In the Matter of the Application Of: Michael Marker, Etc. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1849-22
IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION OF:
MICHAEL MARKER
TO CHANGE THE NAME OF:
OWEN J. CAMAYA,
TO:
OWEN J. CAMAYA-MARKER.
___________________________
Submitted December 13, 2023 – Decided January 12, 2024
Before Judges Accurso and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FD-14-0190-23.
Manzi, Esptein, Lomurro & Decataldo, LLC, attorneys
for appellant Marie Camaya (Ashley Vallillo Manzi, of
counsel and on the briefs; Nikki T. Caruso, on the
briefs).
Jardim, Meisner & Susser, PC, attorneys for respondent
Michael Marker (Jessica Ragno Sprague, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Marie Camaya appeals from a January 18, 2023 order and judgment
granting Michael Marker's application to change the name of the parties' minor
child from "Owen James Camaya" to "Owen James Camaya-Marker."
Defendant argues the Family Part judge erred in failing to identify and analyze
the specific factors set forth in the governing case law to determine whether the
name change was in Owen's 1 best interest. We agree and thus reverse and
remand for a new hearing.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The parties are the parents of Owen
James Camaya-Marker (formerly Owen James Camaya) born October 6, 2018.
At the time of this application, Owen was four years old. The parties were never
married and only dated briefly while living in California.
By the time of Owen's birth, Marie had ceased communication with
Michael. Marie did not inform Micheal of Owen's birth, his name, or any other
information concerning Owen.
According to Michael, he discovered Owen had been born "through a
change in [defendant's] profile picture that is public on social media . . . ."
Michael maintains that he immediately attempted to reach Marie to no avail and
1
We refer to the parties and the minor child by their first names for eas e of
reference only and intend no disrespect.
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was therefore "denied the ability to participate in the choice of [Owen's]
name . . . ."
When Owen was approximately two years old, Marie relocated from
California to New Jersey with Owen. She did not inform Michael of her
intention to relocate to New Jersey and did not seek Michael's consent to remove
Owen from the State of California. It was not until January 2021 that Marie
officially told Michael that Owen had been born in October 2018 and that she
and Owen had relocated from California to New Jersey. Michael met Owen for
the first time on February 16, 2021.
At the time, Owen bore Marie's surname, Camaya. Upon learning that
Marie and Owen had moved to New Jersey, Michael relocated to New Jersey
and filed a complaint for joint legal custody and a legal name change specifically
to add his surname to Owen's existing surname so that the child's name would
include the surnames of both parents.
On June 21, 2022, the parties resolved the custody issues by entering into
a Custody and Parenting Time Agreement, wherein they agreed to joint legal
custody of Owen. On June 29, 2022, the judge entered an order incorporating
the parties' Custody and Parenting Time Agreement, terminated the order of
support because of the joint custody agreement, and further ordered that the
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name change issue would be addressed in a separate hearing.2 On January 18,
2023, the parties appeared and testified at the rescheduled name change hearing,
and the judge issued an oral opinion on that same date.
At the hearing, Marie testified that Owen had been diagnosed with autism
in August 2021 and presented the judge with Owen's occupational therapy
evaluations from May 17, 2021, June 2, 2021, June 14, 2021, and August 16,
2021, showing that "Owen present[ed] with underlying deficits with sensory
integration, sensory perception, reactivity and modulation as well as decreased
proximal stability and upper extremity interjoint coordination and distal
control." It was also noted in at least one of these reports that "[h]e has difficulty
with grasp patterns and manipulation of materials," and with respect to Owen's
social skills, one assessment further noted that:
Owen continues to have difficulties with social
communication, imitation and continues to be
inflexible in his play and with daily activities. He
seems to be very involved with numbers, letters,
spelling and humming. Today's observations are
concerning being "red flags" for [a]utism spectrum
disorder, however, Owen has little of repetitive
behaviors and he seems to communicate well with
mom, by looking at her, sharing his achievements,
checking in with her, making eye contact with her. He
2
On June 30, 2022, the judge denied Michael's first application for a legal name
change for Owen, without prejudice, finding it procedurally deficient because
plaintiff had failed to serve the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice .
A-1849-22
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does show restricted interests, ex. counting, or wanting
activities performed in a certain way, he has echolalia,
and he continues to engage in verbal self-stim behavior
(humming).
During the hearing, Marie testified that as a result of his autism, Owen
would struggle with the adjustment of a name change. In a colloquy with the
judge, Marie conveyed her belief there would be an adverse reaction or setback
as he was "going by Owen Camaya at school, by Owen Camaya with friends,
like, writing and all of those things . . ." and that "it will take a little bit for him
to fully understand and grasp why that's changing."
Referring to the results from medical testing and an evaluation he had
secured, Michael maintains that Owen is not autistic. He based his conclusion
on the neurological report prepared by doctors at the St. Barnabas Institute of
Neurology and Neurosurgery in September 2022. They determined that "Owen
is not autistic." The report concluded that Owen's "[s]ocialization and
conversational skills are very slightly delayed," yet "his interpersonal
communication skills, fine motor skills, and gross motor skills seem to be within
normal limits for age." According to the evaluating doctor's report, "suspicion
for autism spectrum disorder in Owen is low based on the history provided and
the exam conducted[.]" The report recommended plaintiff have Owen evaluated
for "possible high-functioning autism," which took place in October 2022. The
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summary report from that evaluation classified Owen as "non-spectrum" and
explained "that Owen's scores are within the range of a high proportion of the
participants with non-spectrum diagnoses," though he did "demonstrate[] a few
symptoms in the social affect category[.]" Plaintiff contends that Marie has
labeled Owen with a diagnosis he does not have, and that is unsupported by the
medical evidence. He attributes some of Owen's behaviors to Marie's influence
and interference and suggests that she contributes to Owen's anxiety.
