State of New Jersey v. J.H.P. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0467-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.
April 8, 2024
J.H.P.,1 APPELLATE DIVISION
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued March 5, 2024 – Decided April 8, 2024
Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County,
Indictment No. 20-12-0268.
Kevin Scott Finckenauer, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer
Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Shannon
Mae Dolan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel and on the brief).
Rory Alexander Eaton, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (John P. McDonald, Somerset
County Prosecutor, attorney; Rory Alexander Eaton
and Bridgett Nichole Dudding, Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the briefs).
1
We use initials to protect the confidentiality of defendant's mental health
diagnoses and evaluations. See R. 1:38-3(a)(2).
Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
Foundation (American Civil Liberties Union of New
Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander R. Shalom and
Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief.)
Claude Caroline Heffron argued the cause for amicus
curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of
New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, PC,
attorneys; Claude Caroline Heffron, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROSE, J.A.D.
At issue in this interlocutory appeal is the propriety of a pretrial order
compelling the administration of psychotropic medication in an attempt to
restore competency, without a defendant's consent, when the accused has not
been deemed a danger to self or others. We also consider the appropriate
standard of review of the State's application to involuntarily medicate a
defendant under these circumstances.
A Somerset County grand jury charged defendant J.H.P. with second-
degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1) and (b)(1); second-degree aggravated
arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(2); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1(b)(8); and third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4), for
allegedly setting ablaze a six-story apartment building under construction in
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Bound Brook. The January 12, 2020 fire caused more than $50 million in
property damage, injuries to a responding firefighter, and the evacuation of
neighboring residences. Defendant was detained pretrial from January 12, 2020
to April 27, 2022, and thereafter transferred to Ann Klein Forensic Center
(AKFC), where he remains civilly committed. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4.
On defense counsel's application, the first motion judge ordered an initial
competency evaluation while defendant was detained in jail. Three additional
evaluations were conducted after defendant was transferred to AKFC. The
evaluators diagnosed defendant with mental illness, deemed him not competent
to stand trial, and opined that psychotropic medication is necessary to restore
competency. Because the evaluators determined defendant does not pose an
immediate danger to self, others, or property – and refuses medication – the
State sought court orders to involuntarily administer medication to restore
competency.
By leave granted, defendant appeals from the August 24, 2023 Law
Division order granting the State's third motion to involuntarily medicate him
pursuant to the four-pronged test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), as applied by this court in State v.
R.G., 460 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 2019). Defendant argues our state
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constitution affords broader protection than its federal counterpart and, as such,
"New Jersey must reject the Sell standard as violating the well-established
liberty interest to be free from unwanted medical treatment." See N.J. Const.
art. I., ¶ 1. In the alternative, defendant contends the State failed to satisfy the
first and second Sell prongs.
After granting defendant leave to appeal, we listed the matter for argument
and invited the Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey (Attorney General)
and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to
appear as amici curiae, focusing on the propriety of forced medication as an
attempt to restore competency when a defendant has not been deemed a danger
to self or others. The ACDL accepted our invitation; the Attorney General
declined. Thereafter, we permitted the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of New Jersey (ACLU) to participate. Amici primarily argue the
Sell standard violates the New Jersey Constitution.
During oral argument before us, the State acknowledged: defendant has
a substantial interest in challenging the forced administration of antipsychotic
medication; this court in R.G. did not expressly adopt the Sell standard but
applied the factors in that matter; and the State's applications for involuntary
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medication to restore competency are sought and ordered sparingly. The State
urges us to affirm the motion court's order.
With defendant's constitutional rights in view, we apply the Sell test and
conclude the motion judge erroneously determined the State satisfied the second
prong. We therefore reverse the order under review. In doing so, we hold our
standard of review under the Sell test is mixed. We therefore review the motion
court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error as to
each Sell prong. Having resolved the issues by applying the Sell standard, we
do not reach the constitutional arguments raised.
