State of New Jersey v. Corey J. Barber ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2044-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COREY J. BARBER,
Respondent-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued February 12, 2024 – Decided February 28, 2024
Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk, and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 18-
021.
Damiano Marcello Fracasso argued the cause for
appellant.
Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Robert J. Carroll, Morris County
Prosecutor, attorney; Tiffany M. Russo, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Corey J. Barber appeals from his conviction for driving under
the influence (DUI) of a drug, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). We reverse and vacate the
conviction for the reasons expressed herein.
The following facts were adduced during a pre-trial motion to suppress
and defendant's municipal court trial. The State's witnesses were Morris County
Park Police Officers Joseph Abrusci and Anthony Brunone, and a New Jersey
State Police forensic scientist. Defendant testified on his own behalf.
At approximately 1:26 p.m. on September 16, 2016, Officers Abrusci and
Brunone were in a patrol vehicle in the median of Route 80 monitoring
westbound traffic. The posted speed limit was sixty-five miles per hour. Officer
Abrusci was operating the speed radar and attempted to aim it at defendant's
vehicle but there were cars in the way. However, the vehicles he did scan were
traveling over seventy to seventy-five miles per hour, and defendant's vehicle
was traveling faster than those cars. Officer Abrusci conservatively estimated
defendant's vehicle was "traveling approximately [seventy-five] to [eighty]
miles an hour." The officers pursued defendant to stop him for speeding.
While following defendant, Officer Abrusci observed him make "an
abrupt lane change, from the fast lane to the middle lane" without using any turn
signal. There were vehicles in the middle lane, and defendant moved in between
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them. Defendant's maneuver caused the vehicle behind him to slow down to let
him into the middle lane. Officer Brunone offered similar testimony about the
pursuit.
After the officers pulled defendant over, Officer Brunone approached the
driver's side of defendant's vehicle and Officer Abrusci approached on the
passenger side. Officer Abrusci observed defendant had "red, watery eyes" and
"droopy eyelids." His voice was "hoarse, raspy," and he "appeared nervous,
shaky."
Officer Abrusci observed "a couple of bottles of air fresheners" in the car,
and smelled "a faint odor" of raw cannabis that was "partially masked by the air
fresheners." In Officer Abrusci's experience, air fresheners were used to "mask
the odors from inside a vehicle," in particular, "[o]dors of marijuana ." He could
also "see some greenish brown vegetation that was in the matting of the . . .
floor, on the other side of the car" and went around to the driver's side of the
vehicle "to get a better look at it." He believed the vegetation was small pieces
of cannabis, known as "shake." However, he did not collect a sample of the
vegetation because it was too small to send to a laboratory for testing.1
1
Officer Brunone's report did not mention defendant having watery or
bloodshot eyes, the smell of air fresheners, seeing "burnt marijuana," or
observing "shake" on the floor.
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3
Officer Abrusci motioned to Officer Brunone to have defendant exit his
vehicle. However, Officer Brunone testified he did not see Officer Abrusci
attempting to get his attention. Instead, Officer Brunone asked defendant to get
out of the car because it was safer to talk to him outside of the car, though he
admitted he did not think defendant was a threat to him.
Defendant told Officer Brunone that he had had knee surgery about three
months prior. After defendant got out of the car, Officer Abrusci went back and
forth from the passenger side to the driver's side of the car several times. He
testified the odor of cannabis was stronger on the driver's side. Officer Abrusci
confirmed his observation defendant "had very distinct reddening" of the eyes,
as well as droopy eyelids, and "glassy, or watery" eyes. He asked defendant to
close his eyes, and he observed "very noticeable eyelid tremors."
Both officers noted defendant's pupils were constricted. However, they
acknowledged this could have been a normal reaction to the sun.
Each officer asked defendant a variety of background questions, which
defendant had no difficulty understanding. However, Officer Abrusci suspected
defendant was under the influence of "cannabis and [there] may have been other
substances involved" because his "mannerisms" were consistent with being
under the influence of cannabis and narcotics.
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After a third officer arrived on the scene, Officer Abrusci searched the
vehicle. He located two prescription pill-type bottles on the back seat
underneath clothes and other items, within reach of the driver, and found some
cannabis and a pipe with the burnt residue of cannabis. Officer Abrusci could
smell the odor of cannabis emanating from both containers, and could tell by the
semi-transparent nature of the containers that they did not contain pills "or
something that would normally be in a prescription bottle."
The officers permitted defendant to use his cell phone to make a call.
Defendant called his brother-in-law, who was a police officer in New York. He
also texted his attorney, who responded that defendant should assert his right to
counsel and to remain silent.
