Akansha Singh v. Soulcycle, Inc. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0732-22
AKANSHA SINGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SOULCYCLE, INC. and
SOULCYCLE SHORT HILLS,
LLC,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued September 28, 2023 – Decided July 15, 2024
Before Judges Vernoia and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-6565-19.
Denise Campbell argued the cause for appellant
(Campbell Legal Associates, PLLC, attorneys; Denise
Campbell, on the briefs).
David N. Kittredge argued the cause for respondents
(LaRocca Hornik Rosen & Greenberg, LLP, attorneys;
David N. Kittredge, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this personal-injury action, plaintiff Akansha Singh alleges that she fell
from a stationary exercise bike during a cycling class at an exercise studio
owned and operated by defendants SoulCycle, Inc. and SoulCycle Short Hills,
LLC. She appeals from an order granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissing her complaint with prejudice. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
I.
We summarize the material facts gleaned from our analysis of the parties'
submissions to the motion court under Rule 4:46-2, viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in her favor. See Crisitello v. St. Theresa Sch., 255 N.J.
200, 218 (2023).
On September 9, 2017, plaintiff enrolled in a cycling class at defendants'
studio. Defendants required that plaintiff sign a document titled in part as a
"WAIVER and RELEASE" (the 2017 waiver) prior to her participation in the
cycling class that day. Four years earlier, on December 19, 2013, plaintiff had
signed a separate document, titled "NEW RIDER WAIVER FORM" (the 2013
waiver), provided by defendants. The 2013 waiver stated it was for an
"indefinite" term.
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On September 9, 2017, plaintiff participated in a cycling class at
defendants' studio. The class, "led by instructor Kylie Butler, consisted of two
portions: the riding portion, which lasted [forty-five] minutes, and then the post-
ride stretch portion."
Prior to the start of the class, defendants had provided "[p]laintiff cycling
shoes, which . . . were secured by velcro straps." After placing her feet in the
shoes and securing them with the straps, plaintiff "securely clipped" the shoes
"into the pedals of the stationary indoor bike selected by [p]laintiff." Plaintiff
completed the riding portion of the class "without incident." The class then
transitioned to the post-ride stretch portion, "which targeted the hamstrings."
"The post-ride stretch portion . . . was performed while the . . . [c]lass
participants were still sitting on their bikes, and by unclipping one shoe [from
the bike pedal] and stretching one leg at a time." When riders had "difficulty
unclipping" the shoes from the bike pedals, defendants' instructors offered the
riders "an alternative method" for disengaging their feet from their attachment
to the bike pedals.
Defendants' employee Kristen Mitton "testified that riders 'can slip their
foot right out of the shoe' if they are unable to un-clip" the shoe from the bike
pedal. Plaintiff, however, "was unable to unclip her left shoe from her bike's
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pedal," and Butler "noticed" the difficulty plaintiff was having unclipping the
shoe from the pedal. "Butler had actual notice of this problem with the shoes
worn by other riders in her classes," but the parties dispute how "common" or
"uncommon" the problem had been for riders that had attended classes at the
studio.
Butler testified that "consistent with" her training, she instructed plaintiff
"to remove her foot from the shoe and perform the stretch without the shoe on ."
In accordance with Butler's instruction, plaintiff removed her left foot from the
shoe and "stretched her left hamstring for several minutes . . . , following which
it was time for the class to switch to the right hamstring stretch." "Plaintiff
followed the same procedure that she had . . . with her left foot" and, with her
left foot no longer in the shoe clipped to the left pedal, she "began to remove her
[right] foot from the cycling shoe." As she did so, "she fell off the side of the
bike." Thus, "[a]t the moment she fell off the bike, [p]laintiff was sitting on the
bike, leaning over to the right and attempting to take her right foot out of the
shoe[] while he[r] left foot was already out of the left shoe and both shoes were
attached . . . to the pedals." Plaintiff suffered significant personal injuries from
her fall.
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"Following [p]laintiff's accident, the bike that [p]laintiff had been riding
(which was identified as 'Bike #47') was immediately inspected for any
problems by [defendants'] personnel and cleared for use by other [of defendants']
guests in the ordinary course of business." "On September 20, 2017,
[defendants] received correspondence from [p]laintiff's counsel asking that Bike
#47 and the shoes that [p]laintiff [had used] be retained." "By that
point . . . Bike #47 had been used . . . for other cycling sessions, such that it is
unknown whether the handlebar and saddle" had been adjusted following
plaintiff's injury.
