Greenbriar Community Association, Inc. v. Carla McGruder ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3163-22
GREENBRIAR COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARLA MCGRUDER,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted May 20, 2024 – Decided July 9, 2024
Before Judges Gilson and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. DC-004655-22.
Simeone & Raynor, LLC, attorneys for appellant (I.
Dominic Simeone, of counsel; Stefanio G. Troia, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Richard B. Supnick, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
This appeal involves a dispute over attorneys' fees. Plaintiff, Greenbriar
Community Association, Inc., appeals from a May 8, 2023 amended judgment,
which awarded it $1,000 in "other cost[s]." Plaintiff contends that the court
abused its discretion in limiting the award to $1,000 when it had requested
$11,103.14 in fees and costs from defendant, Carla McGruder. Given that the
$1,000 fee award was reasonable and proportionate to the $2,352.46 damages
award, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.
I.
In 2000, defendant purchased a home in Gloucester Township and became
a member of plaintiff's homeowners association, Greenbriar Community
Association (the Association). As a member, defendant was subject to the
Association's declaration of covenants and bylaws, which included an agreement
to pay all assessments levied by the Association. Specifically, defendant agreed
to pay annual assessments, special assessments for capital improvements, and
any default assessments. The default assessments included cost of damages,
attorneys' fees, costs of suit, and court costs if a member failed to pay the other
assessments and the Association sued to recover the assessments.
Plaintiff has sued defendant at least three times seeking to recover
delinquent assessments. In 2016, defendant became delinquent in paying her
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Association fees, and plaintiff sued in April 2016. Two months later, in June
2016, the court entered a default judgment against defendant in the amount of
$2,496.01. The following year, in 2017, plaintiff again sued defendant seeking
a judgment in the amount of $2,848.41, which the court entered against
defendant on January 5, 2018.
Plaintiff filed the underlying suit that gives rise to this appeal in July 2022.
Plaintiff sought a judgment against defendant in the amount of $5,789.25 ,
consisting of (1) $3,689.25 for unpaid assessments, fines, and late charges
through June 30, 2022; (2) $600 for the accelerated balance of the 2022 annual
assessment; and (3) $1,500 for attorneys' fees.
Defendant, who was then self-represented, filed a counterclaim
contending that the amount claimed by plaintiff was incorrect and that plaintiff
owed her $3,283.95 for overpayments she had made to satisfy the judgments
entered against her in 2016 and 2018.
The 2022 matter then proceeded to trial, which was conducted over two
days. On February 15, 2023, the Special Civil Part issued an order and a written
opinion awarding plaintiff $2,352.46, plus $82 in filing fees, for a total judgment
of $2,434.46. Of the $2,352.46, $498 was owed for assessments and late fees,
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and the remaining $1,854.46 was for prior awards of attorneys' fees and costs.
The Special Civil Part also dismissed defendant's counterclaim as without merit.
In its written opinion, the court began its analysis by looking at the
$2,848.41 balance owed by defendant when the 2018 default judgment was
entered. The court reasoned that plaintiff's 2017 complaint sought compensation
that was still owed from the 2016 litigation, in addition to unpaid and accelerated
assessments, attorneys' fees, and costs of suit. Next, the court found that
plaintiff failed to offer any persuasive argument or facts to explain its demand
for additional legal fees that had accrued after the filing date of the 2018
judgment but before the filing of the 2022 complaint. Accordingly, the court
held that plaintiff's requests for attorneys' fees that accrued between November
21, 2017 and July 7, 2022 lacked factual support and should not be awarded.
The court then found that plaintiff had proven recoverable assessments
and costs of $9,947.87 for the period from November 21, 2017 to December 19,
2022. The court also found, however, that defendant was entitled to a credit in
the amount of $7,595.41 for payments she had made to plaintiff during that time.
Accordingly, the court awarded plaintiff $2,352.46, plus $82 in filing fees, for
a total judgment of $2,434.46.
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On March 7, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration seeking
attorneys' fees that had accrued after December 19, 2022, and an opportunity to
submit an affidavit of service to prove the fees incurred. In response, defendant
cross-moved, requesting the court to enforce the 2022 judgment, compel
plaintiff to apply the payments tendered by defendant to satisfy the judgment,
and direct plaintiff to adjust its records to reflect the actual balance she owed.
On March 24, 2023, the court issued an order granting plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration and directing plaintiff to submit a certification of attorneys'
fees detailing the fees incurred after December 19, 2022. In a separate order
issued that same day, the court denied defendant's cross-motion. Thereafter, in
April 2023, plaintiff filed a fee application and letter brief, seeking $11,103.14
in attorneys' fees and costs incurred from October 1, 2022 through March 31,
2023.