Officer Brunone placed defendant under arrest for possession of
marijuana and paraphernalia and read him his Miranda2 rights. The officers
transported defendant to the Morris County Park Police headquarters. On the
way to headquarters, defendant's cell phone was in the front seat with the
officers and rang continually. Defendant told the officers it was either his father
or his attorney calling. Officer Abrusci testified defendant was not given his
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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phone because he "was not entitled to make a phone call, because of the breath
test prerequisites."
The trio arrived at the police station at approximately 2:20 p.m. Both
officers conducted a pre-breath-test observation period by observing defendant
for thirty minutes. However, the Alcotest machine was not working, and the
officers realized they would need to transport defendant to another police station
to obtain a valid breath test.
Instead, Officer Abrusci decided to proceed with a drug recognition expert
(DRE) evaluation because he was concerned about "potentially losing evidence
of [defendant's] drug impairment" due to the time needed to obtain a valid breath
test at another facility. Officer Abrusci testified defendant's breath did not smell
of alcohol and he had no reason to believe defendant had been drinking.
Before Officer Abrusci proceeded with the DRE evaluation, Officer
Brunone again read defendant his Miranda rights and had him sign a notification
of rights form. Notably, defendant initialed that he had been read and
understood each right, but he checked "no" in response to the final entry:
"HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, I WISH TO TALK TO YOU." Officer
Brunone could not recall if the second Miranda warning took place before or
after the aborted breath test, but he knew it was before the other steps o f the
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DRE evaluation began. Officer Abrusci testified both he and Officer Brunone
read defendant his Miranda rights before the DRE evaluation began.
Defendant testified the officers never returned his phone before the DRE
evaluation, and instead returned it to him "at the very end, after they gave [him]
all the tickets." Officer Abrusci testified that, when he read defendant his
Miranda rights, defendant asked if he could call his attorney. The officer told
him he could and offered defendant his phone, but defendant declined to take
the phone and said he would answer the officer's "stupid questions," adding that
they both knew he was there because Officer Abrusci "illegally searched his car
and found a gram of pot." Officer Abrusci testified defendant "admitted at that
point he had smoked pot a couple of hours ago." Officer Brunone testified he
did not know if defendant refused to take the cell phone, only that Officer
Abrusci asked defendant if he wanted to call his attorney and defendant "said
I'll answer your questions, and that was that."
Officer Abrusci testified that "even though [defendant] didn't directly
invoke his right to remain silent," he decided based on defendant's comments
not to ask all the "standard questions" usually part of the DRE evaluation.
Moreover, he did not ask "certain incriminating questions" because defendant
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"did ask about calling an attorney" and the officer "didn't want to violate
[defendant's] rights . . . to give [him an] opportunity to consult with an attorney."
Officer Abrusci testified he has been certified as a DRE in New Jersey for
more than two decades and has been qualified as a DRE in "at least [twenty]
different courts." He has also instructed other officers in the required DRE
training on how to administer the standardized field sobriety tests. He served as
a member at large to the "IACP Technical Advisory Panel."3 At the time of
3
As recently explained by our Supreme Court, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) participated in the "development and national
expansion" of the DRE protocol, undertook responsibility for the credentialing
of DREs nationwide, and
[i]n 1988, again at the NHTSA's request, the IACP
established the Technical Advisory Panel (TAP), which
develops criteria for training and certifying DREs, and
continually improves the DRE protocol. . . . The TAP
typically consists of a physician, a behavioral
optometrist, and a toxicologist, as well as DREs and
educational institutions.
....
As of December 2022, the IACP has certified over 400
DREs in New Jersey, the second most of any state in
the nation. Presently, there are over sixty certified DRE
instructors in this State who train officers in the
protocol.
[State v. Olenowski, 255 N.J. 529, 561 (2023) (citation
and footnote omitted) (Olenowski II).]
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defendant's arrest, Officer Abrusci had thirty-seven years of experience in law
enforcement.
Officer Abrusci testified to other vocational experiences, namely, that he
has been "in the company of individuals under the influence of marijuana" more
than a thousand times. He was involved in arrests "wherein marijuana was found
either on a person, in a vehicle or in a home" over a thousand times and was
familiar with the smell of raw and burnt cannabis, and "signs that an individual
may display" after smoking cannabis.
Officer Abrusci testified when he asked defendant to submit to a DRE
evaluation after the failed Alcotest, he explained to him that it was because his
observations of defendant gave him "reason to suspect that there may be drugs
involved." The officer told defendant he would "be checking his pulse, . . .
pupils, . . . blood pressure . . . , running him through a standard series of . . .
steps . . . as part of the evaluation process."
Officer Abrusci also told defendant that there were "preliminary
questions" that he "would normally ask" during the evaluation . However,
since it wasn't clear . . . whether or not he was invoking
his right to remain silent or just . . . his . . . consultation
with an attorney, . . . when I had asked him in reference
to . . . the questions, [his answer] was ["]I [will] answer
your stupid questions.["] . . . I told him I'm not going
to ask you those questions at this point . . . .