I. Governing Legal Principles
To give context to the issues presented on appeal, we begin by setting
forth the guiding legal principles. In Sell, the federal high court held:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges
in order to render that defendant competent to stand
trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate,
is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account
of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly
to further important government trial-related interests.
[539 U.S. at 179.]
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Thus, the motion court must first find "important governmental interests"
are at stake. Id. at 180. The interest in bringing an individual charged with a
serious crime, whether against person or property, to trial is such an interest.
Ibid. Nonetheless, courts must consider the facts of the individual case in
evaluating that governmental interest. Ibid. "Special circumstances," such as
lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill, would diminish the
risks that the accused would go free without punishment and may affect the need
for prosecution. Ibid. The same is true where the defendant has been confined
in prison for a significant amount of time. Ibid.Second, the motion court must conclude that the involuntary medication
will "significantly further" those interests. Id. at 181. In so doing, the court
must find that administration of the drugs is
substantially likely to render the defendant competent
to stand trial. At the same time, it must find that
administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to
have side effects that will interfere significantly with
the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a
trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.
[Ibid.]
"Third, the court must conclude that the involuntary medicine is necessary
to further those interests." Ibid. The court "must find that any alternative, less
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results." Ibid.A-0467-23
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In addition, the court "must consider less intrusive means for administering the
drugs," such as a "court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power,
before considering more intrusive methods." Ibid.Finally, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is
"medically appropriate"; that is, "in the patient's best medical interest in light of
his medical condition." Ibid. The Court noted "[d]ifferent kinds of
antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels
of success." Ibid.Summarizing, the Court framed the issue in cases where the prosecution
seeks to involuntarily medicate an accused as follows:
Has the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side
effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical
appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic
drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment
sufficiently important to overcome the individual's
protected interest in refusing it?
[Id. at 183.]
"The Court made clear that the instances where [the Sell] factors would be met
'may be rare.'" R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 429 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180).
Applying the Sell test in R.G., we addressed for the first time "whether a
defendant charged with a crime, who is not competent to stand trial but who is
competent to make medical decisions and has refused to take antipsychotic
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medication, can be involuntarily medicated to restore competency to stand trial."
Ibid. The defendant in R.G. was charged with third-degree neglect of an elderly
or disabled person, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-8(a). Id. at 420. At the request of defense
counsel, the motion court ordered a competency evaluation, which was
administered in a psychiatric hospital. Ibid.
Both doctors, who testified at the hearing on the State's motion to
involuntarily medicate the defendant, found him not competent to stand trial.
Id. at 421. They described the defendant as delusional and suffering from
psychosis. Ibid. The psychiatrist recommended the administration of Prolixin
to restore competency and treat the defendant's mental health issues. Id. at 421-
22. He testified Prolixin could cause "abnormal movement," such as shaking,
tremors, and rigidity. Id. at 422. However, other medications could be
administered to control such reactions. Ibid. The psychiatrist concluded "it was
in [the] defendant's best medical interest to take the medication" and "there was
a reasonable probability the medication would enable [him] to participate in a
trial." Ibid.
We agreed with the motion court that the State failed to satisfy the first
Sell factor because "special circumstances lessened the State's interest in th[at]
case." Id. at 431. Specifically, the defendant's confinement at the psychiatric
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facility was lengthier than had he been convicted of the charged offense. Id. at
432. We concluded, the "court correctly considered the length of time [the]
defendant was confined, his possible need for future confinement[,] and
potential jail credits." Ibid. Although we did not reach the remaining Sell
factors or address the constitutional argument raised by the defendant and
amicus curiae ACLU, we recognized:
A trial court, in applying the Sell test, should also
consider the effects of the medication on a defendant's
right to a fair trial. Medical experts should testify about
how the medication is likely to affect a defendant's
ability to communicate with counsel, to testify, to react
rapidly to events in the trial, and to express emotions
before the jury. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 185; see also
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992). The
effect on physical appearance also should be
considered. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137. It then is for
the trial court to determine if a defendant's right to a
fair trial will be adversely affected.