After defendants had received correspondence from plaintiff's counsel,
they removed Bike #47 "from operation, and stored it in its warehouse for
approximately four years while" this litigation was pending. Plaintiff's liability
expert, Alan Coté, "inspected and tested Bike #47" on October 15, 2021.
Plaintiff's counsel had also requested that defendants preserve the studio's
"surveillance video" footage from the date of plaintiff's injury, but the letter
"arrived on a date that was subsequent to the seven-to-ten-day period that"
defendants preserved surveillance video footage before it was "automatically
overwritten by the recording system's technology."
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Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims against defendants for
negligence, negligent spoliation of evidence, and fraudulent concealment of
evidence. Defendants filed an answer, the parties engaged in discovery, and
defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed opposition to the
motion and the court heard argument.
In a decision from the bench, the court first rejected plaintiff's contention
the motion should be denied because it had not been made returnable more than
thirty-days prior to the then-scheduled trial date as required under Rule 4:46-1.
In its decision, the court noted the trial date that had been in place when the
motion was filed had been adjourned and, at the time argument on the summary-
judgment motion was heard, the scheduled trial was three months away. The
court reasoned that any grounds to object to the motion based on untimeliness
under Rule 4:46-1 that existed when the motion was filed were no longer extant
and it explained it would therefore address the motion on the merits.
The court further accepted defendants' contention that plaintiff's claims
were barred under the 2013 and 2017 waivers plaintiff had executed prior to
participating in the cycling class in which she was injured. The court found the
waivers valid and enforceable against plaintiff based on the principles
established by the Supreme Court in Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC, 203
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N.J. 286 (2010), plaintiff was injured while "engaged in an activity that is
exactly what was envisioned by the waiver," and plaintiff therefore had waived
her right to assert any ordinary negligence claims against defendants.
The court further determined the evidence did not support a claim that
plaintiff's injuries were the result of gross negligence, such that the waivers did
not bar plaintiff's claims against defendants under Stelluti. The court found
there was no evidence of "a reckless or extreme deviation" from the standard of
care defendants owed plaintiff and "absent that, . . . a reasonable jury would
[not] be able to find gross negligence in this case."
The court entered an order granting defendants summary judgment and
dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
II.
We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standard as the trial court. Crisitello, 255 N.J. at 218. That standard
requires that we "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Branch v.
Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
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"Summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'"
Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "We owe no deference to conclusions of
law that flow from established facts." Crisitello, 255 N.J. at 218 (citing State v.
Perini Corp., 221 N.J. 412, 425 (2015)).
"A dispute of material fact is 'genuine only if, considering the burden of
persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together
with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would
require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Gayles by Gayles v. Sky
Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Grande
v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)). "Rule 4:46-2(c)'s 'genuine
issue [of] material fact' standard mandates that the opposing party do more than
'point[] to any fact in dispute' in order to defeat summary judgment." Globe
Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (alterations in original) (quoting
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995)). Insubstantial
arguments based on assumptions or speculation are not enough to overcome
summary judgment. Brill, 142 N.J. at 529. "'[C]onclusory and self-serving
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assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome' a motion for
summary judgment." Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522,
533 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005)).
Plaintiff makes three arguments in support of her challenge to the court's
summary-judgment order. First, she contends the court erred by finding the
2013 waiver and 2017 waiver are enforceable against her under the principles
explained by the Court in Stelluti. Second, she contends the court erred by
applying the incorrect legal standard in its determination plaintiff lacked
evidence establishing defendants had committed gross negligence. Last,
plaintiff argues the court erred by rejecting her claim defendants' motion was
untimely filed under Rule 4:46-1 and should have been denied for that reason.
We reject plaintiff's argument based on the alleged untimeliness of the
filing of defendants' summary-judgment motion as without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We note only that
we discern no basis to conclude the court abused its discretion by determining
it was appropriate to address the merits of the important issues presented by the
motion in the absence of any showing plaintiff had suffered prejudice by the
timeliness of the filing. See generally Tyler v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting
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Ass'n, 228 N.J. Super. 463, 467-68 (App. Div. 1988); see also R. 1:1-2(a). We
consider plaintiff's remaining arguments in turn.
Plaintiff contends the waivers she executed in 2013 and 2017 are invalid
and unenforceable under the principles established by the Court in Stelluti.
