State of New Jersey v. Wendy Bermingham ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0082-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WENDY BERMINGHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued January 24, 2024 – Decided February 27, 2024
Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Indictment No. 21-01-0035.
Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura of counsel and on
the brief).
Randolph E. Mershon, III, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex
County Prosecutor, attorney; Randolph E. Mershon, III,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By leave granted, defendant Wendy Bermingham appeals from an order
entered on August 1, 2023, denying her application for admission to Recovery
Court over the State's objection. We discern no abuse of discretion by the court
in denying the motion and affirm.
Indicted on charges of third-degree distribution of methadone, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(b)(3) and third-degree endangering another person, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
7.1(a)(3), defendant applied for Recovery Court.1 The charges against defendant
stem from the tragic death of her roommate from a lethal overdose of
methadone2 that was given to her by defendant.
1
Effective January 1, 2022, the Drug Court Program was renamed the New
Jersey Recovery Court Program to better reflect the primary goal of the program,
thus, Drug Court and Recovery Court may be used interchangeably in this
opinion. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Notice: Drug Court Name Change to New
Jersey Recovery Court (December 28, 2021).
2
"According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, methadone
maintenance treatment is 'the most effective treatment for opiate addiction[.]'"
New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. Y.N., 220 N.J. 165, 184 (2014)
(quoting Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Methadone Maintenance
Treatment 1 (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/idu/facts/methadonefin.pdf.).
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2
At the time of the roommate's death, defendant was a participant in a
medication-assistance treatment program (MAT).3 Defendant and her roommate
resided together at a Sayreville motel. As part of the MAT program, defendant
had been prescribed methadone. On March 20, 2018, defendant obtained a daily
dose of prescribed methadone from the clinic she attended as part of the MAT
program. On this same date, clinic staff permitted defendant to take home an
additional 120 milligram dose of methadone which was intended for her to use
the following day—her daily dose for March 21, 2018. According to defendant,
she was permitted to take an additional daily dose of methadone with her out of
concern that she may not make it into the clinic the following day because of
impending inclement weather.
During the police investigation, defendant told police that when she
returned to the motel room, her roommate asked for defendant's next day's dose
of methadone. Defendant also admitted to police that prior to giving her
3
"The term 'medication-assisted treatment' means the use of any medications
approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration to treat substance use
disorders, including extended-release naltrexone, methadone, and
buprenorphine, in combination with counseling and behavioral therapies, to
provide a whole-patient approach to the treatment of substance use disorders."
Admin. Off. of the Cts., New Jersey Statewide Recovery Court Manual at 27
(Jan. 2022) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14) (hereinafter, the 2022 Manual).
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3
roommate the methadone, she advised her roommate that 120 milligrams of
methadone is "a lot [to handle] for a person who never used it before."
Nevertheless, defendant gave the methadone to her roommate who ingested it.
Defendant told police that after taking the methadone, her roommate "was out
of it for the remainder of the day and night," and while she was "out of it," she
used her roommate's cell phone—not her own phone—to text a drug dealer to
inquire about purchasing heroin for her personal use.
The next morning, defendant called 9-1-1—from her roommate's phone—
to report that her roommate was not breathing. Police officers arrived to find
the roommate in the hotel room she shared with defendant. The roommate was
found unresponsive and lying in the bed next to defendant's, when pronounced
dead.
Detective Louis Becker of the Sayreville Police Department's Criminal
Investigation unit responded to the motel where he met defendant, who had
previously disclosed to the 9-1-1 operator that her roommate had suffered a
possible overdose. According to the police report, defendant told Detective
Becker that she had been with her roommate all night and that her roommate had
ingested methadone the previous day.
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4
During the evidence collection process, officers found a black ZTE cell
phone belonging to the roommate in the motel room. Police then contacted the
roommate's family and obtained her spouse's consent to search the cellphone for
evidence. The search of the cellphone revealed a series of text messages sent to
a person referred to as "Godson." The police investigation revealed the
messages were sent by defendant, not her roommate, who according to defendant
was "passed out" or under the influence of the methadone defendant had
provided. Police described defendant's text messages to Godson as "drug
conversation or drug talk." These text messages were provided to the court in
support of the State's opposition to defendant's application for Recovery Court.
