State of New Jersey v. Margaret Austin ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3440-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARGARET AUSTIN,
a/k/a MARGARET A. AUSTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted September 12, 2024 – Decided September 17, 2024
Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Municipal Appeal No.
23-2.
The Law Office of Nicholas A. Moschella, Jr., LLC,
attorneys for appellant (Nicholas A. Moschella, Jr., on
the brief).
John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Terence J. Ford, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Margaret Austin appeals from a June 1, 2023 order denying her
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
In 2015, defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). She
appeared before a municipal court judge, pled guilty to the offense, and was
subsequently sentenced. At the plea hearing, the State placed on the record that
defendant's blood alcohol concentration was 0.05%, and she was unable to safely
operate a motor vehicle because of alcohol and prescription medication in her
system. The State noted defense counsel had provided evidence showing
defendant had a valid prescription at the time of the offense.
The municipal court judge addressed defendant directly and she admitted
she consumed an "[a]irplane miniature [size bottle] of alcohol[,]" which affected
her ability to operate a motor vehicle. Defendant told the judge, she: understood
she was pleading guilty to a DWI; had an opportunity to discuss her plea with
defense counsel who "[t]horoughly" answered all of her questions; was satisfied
with her attorney's services and advice; and was entering the plea freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily.
In 2021, defendant was charged with a new DWI offense. In 2022, she
filed her PCR petition asking the municipal court to vacate her 2015 plea,
claiming there was an insufficient factual basis and ineffective assistance of
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counsel. The municipal court denied the petition and defendant appealed. Judge
Jonathan W. Romankow heard the appeal and denied it in a written opinion.
Defendant argued there was excusable neglect for her failure to file the
PCR petition within the five-year time-period required by Rule 7:10-2. She
asked the court to relax the time-period because her due process rights would be
violated if the plea stood because there was an insufficient factual basis. She
claimed the municipal judge failed to address: the elements of the DWI offense,
the probity of field sobriety tests, the amount of alcohol she ingested, and
whether it impaired her ability to operate a vehicle. Also, defense counsel was
ineffective because defendant had inadequate time to meet with her to discuss
the defense before entering the plea, which rendered the plea invalid since it was
not entered knowingly or intelligently. And for the first time, defendant argued
her plea was invalid because the municipal judge failed to place her under oath
before accepting her plea.
Judge Romankow found defendant had "not presented any facts,
explanation, reason or excuse whatsoever as to why she waited almost seven
years to file the PCR" petition. Defendant alleged no facts showing "she would
suffer an injustice . . . a serious question about her guilt, or the propriety of the
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sentence she received . . . ." The petition's bare allegations were not grounds to
overcome or relax the time limitations in Rule 7:10-2(b)(2).
Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the judge reached the merits of
defendant's petition. He rejected her claim there was an inadequate factual basis
for the plea and carefully recited the evidence adduced by the State, as well as
defendant's colloquy with the municipal judge, which "encompassed all the
essential elements of DWI." Defendant's admissions that she had consumed
alcohol prior to operating a vehicle and that her ability to operate a vehicle was
affected by the alcohol and prescription drugs in her system "was all that was
necessary to support a valid guilty plea to DWI." The claim the municipal judge
erred because he did not place defendant under oath was not raised in the
municipal court and was barred by Rule 7:10-2(d)(1). The argument was also
rejected because an oath was not required by Rule 7:6-2(a)(1), and defendant
"failed to provide any facts, argument, caselaw, or anything else to support her
contention that the absence of an oath should result in her guilty plea being
vacated."
Defendant failed to present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel because the claim she did not have enough time to meet with her
attorney to discuss her defense was based on "bald assertions, with no evidential
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support . . . ." The judge pointed out defendant had not certified to "specific
facts to support her claim." Her "allegations [were] belied by the plea transcript,
which reflect[ed] that she discussed the plea with her attorney, that her attorney
thoroughly answered all of her questions, and that she was satisfied with her
attorney's services."
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THE
PETITION FOR [PCR] WAS UNTIMELY AND
FAILED TO ENGAGE IN THE APPROPRIATE
ANALYSIS AS REQUIRED BY STATE V.
SLATER,[1] et. al.
POINT TWO
THE COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THE
ORIGINAL GUILTY PLEA OF DEFENDANT WAS
SUPPORTED BY AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL
BASIS.
POINT THREE
DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
To establish a PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must satisfy the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466
1
198 N.J. 145 (2009).
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U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State
v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). A prima facie case is established by first
"showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," and then proving they
suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.
To demonstrate "prejudice after having entered a guilty plea, a defendant
must prove 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[they] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"
State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200
N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). A defendant must show that, "had [they] been properly
advised, it would have been rational for [them] to decline the plea offer and
insist on going to trial and, in fact, that [they] probably would have done so."
State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011).
A defendant must "do more than make bald assertions that [they were]
denied the effective assistance of counsel" to establish a prima facie claim. State
v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). There must be a
"reasonable probability" the deficient performance affected the outcome of the
proceeding. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
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A PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401
(App. Div. 2013). We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo.
State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004).
Having considered defendant's arguments and the record pursuant to these
principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Romankow's
thorough and well-written opinion. The judge correctly determined defendant
did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or
grounds to vacate the plea. The record indisputably shows the plea proceeding
and the plea itself were valid, and we are unconvinced there was either an
injustice or violation of defendant's rights to warrant our intervention. The
arguments raised on appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in
a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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