More particularly, plaintiff argues the waivers she signed are distinguishable
from the waiver the Court in Stelluti found enforceable such that she is entitled
to proceed on her ordinary negligence claims against defendants. Plaintiff also
argues the waivers do not bar her claims because she was not engaged in
strenuous activity involving an inherent risk of injury at the time she was
injured.
"As a general and long-standing matter, contracting parties are afforded
the liberty to bind themselves as they see fit." Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 302 (citing
Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931)).
Nonetheless, "[c]ontracts that purport to exculpate a party from its future
carelessness are subject to special rules." Marcinczyk v. State of N.J. Police
Training Comm'n, 203 N.J. 586, 593 (2010). Exculpatory agreements that
absolve a party from future wrongdoing are generally disfavored "essentially
because they violate the aims underlying our tort law: deterrence of careless
behavior and compensation by the wrongdoer for injuries sustained by victims."
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Ibid. "Such contracts are subjected to 'close judicial scrutiny.'" Vitale v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 247 (2017) (quoting Stelluti, 203 N.J. at
303).
Because an exculpatory agreement results in the relinquishment of a right
to seek relief from a party that is alleged to have breached "its common law duty
of care," to be enforceable, an exculpatory agreement "must, on its face, reflect
the unequivocal expression of the party giving up his or her legal rights that this
decision was made voluntarily, intelligently and with the full knowledge of its
legal consequences." Gershon v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J. Super.
237, 247 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003));
see also Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 304-05. "'Any doubts or ambiguities as to the scope
of the exculpatory language must be resolved against the drafter of the
agreement and in favor of affording legal relief.'" Marcinczyk, 203 N.J. at 593
(quoting Gershon, 368 N.J. Super. at 247). However, "[e]ven if unambiguous,"
an exculpatory agreement "will not be enforced where [it is] contrary to public
policy." Id. at 594 (citing Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 303).
In Stelluti, the Court, in part, considered the enforceability of an
exculpatory agreement—a "WAIVER & RELEASE FORM"—executed by the
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plaintiff as a condition of her membership in and use of the defendant's gym.
203 N.J. at 292-93. As recited by the Court, the agreement provided as follows:
Because physical exercise can be strenuous and subject
to risk of serious injury, the club urges you to obtain a
physical examination from a doctor before using any
exercise equipment or participating in any exercise
activity. You . . . agree that if you engage in any
physical exercise or activity, or use any club amenity
on the premises or off premises including any
sponsored club event, you do so entirely at your own
risk. Any recommendation for changes in diet
including the use of food supplements, weight
reduction and or body building enhancement products
are entirely your responsibility and you should consult
a physician prior to undergoing any dietary or food
supplement changes. You agree that you are
voluntarily participating in these activities and use of
these facilities and premises and assume all risks of
injury, illness, or death. We are also not responsible for
any loss of your personal property.
This waiver and release of liability includes, without
limitation, all injuries which may occur as a result of,
(a) your use of all amenities and equipment in the
facility and your participation in any activity, class,
program, personal training or instruction, (b) the
sudden and unforeseen malfunctioning of any
equipment, (c) our instruction, training, supervision, or
dietary recommendations, and (d) your slipping and/or
falling while in the club, or on the club premises,
including adjacent sidewalks and parking areas.
You acknowledge that you have carefully read this
"waiver and release" and fully understand that it is a
release of liability. You expressly agree to release and
discharge the health club, and all affiliates, employees,
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agents, representatives, successors, or assigns, from
any and all claims or causes of action and you agree to
voluntarily give up or waive any right that you may
otherwise have to bring a legal action against the club
for personal injury or property damage.
To the extent that statute or case law does not prohibit
releases for negligence, this release is also for
negligence on the part of the Club, its agents, and
employees.
If any portion of this release from liability shall be
deemed by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be
invalid, then the remainder of this release from liability
shall remain in full force and effect and the offending
provision or provisions severed here from.
By signing this release, I acknowledge that I understand
its content and that this release cannot be modified
orally.
....
[Id. at 293 (emphasis in original).]
The plaintiff in Stelluti suffered injuries when, during a cycling class, the
bike's handlebars dislodged and the plaintiff "fell forward while her feet
remained strapped to the pedals." Id. at 293-94. The plaintiff sued and the trial
court later granted the defendant summary judgment, in part based on the court's
determination the exculpatory agreement the plaintiff had signed was
enforceable and barred the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 297. We affirmed the trial
court's finding that the agreement was enforceable but rejected its finding that
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the agreement barred the plaintiff from asserting gross-negligence claims
against the defendant. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 408 N.J. Super. 435,
453-55 (App. Div. 2009). Based on public policy grounds, we limited the
enforceability of the waiver to the plaintiff's ordinary negligence claims against
the defendant. Id. at 457.