On April 21, 2023, the court issued an oral decision awarding plaintiff an
additional $1,000. In its oral decision, the court first noted that additional
attorneys' fees were warranted because plaintiff had to try the 2022 lawsuit. The
court also acknowledged that there was a legal basis for an award given the
express provision in the Association's bylaws. The court then proceeded to
assess the reasonableness of plaintiff's request for legal fees.
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In holding that the requested amount of attorneys' fees was not reasonable,
the court focused its evaluation on the reasonableness of the total fees requested
in comparison to the amount of the damages recovered. In doing so, the court
cited and relied on Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427 (2001),
and Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 200 N.J. 372 (2009). The
court then reasoned that plaintiff was seeking more than $11,000, which was in
addition to the $2,434.46 already awarded—an amount that was primarily
comprised of legal fees. So, the court limited the additional award to $1,000.
On May 8, 2023, the court memorialized its ruling in an amended
judgment, which listed the total amount owed as $3,434.46. Plaintiff now
appeals from that amended judgment.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the court abused its discretion by limiting
the fee award to $1,000. In that regard, plaintiff argues the court erred in
deciding that the $11,103.14 requested was unreasonable because the requested
fees far exceeded the damages awarded.
"A prevailing party can recover counsel fees if expressly allowed by
statute, court rule, or contract." Empower Our Neighborhoods v. Guadagno, 453
N.J. Super. 565, 579 (App. Div. 2018). Generally, the party who prevails on a
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breach of contract claim satisfies the contractual right for an award of fees.
Litton Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. at 385-86.
We review an award of attorneys' fees for an abuse of discretion.
Empower Our Neighborhoods, 453 N.J. Super. at 579; Shore Orthopaedic Grp.,
LLC v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 397 N.J. Super. 614, 623
(App. Div. 2008). "[F]ee determinations by trial courts will be disturbed only
on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion."
Empower Our Neighborhoods, 453 N.J. Super. at 579 (alteration in original)
(quoting Packard-Bamberger & Co., 167 N.J. at 444).
In this matter, plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under
section 4.08 of the Association's declaration of covenants and bylaws. That
section stated, in relevant part:
The Association may bring an action at law against the
Owner personally obligated to pay [assessments] . . .
and in the event a judgment is obtained, such judgment
shall include interest on the amount due as herein
provided and reasonable attorneys' fees to be fixed by
the court together with costs of the action.
Moreover, plaintiff was the prevailing party in the 2022 litigation. Accordingly,
the issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
awarded plaintiff $1,000 in additional attorneys' fees.
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In assessing a request for attorneys' fees, a court must determine the
"lodestar," which is the "number of hours reasonably expended by the successful
party's counsel in the litigation, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Litton
Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. at 386; see also Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J.
1, 21 (2004); Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 334-35 (1995). "[T]he trial court
should satisfy itself that the assigned hourly rates are fair, realistic, and accurate,
or should make appropriate adjustments." Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337. In making
that inquiry, the court should consider the factors laid out in RPC 1.5(a) ,
including "the amount involved and the results obtained." RPC 1.5(a)(4).
In calculating the number of hours to be used in determining the lodestar,
a court "must not include excessive and unnecessary hours spent on the case."
Furst, 182 N.J. at 22. So, a court has discretion to exclude certain hours from
the calculation "if the specific circumstances incidental to a counsel -fee
application demonstrate that the hours expended, taking into account the
damages prospectively recoverable, the interests to be vindicated, and the
underlying statutory objectives, exceed those that competent counsel reasonably
would have expended to achieve a comparable result." Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336.
In this case, the court focused on the amount of fees requested by plaintiff
compared to the result obtained. Given what was at issue in this case, we discern
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no abuse of discretion. The New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that trial courts should evaluate the reasonableness of a fee request by comparing
the amount requested to the amount of damages actually recovered. See
Packard-Bamberger & Co., 167 N.J. at 445-46; Litton Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. at
387. The underlying litigation here involved a claim for assessments owed to a
homeowners association. Ultimately, plaintiff recovered less than $500 for
unpaid assessments, and the remainder of the award was for prior attorneys' fees.
Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion by recognizing that a request
for more than $11,000 in additional attorneys' fees was not reasonable and was
not justified given the damages recovered.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by not going through a detailed
analysis of the lodestar and all the factors under RPC 1.5(a). While we recognize
that the court's analysis did not go into detail, we discern no reversible error.
The court spent two days trying a case where plaintiff claimed several thousand
dollars due in assessments, while defendant maintained that she had paid most
of those assessments. Ultimately, the court found that plaintiff was owed less
than $500 in assessments. Given those facts, there was no abuse of discretion
in the trial court's focus on the reasonableness of the additional request for
attorneys' fees in comparison to the result obtained.
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In discerning no reversible error, we also consider the nature of this
litigation. This was not a litigation where a significant public policy was at
issue, like in cases involving claims of discrimination. The attorneys' fees award
was, therefore, not vindicating some important public policy. Instead, the
underlying case was a relatively small dispute that was resolved in the Special
Civil Part.
Affirmed.
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