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A DRE's evaluation protocol, known as the Drug Recognition and
Classification Program is a twelve-step process,4 including the Alcotest as step
one, and a urine or other toxicological sample as step twelve. Defendant refused
to provide a urine sample. Therefore, Officer Abrusci testified he
"proceeded . . . with the evaluation," and defendant cooperated.
Because Officer Abrusci was one of the arresting officers, he did not need
to interview the arresting officer, as required by step two. Further, he "believed
[defendant] may have invoked his rights," so he did not ask him "about usage"
of cannabis or other drugs. However, he did "go through some background
questions with him, as far as medical conditions, those types of things, and some
4
The Court explained,
[t]he twelve steps in the DRE protocol consist of (1) a
breath alcohol test; (2) an interview of the arresting
officer; (3) a preliminary examination and first pulse
check; (4) a series of eye examinations; (5) four divided
attention tests; (6) a second examination and vital signs
check; (7) a dark room examination of pupil size and
ingestion sites; (8) an assessment of muscle tone; (9) a
check for injection sites and a third pulse reading; (10)
an interrogation of the driver and documentation of
statements made by the driver as well as any other
observations; (11) a final opinion based on the totality
of the examination; and (12) a toxicological analysis.
[Id. at 553 (footnote omitted).]
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background," in order "to get some clarification and make sure that there were
no underlying medical conditions." He asked defendant "about injuries [and]
other medical conditions that could potentially give [the officer] some [e]ffect
during the course of the evaluation," and defendant reported none.
Officer Abrusci checked defendant's eyes and found "equal tracking" and
a "lack of convergence," which he noted were "consistent and expected with
somebody under the influence of cannabis." He noted "there was no indication
of H.G.N. [5], . . . no lack of smooth pursuit, . . . no distinct sustained jerking at
maximum deviation and . . . no angle of onset" or vertical nystagmus and that,
with cannabis usage, he "wouldn't expect to see" those indicators.
The first pulse measurement Officer Abrusci took was sixty-two beats per
minute, which was "at the low end of average ranges" of sixty-to-ninety beats
per minute. The second measurement was sixty-four beats per minute, and the
third was sixty-two. Officer Abrusci testified a person under the influence of
cannabis would have a pulse "on the high side, or elevated."
During step five, which included the Romberg Balance, walk-and-turn,
and one-leg-stand tests, Officer Abrusci observed defendant "had eyelid
5
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus is the name for abnormal eye movements that are
a sign of intoxication. Nat'l Traffic L. Ctr., Nat'l Dist. Att'ys Ass'n, Horizontal
Gaze Nystagmus: The Science and the Law 1 (2d ed. 2021).
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tremors, he had about a one[-]inch sway, side to side from center . . . and [a]
one[-]inch sway front to back from center." When he asked defendant to close
his eyes for thirty seconds, he opened his eyes at eighteen seconds and, when
the officer asked him "how he estimated the time," defendant said "that he just
counted, that he got to [twenty-five] and thought that he was counting slowly
and opened his eyes, thinking that he had already gotten to [thirty] seconds."
Officer Abrusci testified "eyelid tremors are commonly observed in
people that have smoked cannabis" and swaying from side-to-side can be
consistent with cannabis use. He also opined that defendant misjudging the time
showed his "perception of time, his reaction time were . . . affected," which was
consistent with cannabis use.
Defendant had leg tremors during the walk-and-turn test both in the
starting position and while walking, which was an indicator of cannabis usage.
He had to stop to regain his balance a couple of times, "stepped off the line to
his left" when taking his fifth step, failed to pivot in a directed fashion, and took
fewer steps than directed—all of which were consistent with cannabis use.
During the one-leg-stand test, Officer Abrusci again observed "noticeable
leg tremors." Defendant "was able to keep his foot up" and "count to [twenty-
eight] in [thirty] seconds," which was "not a . . . problematic observation," but
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the officer noted that defendant "swayed and he was hopping while doing the
test, trying to keep his balance." The same thing occurred when defendant did
the one-leg-stand test with his other leg.
During the finger-to-nose test, Officer Abrusci again observed eyelid
tremors and swaying. Defendant used the pad rather than the tip of his finger
when touching his nose and, "on a couple of the attempts he didn't touch the tip
of his nose but touched other areas of his nose that were not . . . in accordance
with the directions."
During step six, Officer Abrusci measured defendant's temperature at 97.3
degrees, which was below the average range of 98.6 plus or minus one degree.
This was inconsistent with cannabis use and "actually helped to . . . point
towards a narcotic." Defendant's blood pressure was 118/72. Officer Abrusci
noted "118 was below the average ranges of 120 to 140, and a blood pressure at
[seventy-two was] at the low end of average ranges of [seventy] to [ninety]."
