ERIC APPERMAN VS. VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION OF WESTFIELD(DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5446-15T3
    ERIC APPERMAN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION
    OF WESTFIELD,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    Argued October 11, 2017 - Decided October 30, 2017
    Before Judges Yannotti, Carroll and Leone.
    On appeal from New Jersey Department of Labor
    & Workforce Development, Division of Workers'
    Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2004-12557.
    Pablo N. Blanco argued the cause for appellant
    (Livingston DiMarzio, LLP, attorneys; Mr.
    Blanco, on the brief).
    David P. Kendall argued the cause for
    respondent    (New    Jersey    Manufacturers
    Insurance Co., attorneys; Ann DeBellis, of
    counsel; Mr. Kendall and Brittney Kern, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this workers' compensation case, the judge of compensation
    interpreted N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 to limit the payment of dependency
    benefits to an incapacitated adult child to 450 weeks.          On appeal,
    petitioner Eric Apperman challenges that interpretation, which
    resulted in the denial of his application to enforce a settlement
    order that would have continued benefits to his disabled adult son
    beyond the statutory 450-week period. For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    I.
    The essential facts are undisputed.           Phyllis Apperman was
    employed   by   respondent   Visiting     Nurse   Association    when   she
    tragically died in a motor vehicle accident in December 2003.
    Respondent was insured by New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co.
    (NJM) for workers' compensation and admitted the fatal accident
    was work related.
    Phyllis was survived by her husband, Eric, and their adult
    disabled son, Harold.    Harold was thirty-four years old when the
    accident   occurred,   and   had   been   adjudicated   an   incapacitated
    person in 1988.
    Eric Apperman filed a claim petition in April 2004, seeking
    dependency benefits for himself and Harold.         The parties reached
    a negotiated settlement on February 23, 2007.            On the record,
    NJM's counsel stated:
    Your Honor, this is a dependency claim where
    dependency benefits had been paid to [Eric]
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    who has since remarried and his claim has been
    completed.
    However, we are here today as he [has]
    requested benefits for his son as a dependent,
    and we do stipulate that the son is
    incompetent and should receive dependency
    benefits at the amount of [fifty] percent of
    Phyllis Apperman's wages of $800. So, he will
    get $400 per week for 450 weeks and continuing
    as long as he remains incompetent. Payments
    shall date back to March 4, 2005.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    The    compensation   judge   entered    an   order   approving   the
    settlement.   The order contained an executed addendum stating that
    Harold's dependency benefits "shall continue for 450 weeks and
    shall be paid thereafter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b) et seq."
    NJM terminated Harold's dependency benefits on October 17,
    2013, after 450 weeks of payment.            On February 25, 2014, NJM
    notified Eric that "[n]o further benefits are payable at this
    time."
    Eric then filed an application to enforce the order of
    settlement and compel NJM to resume payment of Harold's dependency
    benefits.     Eric argued that the terms of the settlement were
    specifically negotiated to protect Harold for life, and that both
    parties interpreted the dependency statute to provide for lifetime
    dependency benefits.    NJM opposed the application, arguing it had
    no legal obligation to pay dependency benefits past the statutory
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    450-week period, and that inclusion of the language regarding
    continued benefits thereafter was a mistake of law.
    Because   the   compensation       judge    who    approved    the     2007
    settlement   had   retired,   the   matter      was    assigned    to   another
    compensation judge, who denied the application.               In a detailed
    written opinion, the judge found that N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 controlled
    the payment of dependency benefits, and "reveal[ed] no provision
    whatsoever for the extension of the 450[-]week dependency benefit
    period for a disabled child."       Although the judge was "persuaded
    that the plain language of the statute as written does not provide
    for [lifetime] dependency benefits to an incapacitated child," she
    looked to the legislative history of the Workers' Compensation Act
    since its initial adoption in 1911.          The judge "conclude[d] that
    the [L]egislature has repeatedly amended this statute to increase
    benefits. None of these amendments address[] the issue of lifetime
    benefits for incapacitated children . . . [and] there was no
    legislative intent to create such a benefit."
