Gregory Battle v. Hannah Algee ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3658-21
GREGORY BATTLE,
Plaintiff-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
HANNAH ALGEE,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
_______________________
Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided January 10, 2024
Before Judges Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FD-09-0107-22.
Dario, Albert, Metz, Eyerman, Canda, Concannon,
Ortiz & Krouse, attorneys for appellant/cross-
respondent (Shelley D. Albert and Paul Joseph
Concannon, on the briefs).
Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost Botwinick, attorneys for
respondent/cross-appellant (Kristi Lynn Terranova,
Jessica R. Sciara, Matheu D. Nunn and Bonnie C. Frost,
on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Hannah Algee appeals from a June 15, 2022 Family Part order
granting plaintiff Gregory Battle's motion to register and enforce multiple orders
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54 to -95. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the June 15 order,
arguing the trial court mistakenly neglected to address his request for an award
of counsel fees and costs against defendant. We affirm the challenged order as
to the appeal, and remand for further proceedings as to the cross-appeal.
I.
The parties previously dated and have a son together. The child was born
in Pennsylvania in 2010 and is diagnosed with various learning disabilities.
When the parties' relationship ended in 2012, plaintiff moved to Jersey
City and defendant remained in Philadelphia with the child. Pursuant to a July
12, 2012 consent order (CO) entered in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, the parties agreed to share joint legal
custody of their son, with defendant remaining the child's primary caretaker and
plaintiff having parenting time on alternating weekends and on Sundays when
he did not have the child for a full weekend. The CO also provided plaintiff
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with "reasonable additional visitation during the week," and holiday and
vacation time. Under the CO, plaintiff was solely "responsible for picking the
child up and dropping him off at [defendant]'s house" during parenting time
exchanges. Over the next several years, plaintiff exercised parenting time in
New Jersey and transported the child for visits, consistent with the terms of the
CO.
In 2019, defendant, a Canadian citizen, filed a motion in Pennsylvania,
seeking permission to relocate to Canada with the parties' son. Plaintiff opposed
the motion. Following a virtual trial, the judge granted defendant's relocation
application and entered a conforming order on July 27, 2020.
The July 27, 2020 order directed the parties to continue sharing legal
custody of their son, with defendant "retain[ing] primary physical custody of the
child." The order also awarded plaintiff "partial physical custody" and parenting
time for six weeks during the summer, plus alternating spring and winter school
breaks, additional "reasonable visitation" in Canada on notice to defendant, and
"any other times the parties mutually agree[d] to." Moreover, the order granted
plaintiff the right to daily electronic or telephonic contact with the child.
Finally, the July 27 order stated the Pennsylvania courts "relinquishe[d]
jurisdiction of th[e] matter to the judicial county in which father resides."
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In a written opinion accompanying the July 27 order, the judge explained
she granted defendant's relocation motion, in part, because most of defendant's
extended family lived in Canada. Further, the judge found "[n]o contempt
petitions for failure to comply with the [parties' CO] ha[d] been filed since it
went into effect." The judge also noted that although the parties recently argued
over defendant's "decision to withhold the child from [plaintiff], this was due
solely to the current pandemic and th[e fact plaintiff wa]s residing in an area
which had a high rate of COVID-19 cases." Accordingly, the judge found
defendant's "conduct d[id] not support a finding that she would withhold the
child from [plaintiff] in the future."
On plaintiff's motion to reconsider the July 27 order, the judge entered an
amend order on August 12, 2020, prohibiting plaintiff from "exercis[ing] his
custodial time during the one . . . week prior to [the] child's school year
commencing in Canada." The August 12 order also stated plaintiff was entitled
to overnights in Canada "as [the] parties mutually agree" "upon providing
[defendant] at least seven . . . days written notice of a planned visit," and that
"[a]ll other terms of the July 27, 2020 order not revised by this order remain[ed]
in effect." Neither party appealed from the July 27 or August 12 orders.
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Defendant promptly relocated to Canada with the parties' son following
the relocation hearing. Plaintiff refrained from exercising his holiday and school
recess parenting time for the balance of 2020 and into 2021, due to the ongoing
pandemic. However, starting in March 2021, plaintiff emailed defendant he
wished to exercise parenting time in Canada and enjoy six weeks of parenting
time in New Jersey that summer, consistent with the July 27, and August 12,
2020 orders. Defendant responded to plaintiff in April 2021, stating it was not
"safe for [the parties' son] to be travel[]ing to the [United States], let alone to
the North Jersey/New York City area this summer," due to the pandemic, and
asked plaintiff to "reconsider [his] plans for this summer . . . to keep [the child]
safe."