These readings were, "again, not consistent with marijuana, but . . . another
indicator, point[ing] towards the direction of a narcotic."
Officer Abrusci measured defendant's pupils in regular room light and
found them to be two millimeters, which was below the average range of 2.5 to
five millimeters. He then took defendant into an adjacent room for a "dark room
A-2044-19
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exam." After more than ninety seconds, defendant's pupils "only opened up a
half a millimeter to two and a half millimeters," which was below the average
of five millimeters to 8.5 millimeters and showed "basically little to no
reaction . . . to the change in light." When Officer Abrusci shined a penlight
into defendant's eyes, they constricted to two millimeters. He concluded
defendant's pupil reactions were "consistent with narcotics," not "straight
marijuana" usage.
Officer Abrusci examined defendant's mouth and nostrils with a penlight
and ultraviolet light to check for recency of drug usage. He observed a green
color that "was consistent with somebody that's recently smoked marijuana,"
and observed "residue" under the ultraviolet light also "consistent with
somebody who's recently ingested or smoked marijuana." He testified it was
during the dark room examination, while he was telling Officer Brunone the
significance of his ultraviolet light observations, that defendant volunteered he
had smoked cannabis from the pipe found in his car "a few hours" before the
stop.6
6
Defendant denied ever telling either officer he had smoked cannabis on the
day of his arrest, but during cross-examination he admitted he had smoked
cannabis at 9:00 a.m. that day.
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Based on the DRE evaluation and the totality of the circumstances, Officer
Abrusci concluded defendant had been driving under the influence of "[a]
combination of narcotics and cannabis" that would have "affected his ability to
operate the motor vehicle." Defendant was eventually taken to another police
station for an Alcotest procedure that showed his blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) was 0.00%.
Following defendant's conviction in municipal court, he appealed, and the
Law Division conducted a trial de novo on the record. The court denied
defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence, granted the State's motion
to admit defendant's statements, found defendant guilty of the same charges 7 as
the municipal court, and imposed the same penalties.
The court issued a written opinion concluding the officers were justified
in stopping defendant's vehicle based on the observations of him speeding and
7
In addition to the DUI charge, the other charges included: possession of less
than fifty grams of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4); failure to turn over a
controlled dangerous substance to law enforcement, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c);
possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2; driving under the influence
of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(b). We granted the State's motion to remand
for entry of an amended judgment given the passage of New Jersey Cannabis
Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act,
N.J.S.A. 24:61-31 to -56. The Law Division subsequently dismissed the
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4); N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c); N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2; and N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(b) convictions.
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the abrupt lane change without signaling. It found the officers were justified to
broaden the inquiry because of the marijuana odor emanating from the vehicle
"partially masked by the smell of the air fresheners," the observation of shake
on the car floor, and defendant's nervousness, red eyes, and droopy eyelids. The
odor and the substance on the floor "provided the officers with probable cause
to search the vehicle." Therefore, the warrantless search yielding the pipe and
the cannabis was justified under the automobile exception.
The court admitted the statement defendant made following his arrest that
he smoked marijuana earlier in the day. It reasoned he had received multiple
Miranda warnings, "was aware of his Miranda rights, knew full well how to
assert them, and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights when answering
Officer Abrusci's questions."
The court rejected defendant's argument the law required corroborating
toxicology for a DRE opinion to be admissible. It recounted defendant's
performance during the DRE evaluation and credited Officer Abrusci's opinion
that defendant "operated his vehicle under the influence of marijuana" and "that
[d]efendant's ability to [operate] his vehicle would have been impaired." It
noted an officer's subjective observation "is a sufficient ground to sustain an
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under the influence or DWI conviction." The court found the totality of the
circumstances, including the
observations of [d]efendant at the scene by Officers
Abrusci and Brunone, the odor of raw marijuana, the
recovery of marijuana and a glass pipe from
[d]efendant's car, [d]efendant's own admissions that he
ha[d] smoked marijuana earlier that day, and Officer
Abrusci's testimony regarding his examination of
[d]efendant at police headquarters, [show] the State has
established beyond a reasonable doubt that [d]efendant
was under the influence of marijuana in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(b); and DWI in violation of N.J.S.A.
39:4-50(a).
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
I. THE [OFFICERS'] ROADSIDE AND POST–
ROADSIDE WARRANTLESS CUSTODIAL
DETENTION WAS AN UNREASONABLE AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE OF . . .
DEFENDANT'S PERSON.
a. GENERALLY.
b. FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE
DOCTRINE.
c. THE PROLONGED WARRANTLESS
ROADSIDE DETENTION OF . . .
