State of New Jersey v. Philip J. Ianuale ( 2024 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2431-22
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    PHILIP J. IANUALE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted March 18, 2024 – Decided April 4, 2024
    Before Judges DeAlmeida and Bishop-Thompson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 14-01-
    5648.
    Philip J. Ianuale, appellant pro se.
    Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Alecia Nathanne Woodard,
    Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Philip J. Ianuale appeals from the November 28, 2022 order of
    the Law Division dismissing his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)
    as untimely filed. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    In 2017, a jury convicted defendant of third-degree aggravated assault on
    a police officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), and fourth-degree resisting arrest,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2). The jury acquitted defendant of third-degree resisting
    arrest but found him guilty of the lesser-included disorderly persons offense of
    preventing an officer from effecting an arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1). The court
    subsequently found defendant guilty of disorderly persons possession of a
    controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), and disorderly
    persons possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2.              The court
    sentenced defendant to a three-year term of noncustodial probation. Defendant
    did not file a direct appeal from his convictions and sentence.
    On December 5, 2017, defendant filed his first petition for PCR. He
    alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and errors by the trial court.
    On April 11, 2019, the trial court issued an oral opinion and order denying
    defendant's first petition.
    A-2431-22
    2
    On August 25, 2021, we affirmed the trial court's decision.      State v.
    Ianuale, No. A-5352-18 (App. Div. Aug. 25, 2021).
    Defendant alleges that he did not receive notice of our August 25, 2021
    decision until April 4, 2022.
    On August 4, 2022, defendant filed a second petition for PCR. The only
    document in defendant's appendix described as a petition for PCR consists of
    the following single paragraph:
    Please accept this verified Petition for Post-Conviction
    Relief of the action identified above based on grounds
    that rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
    Constitution of the United States and Article I[,]
    Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution were
    violated.
    It appears no subsequent filing in the trial court specified the basis for these
    broad allegations. As far as we can discern from the record, defendant was not
    given an opportunity to file an amended second petition detailing the basis for
    his claims or written argument opposing dismissal of his second petition.
    On November 28, 2022, the trial court issued an order dismissing
    defendant's second PCR petition. The court concluded the second petition was
    A-2431-22
    3
    untimely because it was filed more than one year after dismissal of the first
    petition for PCR. See R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C); R. 3:22-4.1
    This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following arguments.
    POINT I
    THE SECOND PETITION WAS TIMELY SINCE IT
    WAS FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DATE
    ON WHICH THE FACTUAL PREDICATE WAS
    DISCOVERED.
    POINT II
    FAILURE TO FILE A TIMELY SECOND PETITION
    IS ACTUALLY A FURTHER INDICATION OF
    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
    POINT III
    THE CONCURRENT PANDEMIC CAUSED MANY
    TIMELINES TO EXCEED THEIR USUAL
    LENGTHS.
    POINT IV
    THERE WAS A LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY
    THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE TO ASSURE
    DEFENDANTS ARE TIMELY INFORMED.
    1
    The trial court, citing Rule 3:22-12(a)(3), also concluded defendant's second
    petition was untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after the date
    of the judgment on direct appeal. Defendant, however, did not file a direct
    appeal of his conviction and sentence. Thus, Rule 3:22-12(a)(3) does not apply
    here. Presumably, the trial court was referring to our August 25, 2021 decision
    affirming the order dismissing defendant's first petition for PCR. That decision,
    however, is not a judgment on a direct appeal within the meaning of the rule.
    A-2431-22
    4
    POINT V
    THE    COMBINATION     OF    INEFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE IMPACT OF THE
    PANDEMIC     AND    THE      LACK     OF
    ACCOUNTABILITY ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THE
    RESULTING DELAY.
    POINT VI
    THESE ISSUES MUST BE ADDRESSED SO THAT
    ALL   DEFENDANTS'    RIGHTS  CAN    BE
    PROTECTED VIA FURTHER COURT RULES OR
    PROCEDURES.
