State of New Jersey v. Christopher W. Heddy ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0299-22
A-0300-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER W. HEDDY,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN M. LAFOLLETTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted February 28, 2024 – Decided April 9, 2024
Before Judges Accurso and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Sussex County, Indictment No. 21-02-0026.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant Christopher W. Heddy (Brian P. Keenan,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant Stephen M. LaFollette (Morgan A. Birck,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
Carolyn Murray, Acting Sussex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Shaina Brenner, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
In these back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of
issuing a single opinion, defendants Christopher W. Heddy and Steven M.
LaFollette appeal from an order denying their motions for entry into the pre-trial
intervention (PTI) program and subsequent convictions. LaFollette also
contends his sentence was excessive. Agreeing with the trial court that the
prosecutor's rejection of defendants' PTI applications was not a gross and patent
abuse of discretion and discerning no error in LaFollette's sentence, we affirm.
I.
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During a warranted search of the home defendants shared, 1 law-
enforcement officers seized various electronic devices, including at least one
computer and several external hard drives. Those devices collectively contained
hundreds of thousands of images depicting the sexual exploitation or sexual
abuse of children, including images of children engaged in sexual intercourse.
On October 8, 2019, defendants were arrested and charged in complaint-
warrants with second-degree child endangerment ("possessing over one-hundred
(100) images depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor on a computer or
device that also had a peer-to-peer/file sharing network on it"), in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii), and third-degree child endangerment
("knowingly possessing over one-hundred (100) images depicting the sexual
exploitation of a minor on an external hard drive"), in violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(iii).
LaFollette submitted a PTI application dated October 31, 2019. A
probation officer recommended he be admitted into the program. The State
disagreed and denied his application, explaining its reasons for doing so in a
letter submitted pursuant to Rule 3:28-9. The State indicated PTI was
"presumptively inappropriate" for LaFollette because he was "subject to a
1
LaFollette was the boyfriend of Heddy's mother, who died in 2007.
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presumption of incarceration in light of his pending charges ." The State also
noted he had "prior charges from California with an unknown disposition" and
found his "attitude suggest[ed] a lack of remorse or regret." The State cited
paragraphs one through three, five through eight, ten, fourteen, and seventeen
of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) as weighing against his admission into PTI. The State
asserted LaFollette's "possession of a cache of illicit and illegal images that he
carefully organized and curated at home" was "not to be considered one of the
'victimless crimes' typically found to be appropriate for PTI."
On November 14, 2019, Heddy submitted a PTI application, which
included a letter from his counsel "set[ting] forth the compelling reasons that
justify consideration of his PTI application without the consent of the
prosecutor." She included information about his age (thirty-eight years), the
lack of any prior arrests or convictions, his family life, the early death of his
parents, his cooperation with law-enforcement officials, his lack of contact with
the children depicted in the videos and lack of participation in the creation of
the videos, and his willingness to apply for his GED, become employed, obtain
a medical evaluation, follow treatment recommendations, and accept reasonable
restrictions on his use of computers in the future. The State denied Heddy's
application, setting forth the reasons for its denial in a letter submitted pursuant
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to Rule 3:28-9(a). The State found PTI was "presumptively inappropriate" for
Heddy because his pending charges had a presumption of incarceration. The
State cited paragraphs one through three, five through eight, ten, and fourteen
of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) as weighing against his admission into PTI.
Defendants appealed in the Law Division the State's denials of their PTI
applications. In his submission to the Law Division, LaFollette faulted the State
for "attempt[ing] to cast a negative light on [him], but omit[ting] nearly all of
[his] history and character." He highlighted his recent acceptance into a
counseling program, the assistance he had given to Heddy and others, his history
of deep vein thrombosis and blood clots, a 2002 work-related injury, the
financial support he had received from others, and that he had not participated
in making child pornography.
In his submission to the Law Division, Heddy identified "personal
problems which may have led [him] to commit the crimes," describing them as
"factors which led to his having too much time on his hands, resulting in this
offense": the early death of his father, his withdrawal from high school, and the
financial support he has received, which enabled him to remain jobless.
Referencing the State's assertion his crime was not "victimless," Heddy stated
he "had no involvement in procuring or posting the images he accessed" and had
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not met the children depicted in those images. He noted his eye issues and recent
diagnosis of high blood pressure and made the unsupported contention he "is
likely suffering from a diagnosable mental health condition . . . leading to the
commission of the crime." Heddy disputed the State's conclusion he had
exhibited a pattern of anti-social behavior, asserting "[w]hat he was doing was
exhibiting a pattern of behavior of a person who lacked sufficient social
stimulation and other worthwhile outlets for his talents." Heddy characterized
as "weak" the State's reliance on factor fourteen.