DEFENDANT WAS UNREASONABLE.
d. [OFFICER] ABRUSCI'S
WARRANTLESS STATIONHOUSE SO
CALLED "DRUG RECOGNITION
EVALUATION" WHICH HE CONDUCTED
UPON . . . DEFENDANT'S PERSON IS A
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"SEARCH" UNDER THE [FOURTH]
AMENDMENT NOT SUBJECT TO ANY
LAWFULLY RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION.
II. [OFFICER] ABR[U]SCI'S SO CALLED "DRUG
RECOGNITION EVALUATION" IS INADMISSIBLE
JUNK SCIENCE PERFORMED AND EVALUATED
BY AN INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUAL.
a. ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE GENERALLY.
b. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS
TESTIMONY GENERALLY.
c. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THAT [OFFICER] ABRUSCI WAS AN
"EXPERT" IN ANY FIELD OTHER THAN
DETECTING ALCOHOL INTOXICATION OR
THE ABSENCE THEREOF.
III. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE . . .
DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(A)) BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV. . . . DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR
AND UNBIASED TRIAL (ARGUMENTS
TRUNCATED BECAUSE OF RESTRICTIONS ON
LENGTH OF BRIEF). (Raised Below).
a. SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED.
b. DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS NEVER
RULED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THE LAW DIVISION (DELAY,
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CONCEALMENT AND DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE).
c. FAILURE TO RULE ON THE N.J.R.E.
104 AND SUPPRESSION MOTION PRIOR TO
THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENTATION
OF TRIAL EVIDENCE.
d. THE TRIAL WAS NOT A FAIR TRIAL.
i. JUDGE AND STATE
PROLONGED THE TRIAL.
ii. THE JUDGE WAS BIASED IN
FAVOR OF THE STATE.
1. INTIMIDATED,
DISRESPECTED AND
DISMISSIVE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL;
2. ASSISTED THE STATE
WITH ITS CASE;
3. HELD THE STATE TO A
LOWER STANDARD;
4. REJECTED DEFENSE
EXPERT TESTIMONY WITHOUT
CAUSE.
iii. [OFFICER] ABRUSCI WAS THE
MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR'S FORMER
PRIVATE PRACTICE CLIENT.
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I.
Following a de novo appeal to the Law Division, conducted on the record
developed in the municipal court, our scope of review is limited. State v.
Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005); see also R. 3:23-
8(a)(2). We consider only "the action of the Law Division and not that of the
municipal court." State v. Palma, 219 N.J. 584, 591-92 (2014) (quoting State v.
Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961)). The Law Division judge must make independent
findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidentiary record of the
municipal court, with deference to the municipal court judge's ability to assess
the witnesses' credibility. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964). This is
because the municipal court has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses
and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State
v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161).
In turn, we focus our review on "whether there is 'sufficient credible
evidence . . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v.
Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162).
However, our review of legal determinations is plenary. See State v. Kuropchak,
221 N.J. 368, 383 (2015).
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II.
In Point III, defendant argues the State failed to meet its burden of proof
to show he was guilty of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. He points to the fact
his BAC was 0.00%, he was acquitted of the N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(b) offense, and
there was "no objective or corroborating toxicology evidence at trial." He
asserts he was convicted solely because of Officer Abrusci's "unfounded 'hunch'
that [he] was under the influence of marijuana."
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), "[a] person who operates a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or
habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a [BAC] of 0.08% or
more" is guilty of DUI. The Court in Olenowski II explained:
The statute has a vital purpose. It "seeks to prevent the
operation of motor vehicles by those whose faculties
are so impaired as to present a danger to the safety of
others as well as themselves." State v. DiCarlo, 67 N.J.
321, 325 (1975). In enacting N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, "[t]he
obvious intention of the Legislature was to prescribe a
general condition, short of intoxication, as a result of
which every motor vehicle operator has to be said to be
so affected in judgment or control as to make it
improper . . . to drive on the highways." [Johnson, 42
N.J. at 164-65] (noting that even "the smallest amount
of alcohol has some slight effect or influence on an
individual" and that being "absolutely 'drunk'" is not a
statutory requirement).
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[255 N.J. at 547 (first alteration in original) (footnote
omitted).]
"[W]hether the cause of intoxication is alcohol or narcotics, hallucinogens
or habit-forming drugs is largely irrelevant." Id. at 547-48 (quoting State v.
Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 588 (2006)). However, while "a driver whose BAC level
exceeds the 0.08% limit prescribed by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 is guilty – per se – of
driving while intoxicated, . . . [t]here is no equivalent per se violation in this
state for persons who drive with impairment-causing drugs in their system." Id.
at 548. "The critical phrase 'under the influence' within N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 is 'not
self-defining and [has] required judicial ascertainment of the legislative intent.'"
Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 164).
