Dcpp v. E.K. and C.D., in the Matter of the Guardianship of K.L.D. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3437-22
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
E.K.,
Defendant,
and
C.D.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF K.L.D.,
a minor.
__________________________
Submitted April 9, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
No. FG-15-0014-22.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Louis W. Skinner, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Lisa J. Rusciano, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock,
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant C.D.1 is the biological father of K.L.D., born in June 2020.
Defendant appeals from the June 22, 2023 judgment of guardianship terminating
his parental rights to the child. 2 Defendant contends the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A.
1
We refer to the parties and the child by initials to protect their privacy. R.
1:38-3(d)(12).
2
E.K., who is K.L.D.'s biological mother, voluntarily surrendered her parental
rights to K.L.D. to the child's resource parent on February 1, 2023.
A-3437-22
2
30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence. The Law Guardian supports
the termination on appeal as it did before the trial court.
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that
the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the
decision to terminate defendant's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm
substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Deborah Hanlon-Schron in her
thorough oral decision rendered on June 22, 2023.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's interactions with
defendant and K.L.D. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings
and legal conclusions contained in Judge Hanlon-Schron's decision. We add the
following brief comments.
The guardianship petition was tried before Judge Hanlon-Schron over the
course of four days. The Division presented overwhelming evidence of
defendant's parental unfitness and established, by clear and convincing
evidence, all four statutory prongs outlined in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). In her
thoughtful opinion, Judge Hanlon-Schron concluded that termination of
defendant's parental rights was in the child's best interests, and fully explained
the basis for each of her determinations. In this appeal, our review of the judge's
decision is limited. We defer to her expertise as a Family Court judge, Cesare
A-3437-22
3
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings
so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth
& Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of
J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).
Applying these principles, we conclude that Judge Hanlon-Schron's
factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her
legal conclusions are unassailable. We have duly considered, and reject,
defendant's arguments that his parental rights were terminated because of his
poverty and other inappropriate factors, and that the Division failed to offer him
reasonable services or consider kinship legal guardianship as an alternative. To
the contrary, the trial judge relied on appropriate considerations, including the
Division's repeated efforts to provide services and K.L.D.'s need for
permanency.
David Brandwein, Psy.D., an expert psychologist, diagnosed defendant
with an unspecified bipolar and related disorder, a moderate cannabis use
disorder, and adult antisocial behavior.3 Brandwein opined that these
conditions, coupled with defendant's refusal to engage in services, prevented
3
Defendant did not call any experts to rebut Brandwein's testimony.
A-3437-22
4
defendant from serving as an independent caregiver for K.L.D. Brandwein
explained:
[Defendant] is a poor candidate to provide his child
permanency in the foreseeable future. The Division has
provided services to [defendant], which [defendant] has
not fully complied with and has not fully benefitted
from. And . . . I don't see that changing [for six]
months, [twelve] months, [eighteen] months, [twenty-
four] months, I don't see that changing.
Unfortunately, you know, for [K.L.D.], his
understanding of time is not our understanding of time.
[Seventeen] or [eighteen] months probably isn't a long
time for us, but for a child, it's glacial time. So, you
know, to keep [K.L.D.] in limbo when there's already a
pattern of behavior that's been observed and
documented, that's not best for [K.L.D.]
Children are entitled to a permanent, safe and secure home. We
acknowledge "the need for permanency of placements by placing limits on the
time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation of reuniting with the
child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App.
Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly focuses on a child's need for
permanency, the emphasis has "shifted from protracted efforts for reunification
with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to promote the child's
well-being." Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1). That is because "[a] child
cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents.
A-3437-22
5
Children have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and
stable placement." Ibid.The question then is "whether the parent can become fit in time to meet
the needs of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J.
Super. 235, 263 (App. Div. 2005); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 512 (2004) (indicating that even if a parent is trying to
change, a child cannot wait indefinitely). After carefully considering the
evidence, Judge Hanlon-Schron reasonably determined that defendant was
unable to parent K.L.D. and would not be able to do so for the foreseeable future.
Under those circumstances, we agree with the judge that any further delay of
permanent placement would not be in the child's best interests.
Affirmed.
A-3437-22
6