During argument, Judge Louis S. Sceusi summarized the facts set forth
before him, including that approximately 100,000 "alleged images and videos
depicting the alleged sexual exploitation of minors [had been] recovered from
the hard drives located in [defendants'] residence." Defense counsel did not
dispute that statement. The assistant prosecutor stated, "defendants had
hundreds of thousands of images of child porn on their computers," "there is
damage that has occurred to these victims," and Heddy had "[sought] out over
an extended period of time vast amounts of child porn." Defense counsel did
not dispute those assertions. Heddy's counsel described defendants as two
people who "just had too much time on their hands." LaFollette's counsel
disputed her client was "a violent individual" but emphasized she was "not
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arguing this was a victimless crime" and acknowledged, "this is a serious offense
. . . [a]nd having [these images] and sharing them . . . does have a tendency to
perpetuate the continual making of [child pornography]."
On June 25, 2020, Judge Sceusi entered an order denying defendants'
appeal of the State's rejection of their PTI applications. In a comprehensive
written opinion, the judge found neither defendant had proved by clear and
convincing evidence the State's decision to deny their applications was a patent
and gross abuse of discretion.
On February 4, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment charging
LaFollette and Heddy with "knowingly possess[ing], view[ing], or hav[ing]
under his control . . . 100,000 or more items depicting the sexual exploitation or
abuse of a child," a first-degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i); and
"knowingly stor[ing] or maintain[ing] an item depicting the sexual exploitation
or abuse of a child using a file-sharing program which is designated as available
for searching by or copying to one or more other computers," a second-degree
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii). The indictment also charged
LaFollette with "knowingly distribut[ing] items depicting the sexual
exploitation or abuse of a child," a second-degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
4(b)(5)(a)(i), and "knowingly possess[ing] items depicting the sexual
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exploitation or abuse of a child with the intent to distribute the items," a second-
degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(ii).
Pursuant to negotiated plea agreements in which the State agreed to
recommend ten-year prison sentences subject to Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1
to -19, and other conditions and to dismiss the remaining counts of the
indictment, defendants pleaded guilty to first-degree endangering the welfare of
children, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)(i). At his plea hearing,
LaFollette admitted he knowingly had possessed a computer and other devices
that contained almost half a million images and videos showing children
involved in sexual activity, including intercourse. At his plea hearing, Heddy
admitted he knowingly had possessed electronic devices containing
approximately 294,000 images depicting the sexual exploitation or abuse of a
child, including images and videos of children engaging in sexual intercourse.
At the sentencing hearings, each defense counsel asked the sentencing
judge to reduce the degree of the crime and impose a sentence not to exceed five
years. The State asked the judge to sentence defendants in accordance with the
plea agreement. LaFollette under oath acknowledged and agreed with a finding
contained in "the Avenel Report" that he was "a repetitive and compulsive
violator when it comes to child pornography." Discussing a letter LaFollette
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had sent to the judge, defense counsel said LaFollette had written he "had been
struggling with [his child pornography addiction] for a long time ."
The judge denied defendants' requests to lower the degree of their crimes.
He found aggravating factors three (risk defendant will commit another offense),
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and nine (need to deter the defendant and others from
violating the law), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), and mitigating factor seven
("defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a
law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the
present offense"), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The judge sentenced each defendant
to a ten-year term of imprisonment and imposed $4,955 in assessments and
penalties. The judge also ordered defendants be placed on parole supervision
for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, register as sex offenders, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2, and
forfeit all devices seized.
On appeal, Heddy challenges the prosecutor's rejection of his PTI
application, arguing:
THE PROSECUTOR'S REJECTION OF
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION INTO THE PRE-
TRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM WAS AN
ARBITRARY, PATENT, AND GROSS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHICH MUST BE CORRECTED BY
THIS COURT.
In addition to making that same argument, LaFollette challenges his sentence:
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THE SENTENCE IS EXCESSIVE WHERE THE
TRIAL COURT DOUBLE COUNTED, RELIED ON
FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO FIND
MITIGATING FACTORS SUPPORTED BY FACTS
IN THE RECORD.
Unpersuaded by those arguments, we affirm.
II.