On the plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court explained the threshold issue
in determining whether an exculpatory agreement is enforceable is whether the
agreement "reflect[s]" the plaintiff's "unequivocal expression of . . . giving
up . . . her legal rights" and that the decision to do so was "made voluntarily,
intelligently and with the full knowledge of" her legal rights. Stelluti, 203 N.J.
at 304-05 (quoting Gershon, 368 N.J. Super. at 247). The Court then determined
the agreement included the requisite unequivocal expression of the waiver of the
plaintiff's rights such that it supported a finding she had waived her rights
voluntarily, intelligently, and with full knowledge of those rights. Id. at 305.
More particularly, the Court noted the agreement explicitly stated that it
covered the malfunctioning of equipment, the use of all equipment, and the
participation in classes. Ibid. The Court further noted the agreement expressly
provided that it "covered" the defendant's "negligence," stating "'this release is
also for negligence on the part of the [defendant], its agents, and employees. '"
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Ibid. The Court also explained the agreement included terms limiting the
defendant's liability, such as: "'entirely at your own risk,' 'assume all risks,' and
'release of liability,'" that had been "set forth prominently" in the agreement.
Ibid.Also finding the plaintiff had signed the agreement and had not made any
claims of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, the Court determined the
agreement was enforceable as written. Ibid. However, the Court further
explained it was also required to determine if the agreement otherwise
implicated a matter of public interest, or included a putative waiver of a claim
the defendant had breached a duty it had a legal obligation to perform, such that
the agreement should be deemed unenforceable on those bases. Id. at 305-06.
And the Court held that contractual provisions providing for a waiver of claims
founded on reckless or gross negligence are unenforceable on public-policy
grounds. Id. at 311-13.
Here, we first address, as the Court did in Stelluti, the threshold question
of whether the 2013 and 2017 waivers signed by plaintiff are enforceable
exculpatory agreements. See id. at 304-05 For the reasons we explain, we have
determined they are not.
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The parties do not dispute that plaintiff executed the 2013 waiver and the
2017 waiver and that the waivers govern our disposition of defendants'
contention they jointly constitute an exculpatory contract barring the claims
asserted in plaintiff's complaint. 1 As noted, the 2013 waiver is titled, "NEW
RIDER WAIVER FORM," and the language setting forth the putative agreement
is preceded by the following subtitle, "ASSUMPTION OF RISK, WAIVER,
AND RELEASE." The text reads as follows:
By signing up for and/or attending classes, events,
activities, and other programs and using the premises,
facilities and equipment (individually and/or
collectively, the "Classes and Facilities") of SoulCycle
Holdings, LLC and its subsidiaries (collectively,
"SoulCycle"), I hereby acknowledge on behalf of
myself, my heirs, personal representatives and/or
assigns, that there are certain inherent risks and dangers
in indoor cycling and exercise equipment in association
with the Classes and Facilities. I acknowledge that
some of these risks cannot be eliminated regardless of
the care taken to avoid injuries. I also acknowledge that
1
We recognize plaintiff in the first two counts of her complaint asserts
negligence claims and in the third count she alleges defendants engaged in
fraudulent conduct. Neither party argues that distinction among the causes of
action in the complaint should affect the disposition of the issues presented on
appeal. We therefore do not address the distinction, see Drinker Biddle & Reath
LLP v. N.J. Dep't of L. & Pub. Safety, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 496 n.5 (App. Div.
2011) (explaining issues that are not addressed in a party's initial merits brief on
appeal are deemed abandoned), other than to note our determination that the
2013 and 2017 waivers are unenforceable exculpatory agreements renders any
issues related to the distinction among the asserted causes of action moot for
purposes of this appeal.