The following month, defendant's attorney notified plaintiff that
defendant would not permit the parties' child "to travel to the United States" for
plaintiff's summer parenting time, "due to the serious health and safety concerns
related to the COVID-19 pandemic." Defendant's counsel proposed that
plaintiff instead exercise six weeks of summer parenting time in Canada after
self-isolating for fourteen days, consistent with the requirements in defendant's
province. Lastly, defendant's attorney informed plaintiff that because the
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parties' child was "now habitually resid[ing] in [Canada], the Court of Queen's
Bench . . . would have jurisdiction over this matter."
Twice in June 2021, counsel for plaintiff wrote to defendant's attorney,
reiterating plaintiff's request that defendant comply with the July 27, and August
12, 2020 orders, and allow plaintiff six weeks of summer parenting time in New
Jersey. Because defendant did not agree to these requests, in July 2021, plaintiff
filed a verified complaint and order to show cause (OTSC) in New Jersey to
enforce the July 27, and August 12, 2020 orders. He also sought reimbursement
for all "travel costs and fees incurred to transport the child to and from parenting
time," make-up parenting time, sanctions, a transfer of the child's physical
custody "if [defendant] continue[d] to interfere with [his] custody and parenting
time" and an award of counsel fees and costs. Additionally, plaintiff filed a
notice to register and enforce the following Pennsylvania orders: the July 10,
2012 CO; a July 22, 2020 order granting plaintiff's request for the parties' son
to undergo certain evaluations at plaintiff's cost; and the July 27, and August 12,
2020 orders granting defendant's relocation application, subject to plaintiff's
parenting time (collectively Pennsylvania orders).
On July 26, 2021, defendant moved for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
due to a lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively, she sought dismissal under the
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doctrine of forum non conveniens. Also, barring dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint, defendant asked the trial court to deny his OTSC.
Following virtual argument on the parties' cross-applications on July 27,
2021, the motion judge granted the OTSC, finding New Jersey had jurisdiction
to address the matter based on "the emergent nature of the application ." Noting
neither party appealed from the July 27, or August 12, 2020 orders, and both
orders allowed "the case [to] now move over to New Jersey," the judge found
New Jersey could exercise emergency jurisdiction to address the parties' custody
and parenting time issues. She concluded, "if there's no parenting time[,] then
in some respects[, an] argument[] can be made that there's an interference with
custody. And therefore, there are emergent aspects [to] this" application. The
judge added, "[t]hese extended periods of time where one parent is really out of
the picture . . . does lead to a deterioration of the relationship between parent
and child. . . . [W]e've got to take steps . . . to reestablish the bond."
However, the judge also stated that because "COVID [wa]s . . . rising up
again," the child was due to start school soon, and he should "be home in time
to get everything on board for the start of school," she would not permit plaintiff
to exercise six weeks of parenting time that summer. Thus, the judge ordered
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the parties to attempt to agree on a start and end date for plaintiff's summer
parenting time before returning to court two days later.
By the time the parties virtually appeared in court with counsel on July
29, 2021, they agreed plaintiff's parenting time would commence on August 7,
2021. But they could not agree on when the child should return to Canada, in
part, because defendant represented the child required certain "in-home" training
in August.
The judge found defendant "made an arbitrary decision . . . to cancel
parenting time for [plaintiff] over the summer," and ordered defendant to
produce the child for plaintiff's parenting time in New Jersey from August 7 to
August 28, 2021. The judge also directed the parties to "cooperate with each
other" and "work[] out [the child's] technology training remotely" so he could
receive any necessary training while in New Jersey.
The judge entered a conforming order on July 30, 2021. The order also
directed any remaining non-emergent issues would be decided on October 1,
2021, after counsel briefed those issues. Neither party appealed from the July
30 order.
In September 2021, plaintiff filed a child support action in Canada. The
parties resolved this action four months later by entering into and filing a
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consent order with the Court of Queen's Bench in Canada. In the interim, the
October 1, 2021 hearing in New Jersey was postponed to March 2, 2022. Prior
to the March 2 hearing, plaintiff filed an additional certification with the court,
alleging defendant continued to unreasonably limit his parenting time. He also
reiterated his demand for a counsel fee award.
