Luisa Rodriguez v. Enrique Rodriguez ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0214-22
LUISA RODRIGUEZ, LUIS
RODRIGUEZ, and BELKYS
RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted February 14, 2024 – Decided April 15, 2024
Before Judges Currier and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Passaic County, Docket No. C-
000105-20.
Alsaidi Chang Hamdan, LLC, attorneys for appellants
(Joseph A. Chang, of counsel and on the brief; Jeffrey
M. Zajac, on the brief).
Fusco & Macaluso, PC, attorney for respondent
(Yafresie Feliz, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Luisa Rodriguez, Luis Rodriguez, and Belkys Rodriguez
(collectively referred to as plaintiffs) appeal from a September 8, 2022
Chancery Division order denying plaintiffs' request for partition of a two-
family residential home (the Property) owned in title by their brother,
defendant Enrique Rodriguez, in which their stepfather, Ceferino De La Cruz,
resides. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Bruno
Mongiardo in his oral decision issued at the conclusion of a bench trial.
I.
We derive the following salient facts on this intra-familial dispute from
the trial record and Judge Mongiardo's September 8, 2022 oral decision.
On June 30, 2020, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Enrique 1 seeking
partition of the Property in accordance with their respective interests or , in the
alternative, compelling the sale of the Property and the division of the
proceeds. Plaintiffs requested relief under theories of constructive trust and
joint venture to effectuate the alleged express intention of their mother, Jova
Dolores De La Cruz, for all of her children to hold title to the Property upon
her death.
1
Since the parties share a surname, we refer to them individually by their first
names for clarity of the record and ease of the reader. By doing so, we intend
no disrespect.
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2
On May 9 and 10, 2022, a bench trial was held at which Luisa, Belkys,
Enrique and Ceferino testified. Luisa and Belkys testified that in February
2013, Jairo De La Cruz, the parties' stepbrother, purchased the Property for
their mother, Jova, in "name only" using funds from Jova and Ceferino for the
down payment. Ceferino testified that he and Jova moved to the Property
while Jairo owned it.
In 2019, Jairo wanted to sell the Property in order to purchase another
piece of real property. Luisa testified that Jova asked family members if they
would buy the Property.
She explained that Jova and Ceferino were unable to buy the Property
because they could not obtain a mortgage due to their lack of income and poor
credit. Belkys also testified that Jova feared losing her Social Security,
Medicaid, and Medicare benefits as well as health insurance if she owned real
property in the United States.
Belkys testified that "the family" decided Enrique would purchase the
Property from Jairo and, thereafter, Jova and Ceferino asked Enrique to obtain
a mortgage because he had established credit and owned other properties . On
February 28, 2019, Enrique purchased the Property from Jairo for $225,000. It
is undisputed that only Enrique's name appears on the deed.
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Plaintiffs and Enrique each testified differently as to the source of funds
used for the down payment to purchase the Property. Luisa and Belkys
testified that Jova and Ceferino sold their home in Santiago, Dominican
Republic (the Santiago Property) to assist in the purchase of the Property from
Jairo. Belkys testified she originally owned the Santiago Property but gave the
house to her mother and Ceferino as a gift. Both Enrique and Ceferino denied
that the Santiago Property was gifted to Jova and Ceferino. Ceferino testified
regarding a 1993 deed, admitted into evidence, showing title to the Santiago
Property only in his name. Enrique testified he sold the Santiago Property for
Ceferino and Jova through execution of a power of attorney.
According to Luisa and Belkys, Jova alone received $85,000 from the
sale of the Santiago Property, and $53,000 from the proceeds was given to
Enrique to put towards the mortgage on the Property to reduce the monthly
mortgage payment. The additional $32,000 was placed into Enrique's Wells
Fargo account. Enrique testified that Ceferino provided him with $40,000 for
the down payment on the Property, which was from the sale of the Santiago
Property purchased by Ceferino and Jova.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that none of them contributed any money
towards the purchase of the Property and that Enrique is the sole obligor on the
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$168,000 mortgage. Plaintiffs do not assert they made any mortgage
payments.
Luisa testified that Jova was the landlord of the Property, rented out a
unit within the home to tenants, collected rent, paid all the bills for the
premises and made repairs whenever they were needed. She testified the rent
money paid for the mortgage. Belkys testified that Jova "was too old" to have
a bank account.
Both Jova and Ceferino lived at the Property until Jova's death on April
29, 2020.2 Ceferino continues to reside at the Property. He testified that
Enrique still owns the Property and Ceferino lives there rent free.