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the specific risks vary from one activity to another, but
range from (1) minor injuries such as scratches, bruises,
and sprains; (2) major injuries such as eye injury or loss
of sight, joint or back injuries, heart attacks, and
concussions; and (3) catastrophic injuries including
paralysis and death. I have read and thoroughly
understand the SoulCycle Bike Safety Instructions that
are posted on SoulCycle's website (www.soul-
cycle.com), a hard copy of which was also provided to
me by SoulCycle staff. At all times, I shall comply with
all stated and customary terms, posted safety signs,
rules, and verbal instructions given to me by staff. If in
the subjective opinion of the SoulCycle staff, I would
be at physical risk participating in SoulCycle's Classes,
I understand and agree that I may be denied access to
the Classes and Facilities until I furnish SoulCycle with
an opinion letter from my medical doctor, at my sole
cost and expense, specifically addressing SoulCycle's
concerns and stating that SoulCycle's concerns are
unfounded. In consideration of being allowed to
participate in and access the Classes and Facilities, I
hereby (1) agree to assume full responsibility for any
and all injuries or damage which are sustained or
aggravated by me in relation to the Classes and
Facilities, (2) release, indemnify, and hold harmless
SoulCycle, its direct and indirect parent, subsidiary
affiliate entities, and each of their respective officers,
directors, members, employees, representatives and
agents, and each of their respective successors and
assigns and all others, from any and all responsibility,
claims, actions, suits, procedures, costs, expenses,
damages, and liabilities to the fullest extent allowed by
law arising out of or in any way related to participation
in the Classes or use of the Facilities, and (3) represent
that I (a) have no medical or physical condition that
would prevent me from properly using any of
SoulCycle's Classes and Facilities, (b) do not have a
physical or mental condition that would put me in any
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physical or medical danger, and (c) have not been
instructed by a physician to not participate in physical
exercise. I acknowledge that if I have any chronic
disabilities or conditions, I am at risk in using
SoulCycle's Classes and Facilities, and should not be
participating in any Classes.
I have read this Assumption of Risk, Waiver, and
Release Agreement, fully understand its terms, and
understand that I am giving up substantial rights
including my right to sue SoulCycle under certain
circumstances. I acknowledge that I am signing this
waiver freely and voluntarily. The term of this waiver
is indefinite.
[(Emphasis added).]
On the day of her accident and injuries, plaintiff signed the 2017 waiver
that effectively repeats, with minor variations, some of the language in the 2013
waiver. The 2017 waiver reads as follows:
By signing up for and/or attending SoulCycle classes,
activities and other programs, and using SoulCycle's
premises, facilities, and equipment (collectively,
Classes and Facilities), you hereby agree that there are
certain inherent risks and dangers in indoor cycling and
exercise and in using indoor cycling and exercise
equipment in association with the Classes and
Facilities. In consideration of being allowed to
participate in and access the Classes and Facilities
provided by SoulCycle, in addition to the payment of
any fee or charge, you hereby (1) agree to assume full
responsibility for any and all injuries or damage which
are sustained or aggravated by you in relation to the
Classes and Facilities, (2) waive, release and forever
discharge SoulCycle, its officers, agents, members,
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employees, representatives, and all others from any and
all responsibility, claims, rights, causes of action and/or
liability from injuries or damages to your person or
property resulting from your participation in and use of
the Classes and Facilities, and (3) represent you have
no medical or physical condition which would prevent
you from attending and/or using any of SoulCycle's
Classes and Facilities and/or put you in any physical or
medical danger, and have not been instructed by a
physician not to do so. SoulCycle hereby advises you
that individuals with any chronic disabilities or
conditions are at risk in using SoulCycle's Classes and
Facilities, and are advised against doing so. In
addition, if in the opinion of SoulCycle staff, you would
be at physical risk using SoulCycle's Classes and
Facilities, you will be denied access to SoulCycle and
its Classes and Facilities until you furnish SoulCycle
with an opinion letter from your medical doctor, at your
sole cost and expense, specifically addressing
SoulCycle's concerns, and stating that SoulCycle's
concerns are unfounded. If you decline to obtain such
a letter, you will not be permitted to use the Classes and
Facilities of SoulCycle.
[(Emphasis added).]
The waivers signed by plaintiff include language similar to some of the
provisions own which the Court in Stelluti relied to support its conclusion the
exculpatory agreement there constituted an enforceable waiver of the plaintiff's
right to bring ordinary negligence claims against the defendant. For example,
like in Stelluti, the 2013 and 2017 waivers state that plaintiff assumed full
responsibility for any and all injuries she sustained while in the class and while
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using defendants' facilities and that she released defendants from all
responsibility, claims, and liability for injuries she sustained while in a class or
while using defendants' facilities. See Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 305.
Those provisions, however, do not constitute the requisite "'unequivocal
expression'" that plaintiff gave up her rights to sue defendant for ordinary
negligence when they are viewed in the context of the other language in the
waivers. Id. at 304-05. In the first instance, unlike in Stelluti, the waivers do
not "explicitly" address or "cover[] negligence." Id. at 305. That is, the waivers
do not affirmatively state that plaintiff waived her right to bring negligence
claims against defendant.