A judge newly assigned to the New Jersey case heard argument from
counsel on March 2 and reserved decision. On June 15, 2022, he issued an order
granting plaintiff's request to register and enforce the Pennsylvania orders, and
specifically granted plaintiff's request to enforce the July 27, 2020 order "as to
[plaintiff's] summer parenting time." 1 Further, the judge directed defendant to
make the child available to plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the July 27, 2020
order or face sanctions and fees. Finally, the judge denied plaintiff's request to
modify the existing custody and parenting time arrangement, finding New Jersey
"lack[ed] jurisdiction to" do so under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-80,2 and, because New
1
In a second order also dated June 15, 2022, the judge denied the balance of
plaintiff's OTSC as moot and concluded "[n]o further hearing was necessary."
Neither party challenges the denial of emergent relief under this second order.
2
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-80(b) states, "[a] court of this State shall recognize and
enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with article 2 of this act, a
registered child custody determination of another state." (Emphasis added).
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Jersey was "an inconvenient forum for addressing the issue of custody and
parenting time under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71."3
In a written opinion accompanying the June 15, 2022 order, the judge
determined he had personal jurisdiction over defendant because she had
"sufficient contacts" with New Jersey. He reasoned the parties "exercised joint
legal custody while [p]laintiff resided in New Jersey" and plaintiff exercised
parenting time in New Jersey with the parties' son "over several years." Further,
the judge noted neither party appealed from the July 27, 2020 order, which
"specifically provided that parenting time would continue in the State of New
Jersey, and that jurisdiction would remain with New Jersey." The judge added,
"[w]hile this [c]ourt is not bound by Pennsylvania's assignment of custody[,] . . .
[it] does find . . . [d]efendant had minimum contacts with New Jersey such that
she could reasonably anticipate being called into court in this state."
3
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71(a) provides, in part:
A court of this State that has jurisdiction under this act
to make a child custody determination may decline to
exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it determines that
it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
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Significantly, the judge also found New Jersey had jurisdiction to enforce
the Pennsylvania orders pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-77.4 After reminding the
parties the July 27, 2020 order "permit[ted d]efendant to relocate to Canada with
the parties' minor child, establishe[d] custody, and set[] forth a parenting time
schedule for [p]laintiff," the judge explained that when the July 27 order was
entered:
The Pennsylvania court exercised its jurisdiction in
substantial conformity with [UCCJEA], as
5
Pennsylvania was the ["]home state[" ] of the minor
child at the time the [o]rder was entered. This [c]ourt
is therefore bound to enforce the Pennsylvania [o]rders.
Under the terms of the [July 27, 2020 o]rder, [p]laintiff
is entitled to summer parenting time with the minor
4
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-77 provides, in part:
a. A court of this State shall recognize and enforce a
child custody determination of a court of another state
if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial
conformity with this act or the determination was made
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional
standards of this act and the determination has not been
modified in accordance with this act.
b. A court of this State may utilize any remedy available
under other law of this State to enforce a child custody
determination made by a court of another state.
5
The "home state" is defined as "the state in which a child lived with a
parent . . . for at least six consecutive months immediately before the
commencement of a child custody proceeding." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54.
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child. Although there is currently litigation between
the parties regarding modification of the [July 27, 2020
o]rder, [it] has not been modified and remains in place.
Finally, citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-80 and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-67,6 the judge
concluded "New Jersey [wa]s an inconvenient forum for purposes of modifying
the [July 27, 2020 o]rder," whereas "[t]he . . . Court [in Canada wa]s the proper
forum to address modification of the [o]rder." In reaching this conclusion, the
judge found New Jersey did not have "substantial evidence . . . concerning the
child's care, protection, training[,] and personal relationships," consistent with
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-67(2)(b).
Further, the judge concluded even if substantial evidence about the child
was available in New Jersey, he "would nevertheless find . . . New Jersey [wa]s
an inconvenient forum for determining custody," pursuant to the factors set forth
under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71(b),7 each of which he addressed. Accordingly, the
6
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-67 states, "a court of this State may not modify a child custody
determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this State has
jurisdiction to make an initial determination under paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection [(a)] of" N.J.S.A. 2A:34-65.