    The compensation judge further noted that N.J.S.A. 34:15-
    12(b) addresses benefits payable to an injured employee and not
    his or her dependents.    As such, the judge found the reference to
    that statute in the addendum to the settlement order was erroneous,
    and "that NJM's agreement to pay dependency benefits to Harold
    4                                   A-5446-15T3
    Apperman post the 450 weeks and continuing as long as he remains
    incompetent was a mistake of law."         This appeal followed.
    II.
    Our review of factual findings by a judge of compensation is
    limited.    Renner v. AT&T, 
    218 N.J. 435
    , 448 (2014) (citing Close
    v.   Kordulak   Bros.,   
    44 N.J. 589
    ,    599   (1965)).   "However,
    'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
    from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'"
    
    Ibid. (quoting Manalapan Realty,
    L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
    
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995)).       Both parties agree that this case
    turns on an issue of law, namely the interpretation of N.J.S.A.
    34:15-13(i) and (j) regarding the payment of dependency benefits
    to an incapacitated adult.      Accordingly, our review is de novo.
    Williams v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 
    449 N.J. Super. 559
    , 562
    (App. Div. 2017) (citing Sentinel Ins. Co. v. Earthworks Landscape
    Constr., L.L.C., 
    421 N.J. Super. 480
    , 485-86 (App. Div. 2011)).
    In determining the meaning of a statute, as we are required
    to do here, the first step is always to consider its plain
    language.    Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 
    193 N.J. 558
    , 568
    (2008).    We construe that language in light of the entire statute
    and the overall statutory scheme.            Cty. of Bergen Emp. Benefit
    Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 
    412 N.J. Super. 126
    , 132 (App. Div. 2010).      "When the language in a statute 'is
    5                            A-5446-15T3
    clear   and     unambiguous,      and     susceptible    to    only     one
    interpretation,' we presume the Legislature meant what it said and
    that the plain meaning governs."          
    Ibid. (quoting Burnett v.
    Cty.
    of Bergen, 
    198 N.J. 408
    , 421 (2009)).
    N.J.S.A. 34:15-13, in pertinent part, provides:
    (i) In computing compensation to those
    [dependents] named in this section . . . only
    those under 18 or over 40 years of age shall
    be included[,] and then[,] only for that
    period in which they are under 18 or over 40;
    provided, however, that payments to such
    physically or mentally deficient persons as
    are for such reason dependent shall be made
    during the full compensation period of 450
    weeks.
    (j) The compensation shall be paid, in the
    case of a surviving spouse . . . during the
    entire period of survivorship or until such
    surviving spouse shall remarry and, in the
    case of other dependents, during 450 weeks and
    if at the expiration of 450 weeks there shall
    be one or more dependents under 18 years of
    age, compensation shall be continued for such
    dependents until they reach [the age of
    majority].
    [(Emphasis added).]
    On appeal, Eric Apperman argues that under N.J.S.A. 34:15-
    13, Harold is entitled to continued dependency benefits for as
    long as he is disabled.       He recognizes that the statute does not
    explicitly    provide   for    benefits    for   life,   but   argues   the
    Legislature's use of the phrase "full compensation period" was a
    reference to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b).           He contends that otherwise
    6                              A-5446-15T3
    there would be an unintentional omission in the statute because
    subsection (i) permits payment of dependency benefits to both
    minor children and mentally or physically deficient persons, while
    subsection (j) provides for continuation of benefits beyond 450
    weeks for minor dependents who continue in minority but not for
    adult    children      who     remain      incapacitated.           Eric   contends        the
    Legislature      did    not     intend      to      terminate    benefits       for     adult
    incompetent dependents such as Harold based on this gap in the
    statute.
    Eric's argument fails to recognize that "[t]he court's task
    is to construe the [statute] as written."                         U.S. Bank, N.A. v.
    Hough, 
    210 N.J. 187
    , 199 (2012).                       As written, section 13(j)
    unambiguously limits dependency benefits for dependents (including
    incapacitated dependents) still above the age of majority to 450
    weeks,   while    section          13(i)   allows      benefits     for    incapacitated
    dependents still under the age of majority at the close of 450
    weeks    to   continue        until       the    age   of   majority       is   attained.