We do not suggest such language is required in every instance for an
exculpatory contract to be enforceable. But the failure to expressly refer to
negligence claims here is, in our view, misleading by omission. That is because
the 2013 and 2017 waivers introduce the waiver language—and provide the
context for it—by stating "there are certain inherent risks and dangers in indoor
cycling and exercise equipment in association with the Classes and Facilities ."
Stated differently, the language on which defendant relies is presented in the
2013 and 2017 waivers in the context of the "inherent risks and dangers in indoor
cycling and exercise equipment," but we find no basis in the law or logic for a
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conclusion that defendants' alleged negligence constitutes an "inherent risk" in
a cycling class or the use of a stationary exercise bike. To the contrary, there is
nothing inherent in the use of exercise equipment or in exercise itself that
includes the negligence of the equipment owner or the leader of an exercise
class. And, again, unlike the waiver in Stelluti, neither the 2013 nor 2017 waiver
make reference to "malfunctioning . . . equipment[,]" ibid., as presenting one of
the risks of injury for which plaintiff assumed the risk and released all claims.
There is a separate but equally dispositive reason the 2013 and 2017
waivers do not constitute "unequivocal expression[s,]" id. at 304-05, of
plaintiff's knowing and voluntary right to sue defendant for ordinary negligence.
The 2013 waiver is expressly equivocal and vague about plaintiff's right to sue
defendant.
At its end, and after all the putative waiver language, the 2013 waiver
provides that plaintiff acknowledges that she is "giving up substantial rights
including [her] right to sue [defendants] under certain circumstances."
(Emphasis added.) The waiver does not define those circumstances, and a plain
reading of that language requires the conclusion that despite the putative waiver
language that defendants claim bars plaintiff's ordinary negligence claims, the
agreement defendants' drafted expressly reserved for plaintiff the authority to
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sue defendants under certain circumstances. That is hardly an unequivocal
waiver of plaintiff's right to sue defendants.
Moreover, the absence of any express provision in the waivers barring a
negligence suit, like there was in Stelluti, id. at 305, has additional significance
because had such language been included in the 2013 waiver, it might be
concluded the "certain circumstances" for which the 2013 waiver permitted
plaintiff to sue did not include negligence. In the absence of any express waiver
of negligence claims in the 2013 and 2017 waivers, like the language in the
waiver on which the Court relied in part in Stelluti, no similar conclusion may
be reached here.
There is no reasonable interpretation of the language authorizing plaintiff
to sue under certain circumstances that permits a determination the waivers
unequivocally barred plaintiff from bringing a suit for ordinary negligence
against defendants. The 2013 waiver is wholly ambiguous in that, on the one
hand, it purports to provide that plaintiff assumes all responsibility of any
injuries she sustains at the studio and releases defendants from all claims and
liability for those injuries, while, at the same time, it expressly provides that she
gave up her "substantial right . . . to sue" defendants, but only "under certain
circumstances." There is nothing unequivocal about that.
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For those reasons, we are convinced the 2013 and 2017 waivers are
unenforceable because they do not reflect an "unequivocal expression" that
plaintiff waived her right to bring the claims in her complaint against defendants,
and, as such, we cannot conclude she made a decision to forfeit that right
"voluntarily, intelligently and with the full knowledge of its legal
consequences." Gershon, 368 N.J. Super. at 247 (citing Knorr, 178 N.J. at 177).
The 2013 waiver effectively reserved for plaintiff a right to sue defendants
"under certain circumstances," and the "'ambiguit[y] as to the scope of'" that
reservation within the putative exculpatory contracts "'must be resolved against
the drafter[s] of the agreement[, defendants,] and in favor of affording legal
relief'" to plaintiff. Marcinczyk, 203 N.J. at 593 (quoting Gershon, 368 N.J.
Super. at 247). We therefore reverse the court's summary-judgment order and
remand for further proceedings on the claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint.
Because we conclude the 2013 and 2017 waivers do not bar plaintiff's
causes of action against defendants, it is unnecessary to address or decide
plaintiff's contention that she had otherwise presented sufficient evidence in
opposition to defendants' summary-judgment motion to support a cause of action
for reckless or gross negligence against defendants. See generally Stelluti, 203
N.J. at 311-13.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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