The Court has further explained as follows:
The language "under the influence" . . . means a
substantial deterioration or diminution of the mental
faculties or physical capabilities of a person whether it
be due to intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic
or habit-producing drugs. In [Johnson], an intoxicating
liquor case, we stated that "under the influence" meant
a condition which so affects the judgment or control of
a motor vehicle operator as to make it improper for
[them] to drive on the highway. . . . [I]n [DiCarlo], we
held that an operator of a motor vehicle was under the
influence of a narcotic drug within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) if the drug produced a narcotic
effect "so altering [their] normal physical coordination
and mental faculties as to render such person a danger
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to [themselves] as well as to other persons on the
highway."
[State v. Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414, 420-21 (1975)
(emphasis added).]
Tamburro remains vital today. See Bealor, 187 N.J. at 589 (quoting the
definitions cited in Tamburro and noting the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the unsafe effect on the defendant's physical or mental
capabilities); Olenowski II, 255 N.J. at 549 (quoting Tamburro definitions).
"[T]he State must prove in [driving under the influence of drugs] cases that (1)
the defendant was intoxicated and (2) the cause of the intoxication was either
narcotics, hallucinogens, or habit-producing drugs." Olenowski II, 255 N.J. at
550. Pursuant to these principles, we conclude the municipal court judge and
the Law Division erred as a matter of law when they found that proof of cannabis
use alone was sufficient to meet the State's burden of proof.
The municipal court judge applied the incorrect standard when he held
"the current state of the law" was that "if a defendant smokes marijuana and they
operate a vehicle, they are under the influence while operating a motor vehicle"
and rejected the argument defendant could have "used marijuana at some point
in time . . . on the date in question" yet not be guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-
50(a). The judge ignored that a finding of "under the influence" requires proof
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that use of a drug caused "a substantial deterioration or diminution of the mental
faculties or physical capabilities of a person," "a condition which so affects the
judgment or control of a motor vehicle operator as to make it improper for him
to drive on the highway," or "a narcotic effect 'so altering his or her normal
physical coordination and mental faculties as to render such person a danger to
[themselves] as well as to other persons on the highway.'" Tamburro, 68 N.J. at
420-21 (quoting DiCarlo, 67 N.J. at 328). See also Bealor, 187 N.J. at 589(noting Tamburro definitions applicable to DWI and DUI prosecutions);
Olenowski II, 255 N.J. at 549 (same).
The Law Division similarly overlooked the law when it noted Officer
Abrusci "opined . . . [d]efendant's ability to [operate] his vehicle would have
been impaired," yet made no finding as to the nature or degree of defendant's
alleged impairment. Like the municipal court, it rejected Officer Abrusci's
opinion the signs and symptoms of drug use observed in defendant were due to
"[a] combination of narcotics and cannabis" but erred because it made no
findings whether the impairment was because of cannabis use.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) requires proof of alcohol or drug use, proof of
impairment, and a causal link between the two. See, e.g., State v. Bealor, 377
N.J. Super. 321, 328 (App. Div. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 187 N.J. 574A-2044-19
24
(2006) (noting the State was obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
drug use "was the proximate cause of defendant's behavior"); State v.
Franchetta, 394 N.J. Super. 200, 206 (App. Div. 2007) (noting conviction of
DUI is appropriate where the defendant was physically impaired to the point of
being unable to drive and "the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
cocaine was the proximate cause" of impairment). Although the specific type
of drug ingested need not be proven in a DUI case, impairment must be shown
"from the subject's conduct, physical and mental condition and the symptoms
displayed," Tamburro, 68 N.J. at 421, and that impairment must result from a
"narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug." N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).
Because these essential findings regarding the elements of the DUI offense were
not made, we are constrained to reverse and vacate defendant's conviction.
Moreover, our review of the record reveals the State's evidence was
insufficient to prove defendant was operating his vehicle while impaired by
drugs. The evidence shows defendant was speeding and made an abrupt lane
change without signaling. However, no link was drawn between these
infractions and drug use. Officer Abrusci did not connect the signs of cannabis
use or any of the signs and symptoms he opined were consistent with drug use
to defendant's driving. Although he testified his testing of defendant
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25
demonstrated a lack of perfect motor control and perception, he did not explain
how, or to what extent, defendant's signs and symptoms showed "substantial
deterioration or diminution of . . . mental faculties or physical capabilities," a
significant impact on "judgment or control of a motor vehicle," Tamburro, 68
N.J. at 420-21, or a meaningful alteration of "normal physical coordination and
mental faculties." Ibid. (quoting DiCarlo, 67 N.J. at 321). He did not explain
how a person who had not used any drugs would score on the tests he
administered to defendant.