"PTI is a 'diversionary program through which certain offenders are able
to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected
to deter future criminal behavior.'" State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 16 (2023)
(quoting State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). "[T]he primary purpose of
PTI has been 'to assist in the rehabilitation of worthy defendants, and, in the
process, to spare them the rigors of the criminal justice system.'" Id. at 17
(quoting State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 513 (2008)). "PTI eligibility has been
broadly defined, subject to specified exclusions, to 'include[ ] all defendants who
demonstrate the will to effect necessary behavioral change such that society can
have confidence that they will not engage in future criminality.'" Ibid. (quoting
Watkins, 193 N.J. at 513). The State "may consider a wide array of factors when
determining whether to recommend someone for PTI," including "'[t]he nature
of the offense,' the motivations of the defendant, the desires of the victim or
complainant with respect to prosecution, the social harm perpetrated by the
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defendant, and '[t]he extent to which the applicant's crime constitutes part of a
continuing pattern of anti-social behavior.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
12(e)).
"[W]hether to admit a particular defendant into PTI has been treated as a
fundamental prosecutorial function." Id. at 18. Accordingly, courts afford
prosecutors "broad discretion" in determining whether a defendant should be
diverted into PTI, "[f]irst, because it is the fundamental responsibility of the
prosecutor to decide whom to prosecute, and second, because it is a primary
purpose of PTI to augment, not diminish, a prosecutor’s options." State v. Chen,
465 N.J. Super. 274, 284 (App. Div. 2020) (first quoting State v. K.S., 220 N.J.
190, 199 (2015); and then quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246).
Given that broad discretion, "our review of a prosecutor's denial of a PTI
application is 'severely limited.'" State v. E.R., 471 N.J. Super. 234, 244-45
(App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003)). "Judicial
review of a prosecutor's decision about PTI admission is 'available to check only
the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness.'" Gomes, 253 N.J. at
18 (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977)). "[T]o overturn a
prosecutor's decision to exclude a defendant from the program the defendant
must 'clearly and convincingly' show that the decision was a 'patent and gross
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abuse of . . . discretion.'" K.S., 220 N.J. at 200 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146
N.J. 576, 582 (1996)). A patent and gross abuse of discretion occurs when "the
[PTI] denial: '(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors,
(b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c)
amounted to a clear error in judgment.'" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555, 563
(App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)). Because
"[i]ssues concerning the propriety of the prosecutor's consideration of a
particular [PTI] factor are akin to 'questions of law,'" we review those legal
determinations de novo. E.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 245 (quoting State v. Denman,
449 N.J. Super. 369, 376 (App. Div. 2017) (alterations in the original)).
In determining whether a defendant should be diverted into PTI, a
prosecutor must make an "individualized assessment of the defendant," State v.
Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621-22 (2015), based on the defendant's "amenability
to correction" and potential "responsiveness to rehabilitation," Watkins, 193
N.J. at 520 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(b)). In making that assessment,
prosecutors must consider seventeen non-exclusive factors listed in N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(e) and additional factors regarding the nature of the offense set forth
in Rule 3:28-4(b)(1). E.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 246; RSI Bank v. Providence Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 473 n.4 (2018). The weight given to those factors
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is left to the prosecutor's discretion. Wallace, 146 N.J. at 585-86. A court
presumes a prosecutor considered "all relevant factors" when making a PTI
determination unless the defendant demonstrates otherwise. Id. at 584.
On appeal, Heddy asserts that "[a]s a non-violent, first-time offender who
expressed an attitude conducive to rehabilitation, [he] should have been afforded
the opportunity for reform through the PTI program." Specifically addressing
the factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), Heddy contends the State
inappropriately found as weighing against his admission into PTI factor six
("likelihood that the applicant's crime is related to a condition or situation that
would be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory
treatment") because he never had a job, factor eight ("extent to which the
applicant's crime constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social
behavior") based on the present offenses, and factor ten ("whether or not the
crime is of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or
in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior") "based on the notion
that the possessory offenses here constituted acts of violence." Heddy also
asserts the State failed to demonstrate factor ten because "there is no evidence
[he] did anything to support the marketplace [for child pornography]." Heddy
argues the State's rejection of his PTI application "constituted a patent and gross
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abuse of discretion" because its "predominant focus . . . was the nature and facts
of the offenses."