[Id. at 430 (citations reformatted).]
II. Defendant's Competency Evaluations
Dena Young, Psy.D., remotely conducted the first court-ordered
competency evaluation in July 2021, while defendant was detained in jail. Dr.
Young diagnosed defendant with "Schizoaffective Disorder Bipolar Type
Multiple Episodes." Referencing defendant's mental health records, Dr. Young
noted "a significant history of mental illness, inpatient hospitalizations, and
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outpatient treatment, since early adolescence." Further noting defendant "was
stabilized with Remeron, Risperdal, and [t]razodone" while hospitalized in
2017, but "was not compliant with treatment and medication" following
discharge, Dr. Young opined: "It is highly possible that his competence could
be established or restored with inpatient treatment along with the introduction
of psychotropic medication." The State then filed its first motion to
involuntarily medicate defendant to restore competency.
At the January 2022 competency hearing, Dr. Young's report was admitted
in evidence, and she testified on behalf of the State as an expert in forensic
psychology. Dr. Young opined there was no indication in defendant's medical
reports to suggest he suffered "severe side effects" while medicated . Further,
there "should be some improvement within three to six months" after
psychotropic medication, such as Risperdal, is commenced.
In a written decision, the first motion judge denied the State's application
without prejudice, finding the State failed to "demonstrate[] that defendant will
refuse medications." Finding hospitalization necessary for a proper evaluation
of defendant's competency, the judge ordered defendant transferred to AKFC.
In May 2022, Tarita Collins, D.O., conducted a competency assessment
at AKFC, which was admitted in evidence at the July 2022 commitment hearing
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before the present judge. Qualified as the State's expert in forensic psychiatry,
Dr. Collins testified defendant suffered from schizophrenia but did not pose "an
imminent danger to himself or others because he has been incarcerated and has
not . . . had any incidents." However, Dr. Collins found defendant not competent
to stand trial. In her report, Dr. Collins explained: "It is substantially probable
that [defendant] will regain competence in the foreseeable future with
stabilization on medication. However, he refuses to consent to psychotropic
medication and does not meet criteria for non-emergency involuntary
medication in accordance with Division of Mental Health policy." See N.J.A.C.
10:37-6.54(i). Accordingly, Dr. Collins "recommended that the court reconsider
involuntary medication to assist in establishing competency" opining therapy,
alone, would not alleviate defendant's hallucinations and delusions.
On cross-examination, Dr. Collins acknowledged the administration of
antipsychotic medication, including Risperdal, Zyprexa, and Seroquel, caused
side effects such as sedation, ticks, and tremors. Generally, side effects could
present within thirty days but "metabolic side effects could develop more long
term."
In his written decision, the motion judge denied the State's application to
involuntarily medicate defendant. The judge reasoned forced medication to
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restore competency would violate defendant's right to be free from unwanted
medication under the New Jersey Constitution. See N.J. Const. art. I., ¶ 1.
In the alternative, the judge found the State failed to satisfy the first and
second Sell factors. As to the first factor, the judge found defendant was facing
a prison term of five to ten years, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, but the crimes "were likely committed due to [defendant's]
psychiatric delusions." Finding defendant's liberty interests were at stake as
determined in R.G., on balance, the judge was not convinced the State satisfied
the first Sell factor by clear and convincing evidence. Declining to consider the
remaining Sell factors, the judge nonetheless noted Dr. Collins's testimony that
"forced medication of [defendant] would not guarantee results." As such, the
judge found the State was unable to satisfy the second Sell prong.2
Another competency hearing was held in January 2023, during which Dr.