In short, none of the signs and symptoms Officer Abrusci testified to were
correlated to an adverse impact on defendant's driving. The evidence was
insufficient to prove defendant operated the vehicle while impaired by drugs.
For these reasons as well, we reverse and vacate defendant's conviction.
III.
In Point I, defendant argues: 1) the State failed to establish he knowingly
and voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel; 2) the officers
had no basis to detain him roadside and the prolonged detention between the
initial traffic stop and his arrest was unconstitutional; and 3) the DRE
examination required a search warrant or a finding the examination fell under
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an exception to the warrant requirement. We find no merit to the two latter
arguments and address only the first one.
Defendant contends the municipal court judge erred in refusing to find a
Miranda violation and suppressing his admissions about smoking cannabis
earlier in the day. He asserts the Law Division also erred because it gave short
shrift to this argument.
"An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal
case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision,
provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven,
226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). Factual findings should be overturned "only if they are
so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction.'" Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). We owe
no deference to conclusions of law, which we review de novo. Boone, 232 N.J.
at 426.
"Before the police can interrogate a suspect in custody, they must inform
the person of his constitutional rights in accordance with Miranda." State v.
O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408, 420 (2022) (citing State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 382
(2014)). Miranda protects a suspect's right against self-incrimination based
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upon "the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's
common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule,
N.J.R.E. 503." State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381-82 (2017) (quoting State v.
Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399 (2009)). "New Jersey's privilege against self-
incrimination is so venerated and deeply rooted in this state's common law" that
it is regarded "as though it were of constitutional magnitude." State v. Rivas,
251 N.J. 132, 153 (2022) (quoting State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 176-77 (2007)).
See also, e.g., State v. Wright, 444 N.J. Super. 347, 363-64 (App. Div. 2016)
(noting New Jersey courts have treated the state privilege as though of
constitutional magnitude and have found that its protection is broader than its
Fifth Amendment federal counterpart).
"A defendant's statement to the police, made in custody, is admissible if
it is given freely and voluntarily, after the defendant received Miranda warnings,
and after he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights."
O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 413. The burden is on the State to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a defendant's waiver of rights was valid. Ibid. See also,
e.g., State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 211 (2022) (the State must show, given the
"totality of the circumstances," that waiver was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent), reconsideration denied, 250 N.J. 493 (2022), and cert. denied, __
A-2044-19
28
U.S. __ (2022). "Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to assess
whether the State has met its burden." O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. at 413.
However, where there is no waiver and a defendant invokes their right to
remain silent, it must be "scrupulously honored." Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S.
96, 103-04 (1975). "[T]he requirement that the police 'scrupulously honor' the
suspect's assertion of [their] right to remain silent is independent of the
requirement that any waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" and should
be addressed first. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 261 (1986) (citing Mosely,
423 U.S. at 102-03). See also State v. Mallon, 288 N.J. Super. 139, 148 (App.
Div. 1996) (noting the trial judge "focused solely upon defendant's waiver" and
failed to make "the critical inquiry" of whether his rights had been scrupulously
honored).
Here, the municipal court judge found defendant waived his Miranda
rights because he agreed to being questioned after invoking his rights to counsel
and to remain silent. However, the judge did not resolve the conflicting
evidence, namely, the fact defendant had checked "no" on the Miranda form,
with Officer Abrusci's testimony that defendant agreed to answer his questions.
Instead, the judge found there had been no "interrogation" by the police
following defendant's invocation of his rights, because defendant's statements
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were made during the DRE examination. The Law Division found the municipal
court correctly concluded defendant's Miranda rights were not violated.
We are constrained to reverse because neither court adjudicated whether
the officers scrupulously honored defendant's right to remain silent.
Interrogation or not, the substantial, credible evidence in the record readily
shows Officer Abrusci continued questioning defendant after he repeatedly and
unambiguously invoked his right to speak to his attorney. Officer Abrusci
acknowledged as much when he testified he altered the DRE evaluation to
exclude what he considered to be incriminating questions. While the officer
may have had good intentions, once defendant asked for counsel and indicated
he did not want to answer questions on the Miranda rights form, all interrogation
had to cease.
Although Officer Abrusci believed asking questions about defendant's
medical background did not flout the right against self-incrimination, the Court
in Olenowski II explained: DREs are "trained . . . to ask drivers during the
protocol about whether they have medical conditions or about other causes that
might impair them or affect their performance on the field sobriety tests," not to
render a medical diagnosis or offer medical assistance, but so that they can better
form and confirm their drug-use opinion. 255 N.J. at 587-88. DREs are trained
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to be aware of the major non-drug causes of impairment
that may mimic signs of drug or alcohol impairment
(e.g., head trauma, low blood sugar in diabetics,
seizures and neurological disorders, conjunctivitis,
some mental health issues, and "physical defects" like
injuries that might affect performance of certain steps
of the protocol).