7
Those factors are:
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is
likely to continue in the future and which state could
best protect the parties and the child;
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judge concluded he had "the authority to enforce the Pennsylvania
[o]rders[,] . . . [but] d[id] not have the authority to modify" them because
"Canada [wa]s the appropriate jurisdiction for modification of the Pennsylvania
[o]rders." Therefore, the judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss and her
request for fees, and granted in part, and denied in part, plaintiff's remaining
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this
State;
(3) the distance between the court in this State and the
court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should
assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation, including the testimony
of the child;
(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the
issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to
present the evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the
facts and issues of the pending litigation.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-71(b).]
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requests for relief without addressing plaintiff's request for counsel fees and
costs.
II.
On appeal, defendant presents four overlapping arguments for our
consideration. She contends the judge erred in: (1) denying her motion to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint despite New Jersey's "lack of jurisdiction"; (2)
denying her motion to dismiss despite New Jersey's "lack of personal
jurisdiction over" her; (3) registering and enforcing the Pennsylvania orders over
her objection; and (4) enforcing the custody and parenting time provisions of
the Pennsylvania orders against her, despite the fact New Jersey "lacked
personal jurisdiction." In support of her jurisdictional arguments, defendant
points to the fact that on September 6, 2022, the parties entered into a consent
order partially resolving issues the parties raised before the Court of Queen's
Bench in Canada. In his cross-appeal, plaintiff solely argues the judge "erred in
failing to address or make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding [his]
request for counsel fees."
We begin with the principles that govern our analysis. As a threshold
matter, we do not consider evidence which was not presented to the trial court.
See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 45 n.2 (2015). Therefore, we do not
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consider the September 6, 2022 order entered in Canada months after the entry
of the challenged June 15, 2022 order.
Next, we recognize "appeals are taken from orders and judgments," rather
than opinions. Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001).
Thus, "[a] trial court judgment that reaches the proper conclusion must be
affirmed even if it is based on the wrong reasoning." Hayes v. Delamotte, 231
N.J. 373, 387 (2018).
Additionally, it is well settled that we accord "great deference to
discretionary decisions of Family Part judges," Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J.
Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012), in recognition of the "family courts' special
jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.
v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
413 (1998)). However, our review of the Family Part's interpretation of the law
is de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012). Accordingly,
jurisdictional questions in interstate child custody disputes are reviewed de
novo. See Sajjad v. Cheema, 428 N.J. Super. 160, 170 (App. Div. 2012).
"The UCCJEA governs the determination of subject matter jurisdiction in
interstate . . . custody disputes." Ibid. (citing Greely v. Greely, 194 N.J. 168,
178 (2008)). It serves to "ensure that custody determinations are made in the
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state that can best decide the case." Griffith v. Tressel, 394 N.J. Super. 128, 138
(App. Div. 2007). The UCCJEA was enacted "'to avoid jurisdictional
competition and conflict' between jurisdictions in favor of 'cooperation with
courts of other states.'" Sajjad, 428 N.J. Super. at 170-71 (quoting Griffith, 394
N.J. Super. at 138). Accordingly, to address a multi-state child custody issue, a
Family Part must follow the procedures set forth in the UCCJEA. Id. at 171
(citing Poluhovich v. Pellerano, 373 N.J. Super. 319, 357 (App. Div. 2004)).
The UCCJEA typically "prioritizes the use of the child's 'home state,' as
the exclusive basis for jurisdiction of a custody determination, regardless of the
residency of the parents." Ibid. (citing Dalessio v. Gallagher, 414 N.J. Super.
18, 26 (App. Div. 2010)). However, even if New Jersey is not the "home state,"
it may still exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-68.
To exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction under this statute, the child must
have been abandoned or "subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse."
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-68(a).
"New Jersey's adoption of the []UCCJEA created a full-throated
obligation on our courts to not only recognize, but also enforce foreign orders."
H.V.D.M. v. R.W., 466 N.J. Super. 227, 239 (App. Div. 2021). "Also, pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-87, New Jersey 'shall accord full faith and credit' to the
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foreign order." Ibid. Moreover, under the UCCJEA,
[a] court of this State which does not have jurisdiction
to modify a child custody determination [8] may issue a
temporary order enforcing:
(1) a visitation schedule made by a court of
another state; or
(2) the visitation provisions of a child
custody determination of another state that
does not provide for a specific visitation
schedule.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-78(a).]
The UCCJEA also authorizes New Jersey to register a foreign custody
determination. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-79. The registration process outlined under
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-79 includes sending a certified copy of the child custody
determination to the Superior Court of New Jersey. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
79, "[a] child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be
registered in [New Jersey], with or without a simultaneous request for
enforcement." Ibid.As mentioned, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-77, New Jersey must
8
A "child custody determination" is any "judgment, decree, or other order of a
court providing for the legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect
to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial[,] and modification
order." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-54.
