City of Plainfield v. Fmba Local 7 ( 2024 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3557-22
    CITY OF PLAINFIELD,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    FMBA LOCAL 7,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Argued May 20, 2024 – Decided July 11, 2024
    Before Judges Gilson, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop-
    Thompson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1177-23.
    Kathryn V. Hatfield argued the cause for appellant
    (Hatfield Schwartz Law Group, LLC, attorneys;
    Kathryn V. Hatfield, of counsel and on the briefs).
    Stephen B. Hunter argued the cause for respondent
    (Detzky, Hunter & DeFillippo, LLC, attorneys; Stephen
    B. Hunter, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This appeal arises out of a dispute between the City of Plainfield (the City)
    and Plainfield FMBA Local 7 (the Union), which represents the City's fire
    personnel, excluding Fire Officers. In 2019, the City sought to collect from
    certain retirees a percentage of the costs of their healthcare insurance premiums.
    The Union objected, contending that under the governing collective negotiations
    agreement, the City had agreed to pay those costs at "its sole expense."
    The dispute was arbitrated, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the Union.
    The City now appeals from a Law Division order denying its application to
    vacate the arbitration award and, instead, confirming the award. Discerning no
    basis to disturb the arbitrator's award, we affirm.
    I.
    The City is a civil service municipality that maintains its own professional
    fire department. The Union is the exclusive representative for the City's fire
    personnel, except for Fire Officers.         Effective January 1, 2018 through
    December 31, 2021, the City and Union were parties to a collective negotiations
    agreement (the 2018 CN Agreement). Article 13.7B of the 2018 CN Agreement
    stated that the City would provide health insurance coverage for retirees with
    twenty-five years or more of service at "its sole expense." Specifically, that
    article stated:
    A-3557-22
    2
    The City agrees at its sole expense to continue the
    health insurance coverage for employee, spouse and
    eligible dependents for those employees who retire, as
    such retirement is based upon [twenty-five] years or
    more of credited service in their pension system (except
    those who elect a deferred retirement) or disability
    retirement regardless of years of service. Said health
    insurance coverage shall be the same coverage as
    provided to City employees.
    On April 17, 2019, the City sent a letter to the Union, stating that the City
    had mistakenly failed to comply with L. 2011, c. 78 (Chapter 78) and had not
    collected a percentage of the costs for certain retirees' health insurance as
    required by Chapter 78. The City explained that "at this time" it would not seek
    to collect the money owed for prior years. Instead, the City announced that
    beginning July 1, 2019, it would bill certain retirees for their contributions to
    their health insurance costs. In that regard, the City explained that the Chapter
    78 contribution requirements did not apply to retirees who had twenty years or
    more of service as of June 28, 2011. Therefore, the City stated it would collect
    the contributions from retirees who had less than twenty years of service as of
    June 28, 2011. In addition, the City stated that it would "phase in the amount
    retirees will owe" over a year and a half between July 2019 and January 2021.
    A-3557-22
    3
    In May 2019, the City sent letters directly to the affected retirees. Those
    letters repeated the positions the City had set forth in its April 17, 2019 letter to
    the Union.
    In June 2019, the Union filed a grievance with the City, alleging that the
    City had unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of the 2018 CN
    Agreement regarding retirees with twenty-five or more years of service and,
    thereby, breached the 2018 CN Agreement. The grievance asserted that the 2018
    CN Agreement expressly stated that the City would cover the entire cost of the
    retirees' health insurance.    The Union also alleged that "[t]hroughout the
    duration and expiration of Chapter 78[,] the City continued to pay 100 percent
    of [the] health care premium[s]" for all retirees and that the City had continued
    to pay those costs after entering into the 2018 CN Agreement.
    The City denied the grievance, and the Union requested arbitration.
    Thereafter, the Public Employment Relations Commission appointed an
    arbitrator to resolve the dispute.
    The arbitrator held a one-day hearing on December 16, 2021, during
    which one witness testified: Mark Ruderman, the City's former labor counsel.
    Thereafter, the City and Union submitted post-hearing briefs.
    A-3557-22
    4
    On March 6, 2023, the arbitrator issued a written decision and award in
    favor of the Union. The arbitrator found that the City and the Union had
    negotiated Article 13.7B in the 2018 CN Agreement.          In that regard, the
    arbitrator noted that during the contract negotiations leading to the 2018 CN
    Agreement, the Union had sent the City a proposal with certain proposed
    changes to the prior collective negotiations agreement. The proposal did not
    change Article 13.7B; rather, the proposal stated: "All other provisions of the
    contract remain unchanged." The arbitrator also found that the City had sent
    Patrice Dawkins, an insurance broker, "to discuss the insurance proposal" with
    representatives of the Union. Based on those facts, the arbitrator concluded that
    the City and Union had negotiated Article 13.7B and had, thereby, agreed to
    leave the language stating that the City would be responsible for paying retirees
    insurance premium costs at "its sole expense."