Collins again testified on behalf of the State pursuant to her updated report,
which was admitted in evidence. The expert opined defendant remained not
competent to stand trial, specifically because he suffered delusions regarding
the charges against him and was unable to work with his attorney to formulate
2
Thereafter, defendant filed two motions to dismiss the indictment based on
lack of competency. Defendant did not move for leave to appeal from either
order denying those applications.
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an adequate defense. With proper medication, it was "substantially probable"
that defendant would regain competency within three to six months but he "will
not become competent without taking medication." Dr. Collins further noted
during prior hospitalizations, defendant was involuntarily medicated with
Risperdal and trazodone and exhibited a positive response. Following the
hearing, the judge found defendant remained incompetent to stand trial,
continued his civil commitment, ordered another evaluation, and continued the
matter for six months.
Dr. Collins evaluated defendant in June 2023; her report was admitted in
evidence at the August 2023 hearing. Dr. Collins testified defendant continued
to suffer from schizophrenia and his delusions affect his ability "to rationally
. . . work with his attorney." The expert maintained there was a "substantial
probability" defendant would regain competency if involuntarily medicated with
antipsychotic medication. Noting the particular medication would be decided
by defendant's treating psychologist, Dr. Collins opined Risperdal "would be the
place to start" because the medical records indicated that drug had been
prescribed previously. Dr. Collins reiterated it generally took three to six
months to determine "if the medication is having an [e]ffect on him."
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At the time of the hearing, defendant had completed "about two-thirds" of
AKFC's Legal Competency Restoration Program (LCRP), which was designed
"to address . . . components of competency without medication." In response to
the judge's inquiry, Dr. Collins explained defendant "routinely" attends the
program and participates but she could not opine at the time of the hearing
whether LCRP would "ultimately have an effect" on his competency. In her
report, Dr. Collins stated it was "premature at this time" to so conclude.
Dr. Collins also described defendant as "generally cooperative but just
more or less isolates himself." She further stated defendant attends to "his
hygiene" and "all the things that are required of him. He goes to the groups, and
he goes to rehab[ilitation] programing." During "his entire hospitalization,"
however, "he has declined medication."
Following closing arguments, the motion judge reserved decision and
thereafter issued a written opinion granting the State's application. In applying
the four-part Sell test, the judge concluded the State proved, by clear and
convincing evidence, an important governmental interest in medicating
defendant. Citing the extensive damage to the building, the firefighter's injuries,
and the threats to the surrounding buildings and residents, the judge found ,
"[s]ociety's interest in the prosecution of this case far outweighs . . . defendant's
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interest in refusing prescribed medication (that he has already taken in the past),"
satisfying the first prong.
As to the second prong, the judge acknowledged there was "no guarantee"
medication would restore defendant to competency. Nor could "all side effects"
of treatment be predicted but "there is a very real possibility" that defendant
"may regain competency." The court further noted defendant "has exhausted all
other forms of treatment including individual and group therapy," and "has taken
Risperdal in the past without significant ill effects."
Addressing the third Sell prong, the judge was persuaded that "all other
means of treatment have been used with little success." Noting defendant "has
already taken medication in the past," the judge found defendant failed to
demonstrate "any history of side[]effects from particular medications." The
judge thus concluded the third prong was satisfied because "medication is
necessary to assist in his well[-]being and stability for rehabilitation."
Citing Dr. Collins's most recent report, the motion judge also found the
State satisfied the fourth Sell factor. Noting defendant generally was aware of
the legal process, the judge determined defendant therefore possessed the ability
to "regain full competency, if medicated with a drug he has already taken in the
past."
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III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We commence our analysis noting in R.G. we did not expressly address
the standard for reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to force
medication to restore competency. Nor did the Court in Sell set forth the
standard. However, "the overwhelming majority" of federal appellate courts
considering such orders generally review the Sell first prong de novo and the
remaining prongs for clear error. United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839 (8th
Cir. 2010). That is because "[w]hether the Government's asserted interest is
important is a legal question[,]" whereas the "court's findings with respect to the
other Sell factors are factual in nature and are therefore subject to review for
clear error." United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007) (expressly adopting
the Second Circuit's standard of review articulated in Gomes); United States v.