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"recognize and enforce a child custody determination . . . of another state if the
latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with [the UCCJEA]
or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the
jurisdictional standards . . . and the determination has not been modified in
accordance with this act." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-77(a). New Jersey courts also "may
utilize any remedy available" under our laws "to enforce a child custody
determination" from another state. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-77(b). Yet a New Jersey
court "may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another
state unless a court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial
determination," N.J.S.A. 2A:34-67, under one of the scenarios outlined under
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-65, none of which apply here.9
9
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-65:
[A] court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination only if:
(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date
of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the
home state of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is
absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a
parent continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under paragraph (1) of this subsection, or a court of the
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Lastly, it is well settled that a trial court's decision to grant or deny
attorney's fees in a family action will be disturbed "only on the 'rarest occasion,'
and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402
N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J.
292, 317 (1995)). To permit a trial court to determine the reasonableness of a
home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more
appropriate forum under section 19 or 20 . . . of this act
and:
(a) the child and the child's parents, or the
child and at least one parent or a person
acting as a parent have a significant
connection with this State other than mere
physical presence; and
(b) substantial evidence is available in this
State concerning the child's care,
protection, training and personal
relationships;
(3) all courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or
(2) of this subsection have declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of
the child under section 19 or 20 of this act; or
(4) no state would have jurisdiction under paragraph
(1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-65(a).]
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fee application, "all applications for the allowance of fees shall be supported by
an affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(a)."
Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 366 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting R. 4:42-
9(b)).
In determining whether and to what extent a counsel fee award is
appropriate, the court must consider:
(1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the
ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to
contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the
reasonableness and good faith of the positions
advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial;
(4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5)
any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees
previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results
obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to
enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9)
any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.
[R. 5:3-5(c).]
Additionally, when calculating a fee award, a court must determine the
reasonableness of the rates proposed by prevailing counsel and the
reasonableness of the time spent. Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 21
(2004) (citing Rendine, 141 N.J. at 335-36).
We also note the UCCJEA provides for an award of counsel fees and costs
to a prevailing party. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-86. Pursuant to that statute, a trial court:
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shall award the prevailing party, . . . necessary and
reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the
party, including costs, communication expenses,
attorney's fees, investigative fees, expenses for
witnesses, travel expenses, and childcare during the
course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom
fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award
would be clearly inappropriate.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-86(a).]
Governed by these standards, we discern no basis to disturb the June 15,
2022 order as to defendant's appeal. Instead, we agree with the Family Part
judge issuing the June 15 order that he was "bound to enforce the Pennsylvania
[o]rders," pursuant to the UCCJEA. Similarly, although neither party appealed
from the July 30, 2021 order entered in New Jersey, we are persuaded the judge
issuing that order also correctly enforced the July 27, and August 12, 2020
orders from Pennsylvania, and directed defendant to make the parties' child
available for plaintiff's summer parenting time in New Jersey—albeit for an
abbreviated period, due to the judge's concerns about rising rates of COVID-19
and the child's need to be ready for the upcoming school year.
Thus, because the Family Part judges in New Jersey were bound under
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-77 to enforce the child custody determinations issued in
Pennsylvania and were also authorized under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-78 to issue
temporary orders enforcing the parenting time schedule set forth in the July 27,
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and August 12, 2020 orders, defendant's challenges to the June 15, 2022 order
fail. Accordingly, there is no need to further address her jurisdictional
arguments, including the argument she lacked "the requisite 'minimum
contacts'" in New Jersey for this State to "to exercise [their] coercive power over
[her] to perform an affirmative act." Likewise, her contention that plaintiff
failed to properly register the Pennsylvania orders is of no moment, considering
New Jersey courts unquestionably had the power to enforce the Pennsylvania
orders at issue, whether or not plaintiff sought to register those orders.
Finally, as to the cross-appeal, we are constrained to agree with plaintiff
that the trial court failed to squarely address his fee application. Thus, we are
compelled to remand this matter for the judge to consider in the first instance
whether an award of counsel fees and costs is warranted, and to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. R. 1:7-4. We offer no
opinion on whether plaintiff provided sufficient proofs to justify such an award.
To the extent we have not addressed the parties' remaining arguments,
they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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