failed to establish both elements of
an ineffective-assistance claim." Id. at 18.
As to defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
presenting an alibi defense or by failing to request a Wade hearing, we
determined defendant had not shown a hearing would have established a
reasonable probability of defendant's success at trial, as required under the
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second prong of Strickland.5 Id. at 14-22. We determined that the remainder of
defendant's arguments did not merit extended discussion in our written opinion.
Id. at 22-26. On December 3, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certification,
State v. Jackson, 220 N.J. 100 (2014).
On February 26, 2015, defendant filed his second PCR petition. The pro
se brief in support of his petition set forth nineteen arguments as to why he
should be afforded relief including: violation of due process; improper jury
instructions regarding evidence of defendant's prior crimes; impermissible scope
of expert testimony; incorrect assignment of accomplice liability; prosecutorial
misconduct; unduly prejudicial testimony from Price's mother; admission of
hearsay; failure of the court to decide dispositive motions prior to trial; judicial
misconduct; ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, first PCR, and first PCR
appellate counsel; and cumulative prejudicial errors.
On December 8, 2017, Judge Clark denied the second PCR request and
entered a thorough twenty-four-page decision addressing each of defendant's
arguments in full. Judge Clark noted this court had already substantively
addressed and rejected many of defendant's arguments in its prior decisions,
Jackson I and Jackson II. Among other rulings, Judge Clark considered
5
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
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defendant's assertions regarding jury instructions, prejudicial testimony and
evidence admissibility and found that each of them was previously disposed of
and substantively without merit. As to defendant's argument regarding the jury's
consideration of defendant's other crimes, the judge found defendant had
proffered a "complete misstatement of the law" and the trial court had properly
instructed the jury as to these matters.
Judge Clark concluded there were no arguments asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel presented in the second PCR petition that had not already
been considered in one of defendant's prior appeals, and her review of those
decisions found no errors. Given her rejection of all of defendant's arguments,
the judge found no merit in defendant's final assertion that the cumulative impact
of the trial court's errors was prejudicial sufficient to merit reversal. Judge Clark
found that "[b]ased upon [her] review of all of the proceedings, [she] strongly
conclude[d] that [defendant] received a very fair trial."
On appeal from the denial of his second PCR petition, defendant contends:
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE COURT
SHOULD REMAND THE MATTER TO THE LAW
DIVISION FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
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a. THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT
RULED DEFENDANT DID NOT
RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL DUE TO COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO MOVE TO QUASH THE
INDICTMENT FOLLOWING GROSS
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
b. STANDARD FOR DECIDING A FIFTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION.
c. THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE DIRECTED
BY THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
AMOUNTS TO "OUTRAGEOUS"
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT REQUIRING
DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT IT COULD NOT CONSIDER THE
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF MOTIVE UNTIL AFTER IT HAD FOUND
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THE HOMICIDE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT;
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHER CRIMES
EVIDENCE.
POINT III
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
BY THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS
INSTRUCTION ON ORAL STATEMENTS OF THE
DEFENDANT.
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POINT IV
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS NOT VIOLATED
WHEN APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE,
AS ERROR, THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
REINSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW OF
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AS WAS REQUESTED
BY THE JURY AND BOTH PARTIES.
POINT V
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED
BY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING
OPENING STATEMENTS AND SUMMATION
CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S ALIAS.
POINT VI
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS PRESENTED IN HIS
PETITION FOR [PCR] DID NOT WARRANT
REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION.
We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,
181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the
federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). It is the vehicle through which a
defendant may, after conviction and sentencing, challenge a judgment of
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conviction by raising those issues "which could not have been raised on direct
appeal" and, therefore, "ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted."
State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997).
Pursuant to Rule 3:22-5, "prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground
for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the
conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or
prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings."
This procedural bar specifically applies "if the issue raised is identical or
substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct appeal." State
v. Marshall III, 148 N.J. 89, 150 (1997) (quoting State v. Bontempo, 170 N.J.
Super. 220, 234 (Law Div. 1979)).
Under Rule 3:22-4(b), a second PCR petition must be dismissed unless it
is timely and it alleges:
(A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to
defendant’s petition by the United States Supreme
Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that
was unavailable during the pendency of any prior
proceedings; or
(B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought
could not have been discovered earlier through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts
underlying the ground for relief, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would
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raise a reasonable probability that the relief
sought would be granted; or
(C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel that represented
the defendant on the first or subsequent
application for post-conviction relief.
[R. 3:22-4(b)(2).]
We consider whether defendant's arguments comport with Rule 3:22-
4(b)(2). Our careful review of the record confirms there were no assertions of
recently established constitutional protections or newly discovered evidence
under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2). Therefore, we can only consider defendant's
arguments that fall under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2)(C), positing that defendant's first
PCR counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm the second PCR court's
denial of relief as to defendant's arguments in Points II, III, IV, V and VI of his
merits brief. We, therefore, need only consider his argument in Point I as to
ineffective assistance of counsel on his first PCR appeal.
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687, which our Supreme Court adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
"First, the defendant must show . . . . counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."
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Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant must then
show counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To show prejudice, defendant must establish by
"a reasonable probability that" the deficient performance "materially contributed
to defendant's conviction." Id. at 58.
We view defendant's arguments set forth in regarding the deficiency of
counsel on his first PCR appeal through this lens. Although defendant argues
his first PCR counsel was deficient, on appeal, he does not provide any
substantive examples, explanation or law as to this bald assertion. "An issue not
briefed on appeal is deemed waived." Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super.
648, 657 (App. Div. 2011).
The only particularized grievance with his first PCR counsel defendant
identifies in his latest merits brief is in the passing assertion that the attorney
did not argue trial counsel was deficient by failing to move to have the
indictment quashed for prosecutorial misconduct stemming from the warrantless
search of his sleeping area at the county jail before trial. We found this very
argument, raised in Point III of defendant's first PCR petition, to be "without
sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion" pursuant to
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Rule 2:11-3(e)(2). Jackson II, slip op. at 12, 24. However, we did offer the
following:
[D]efendant contends that the State gained insight into
his trial strategy by orchestrating the seizure of letters
he had composed to his attorney while he was in jail
awaiting trial. The circumstances are set forth in the
trial court's opinion suppressing the State's use of the
evidence. Jackson, 321 N.J. Super. 365. The
information obtained by the State involved defendant's
alibi defense. Id. at 371. Defense counsel successfully
moved to suppress it. Id. at 383. It is clear from trial
counsel's testimony at the PCR hearing that the
evidence played no role in counsel not presenting an
alibi defense. Defendant's argument to the contrary
consists of unsupported, conclusory assertions.
. . . . And there is virtually no likelihood that a motion
to dismiss the indictment based on the illegal search of
his jail cell would have succeeded.
[Jackson II, slip op. at 25-26 (emphasis
added)(citations reformatted).]
As we have noted, "a prior adjudication on the merits ordinarily
constitutes a procedural bar to the reassertion of the same ground as a basis for
post-conviction review." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 476 (citing R. 3:22-5). We need
not consider defendant's argument a second time as we have already
substantively decided the same issue in connection with the first PCR petition.
To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we
are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
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Affirmed.
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