State of New Jersey v. Matthew E. Hussey ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0266-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW E. HUSSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 16, 2024 – Decided April 5, 2024
Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No: 21-05-
0290.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Alyssa A. Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Monica Lucinda Do Outeiro,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Matthew Hussey appeals from the Law Division's August 26,
2022 order denying his motion for admission into the pre-trial intervention
program (PTI) after being rejected by the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office
(Prosecutor's Office). We affirm.
I.
We derive the following facts from the motion record. In July 2019,
defendant and his friend drove from New York to Asbury Park to attend a
concert. Upon arriving in Asbury Park, defendant parked his car, and the two
began drinking alcohol. Shortly thereafter, Asbury Park police received a report
that two "teenagers" were drinking alcohol in a gray car with a New York license
plate near 510 Monroe Avenue.
Officer James Crawford was dispatched to investigate the report. Upon
arrival, he observed a car matching the report's description and a young male
exiting the driver's side of the car, later identified as defendant. As Crawford
approached the car and began speaking with defendant, he observed a young
male in the passenger seat "moving around inside of the car." The passenger
then exited the passenger's side of the car with a can in his hand. Crawford
walked around to the passenger's side of the car and saw an alcoholic beverage
can rolling away from the passenger and spilling liquid onto the ground.
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Crawford asked both young males for their identification to determine if
they were of legal drinking age, which revealed that both males were under the
age of twenty-one. Crawford then searched the car for additional alcohol.
Crawford saw a black tote bag on the floor of the car, believing that it contained
more alcohol; however, the search was fruitless. He observed the center console
was "ajar" and possibly contained alcohol. Immediately upon opening the center
console, he saw a grinder, a scale, and rolling papers. As Crawford removed the
scale, he saw a clear plastic bag with a tin foil fold inside of the scale. When
asked what was inside the tin foil, defendant replied that it was "acid," the street
name for hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). According to
Crawford, the passenger seemed surprised.
As Crawford continued to remove the remaining items from the center
console, he also observed a pink zip-loc bag. When Crawford asked what was
inside the bag, defendant replied, "I think that's ecstasy." Crawford opened the
pink bag and saw a clear plastic baggie with money signs on the outside and a
brownish crystalline substance "suspected" to be ecstasy or "molly" on the
inside. During the search of the car, Crawford also found an open and partially
consumed clear glass bottle of rum behind the passenger's seat.
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Crawford radioed for additional police officers. While waiting for
"backup" to arrive, defendant began asking Crawford questions. After a
moment, defendant said, "well, it's mine," referring to the items found in the
center console. Defendant was placed under arrest and he was searched.
Crawford found a "fake" Delaware identification in defendant's wallet. When
Officer Yannazzone arrived, he escorted defendant to Crawford's patrol car.
Crawford completed searching defendant's car and found a "small amount" of
marijuana in the pocket of the driver's door and a silver flask containing liquid
that smelled like alcohol. Crawford secured those items in his police car.
As Crawford was walking back towards defendant's car, Yannazzone was
standing near the front passenger door when he observed a plastic vacuum sealed
bag "sticking out," "possibly" filled with psilocybin mushrooms from under the
passenger's seat. Crawford also secured this item in his patrol car. While sitting
in the back of Crawford's patrol car, defendant stated: "Now you guys are going
to think I'm selling drugs."
A grand jury indicted defendant on charges of third-degree possession of
LSD, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); first-degree possession of LSD with intent to
distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(6); third-degree possession of LSD with intent
to distribute on or within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7;
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second-degree possession of LSD with intent to distribute while on or within
500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1; third-degree possession of
psilocybin mushrooms, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession of
psilocybin mushrooms with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13); third-
degree possession of psilocybin mushrooms with intent to distribute on or within
1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; second-degree possession of
psilocybin mushrooms with intent to distribute while on or within 500 feet of a
public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1; third-degree possession of ecstasy, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1); and fourth-degree possession of a simulated document, N.J.S.A.
2C:21-2.1(d).
In July 2021, defendant applied for admission to the PTI program. In his
application, defendant acknowledged that he was charged with "a crime(s) that
has a presumption of incarceration or a mandatory minimum period of parole
ineligibility." Defendant asserted: "The fact that the [p]rosecutor [was] only
looking for probation and [was] not looking for a plea on the [first-]degree
[charge] is a compelling reason to justify consideration of defendant's PT I
application despite one charge being in the first[-]degree range."
On August 6, 2021, in a comprehensive letter, the Prosecutor's Office
notified defendant that it "declined to consent" to defendant's admission into the
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PTI program. It explained that defendant offered "nothing" other than the
negotiated plea offer for noncustodial probation which did not establish
extraordinary and compelling circumstances to overcome the "heavy"
presumption against PTI admission. Relying upon State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J.
236, 252 (1995), it determined there was nothing in defendant's background that
was "so extraordinary, unusual[,] or idiosyncratic as to justify
admission/consideration of the application."
Defendant appealed the prosecutor's denial of his request for admission.
On appeal to the trial court, defendant proffered new reasons why his application
should be granted; namely, no prior criminal record, nonviolent criminal
charges, his youth, his rehabilitation potential, his history of drug abuse, and his
role as caretaker for his grandparents. The Prosecutor's Office maintained its
position.