Luisa and Belkys testified it was Jova's intention upon her death that the
ownership of the Property be divided among Ceferino and her five children,
Luisa, Luis, Belkys, Enrique and Luce Maria, 3 with fifty percent of her share
going to Ceferino, who would have the right to live in the Property. Belkys
testified that Jova did not execute a will transferring the Property to the
children at her death because she did not own the Property in title. Luisa
testified to a document, not in evidence, signed by Jova which stated that upon
2
Jova died intestate.
3
Luce Maria was not a party to the action.
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her death the $85,000 from the sale of the Santiago Property was to be divided
among her five children.
Belkys asserted Jova wanted Enrique to sign a quitclaim deed in favor of
all the children, but he did not. Enrique testified his sibling, Luce Maria,
asked him to sign a quitclaim deed in favor of all the siblings but that was
before he purchased the Property.
Enrique said he would be willing to pay his siblings $20,000 as advance
inheritance but no agreement was reached. Luisa testified Enrique sent her a
message on WhatsApp two weeks before their mother passed away stating "he
was willing to transfer the [Property] . . . because [Enrique] [did not] want
[plaintiffs] to call [him a] thief anymore." The certified English translation of
the WhatsApp message, originally written in Spanish, was moved into
evidence. Enrique testified he only asked Luisa to consider putting Belkys'
daughter, Beliza, 4 on a quitclaim deed because Luisa said she was going to
have somebody kill him if he did not do what she wanted with the Property.
After trial was concluded, Judge Mongiardo entered a September 8, 2022
order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and denying plaintiffs'
request for partition. In his oral decision, Judge Mongiardo considered the
4
The record is inconsistent as to the spelling of Beliza's name.
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credible testimony in the record as well as the following documents in
evidence: 1) a deed for the Property; 2) Enrique's January 6, 2021 certification;
3) Ceferino's January 5, 2021 and February 8, 2022 certifications; 4) a power
of attorney, both in English and Spanish; 5) two WhatsApp audio messages;5
and 6) a deed for the Santiago Property.
After considering the evidence in the record, the court found the
following facts were undisputed: The parties are siblings, whose mother, Jova,
died intestate on April 29, 2020. Jova and Ceferino first moved into the
Property in 1993 when Jairo was the owner. At the time of her death, Jova
resided on the first floor of the Property with Ceferino, her asserted husband,
and her fifth child, Luce Maria. The sibling plaintiffs are not the biological
children of Ceferino, who has seven children from a prior marriage. Although
there is a question concerning the legality of their marriage, Jova treated
Ceferino as her husband up until her death.
Judge Mongiardo made further findings of fact based on what he found
to be credible evidence in the record: Ceferino continues to live on the first
floor of the Property, and it was Jova's express wish and desire to allow
5
The audio recordings were not provided to us. We requested counsel
provide certified transcripts for our review.
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Ceferino to live in the house until his death if she were to predecease him.
Enrique purchased the Property from Jairo for $225,000 and a February 28,
2019 deed setting forth his ownership was recorded. Jairo is Ceferino's son,
Jova's stepson and plaintiffs' stepbrother. Plaintiffs did not contribute any
money towards the purchase of the Property. Some of the funds for the
purchase of the Property came from the sale of the Santiago Property which
was titled solely to Ceferino. The net proceeds of the Santiago Property were
$80,000.
Additionally, Ceferino, the sole title holder, gave $40,000 to Enrique to
use as a down payment to purchase the Property from Jairo. The remaining
$40,000 was placed in a savings account in Enrique's name. Enrique is the
sole obligor of the $168,000 mortgage balance.
Next, Judge Mongiardo found there was no credible evidence in the
record to establish Jova was the de jure owner, de facto owner or mortgagee of
the Property since her name was not on the title, deed or mortgage when
Enrique purchased the property and there is no documentary evidence that she
paid any of the taxes or contributed to the cost of maintaining the Property.
There also was no documentary evidence to establish Jova collected rent
payments nor were there any tenants who were called as witnesses to support
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the contention she was the landlord. Judge Mongiardo concluded the down
payment for the purchase of the Property came from the sale of the Santiago
Property, which was in Ceferino's name only, and Ceferino was free to gift
money to anyone he wanted. Judge Mongiardo found that "[m]erely residing
at the premise[s] with the consent and permission of . . . defendant does not
equate or rise to the level of possession."
