E.D.L.R. v. R.R v. r. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1067-22
E.D.L.R.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
R.R.V.-R.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted February 7, 2024 – Decided April 24, 2024
Before Judges Currier and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FV-09-2107-21.
Michael F. Wiseberg, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
1
We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of these
proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
After remand, defendant appeals from the final restraining order (FRO)
entered against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:25-17 to -35. Following our review of the first appeal, we affirmed the
court's finding of the predicate act of harassment but remanded for the court "to
provide a more comprehensive statement of [its] findings of fact and conclusions
of law as to whether plaintiff needs an FRO for her protection under the second
prong of Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126 (App. Div. 2006)." E.D.L.R.
v. R.R.V.-R., No. A-0074-21 (App. Div. Oct. 6, 2022) (slip op. at 2)
(italicization omitted).
On remand, the court issued a comprehensive oral decision on November
3, 2022, concluding plaintiff required an FRO for her protection and entering an
FRO. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the court in its
November 3, 2022 decision.
The facts are established in our first opinion, and we need not repeat them
at length here. Essentially, the parties were in a dating relationship and after it
ended, plaintiff moved out of defendant's apartment. We stated:
Plaintiff testified after their relationship ended,
defendant would call her on the phone "[s]even, eight
times a day," and sometimes she answered the phone.
Defendant told plaintiff that she "couldn't drop him,"
and he insulted her by calling her "stupid," "dumb," and
"a b-tch." On some occasions, defendant would say to
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plaintiff she "could not leave him" and she would "be
sorry if [she] did, that he was going to make [her] life
impossible." Plaintiff submitted records of the phone
calls and text messages into evidence corroborating her
testimony, including the screenshot of defendant
kissing another woman that he sent to [plaintiff's niece].
Plaintiff testified she is "very afraid to go outside on
[her] own" and that she is "fearful" for her life.
[Id. at 5-6 (all but second and second to last alterations
in original).]
The trial court found that the repeated phone calls and the photograph
"show[] that . . . [d]efendant acted with [a] purpose to harass . . . [p]laintiff." Id.
at 7 (all but first alterations in original). Therefore, the court found "defendant
committed the predicate act of harassment." Ibid. However, the court did not
provide detailed findings as to why plaintiff required an FRO for her protection.
On remand, the court considered the statutory factors under N.J.S.A.
2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6) and made additional findings of facts and conclusions of
law. The court stated that "given the prior history, abusive communications, and
ongoing escalating threats, [it found] that the second prong of Silver [wa]s
satisfied and there [wa]s an immediate danger to plaintiff, and there exists a need
for an FRO to prevent future acts of abuse."
In this appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in its Silver analysis and
in entering the FRO. We disagree.
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In reviewing a court's decision to grant or deny an FRO, "we accord great
deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges," Milne v.
Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012), in recognition "of the
family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." N.J. Div. of
Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v.
Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "[F]indings by the trial court are binding on
appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare,
154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65
N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and
the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 26 (2014) (quoting
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995)).
The entry of a domestic violence restraining order requires a trial court to
make certain findings. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-28. The court "must
determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible
evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 -
19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125 (italicization omitted); see, e.g., N.J.S.A.
2C:25-19(a)(2). If a trial court finds a defendant has committed a predicate act
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of domestic violence, it next must determine if a restraining order is needed for
the victim's protection. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126.
As stated, in the first appeal, we did not disturb the trial court's finding
that defendant committed the predicate act of harassment. Our review of the
remand proceeding reflects the court thoroughly reviewed the facts and its
credibility determinations, and concluded plaintiff needed an FRO for her
safety. We are satisfied the court had a sufficient basis to conclude that an FRO
was appropriate and necessary in this case. Given the particular expertise of
Family Part judges, it is not our place to second-guess an exercise of discretion
to enter an FRO when supported by "adequate, substantial, credible evidence,"
as was present here. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12.
Affirmed.
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