LaFollette "recognizes that he had accumulated a great number of images
and videos" but criticizes the State's decision for "seem[ing] to be solely based
on this fact, failing to take into consideration important factors and relying on
assumptions not based [o]n facts [i]n the record." He faults the State for
"plac[ing] too much emphasis on the offense itself" and for failing to adequately
consider his remorse and "other factors relevant to his amenability to
rehabilitation," including his efforts since his arrest to seek help and attend
therapy, the medical conditions that purportedly prevented him from being
employed, his care for ill loved ones, and the trauma he experienced from their
deaths. LaFollette argues the State erred in considering factor eight because his
offense did not itself demonstrate a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior
and factor ten because his offense was not a crime of violence. He asserts the
State's "emphasis on the details of the offense and how the public would view
[his] admission to PTI" was a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
We agree with Judge Sceusi; neither defendant proved by clear and
convincing evidence the State's decision to deny his PTI application was a patent
and gross abuse of discretion. Defendants did not demonstrate the State failed
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to consider or to consider adequately the applicable factors. See Wallace, 146
N.J. at 584 (finding a court presumes the State considered "all relevant factors"
when making a PTI determination unless the defendant demonstrates otherwise).
The State in its denial letters explicitly stated it had reviewed "all discovery
related to the matter," "defendant's PTI application," defense counsel's letter in
support of the application, "the PTI Recommendation report," and "the
applicable factors for admission into the Program and the statutory criteria set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) through (17)." The State then identified and
described the factors it believed weighed against defendants' admission into PTI.
A prosecutor is not required to "provide a defendant with a detailed report
outlining every step taken en route to his [or her PTI ] decision." State v. Waters,
439 N.J. Super. 215, 234 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110,
117 (1979)). "At a minimum, the prosecutor 'should note the factors present in
defendant's background or the offense purportedly committed which led [the
prosecutor] to conclude that admission should be denied.'" Ibid. (alteration in
original) (quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 249). Here, the State met that minimum
by stating the reasons why defendants' applications were rejected with enough
"specificity so that defendant[s] ha[d] a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
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that they are unfounded." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 249 (quoting State v. Maddocks,
80 N.J. 98, 109 (1979)).
That the State gave more weight to the nature of the offense and facts of
defendants' cases than to factors defendants emphasize was within the State's
discretion. And in relying on the nature of defendants' offenses and facts of
their cases, the State did nothing wrong. The State did not make a blanket
declaration that because defendants were consumers of child pornography, they
could not participate in PTI. Instead, the State considered expressly the
particular facts of the cases and specific information about defendants, thereby
fulfilling its obligation to make an "individualized assessment[]." State v.
Johnson, 238 N.J. 119, 127 (2019).
As to the individual factors referenced by defendants on appeal, the State
did not abuse its discretion in weighing factor six against Heddy's admission.
As Judge Sceusi found, Heddy had not provided any "medical proof" or
"medically-verified mental health diagnosis" demonstrating he had a "condition
that would be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory
treatment," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(6). And given that Heddy had not participated
in school through graduation, had not participated in a GED program, and had
not participated in any job, the State reasonably concluded the record contained
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"little evidence" to support his ability to participate successfully in a
rehabilitative program. LaFollette also failed to provide medical proof he had a
condition that would be "conducive to change through his participation in
supervisory treatment." The State acted within its discretion in declining to find
LaFollette's post-arrest remorse or enrollment in therapy overcame the
presumption against admission or outweighed other factors disfavoring
admission.
Defendants fault the State for considering defendants' actions as
"continuing pattern[s] of anti-social behavior" under factor eight, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(e)(8). When they submitted their PTI applications and when Judge
Sceusi considered their appeals, defendants had been charged with knowingly
possessing over one hundred images depicting the sexual exploitation of a
minor. During argument on their appeal before Judge Sceusi, defendants did
not dispute the State's contention that they, in fact, possessed hundreds of
thousands of images of child pornography – a multiple of a thousand of the
threshold number required for the crimes for which they had been charged.
Heddy's counsel did not dispute the State's assertion he had "[sought] out over
an extended period of time vast amounts of child porn." On that record, we
perceive no abuse of discretion in the State's consideration of factor eight.
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Defendants contend the State inappropriately considered factor ten,
arguing their crimes did not include an act of violence. Under factor ten,
however, the "assaultive or violent nature" of the crime is not determined solely
based on "the criminal act itself" but also on "the possible injurious
consequences of such behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(10).