A grand jury indicted defendant on two charges: third-degree distribution
of methadone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) and third-degree endangering another
person, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-7.1(a)(3). Following the indictment, defendant sought
admittance to Recovery Court and underwent a Treatment Assessment Services
for the Courts (TASC) substance abuse assessment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
14.4
4
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(1) requires a Recovery Court applicant to have
"undergone a professional diagnostic assessment to determine whether and to
what extent the person is drug-or alcohol-dependent and would benefit from
treatment." See also 2022 Manual at 20.
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5
The TASC evaluator concluded that defendant was clinically eligible for
Recovery Court and recommended intensive outpatient therapy. However, the
county prosecutor recommended that defendant not be admitted into Recovery
Court, citing the pending charges and "concerns about the safety of the
community, and more specifically other [R]ecovery [C]ourt participants . . . ."
Following the prosecutor's negative recommendation, defendant filed a motion
to be admitted into Recovery Court.
After oral argument on the motion, the court accepted the recommendation
of the State and issued an order and written opinion denying defendant's
application. The court later filed an amplification, pursuant to Rule 2:6-2(b),
wherein it provided a more expansive explanation of its reasoning and
conclusion that defendant would be a danger to the community if admitted into
Recovery Court.
In reaching its decision, the court determined defendant was a Track Two
candidate5 for Recovery Court and was "legally ineligible" for the program
5
Applicants to Recovery Court are placed on Track Two when the charged
offense does not carry a statutory presumption of imprisonment or a mandatory
term of parole ineligibility. State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 525 (App. Div.
2021).
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6
based on its finding defendant is "a danger to the community, which is a legal
disqualifier." The judge stated:
Even when I consider the outpatient program
[defendant] will be required to complete, I do not
believe that the supervisory resources of the Recovery
Court program are adequate to safely treat her in the
community. She will be on the street and in a position
where she can once again place someone in harm's way.
In its amplification, the court explained that its denial was "based on the
unique facts of the case, not . . . on the statutory offense involved." Specifically,
the court noted that it "placed great weight" on the fact that defendant "did not
summon help; she summoned a drug dealer using the passed-out victim's
phone."
The court also addressed defendant's "twenty-plus-year history of heroin
use" and cited findings from her TASC evaluation that defendant showed
"'minimal insight' about her relapse triggers . . . []despite being 'treated for drug
abuse on five occasions'[] . . . making her a 'significant risk for continued use.'"
Based on its assessment of the facts, including the findings of the TASC
evaluator, the court determined defendant's "indifference, combined with her
significant risk for continued use, suggest[ed] that allowing her into the program
would place her in a position to endanger again . . . ."
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Defendant moved for leave to appeal the denial of her application to
Recovery Court. We granted defendant's motion.
We "review a sentencing court's decision to admit or deny admission to
Drug Court for an abuse of discretion." State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. at 533.
The abuse of discretion standard essentially means "a reviewing court should
not substitute its judgment if the trial court's ruling was within a range of
acceptable decisions." In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 577 (2012) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
For Recovery Court, "[l]egal eligibility is a threshold question that must
be decided in all cases." Harris, 466 N.J. Super. at 551. "Every candidate falls
under one of two distinct and mutually exclusive tracks." Ibid. "To determine
legal eligibility, the trial court must first determine whether the defendant is a
Track One or Track Two candidate." Ibid. "A defendant is a Track One
candidate if, and only if, [they are] presently subject to the presumption of
imprisonment in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) or to a mandatory period of parole
ineligibility." Id. at 523 (quoting State v. Figaro, 462 N.J. Super. 564, 566 (App.
Div. 2020)). "A Track One candidate can be admitted to Drug Court only if the
court sentences the defendant to special probation, an alternative to
imprisonment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)." Id. at 551. Track One
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candidates must meet all nine eligibility criteria for special probation set forth
in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a). Ibid."Track Two is reserved for drug dependent defendants who are not subject
to the statutory presumption of imprisonment or a mandatory term of parole
ineligibility." Id. at 525 (emphasis omitted). "Those defendants may be
admitted to Drug Court . . . pursuant to the statutory authority of the court to
impose a probationary sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1." Figaro, 462 N.J.