Judge Mongiardo found plaintiffs' proofs did not establish they are
entitled to a constructive trust in the Property. First, Judge Mongiardo
determined there was no evidence Enrique "committed a fraud or made a
mistake" and, instead, "[i]t appears that his stepfather, with the implicit
approval of his mother, facilitated the transaction where [Enrique] obtained
title to the subject property." The judge found it convincing that a portion of
the proceeds of the sale of the Santiago Property was put into a Wells Fargo
account in Enrique's name. Judge Mongiardo rejected Belkys' testimony that
this was done because their mother, at age seventy-nine, "was simply too old"
to have a bank account in her name since it "makes no sense and is not
believable."
The judge found plaintiffs did not establish any wrongdoing by Enrique.
Moreover, the judge stated, that, even if he accepted plaintiffs' allegation that
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wrongdoing occurred when Enrique refused to provide a quitclaim deed to the
property with the names of all five siblings on it, this would contradict Jova's
clear, express desire for Ceferino to live in the Property until his death.
The judge found the proofs of Jova's wishes regarding her children's
interest in the Property were "at best confusing, weak, and equivocal." Judge
Mongiardo concluded the power of attorney executed in the Dominican
Republic evidenced Jova's concern about Ceferino's seven children in addition
to her own, which contradicted the claim it was Jova's desire the Property be
jointly owned only by her five children to the exclusion of Ceferino and his
biological children. Similarly, the judge found Luisa's testimony that Jova's
last wish for one-half of the Property to belong to Ceferino was inconsistent
with plaintiffs' theory that judgment should be entered awarding them all equal
interest in the Property.
Based upon the credible trial testimony, the judge found that Luisa, who
was very close to her mother, never discussed with Enrique putting her or her
sisters' names on the deed and Luisa never discussed the prospect of death with
Jova. The judge found the WhatsApp audio recordings equivocal at best and
not determinative of Jova's wishes.
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The judge also rejected plaintiffs' theory that the real estate transactions
in 2013 and 2019, regarding the Property, were joint ventures between Jova
and Jairo, and later Jova and Enrique. Although Judge Mongiardo recognized
a joint venture can be established by inference through the conduct of the
parties under Mitchell v. Oksienik, 380 N.J. Super. 119, 129 (App. Div. 2005),
he found plaintiffs did not proffer any documentary evidence of: 1)
"contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge, skill , or
other asset to a common undertaking"; and 2) the "right of mutual control or
management of the enterprise" quoting Wittner v. Metzger, 72 N.J. Super. 438,
444 (App. Div. 1962).
The judge concluded he was presented with only the unsubstantiated
claims of two plaintiffs, who lacked credibility due to the inconsistencies as to
the history and ownership of the Santiago Property. Instead, Ceferino's
testimony that he purchased the Santiago Property was supported by the 1993
deed. Furthermore, Judge Mongiardo found that although plaintiffs testified
Jova was involved with both properties, they provided no rational explanation
as to why Jova did not have her name directly involved with either transaction.
Judge Mongiardo concluded that "[s]omething else was going on. That
something else has not been presented to the [c]ourt. There appears to be a
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lack of transparency on the part of . . . plaintiffs." Ultimately, the judge found
the only joint venture was an agreement to surreptitiously keep public entities
providing benefits to Jova, as well as the mortgage company, uninformed.
Judge Mongiardo found the discretionary remedy of partition would not
be equitable here, where plaintiffs were focused on their own interests and
totally ignored the interest of their sister, Luce Maria, an individual with
special needs who lives at the Property, and contradicted Jova's expressed
desire for Ceferino to live in the house until his death. Furthermore, the judge
found that there was nothing in the record to suggest Jova did not have the
capacity to effectuate the plan she supposedly had for her children. In ruling
in favor of Enrique and denying plaintiffs' request for partition, the judge
stated:
Looking at this case from its broadest
perspective, these parties now come before the [c]ourt
seeking judicial intervention to unravel a web of
possible secrecy and possible deceit and deception
which they helped weave. They hope that the [c]ourt
will extract from this web a clear picture of what
plaintiffs claim was their mother's intention and wish
of how she wanted to treat and care for her children.
There's nothing in the record to suggest that
their mother, Jova . . . , did not have the capacity to
set in . . . motion and put in place the plan she
supposedly had for her children. There was nothing
that prevented or impeded her [from] do[ing] so.
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The assertions of the testifying plaintiffs are
bald, bare claims and impressions without any
documentary or corroborative support. Their
testimony in many respects is self-serving, self-
centered, confusing, and non[]sensical.
This is at its core an unfortunate family dispute
where it seems all involved had little regard for
normal legal protocols and conduct.