    The arbitrator then reviewed Chapter 78 and the related statute N.J.S.A.
    40A:10-23. Focusing on the effective date of N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23, which was
    May 21, 2010, the arbitrator construed the statutory provision to mean that only
    retirees hired after May 21, 2010, had to pay a percentage of their healthcare
    costs. The arbitrator then held that (1) any retiree who had been hired before
    May 21, 2010, and had twenty years or more of service did not have to pay for
    A-3557-22
    5
    health insurance; (2) those qualified retirees had to be reimbursed for any
    payment or deduction taken by the City for health insurance costs; and (3) any
    current or future retirees hired after May 21, 2010 had to pay the health
    insurance costs based on Chapter 78. 1 The arbitrator also modified Article
    13.7B of the 2018 CN Agreement to comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:10-21.2.
    Specifically, the arbitrator deleted the "sole expense" language from Article
    13.7B.
    After the arbitrator issued his award, the City filed a summary action
    under Rule 4:67-1(a) in the Law Division, seeking to vacate the award. The City
    argued that the arbitration award was procured by undue means because there
    was no evidence supporting the arbitrator's finding that the City and Union had
    negotiated Article 13.7B. The City also argued that the arbitrator had been
    biased and partial towards the Union.
    On June 21, 2023, after hearing argument on the matter, the Law Division
    issued an order and letter opinion denying the City's application and confirming
    the arbitration award. The court found that there was "sufficient evidence to
    1
    In his written decision, the arbitrator sometimes used the date "May 10, 2010"
    and other times used the date "May 21, 2010." The correct effective date for L.
    2010, c. 2 is May 21, 2010. The arbitrator also did not identify the specific
    percentage that retirees hired after May 21, 2010, would have to pay for health
    insurance.
    A-3557-22
    6
    establish that the [a]rbitrator's interpretation of the [2018 CN Agreement]
    contract language [was] reasonably debatable" and that the court, therefore, was
    required under its standard of review to confirm the arbitration award. In that
    regard, the court found that the arbitrator had "made a reasonable determination
    that [the City] engaged in contract negotiations regarding Chapter 78
    contributions. Specifically, [the Union]—in its written contract proposals—
    stated that [Article 13.7B] of the [2018 CN Agreement] would remain
    unchanged." Therefore, the court reasoned that the arbitrator's finding that the
    City "could have modified the [2018 CN Agreement's] contract language to
    relieve [the City] of [its] contractual obligation in response to [the Union's]
    proposal" was reasonably debatable. Additionally, the court rejected the City's
    argument that the arbitrator had evidenced bias in favor of the Union.
    The City now appeals from the Law Division's June 21, 2023 order
    denying the City's application and confirming the arbitration award.
    II.
    A court's review of an arbitration award is limited. Strickland v. Foulke
    Mgmt. Corp., 
    475 N.J. Super. 27
    , 38 (App. Div. 2023). "Arbitration is a favored
    form of dispute resolution, whose usefulness for labor-management issues is
    well-recognized" in New Jersey.     Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut.
    A-3557-22
    7
    Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 
    247 N.J. 202
    , 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E.
    Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 
    213 N.J. 190
    , 201 (2013)). So,
    reviewing courts "'must give arbitration awards "considerable deference."'"
    Strickland, 475 N.J. Super. at 38 (quoting Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n,
    247 N.J. at 211). "The interpretation of a labor agreement 'is a question for the
    arbitrator. . . . [S]o far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the
    contract, the courts have no business overruling [the arbitrator]' based solely on
    differences of interpretation." Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, 247 N.J. at
    211 (quoting E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 202).
    In the public sector, "'an arbitrator's award will be confirmed "so long as
    the award is reasonably debatable."'" Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of
    Trenton, 
    205 N.J. 422
    , 429 (2011) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ.
    Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 
    202 N.J. 268
    , 276 (2010)). An award is "reasonably
    debatable" if it is "'justifiable'" or "'fully supportable in the record.'" Id. at 431
    (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 
    81 N.J. 208
    , 223-24 (1979)).
    "If the correctness of the award, including its resolution of the public-policy
    question, is reasonably debatable, judicial intervention is unwarranted." Weiss
    v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey, 
    143 N.J. 420
    , 443 (1996).
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    8
    The same deferential standard of review applies to an arbitrator's
    interpretation of a statute. See E. Rutherford PBA, 213 N.J. at 207 (applying
    the "reasonably debatable" standard to an arbitrator's analysis of a statutory
    provision and explaining that the "framework for reviewing a public-sector
    arbitration award accounts for the interplay between [a statutory scheme] and [a
    contract] by requiring a reviewing court to determine whether the arbitration
    award actually causes direct contradiction with law or public policy").