On November 18, 2021, after hearing oral argument, the trial court denied
defendant's motion, finding there was no "patent or gross abuse" of discretion
by the prosecutor. In an oral opinion, the court reasoned the Prosecutor's Office
took into consideration the "entirety" of defendant's application and the
"compelling mitigating" reasons in offering defendant probation. The court
explained that defendant's role as a caretaker for his grandparents was "not
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enough" but was also taken into consideration by the Prosecutor's Office. The
court concluded that there was "nothing in this record that shows any compelling
and extraordinary circumstances . . . for which the Prosecutor's Office should
have under these circumstances have allowed this defendant to apply to PTI.
factors."
Thereafter, on December 27, 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to third-
degree possession of mushrooms with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -
5(b)(13). During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted the psilocybin
mushrooms belonged to him, and he planned to "share or distribute" the
mushrooms but not sell them. On August 26, 2022, the court sentenced
defendant to one year probation, ordered him to obtain substance abuse testing,
counseling, and treatment, and imposed mandatory fines and penalties.
II.
Defendant appeals the denial of entry into PTI, arguing:
POINT I
A REMAND IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THERE
WERE EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING
CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY CONSIDERATION
OF DEFENDANT'S PTI APPLICATION:
DEFENDANT, A COLLEGE STUDENT WITH NO
PRIOR RECORD, WAS FOUND IN POSSESSION OF
DRUGS AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA,
INCLUDING ONE TINFOIL FOLD CONTAINING
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BLOTTER PAPER WITH LSD ON IT; ALTHOUGH
DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR THIRD-
DEGREE POSSESSION OF LSD, HE WAS
INDICTED FOR FIRST-DEGREE POSSESSION
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE BASED ON THE
WEIGHT OF THE BLOTTER PAPER.
A. The "Serious Injustice" Standard Does Not Apply
When the Charges Involve Nonviolent Drug
Offenses That Were Not Part of a Continuing
Criminal Enterprise [or] Organized Criminal
Activity.
1. The evolution of presumptions against
admission.
2. Because, unlike Guideline (3)I, neither the
PTI statute nor court rules establish a
presumption against admission for first- or
second-degree crimes, the "serious
injustice" standard does not apply where
the offenses charges were not otherwise
subject to a presumption against
admission.
B. Even If the "Serious Injustice" Standard [was] the
Proper Standard, the Prosecutor Misapplied it In
This Case.
C. The Prosecutor's Refusal to Consent Cannot
Stand Because "[t]he Record Directly
Contradicts" the Prosecutor's "Bald
Declarations" Regarding the Nature of the
Charged Offenses "Were Sufficiently
'Extraordinary and Unusual'" to Justify
Consideration of Defendant's Application for
Admission to PTI.
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Our review of a PTI rejection "is severely limited," and "serves to check
only the 'most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness.'" State v. Negran,
178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1997));
see also State v. Denman, 449 N.J. Super. 369, 376 (App. Div. 2017). "'PTI is
essentially an extension of the charging decision, . . . the decision to grant or
deny PTI is a "quintessentially prosecutorial function."'" State v. Johnson, 238
N.J. 119, 128 (2019) (citations omitted). "'As a result, the prosecutor's decision
to accept or reject a defendant's PTI application is entitled to a great deal of
deference.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). Thus, "[a] court reviewing a prosecutor's
decision to deny PTI may overturn that decision only if the defendant 'clearly
and convincingly' establishes the decision was a 'patent and gross abuse of
discretion.'" Id. at 128-29 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 583 (1996)).
A PTI application that requires prosecutor consent pursuant to Rule 3:28-
1(d)(1) must "include a statement of the extraordinary and compelling
circumstances that justify consideration of the application notwithstanding the
presumption of ineligibility based on the nature of the crime charged and any
prior convictions." R. 3:28-3(b)(1). In establishing compelling reasons for
admission into PTI, "there must be a showing greater than that the accused is a
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first-time offender and has admitted or accepted responsibility for the crime."
Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 252.
To establish abuse of discretion, a defendant must show the prosecutor's
denial of his or her PTI application "'(a) was not premised upon a consideration
of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or
inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment.'" State v.
Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 625 (2015) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93
(1979)). Abuse of discretion rises to the level of patent and gross when the
defendant shows the prosecutor's denial "'clearly subvert[s] the goals of [PTI].'"
Ibid. (quoting Bender, 80 N.J. at 93).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that defendant's arguments lack
merit. Prosecutor's Office considered defendant's sole reason articulated in his
initial submission. Here, the record fully supports the denial of defendant's
application. Simply put, a plea offer of noncustodial probation was insufficient
to establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances to overcome the
presumption against PTI admission. We also agree with the trial court's
reasoning that defendant's belated assertion that he was a caretaker role fell short
in establishing establish compelling circumstances. We conclude defendant has
not established the Prosecutor's Office engaged in a patent and gross abuse of
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discretion in denying his application for admission into PTI. We, therefore, see
no reason to disturb the trial court's denial of defendant's admission into the PTI
program.
Affirmed.
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