Lorthridge, 87 F.4th 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2023) (reviewing the first Sell prong "de
novo and the remaining elements for clear error").
Under the clear error standard, the reviewing court "may not reverse the
findings of the [motion] court simply because it would have weighed the
evidence differently." United States v. Coy, 991 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2021)
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(quoting Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 920 (8th Cir. 2011)). Rather, an
appellate court will affirm if the factual findings are "plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Dico, Inc., 920
F.3d 1174, 1178 (8th Cir. 2019)); see also State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 366 (1984)
(defining clear error, in the sentencing context, as error that "could not have
reasonably been made upon a weighing of the relevant factors").
At least one circuit, however, has extended de novo review beyond the
first Sell prong. United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (10th Cir.
2005). In Bradley, the Tenth Circuit
expand[ed] the parameters of the legal question to
include whether involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs "is necessary significantly to
further important governmental trial-related interests."
Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. In other words, "has the
Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects,
the possible alternatives, and the medical
appropriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic
drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment
sufficiently important to overcome the individual's
protected interest in refusing it?" Id. at 183.
[Ibid. (footnote omitted) (citation reformatted).]
In reaching its decision, the Bradley court considered that "involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medications implicates a constitutional right."
Id. at 1113 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-79). The court thus reasoned: "The
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standards we set must weigh this vital constitutional interest in the balance."
Ibid. (referencing the standard of review and standard of proof governing the
Sell factors).
Similarly, we recognize defendant's federal – and state – constitutional
rights are implicated by the forced administration of medication solely to restore
competency. In our view, all four Sell prongs necessarily involve mixed
questions of law and fact. Stated another way, each of Sell's four prongs
involves a legal determination as to whether: (1) "important governmental
interests are at stake"; (2) involuntary medication will "significantly further" the
State's interests; (3) "involuntary medication is necessary to further those
interests"; and (4) "administration of the drugs is medically appropriate." See
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81, 185. And each factor is dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular matter.
Moreover, our state's appellate courts generally review mixed questions
of law and fact by affording deference to the trial court's factual findings that
are supported by the record and reviewing de novo issues of law. See, e.g., State
v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015); State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 228 (2013);
State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44
(2007). In light of the constitutional rights at stake on a motion to involuntarily
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medicate a defendant to restore competency, we are therefore satisfied a mixed
standard of review is applicable to each Sell prong, and consonant with the
majority of federal circuits, that the motion court's legal determinations on a Sell
application are reviewed de novo while its factual findings are reviewed for clear
error.
B. Evidentiary Standard
We further note the Court in Sell did not address the evidentiary standard
for establishing its four-pronged test. See R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 429 n.5. In
R.G., however, we discerned "the Sell 'findings must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160). We employ the
same evidentiary standard here.
C. Applicability of the Sell Test
With those standards in view, we address defendant's argument that the
motion judge erroneously found the State satisfied the first and second Sell
factors.
Defendant argues his pretrial confinement and "likely dismissal" of the
charge by reason of insanity constitute "special circumstances" under the first
Sell prong, thereby reducing the State's interest in restoring his competency by
the administration of medication against his will. In August 2023, when the
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present motion was decided, defendant had been confined on the present charges
more than three years.
As we observed in R.G., "Sell's first factor requires more than simple
consideration of the maximum sentence." 460 N.J. Super. at 431 (citing Sell,
539 U.S. at 180). We therefore followed those federal appellate courts that
"consider the defendant's probable sentence" under the first Sell prong. Ibid.We reasoned "the Court would not have mentioned the need to consider special
circumstances – such as the length of confinement, the potential for future
confinement and jail credits to be applied toward sentencing – all of which could
reduce the State's interest in prosecution." Ibid.In the present matter, defendant's charges include two second-degree
offenses, aggravated arson and burglary, both of which fall within a sentencing
range of five to ten years' imprisonment, subject to an eighty-five-percent parole
disqualifier under NERA. Further, an argument could be made for the
imposition of consecutive prison terms if defendant were convicted of the third-
degree aggravated assault or obstruction charges. See State v. Yarbough, 100
N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).