. . . [P]laintiffs have not proven their case. They
have not proven their entitlement to the . . . exercise of
the [c]ourt's equity powers. To order a petition as
requested would do an injustice to a number of
persons, including the following non-parties[:] Luce
Maria . . . [Ceferino] . . . and the seven natural
biological children of [Ceferino].
The judge found plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence they are entitled to partition of the Property.
Judgment was entered for defendant. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue Judge Mongiardo erred in finding they did
not support their causes of action and their trial proofs established a right to
partition under New Jersey law. We disagree.
Partition is an equitable remedy allowing multiple parties to obtain an order
dividing property or compelling its sale. Newman v. Chase, 70 N.J. 254, 261
(1976); see also Greco v. Greco, 160 N.J. Super. 98, 101-02 (App. Div. 1978)
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(citing Newman, 70 N.J. at 263). Whether and how partition is ordered is within
the discretion of the court since "the statutory language is permissive rather than
mandatory." Greco, 160 N.J. Super. at 101-03 (quoting Newman, 70 N.J. at 263).
The "[g]eneral rules governing burden[s] of proof apply in [a] partition action[]."
Swartz v. Becker, 246 N.J. Super. 406, 411 (App. Div. 1991).
Where partition is established, Rule 4:63-1 allows real estate to be
divided if it would not result in great prejudice, otherwise the court may direct
a sale of the property. The sale of property in lieu of partition is statutorily
authorized under N.J.S.A. 2A:56-2, which sets forth that when the partition of
real property would be impracticable or impossible, courts "may . . . direct the
sale thereof if it appears that a partition thereof cannot be made without great
prejudice to the owners, or persons interested therein."
We apply a deferential standard to our review of the factual findings of
the trial judge. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 594-95 (2020). "Reviewing
appellate courts should 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were
'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"
Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms
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Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We give
deference to findings of fact particularly because the judge has an "opportunity
to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand." Balducci, 240 N.J. at
595.
We review questions of law de novo. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239
N.J. 531, 552 (2019). "[A] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences flowing from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Ibid. (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
We first address plaintiffs' argument they are entitled to a constructive
trust affording them equal ownership interests in the Property. "[A]
constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial
interest[,] equity converts him into a trustee." Flanigan v. Munson, 175 N.J.
597, 608 (2003) (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Expl. Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380
(N.Y. 1919)).
Plaintiffs must satisfy a two-prong test to establish the imposition of a
constructive trust is appropriate. Ibid. First, the proofs must establish one of
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the parties "committed 'a wrongful act.'" Ibid. (quoting D'Ippolito v. Castoro,
51 N.J. 584, 589 (1968)). "The act, however, need not be fraudulent to result
in a constructive trust; a mere mistake is sufficient for these purposes." Ibid.The second prong requires proof the wrongful or mistaken act resulted in
a property transfer that unjustly enriched a party. Ibid. See Stewart v. Harris
Structural Steel Co., Inc, 198 N.J. Super. 255, 266 (App. Div. 1984); Carr v.
Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 352 (1990). "[U]njust enrichment rests on the equitable
principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of
another." Goldsmith v. Camden Cnty. Surrogate's Off., 408 N.J. Super. 376,
382 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Assocs. Com. Corp. v. Wallia, 211 N.J. Super.
231, 243 (App. Div. 1986)). A plaintiff seeking the imposition of a
constructive trust must show proof defendant has received a benefit and
retention of that benefit would be unjust. Ibid.Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing Enrique obtained title
to the Property through fraud or mistake and have not demonstrated he would
be unjustly enriched by remaining the sole owner of the property . It is
undisputed Enrique, alone, is and has been financially responsible for the
carrying costs of the Property. The proofs at trial established that Enrique had
express approval from Ceferino, and implicit approval from Jova, to title the
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Property in his name, as corroborated by the proceeds of the sale of the
Santiago Property being placed in Enrique's bank account. Thus, the judge's
finding Enrique did not own the Property by way of a wrongful act or mistake
is supported by evidence in the record.
The evidence adduced at trial supports the judge's conclusion that
Enrique would not be unjustly enriched by retaining title to the Property.
Plaintiffs do not dispute they have not contributed any money towards the
purchase of the property, or paid the carrying costs including mortgage and
taxes. We decline to disturb the judge's factual finding that Enrique alone bore
the responsibility for paying the carrying costs of the property and is the
obligor under the mortgage.