    Furthermore, the phrase "the full compensation period of 450 weeks"
    does not confer benefits beyond 450 weeks, or refer to N.J.S.A.
    34:15-12(b),           which        addresses          injured        employees            not
    dependents.       Based       on    the     statute's       plain    language,         Eric's
    contention regarding a statutory omission warrants no further
    discussion.
    7                                     A-5446-15T3
    We     further   conclude   that   this   interpretation   of   the
    dependency statute does not conflict with the overall statutory
    scheme embodied in the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-
    1 to -142 (the Act).    As Eric correctly points out, because of its
    remedial nature, the Act must be construed liberally.           Wood v.
    Jackson Twp., 
    383 N.J. Super. 250
    , 253 (App. Div. 2006) (citation
    omitted).    Nonetheless, in Wood we further observed:
    The Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) is
    "humane social legislation designed to place
    the cost of a work connected injury upon the
    employer who may readily provide for it as an
    operating expense." . . . Thus, the Act has
    consistently     been    accorded     liberal
    construction. That being said, the preference
    toward liberal construction must nevertheless
    "be constrained by the plain meaning of the
    statute and the underlying purpose of the
    legislature."
    [Id. at 253-54 (emphasis added) (citations
    omitted).]
    We have also recently observed that:
    It is, of course, axiomatic that "the Workers'
    Compensation    Court    [now   Division]   is
    statutory,    with    limited   jurisdiction."
    Connolly v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 
    317 N.J. Super. 315
    , 318 (App. Div. 1998).
    Because its jurisdiction is statutory, it "is
    limited to that granted by the Legislature and
    therefore 'cannot be inflated by consent,
    waiver, estoppel or judicial inclination.'"
    Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 
    360 N.J. Super. 324
    ,
    327 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Riccioni v.
    American Cyanamid Co., 
    26 N.J. Super. 1
    , 5
    (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    13 N.J. 289
                (1953)).
    8                           A-5446-15T3
    
    [Williams, supra
    , 449          N.J.    Super.     at    562
    (emphasis added).]
    The    compensation     judge    correctly       ruled        that    Harold's
    dependency benefits were limited to 450 weeks pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    34:15-13.    Neither party has cited any authority, nor have we
    found any, that would confer jurisdiction on the Division of
    Workers'    Compensation    to    sanction     the   payment       of     dependency
    benefits for a period exceeding that authorized by statute.                         In
    our view, it is irrelevant whether the settlement agreement that
    permitted   continuation     of   those    benefits    beyond       the    450-week
    period was borne out of respondent's benevolent generosity or the
    parties' mutual mistake of law.
    In either event, both parties agree the compensation judge
    lacked authority to enforce a settlement order that would extend
    Harold's benefits beyond the statutory limit.                 See, e.g., Lynch
    v. Newark, 
    43 N.J. Super. 546
    , 550 (Cty. Ct. 1957) (stating "the
    balancing of equities has no place in this dispute.                 The Workmens'
    Compensation    Division    is    a   purely      statutory    tribunal        whose
    jurisdiction has been precisely defined by the Legislature.                         No
    equity jurisdiction was conferred to it[.]").
    Under the terms of the settlement, Harold concededly received
    the maximum amount of dependency benefits authorized by law during
    the 450-week period.       The sole relief Eric sought was to enforce
    9                                     A-5446-15T3
    the settlement order and compel NJM to continue paying dependency
    benefits to Harold.     Notably, Eric does not seek to void the
    settlement agreement predicated on the parties' mutual mistake of
    law or on any other basis. In any event, even were Eric successful
    in voiding the settlement, ultimately Harold could not receive
    more than the 450 weeks of dependency benefits at $400 per week
    he has already been paid in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-13.
    We are not insensitive to the fact that Harold remains
    incapacitated, and the result we reach effectively terminates his
    dependency benefits.   We are sympathetic, but the judiciary is not
    at liberty to subordinate the requirements of the law to the
    natural influences of sentiment and benevolence.     Thus, any gap
    or omission in N.J.S.A. 34:15-13, which Eric urges us to correct,
    is best left to the Legislature to address.
    Affirmed.
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