During argument before Judge Sceusi, LaFollette's counsel made clear she
was "not arguing this was a victimless crime," acknowledged "this is a serious
offense," and conceded "having [these images] and sharing them . . . does have
a tendency to perpetuate the continual making of it." Heddy's assertion that the
record contains "no evidence Heddy did anything to support the [child
pornography] marketplace" is belied by the undisputed fact he had spent an
extended period of time seeking out and retaining "vast amounts of child porn."
His contention that "[d]ownloading, storing, and viewing such images does
nothing to fuel the market for them" is unsupported and flies in the face of logic.
The direct victims of defendants' crimes are the children depicted in the
hundreds of thousands of images in their possession, children who were
subjected to sexual abuse for the creation of the child pornography obtained and
retained by defendants and other consumers and purveyors for their own sexual
gratification. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the State's consideration of
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factor ten. The "assaultive or violent nature" of defendants' crimes are
demonstrated by "the possible injurious consequences" of those crimes: the
sexual assault of the children used to create those images. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
12(e)(10).
LaFollette also appeals his sentence. We review a trial court's sentencing
decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Konecny, 250 N.J. 321,
334 (2022). We do "not substitute [our] judgment for that of the sentencing
court." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). We apply the deferential
standard so long as the sentencing court "follow[ed] the Code and the basic
precepts that channel sentencing discretion." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65
(2014); see also State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020). Thus, we affirm a
sentence "unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating
and mitigating factors found were not 'based upon competent credible evidence
in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case
makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.'"
State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297-98 (2021) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,
364-65 (1984)). The same standard applies to sentences "result[ing] from guilty
pleas, including those guilty pleas that are entered as part of a plea agreement."
State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 292 (1987); see also Rivera, 249 N.J. at 297-98
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(applying abuse-of-discretion standard to review sentence imposed based on
guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement).
On appeal, LaFollette argues the sentencing judge erred in finding
aggravating factor three while giving less weight to mitigating factor seven.
LaFollette contends the judge's conclusion defendant had been downloading and
viewing child pornography for a long time was unsupported and the judge
engaged in improper "double counting." LaFollette also faults the sentencing
judge for failing to find mitigating factors eight ("defendant's conduct was the
result of circumstances unlikely to recur") and nine (defendant's "character and
attitude . . . indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense").
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) and (9).
The sentencing judge concluded aggravating factor three applied because
he concluded "there is a serious and significant risk of re-offense . . . when we
are talking about hundreds of thousands of children who have been molested and
seriously harmed in the making of child pornography images that the defendant
had such an overwhelming appetite to draw on."
In finding mitigating factor seven applied but giving it "minimal weight,"
the judge acknowledged LaFollette had "led a law abiding life for [a] substantial
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period of time prior to the commission of the present offense" but "life
experience, logic, common sense" and
statements from the defendant about how and when he
became in involved in this as his life began to spiral
downward from the other events that he had described
convince[d] the court that [defendant] was engaging in
this activity for a substantial period of time prior to
actually being arrested for the offense and thus why he
was not . . . carrying on a law abiding life for a
substantial period of time; he in fact was engaging in
child pornography for an extended period of time but
just hadn't been caught.
In rejecting mitigating factor eight, the judge noted defendant voluntarily
had begun to participate in mental-health counseling "not too long after his
arrest" but concluded defendant's level of addiction and acknowledged inability
to control it prevented the judge from finding mitigating factor eight applied.
The judge found mitigating factor nine did not apply for the same reasons and
given "the sheer volume of the material that was located on the defendant's
computer."
Unlike the defendant's sentence in Case, 220 N.J. at 54, LaFollette's
sentence was not based on "unfounded assumptions." The judge's conclusion
LaFollette had been downloading and viewing child pornography for a long time
has ample support in the record, including his own admissions. At his plea
hearing, LaFollette admitted he knowingly had possessed a computer and other
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devices that contained almost half a million images and videos showing children
involved in sexual activity. At his sentencing hearing, LaFollette agreed with
the finding that he was "a repetitive and compulsive violator when it comes to
child pornography," and his counsel stated LaFollette had admitted in a letter to
the sentencing judge he "had been struggling with [his child pornography
addiction] for a long time."
On that record, we find support for the judge's findings and perceive no
abuse of discretion or legal error in the sentencing judge's findings regarding
aggravating factors three and nine and mitigating factors seven through nine, no
"double-counting," and no basis to disturb the sentence the judge imposed
pursuant to the parties' agreement. Accordingly, we affirm LaFollette's
sentence.
To the extent we have not otherwise commented on them, we have duly
considered defendants' other arguments and conclude they lack sufficient merit
to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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