Super. at 579.
In contrast to Track One, "[a] Track Two candidate need not satisfy the
nine eligibility criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14." Harris, 466 N.J. Super.
at 552. In Figaro, we held that "[a] judge considering whether a Track Two
applicant is a candidate for [Recovery Court] must, of course, decide whether a
probationary sentence is appropriate in the first instance." 462 N.J. Super. at
579 (citing State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166, 176 (2010)); see also State v. Meyer,
192 N.J. 421, 433 (2007) ("so long as the Code [of Criminal Justice] authorizes
the imposition of a probationary sentence, a judge may sentence an offender to
Recovery Court under Track Two pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1.").
As such, the eligibility criteria for special probation set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:35-14(a) do not govern a Track Two candidate's admission into Recovery
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Court, Figaro, 462 N.J. Super. at 577-78, rather, "[e]ligibility for entry into Drug
Court via Track Two has always been governed by the Drug Court Manuals."6
Id. at 573. The 2022 Manual states:
A Recovery Court prosecutor can recommend a legal
rejection based on Track One cases pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:35-14 or, if it is a Track Two case, on whether the
applicant is a potential danger to the community.
Danger to the community means that the supervisory
resources of Recovery Court are not adequate to safely
treat the defendant in the community at the appropriate
level of care. The Recovery Court judge makes all final
decisions about program eligibility. An applicant’s
acceptance into Recovery Court should be based on the
defendant's clinical and legal eligibility.
[2022 Manual 9-10.]
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the court abused its
discretion in denying defendant admission into Recovery Court based on its
determination that the benefit of supervisory resources of Recovery Court is
inadequate to safely treat defendant in the community with the adequate level of
care. We further acknowledge the imperative expressed in Harris that Recovery
Court judges are to "serve as the gatekeepers to the program" by "linking
6
The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) promulgated the original Drug
Court Manual in 2002, which was subsequently revised in 2019 and 2020,
Harris, 466 N.J. Super. at 523 n.7, and most recently, in 2022.
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deserving candidates to treatment services" but also to "promot[e] public safety
and ensur[e] the continued effectiveness of the program by only admitting
qualified candidates." 466 N.J. Super. at 547.
Here, defendant contends she "is an ideal candidate for an intensive
outpatient recovery program, as . . . recommended by the substance abuse
evaluator who examined her," and the court acknowledged that she "has a severe
opioid addiction and a moderate cannabis addiction . . . ." Defendant also
argues that "[g]iven the success of Recovery Court, there has been a steady
march towards greater inclusion." She further asserts that given the court's
acknowledgment of her addiction issues, the denial of her application constitutes
"an erroneous application of the law" and as a result, she seeks a remand with
instructions to allow her into Recovery Court.
The State contends the trial court appropriately found defendant is a
danger to the community based on her conduct that led to the roommate's death,
defendant's history of opioid and cannabis use and abuse, the results of her
TASC evaluation, and the prosecutor's recommendation. The State also asserts
that the supervisory resources of Recovery Court are not adequate to safely treat
defendant in the community at the appropriate level of care she needs. The State
concurs, in all respects, with the court's determination that defendant is a danger
A-0082-23
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to the community, and it disputes defendant's allegation that the court abused its
discretion in denying her application.
We recognize that defendant filed her brief prior to the court's
amplification which was filed November 3, 2023. Even so, defendant's
argument is based on the uncontroverted fact that she continues to suffer from
an opioid and cannabis addiction. Her arguments, however, ignore the fact that
consideration of her addiction is only part of the analysis the court must
undertake to determine eligibility for admission into Recovery Court, and that
the 2022 Manual also requires consideration of her potential danger to the
community. See Admin. Off. of the Cts., New Jersey Statewide Recovery Court
Manual at 9 (Jan. 2022) ("Danger to the community means that the supervisory
resources of Recovery Court are not adequate to safely treat the defendant in the
community at the appropriate level of care.").