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Realistically, however, in view of defendant's apparent lack of criminal
history,3 see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), and mental health issues, see N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(b)(4), defendant's sentencing exposure likely would be limited to
between five and seven years, subject to NERA on the applicable counts.
Therefore, when the motion judge decided the matter, defendant's confinement
had not yet exceeded his likely sentence, assuming he's convicted of a second-
degree NERA offense.
Moreover, as the motion judge found, the circumstances surrounding the
present offenses included the destruction of an apartment building, more than
$50 million in damages, and injuries to a firefighter. The judge also
acknowledged the State's emphasis on defendant's well-being and desire to assist
him in achieving rehabilitation via psychotropic medication. Based on our
review of the record, we discern no clear error in the judge's findings on the first
Sell prong and conclude the State demonstrated an important governmental
interest by clear and convincing evidence.
3
Born in November 1991, defendant was twenty-eight years old when he was
arrested for the present offenses. Although Dr. Collins's June 2023 evaluation
indicates defendant "had no prior legal history," defendant reported to Dr.
Young that he had been arrested "about 3 or 4 times."
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Turning to the second Sell prong, defendant essentially argues: (1) the
State failed to demonstrate the administration of psychotropic medication would
make it substantially likely he will regain competency (first part of prong two);
and (2) it is substantially unlikely he will experience side effects that would
interfere significantly with his ability to participate in his defense at trial (second
part of prong two).
As to the first part of prong two, the motion judge found "there is a very
real possibility" defendant "may regain competency" from the forced
administration of psychotropic medication. As the Court in Sell held, however,
the test is whether medication is "substantially likely" to render the defendant
competent. 539 U.S. at 181. In our view, "substantially likely" is more certain
than "a very real possibility." Nonetheless, the record reveals Dr. Collins opined
during a prior hospitalization, defendant had responded favorably to the
administration of Risperdal. Moreover, the State's unrefuted expert testified it
was "substantially probable" and there exists a "high likelihood" that defendant
would regain competency if prescribed Risperdal.
Given this evidence, ordinarily, we would discern no clear error in the
judge's decision that the State satisfied the first part of the second Sell prong.
However, the judge also found defendant "exhausted all other forms of
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treatment" when, as Dr. Collins acknowledged, defendant had not yet completed
LCRP. Based on the record before the motion judge, it therefore was premature
to conclude the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the
administration of psychotropic medication would make it substantially likely
defendant will regain competency.
Ordinarily, we might remand for further development of the record,
addressing whether defendant successfully completed LCRP. However, we also
part company with the judge's finding under the second part of the second Sell
prong, that is, whether the medication is "substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist
counsel in conducting a trial defense." Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. Indeed, "[w]hether
a particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with communication
with counsel, prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the
ability to express emotions are matters important in determining the
permissibility of medication to restore competence." Id. at 185 (citing Riggins,
504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
In a thoughtful concurring opinion in Riggins, Justice Kennedy made
several observations about the side effects of antipsychotic drugs:
The drugs can prejudice the accused in two principal
ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that
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will prejudice his reactions and presentation in the
courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or
unwilling to assist counsel.
It is a fundamental assumption of the adversary
system that the trier of fact observes the accused
throughout the trial, while the accused is either on the
stand or sitting at the defense table. . . . At all stages of
the proceedings, the defendant's behavior, manner,
facial expressions, and emotional responses, or their
absence, combine to make an overall impression on the
trier of fact, an impression that can have a powerful
influence on the outcome of the trial. . . .