    II.
    We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that defendant's
    second PCR petition is barred by Rule 3:22-4 and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). State v.
    Harris, 
    181 N.J. 391
    , 419 (2004).
    Rule 3:22-4(b) provides, in relevant part:
    A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction
    relief shall be dismissed unless:
    (1)   it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and
    (2)   it alleges on its face either:
    (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
    constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
    petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
    Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
    during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or
    A-2431-22
    5
    (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought
    could not have been discovered earlier through the
    exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts
    underlying the ground for relief, if proven and viewed
    in light of the evidence as a whole, would raise a
    reasonable probability that the relief sought would be
    granted; or
    (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
    ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
    defendant on the first or subsequent application for
    post-conviction relief.
    Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) provides that "no second or subsequent petition shall
    be filed more than one year after the latest of" the following:
    (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
    was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
    Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
    has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
    and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
    on collateral review; or
    (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the
    relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate
    could not have been discovered earlier through the
    exercise of reasonable diligence; or
    (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
    application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
    assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on
    the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
    relief is being alleged.
    A-2431-22
    6
    "These time limitations shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein." R.
    3:22-12(b).
    Although we do not have the benefit of a second petition setting forth a
    detailed description of the basis for defendant's claims, it appears, according to
    the briefs he filed with this court, that he does not allege he is entitled to relief
    based on a newly recognized constitutional right. His second petition, therefore,
    does not appear to fall within subsection (A) of the rule.
    Defendant appears, however, to allege that his second petition is based on
    a factual predicate he discovered within a year of the filing of that petition.
    According to defendant, it was not until April 4, 2022, when he received notice
    of our August 25, 2021 opinion, that he became aware of the factual predicate
    to allege ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel on this first PCR
    petition. He argues that the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have
    revealed that factual predicate prior to April 4, 2022.         Defendant argues,
    therefore, that his claims fall within subsection (B) of the rule, which allows him
    to file a second PCR petition within one year of April 4, 2022.
    To the extent defendant's second petition alleges he was denied the
    effective assistance of counsel with respect to his trial counsel on his first
    petition, subsection (C) of the rule requires that a second petition be filed no
    A-2431-22
    7
    more than a year after the date of the denial of the first petition. Defendant's
    first petition was denied on April 11, 2019. He did not file his second petition
    until August 4, 2022, more than three years later. Defendant appears to argue,
    however, that he did not discover, and could not reasonably have discovered,
    the factual predicate supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of first PCR
    trial counsel until April 4, 2022, when he was notified of our decision.
    The trial court dismissed the second petition in the absence of allegations
    or written arguments by defendant detailing the basis of his claims. Given the
    sparse record before it, the trial court understandably did not consider
    defendant's arguments, raised for the first time before this court, that his second
    petition was timely filed pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) and (C), because he
    did not discover, and could not have discovered through the exercise of
    reasonable diligence, the factual predicate for the claims in his second petition
    until April 4, 2022. In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law by
    the trial court with respect to the timeliness of defendant's second petition under
    Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(B) and (C), we cannot engage in effective appellate review
    of the November 28, 2022 order. See R. 1:7-4(a); Raspantini v. Arocho, 
    364 N.J. Super. 528
    , 534 (App. Div. 2003).
    A-2431-22
    8
    In light of these circumstances, we vacate the November 28, 2022 order
    and remand this matter to permit defendant to file an amended second petition
    for PCR detailing the basis of his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and
    appellate counsel with respect to his first PCR petition. The trial court shall,
    after briefing by the parties, consider whether any of the claims in defendant's
    amended second petition for PCR were timely filed, using the original August
    4, 2022 filing date of defendant's second PCR petition to determine timeliness.
    We offer no opinion with respect to whether defendant's second PCR petition
    was timely filed or whether he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing or PCR.
    Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    A-2431-22
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-2431-22

Filed Date: 4/4/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/4/2024