As previously noted, Recovery Court judges must "serve as the
gatekeepers to the program" by "linking deserving candidates to treatment
services" and "promot[e] public safety and ensur[e] the continued effectiveness
of the program by only admitting qualified candidates." 466 N.J. Super. at 547.
Under Harris, courts are required to consider not only an applicant's addiction,
but other criteria, including the background of the individual applicant, the
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likelihood of success in the program, the viability and continued effectiveness
of Recovery Court programs, and public safety in general. Ibid.; accord 2022
Manual, at 9-10.
In reviewing the court's opinion, including its amplification filed pursuant
to Rule 2:6-2(b), we note that the court properly considered whether "the
supervisory resources of Recovery Court are not adequate to safely treat the
defendant in the community." 2022 Manual at 9. In addressing this issue, the
court considered the unique circumstances of this case where defendant is
alleged to have provided her own prescribed drug—methadone—to her
roommate—whom she knew to be a drug addicted person that had not been
prescribed methadone. As the court stated, "[s]he gave a powerful drug to the
victim, and we know drug distribution 'can be readily perceived to constitute
conduct which causes and threatens serious harm' to others[.]" (quoting State v.
Tarver, 272 N.J. Super. 414, 435 (App. Div. 1994)).
The court also emphasized that the case "goes beyond mere
distribution . . . " and it placed great weight on the fact that defendant "did not
summon help; [but] summoned a drug dealer using the passed-out victim's
phone," from whom defendant sought to purchase drugs for her own use. The
court specifically found troubling defendant's "indifference to life," and
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concluded that "[t]his indifference, combined with her significant risk for
continued use, suggests that allowing her into the program would place her in a
position to endanger again . . . ."
As previously stated, defendant qualifies as a Track Two candidate as she
is charged with an offense that does not carry a statutory presumption of
imprisonment or a mandatory term of parole ineligibility. Consistent with the
2022 Manual, the court addressed whether defendant qualifies as a deserving
candidate while also considering its responsibility to promote public safety. In
so doing, the court addressed whether defendant was a danger to the community
and whether the supervisory resources of Recovery Court are adequate to safely
treat the defendant in the community at the appropriate level of care.
Specifically, the court considered the TASC evaluation which remarked
upon defendant's "twenty-plus-year history of heroin use," "'limited awareness'
of the need to change," and "her 'minimal insight' about her relapse triggers" in
reaching its conclusion that there is a "'significant risk for continued use.'"
Based on these findings, the court determined defendant had a "continued risk
of criminal behavior, as her crimes are linked to her addiction." In reaching its
determination that the benefit of an intensive outpatient treatment was
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inadequate to safely treat the defendant in the community, the court further
reasoned:
[Her] indifference, combined with her significant risk
for continued use, suggests that allowing her into the
program would place her in a position to endanger
again, especially given the comments in the substance-
abuse evaluation. Her outpatient-treatment
recommendation does nothing to remove this risk, as
she would be on the street, as opposed to a supervised
inpatient setting.
Ultimately, the court concluded that Recovery Court and its outpatient
services would place defendant "in a position to endanger again," thus, finding
that the supervisory resources would be inadequate to safely treat defendant in
the community. Moreover, notwithstanding defendant's arguments that the court
placed great weight on the endangering charge against her and failed to consider
that "there has been a steady march toward greater inclusion" into the Recovery
Court program, we remain unpersuaded that the court erred in denying her
admission to Recovery Court.
We conclude that in expressing its concerns about defendant's extensive
history of drug dependency and her actions and inactions with respect to her
former roommate and victim, the court did not solely base its decision on the
nature of the endangering charge, but properly considered all of the applicable
law and criteria required for Track Two candidates by the 2022 Manual,
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specifically finding she was a potential danger to the community and that the
supervisory resources of Recovery Court are inadequate to safely treat the
defendant in the community at the appropriate level of care. We discern no
abuse of discretion on the part of the court and conclude its findings are
supported by the record and its conclusions are based on a reasoned application
of the established criteria for admission into Recovery Court.
Affirmed.
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