    Accordingly, if an arbitrator's interpretation of a statute is reasonably debatable,
    a court must defer to the arbitrator's determination. See ibid.
    Consistent with that deferential standard, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 sets forth
    specific and limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award related to a
    collective negotiations agreement. In that regard, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 states that
    an award shall be vacated:
    a.    Where the award was procured by corruption,
    fraud or undue means;
    b.    Where there was either evident partiality or
    corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof;
    c.    Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
    in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
    cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear
    evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or
    of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of
    any party;
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    9
    d.   Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly
    executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite
    award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
    A trial court's decision to confirm an arbitration award is a conclusion of
    law, which we review de novo. Pami Realty, LLC v. Locations XIX Inc., 
    468 N.J. Super. 546
    , 556 (App. Div. 2021). Similarly, we "review the trial court's
    decision on a motion to vacate an arbitration award de novo." Yarborough v.
    State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 
    455 N.J. Super. 136
    , 139 (App. Div. 2018)
    (citing Minkowitz v. Israeli, 
    433 N.J. Super. 111
    , 136 (App. Div. 2013)). We
    are bound to accept the trial court's factual findings unless "clearly erroneous."
    Del Piano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
    372 N.J. Super. 503
    ,
    507 (App. Div. 2004) (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 
    514 U.S. 938
    ,
    947-48 (1995)).
    III.
    On appeal, the City makes two arguments in support of its contention that
    the arbitration award should be vacated. First, it contends that the arbitration
    award was "procured by undue means" because it was based on the arbitrator's
    unsupported finding that the parties negotiated Article 13.7B of the 2018 CN
    Agreement. Second, the City asserts that the arbitration award was "the product
    A-3557-22
    10
    of the [a]rbitrator's partiality, or . . . appearance of partiality, towards the
    [Union]."
    A.    The Alleged Undue Means.
    To put the City's undue means argument in context, it is helpful to review
    the statutes governing public employees' contributions to healthcare costs after
    retirement, including Chapter 78.
    Effective May 21, 2010, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23 to
    require retired public employees to pay "1.5 percent of the retiree's monthly
    retirement allowance" for healthcare benefits. L. 2010, c. 2, § 15 (codified at
    N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23). The following year, Chapter 78 was enacted and became
    effective on June 28, 2011. Chapter 78 required public employees and retired
    public employees to pay a portion of their health insurance costs. See N.J.S.A.
    40A:10-21.1. Those costs were phased in over four years, increasing twenty-
    five percent each year and reaching the full contribution amount in the fourth
    year. N.J.S.A. 40A:10-21.1(a). In that regard, Chapter 78 required public
    employees "to achieve full implementation of the increased contribution (Tier
    4) in the fourth year after the statute's effective date or, for employees already
    subject to a collective negotiations agreement[,] . . . in the fourth year after the
    expiration of that agreement." In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 
    244 N.J. 1
    , 5
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    11
    (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:16-17.1) (explaining the analogous provision for local
    board of education employees); N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.28d(c).
    Public employees with twenty years of service as of June 28, 2011, were
    exempt from Chapter 78's contribution requirements.            N.J.S.A. 40A:10-
    21.1(b)(3). Regarding retired public employees, Chapter 78 required that they
    pay at least 1.5 percent of their monthly retirement allowances for health
    insurance. 
    Ibid.
     The law also provided, however, that retirees would not be
    required to pay that 1.5 percent twice. In that regard, Chapter 78 states:
    The amount payable by a retiree under this subsection
    shall not under any circumstance be less than the 1.5
    percent of the monthly retirement allowance, including
    any future cost of living adjustments thereto, that is
    provided for such a retiree, if appliable to that retiree,
    under subsection b. of N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23. A retiree
    who pays the contribution required under this
    subsection shall not also be required to pay the
    contribution of 1.5 percent of the monthly retirement
    allowance under subsection b. of N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23.
    [Ibid. (citations reformatted).]
    After the four years of full implementation, Chapter 78 allowed unions
    and local governments to negotiate the percentage of contributions public
    employees or retirees would pay towards healthcare costs. N.J.S.A. 40A:10-
    21.2. In that regard, the statute stated that once public employees in a union had
    reached the full contribution amount, the contribution levels "shall become part
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    of the parties' collective negotiations and shall then be subject to collective
    negotiations in a manner similar to other negotiable items between the parties."
    
    Ibid.
     In other words, after 2015, unions representing public employees could
    negotiate levels of contributions that differed from the levels mandated in
    Chapter 78 after the full contribution amount had been reached. If, however,
    the union and the local government entity did not agree to a different
    contribution amount, the contribution level would remain at the mandated
    Chapter 78 full contribution level. See 
    ibid.