The side effects of antipsychotic drugs may alter
demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the
defense. Serious due process concerns are implicated
when the State manipulates the evidence in this way.
....
[T]he documented probability of side effects seems to
me to render involuntary administration of the drugs by
prosecuting officials unacceptable absent a showing by
the State that the side effects will not alter the
defendant's reactions or diminish his capacity to assist
counsel.
....
Concerns about medication extend also to the issue of
cooperation with counsel. . . . The defendant must be
able to provide needed information to his lawyer and to
participate in the making of decisions on his own
behalf. The side effects of antipsychotic drugs can
hamper the attorney-client relation, preventing
effective communication and rendering the defendant
less able or willing to take part in his defense. The State
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interferes with this relation when it administers a drug
to dull cognition.
[504 U.S. at 142-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring).]
In the present matter, the motion judge generally acknowledged "all side
effects" of the medication could not be predicted. In our view, however, the
record does not demonstrate the administration of Risperdal or another
psychotropic drug will not "alter[] his demeanor in a manner that will prejudice
his reactions and presentation in the courtroom" or "render[] him unable or
unwilling to assist counsel." See id. at 142. Although Dr. Young testified
defendant's medical records revealed he had not suffered "severe side effects"
during the prior administration of Risperdal, she did not elaborate further.
Additionally, Dr. Collins opined she would "start" treatment with
Risperdal but there is no evidence in the record defendant's treating physician
would prescribe that particular drug. Regardless, Dr. Collins acknowledged
medication, such as Risperdal, could cause sedation and movement disorders
such as ticks and tremors. Beyond the potential for these side effects, however,
the record is devoid of any expert opinion concerning "how the medication is
likely to affect . . . defendant's ability to communicate with counsel, to testify,
to react rapidly to events in the trial, and to express emotions before the jury. "
R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 430; see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 185; Riggins, 504 U.S.
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at 137. Nor is there any evidence in the record concerning the effects of the
contemplated medication on defendant's "physical appearance." See R.G., 460
N.J. at 430. As we recognized in R.G., all these side effects impact "a
defendant's right to a fair trial." Ibid.
We therefore conclude the motion judge's finding on the second part of
the second Sell prong was not "plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety." Coy, 991 F.3d at 929; see also Roth, 95 N.J. at 366. Because the State
failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence it was substantially
unlikely that the side effects of antipsychotic mediation will interfere with
defendant's ability to assist his attorney and the presentation of his defense, we
conclude the State failed to satisfy the second part of the second Sell prong.
Having done so, we need not consider the remaining Sell factors.
D. Challenges to the Sell test under the New Jersey Constitution
Defendant argues our courts should reject the standards set forth in Sell
as violative of the right to be free from unwanted medical treatment under the
New Jersey Constitution. He further maintains the involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication violates his right to a fair trial under our state's
constitution and New Jersey's requirement that an individual civilly committed
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to a psychiatric hospital can only be so medicated if he is an imminent danger
to himself or others. Amici present similar constitutional arguments.
Because we conclude the State failed to shoulder its burden under the Sell
test, we do not reach the constitutional challenges to the standards established
by the United States Supreme Court. See R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 430. "As a
general rule, our courts strive to avoid reaching constitutional issues unless they
are 'imperative to the disposition of the litigation.'" Strategic Env't Partners,
LLC v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 438 N.J. Super. 125, 147 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez v. Wells, 204 N.J. 79, 96 (2010)),
aff'd, 221 N.J. 218 (2015). "A fundamental principle of judicial construction is
that courts must avoid deciding a constitutional issue if, by disposing of other
issues in the case, the constitutional question may be rendered moot." Berkley
Arms Apartment Corp. v. City of Hackensack, 6 N.J. Tax 260, 266 (Tax Ct.
1983).
Disposition of the issues in this case requires that we avoid the
constitutional questions raised. We simply add we have applied the Sell test
with defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and bodily autonomy at the
forefront.
Reversed.
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