We reject the suggestion that granting partition of the Property based
upon constructive trust would be consistent with Jova's intentions. Judge
Mongiardo found plaintiffs' evidence of Jova's wishes as to title to the Property
to be weak, at best. Belkys testified Jova wanted Enrique to sign a quitclaim
deed to include his other four siblings on the title to the property. However,
Belkys also testified at another point in the trial that it was Jova's intention to
divide the Property between Ceferino and her five children. The judge also
found that the proofs regarding Jova's intentions were further muddled by a
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power of attorney executed in the Dominican Republic in which she expressed
concern for Ceferino's seven biological children. Based upon the credible trial
testimony, Judge Mongiardo could only conclude that Jova expressly wanted
Ceferino to live on the Property after her death, which is contrary to plaintiffs'
request for the Property to be partitioned and sold. We see no error in the trial
court's conclusion.
III.
Next, we address plaintiffs' argument the judge erred in failing to find
there was a joint venture sufficient to compel a partition and sale of the
Property. A joint venture is one in which two or more people engage in an
undertaking together for the purpose of making money or generating a profit.
Wittner, 72 N.J. Super. at 444. The joint venture is not created by law, but
rather expressly or impliedly assumed by the parties. Id. at 443.
Parties may enter into formal agreements for a joint enterprise to exist,
but that is not necessary, because a "joint enterprise can be . . . inferred from
the conduct of the parties." Mitchell, 380 N.J. Super. at 129. Under prevailing
law, the following factors are relevant considerations in determining whether a
joint venture is established:
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(A) A contribution by the parties of money, property,
effort, knowledge, skill or other asset to a common
undertaking;
(B) A joint property interest in the subject matter of
the venture;
(C) A right of mutual control or management of the
enterprise;
(D) Expectation of profit, or the presence of
"adventure," as it is sometimes called;
(E) A right to participate in the profits;
(F) Most usually, limitation of the objective to a single
undertaking or ad hoc enterprise.
[Wittner, 72 N.J. Super at 444 (italicization omitted)
(quoting 2 Williston on Contracts § 318A, at pp. 563-
65 (3d. ed. 1959)).]
Plaintiffs assert they established the elements of a joint venture between
Jova and Enrique through "(1) a contribution by the parties of money,
property, effort, knowledge, skill or other asset to a common undertaking; and
(2) a right of mutual control or management in the enterprise." We are
unconvinced the trial record supports plaintiffs' contentions.
The trial proofs did not establish Jova ever held a joint ownership
interest in the Property either in title or through equity and, thus, she had no
right of mutual control or management. The judge found "there [was] no
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credible evidence in the record to establish that Jova . . . was either the de jure
or de facto owner of the subject property." Our review of the proofs in the
record reveals no basis to disturb Judge Mongiardo's factual findings and legal
conclusion that Jova never had a joint equitable or legal interest in the
property.
Further, no documentary evidence was presented to confirm Jova acted
as a landlord for the Property or contributed monetarily to its carrying costs in
furtherance of a joint venture. We decline to disturb Judge Mongiardo's
rejection of the explanation as to why Jova did not have a bank account.
Conversely, Enrique credibly established he alone paid the mortgage, taxes
and maintenance on the Property.
Finally, plaintiffs did not establish by the preponderance of the credible
evidence that Jova and Enrique formed a joint venture based upon contribution
of funds comprising the down payment for the Property. The parties do not
dispute that the sale proceeds from the Santiago Property were used for the
down payment for purchase of the Property. Based on the proofs in the trial
record, we decline to disturb Judge Mongiardo's finding that Ceferino's funds
alone comprised the down payment for the Property. The judge found
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Ceferino's testimony that he purchased the Santiago Property in 1993 to be
credible and corroborated by the deed.
We see no error in the judge's conclusion that plaintiffs' testimony
regarding the ownership and sale of the Santiago Property, used in part for the
down payment for the Property, was inconsistent. Luisa testified the Santiago
Property originally belonged to Ceferino and was then transferred to Belkys.
Belkys contradicted this testimony and asserted she purchased the home in the
Dominican Republic in 1997. At one point Belkys testified she transferred the
Santiago Property to Ceferino and her mother in 2010, but later testified she
transferred the Santiago Property only to Ceferino.
Since plaintiffs did not establish Jova's ownership of the Santiago
Property, Judge Mongiardo's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to establish Jova 's
funds were used for the down payment is supported by the credible evidence in
the record. The failure to establish ownership of the funds comprising the
down payment, coupled with the lack of credible proofs as to any other
contribution towards the Property, was fatal to plaintiffs' joint venture theory.
Affirmed.
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