    It is undisputed that by the time the City and Union negotiated the 2018
    CN Agreement, Chapter 78 should have been fully implemented. Consequently,
    under Chapter 78, the parties were allowed to negotiate new contribution
    amounts. The City argues that the arbitration award was procured by undue
    means because the arbitrator made a mistake in finding that the parties had
    negotiated Article 13.7B in the 2018 CN Agreement. Relying on Ruderman's
    testimony, the City contends that the parties did not negotiate that provision.
    So, the City argues that the status quo of the prior collective negotiations
    agreement was that Chapter 78 had to be deemed to be fully implemented and,
    therefore, Union members should continue to pay the full contributions under
    Chapter 78.
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    13
    The arbitrator rejected the City's position. Instead, the arbitrator found
    that the Union had sent proposals during the contract negotiations concerning
    the 2018 CN Agreement. The arbitrator also found that Dawkins met with Union
    representatives and discussed those proposals and, therefore, the proposal not to
    change Article 13.7B was effectively part of the negotiations. Based on those
    facts, the arbitrator found that the parties negotiated Article 13.7B in the 2018
    CN Agreement. Those findings by the arbitrator were not mistakes of fact;
    rather, they were findings of fact that are supported by the record. The City
    simply disagrees with the arbitrator's findings. That disagreement, however, is
    not a ground on which we can vacate an arbitration award. See N.J.S.A. 2A:24-
    8.
    More to the point, the arbitrator's findings are at a minimum reasonably
    debatable. The arbitrator construed the 2018 CN Agreement in light of Chapter
    78 and N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23. Focusing specifically on the effective date of
    N.J.S.A. 40A:10-23, the arbitrator held that all retirees hired before May 21,
    2010, who had at least twenty years or more of service in a state or locally-
    administered retirement system did not have to pay for health insurance. The
    arbitrator also held that retirees who were hired after May 21, 2010, must pay
    for health insurance based on Chapter 78's tiered system. Those holdings are
    A-3557-22
    14
    reasonably debatable and, therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the
    arbitrator's award.
    The City also contends that the arbitrator's award in this matter was
    inconsistent with an arbitration award relating to a collective negotiations
    agreement governing the Fire Officers' union (the PFOA).           The arbitrator,
    however, distinguished the PFOA award by pointing out that the arbitrator in
    that matter found that the City and the PFOA had not negotiated the costs of
    health insurance for retirees. That distinction by the arbitrator is reasonable,
    and we discern no basis to disagree with the arbitrator. Therefore, we discern
    no basis to vacate the arbitrator's award in this matter.
    Finally, we point out the limit of the holding in this matter. The arbitrator
    was not asked to, and did not, address whether the City could recover the costs
    that should have been paid under Chapter 78 during the mandatory four-year
    implementation of Chapter 78. In its letters to the Union and retirees, the City
    represented that it had failed to collect or deduct from retirees the required
    contributions under Chapter 78.      In that regard, the Union made a similar
    representation in its grievance, noting that contributions from retirees had not
    been taken after Chapter 78 was enacted.          Given the City's and Union's
    representations, we assume that the City failed to properly implement Chapter
    A-3557-22
    15
    78 during its mandatory four-year period. Whether the City can now recover
    those contributions is not an issue presented to us on this appeal, and we express
    no view on that issue.
    B.    The Alleged Partiality.
    In its second argument, the City contends that the arbitration award should
    be vacated because the arbitrator was partial towards the Union. To support that
    contention, the City points to one statement by the arbitrator: "It certainly
    appears to me that the City's status quo argument is actually buyers' remorse,
    which is anathema to the [c]ollective [n]egotiation process."
    We reject the City's contention that the one statement by the arbitrator in
    his written decision establishes partiality or even the appearance of partiality.
    "The party alleging that an arbitrator was impermissibly biased has the burden
    of proving that allegation by a preponderance of the evidence introduced
    concerning [the contention]." Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.,
    
    86 N.J. 179
    , 191 (1981). The arbitrator's statement relied on by the City does
    not demonstrate bias or partiality. Instead, the arbitrator was responding to one
    of the City's arguments. In that regard, after analyzing the City's "status quo"
    argument, the arbitrator rejected it. Read in full context, the statement does not
    demonstrate partiality or even the appearance of partiality.
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    16
    IV.
    In summary, having conducted a de novo review, we, like the Law
    Division, conclude that there are no grounds to vacate the arbitration award in
    this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the June 21, 2023 Law Division order ,
    which denied the City's application to vacate the arbitrator's award and, instead,
    confirmed the award.
    Affirmed.
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    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3557-22

Filed Date: 7/11/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/11/2024