[Id. at 588.]
Therefore, Officer Abrusci's questions were not just for medical
background. They touched upon the element of impairment the State needed to
show a DUI violation. Although Officer Abrusci could have proceeded with the
observational and physical-testing aspects of the DRE protocol without violating
defendant's Miranda rights, he could not question defendant in any manner once
defendant invoked his rights.
Furthermore, we part ways with the municipal court's findings there was
no interrogation. Officer Abrusci's comments to Officer Brunone while
examining defendant under ultraviolet light in the darkroom were the functional
equivalent of interrogation.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), the Court explained
that "the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
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reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." (footnote
omitted). See also State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 68 n.13 (1988) (holding "[t]he
initiation of a general discussion about the victim clearly satisfies" the Innis
standard).
Regardless of Officer Abrusci's reasons for conveying his observations to
Officer Brunone, it is obvious that it would elicit a response from defendant,
who was listening to the incriminating evidence the officer was finding. The
State never proffered a reason for the commentary. Officer Brunone was not a
DRE or in training to become one. He had no need to observe the process or
discuss Officer Abrusci's observations.
Because we find there was both an interrogation and that defendant
unequivocally invoked his rights to counsel and to remain silent, his admissions
about smoking cannabis should have been suppressed. And because Officer
Abrusci's DRE opinion was based in part on defendant's admissions, his DRE
evaluation and opinion should have been excluded, as fruits of the poisonous
tree. O'Neill, 193 N.J. at 171 n.13. Given that the DRE opinion was the only
evidence defendant was driving with cannabis in his system, the State could not
prove the elements of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). For these reasons as well, we reverse
and vacate defendant's conviction.
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IV.
In Point II, defendant argues the DRE evaluation and testimony should
have been excluded because it was based on "inadmissible junk science" that
could not properly support an expert opinion. We are unpersuaded.
The claim in Olenowski was that the DRE evaluations that were admitted
into evidence against the defendant in two municipal court matters should have
been excluded as scientifically unreliable by the standards articulated in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which New Jersey courts had used
in criminal cases for decades to evaluate the reliability of scientific expert
testimony. State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 138-40 (2023) (Olenowski I). The
Court granted certification to decide "whether the testimony of an officer who
is a certified . . . []DRE[] is admissible at trial and, if so, under what
circumstances." Id. at 139 (quoting State v. Olenowski, 247 N.J. 242, 242
(2019)). After the initial argument, the Court concluded "the existing factual
record [wa]s inadequate to test the validity of DRE evidence," and designated a
special master to conduct "a plenary hearing to consider and decide whether
DRE evidence has achieved general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community and therefore satisfies the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702." Id.
at 140 (quoting Olenowski, 247 N.J. at 244).
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Then, the Court considered the continuing viability of the Frye standard
for criminal cases and remanded again for the special master to consider the
defendant's claims applying "a Daubert-type[8] standard in criminal cases." Id.
at 153, 155. On remand, the special master concluded DRE testimony was
reliable and admissible under the Daubert standard adopted in Olenowski I.
Olenowski II, 255 N.J. at 545. The Court adopted the special master's
conclusions with some "modifications and limitations." Id. at 546. It held
the record as a whole justifies the admission of DRE
testimony, with the following four limitations and
safeguards:
• The DRE testimony must be confined to
an opinion that the evaluation is
"consistent with" the driver's ingestion or
usage of one or more of the identified drug
categories. The DRE may not present
opinions as to whether the driver's
observed impairment was actually caused
by such drugs and, if so, to what extent.
• If feasible, the State must make a
reasonable attempt to obtain a toxicology
report based on a blood or urine sample
from the driver. If the State fails to make
such a reasonable attempt without a
persuasive justification, the DRE opinion
testimony must be excluded.
8
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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34
• The defense must be afforded a fair
opportunity to impeach the DRE and
present competing proofs.
• Model instructions to guide juries about
DRE evidence should be considered.
[Ibid.]
For these reasons, we reject defendant's assertions regarding the nature of
DRE evidence. Moreover, the DRE evidence here was admissible under the
standard adopted in Olenowski II, because: Officer Abrusci repeatedly testified
that specific signs or symptoms were "consistent with" cannabis or narcotic use
rather than "caused" by the drugs; defendant affirmatively refused to provide a
urine sample, which he had a right to do, so obtaining a toxicological sample
was not feasible; defendant was afforded but waived the opportunity to cross-
examine Officer Abrusci regarding the DRE evaluation; and the Court's advice
regarding jury instructions was inapplicable as this matter was a bench trial.
V.
Finally, we decline to address the arguments raised by defendant in Point
IV because they have not been briefed. "An issue not briefed on appeal is
deemed waived." Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div.
2011).
Reversed and vacated. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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