In his brief opinion, the judge summarized the facts and applicable law
and addressed some, although not all, of the factors adopted in Emma v. Evans,
N.J. 197, 222 (2013), stating:
The [c]ourt notes that the parties have joint, legal, and
physical custody and parenting time is split fairly
evenly between the two parents. So the child identifies
with both family units. With respect to any potential
anxiety, embarrassment or discomfort, there has not
been anything provided to the [c]ourt that indicates that
any medical condition or any testimony by a medical
expert that a change in name would create potential
anxiety, embarrassment or discomfort. The child is not
old enough to express a preference to the name. The --
the [c]ourt does not find that there is any improper
motivation on Mr. Marker's part to -- to request this
name change. And so after reviewing all the factors,
after reviewing the testimony of, both, Mr. Marker and
Ms. Camaya, the [c]ourt finds that there is a good-faith
basis. This application has been made in good faith to
change the name and will grant the application to
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change the name of Owen J. Camaya to Owen J.
Camaya Marker.
The judge did not make any specific findings concerning Marie's claims
that Owen had been diagnosed with autism and the import of any such diagnosis,
if found, on the within application. Rather, the judge concluded that there was
"a good-faith basis" to grant Michael's application to add his surname to Owen's
existing surname, which was given to him by his mother at birth.
This appeal followed.
Appellate courts "review the Family Part judge's findings in accordance
with a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special jurisdiction
and expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-
83 (2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Those findings
are therefore binding on appeal "when supported by adequate, substantial,
credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12. Reversal occurs "only when a
mistake must have been made because the trial court's factual findings are 'so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. . . .'"
Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015)
(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
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(1974)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J.
Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020).
"Today, 'the best interests of the child' is the applicable standard
governing most decisions affecting the welfare of children." Gubernat v.
Deremer, 140 N.J. 120, 139 (1995). Courts "are required to engage in
meticulous fact-finding to determine the 'best interests' of the child." Ibid."That standard is also the one that we apply in determining the appropriate
surname to be given to a child, regardless of the child's birth status." Ibid.Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4, "the [family court] must state clearly its factual
findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions," Curtis v.
Finnerman, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980), including in deciding a name change
dispute, Gubernat, 140 N.J. at 125-26. Mere "[n]aked conclusions do not satisfy
the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4." Curtis, 83 N.J. at 570.
In Emma v. Evans—the seminal case we use to resolve disputes between
parents over their child's jointly-chosen surname—the Court held that a parent
seeking to change a child's birth surname must show by "a preponderance of the
evidence that the name change is in the child's best interest." 215 N.J. 197, 222
(2013). "Applying the best-interests-of-the-child test in the context of a dispute
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over whether to change a child's name requires a fact-sensitive analysis" and
"[e]ach case should be weighed on its own merits." Id. at 222.
In evaluating whether the name change is in the child's best interest, courts
consider the following eleven factors:
(1) The length of time the child has used her given
surname. (2) Identification of the child with a
particular family unit. (3) Potential anxiety,
embarrassment, or discomfort that may result from
having a different surname from that of the custodial
parent. (4) The child's preference if [h]e is mature
enough to express a preference. (5) Parental
misconduct or neglect, such as failure to provide
support or maintain contact with the child. (6) Degree
of community respect, or lack thereof, associated with
either paternal or maternal name. (7) Improper
motivation on the part of the parent seeking the name
change. (8) Whether the mother has changed or intends
to change her name upon remarriage. (9) Whether the
child has a strong relationship with any siblings with
different names. (10) Whether the surname has
important ties to family heritage or ethnic identity. (11)
The effect of a name change on the relationship
between the child and each parent.
[Id. at 223.]
We consider that both parties have addressed the eleven best interest
factors found in Emma v. Evans, each arguing the strength of their respective
positions. Marie contends that the judge "erroneously ordered the name change
of a minor child, diagnosed with [autism] without proper consideration for the
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child's best interest." She argues the judge "did not make a complete and
comprehensive finding on the record" and did not complete a best interest
analysis for the proposed change to Owen's surname.
Michael argues the judge properly applied all applicable factors and
granted the application based on the evidence presented. He also disputes
Marie's testimony that Owen was diagnosed with autism and consequently may
have difficulty processing the name change at school and with his friends and
that this is a basis to deny the application. He maintains that Marie admitted
that there is also a report indicating that Owen was not autistic.
Here, the judge addressed many of the eleven factors as part of his best
interest analysis, including the length of time Owen had used his given surname;
his identification with a particular family unit; potential anxiety, embarrassment,
or discomfort from having a different surname from that of the custodial parent;
Owen's age (four) and inability to express a preference; and plaintiff's
motivation for seeking a name change stating, "the [c]ourt does not find that
there is any improper motivation on Mr. Marker's part to [] request this name
change[.]" The judge also noted that "[w]ith respect to any potential anxiety,
embarrassment or discomfort, there has not been anything provided to the
[c]ourt that indicates that any medical condition or any testimony by a medical
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expert that a change in name would create potential anxiety, embarrassment or
discomfort." After reviewing these factors, the judge concluded there was a
good faith basis to grant Michael's application to change Owen's surname from
Camaya to Camaya-Marker.
Although the judge may have believed he implicitly addressed the issue
of Owen's autism noting there was no medical evidence about anxiety, he did
not squarely address what was obviously the critical dispute between these
parents of whether Owen was autistic and the potential impact of such a
diagnosis, if established, on the name change application. Thus, although the
judge appropriately considered most of the Emma factors, he did not make
factual findings on the critical issue of Owen's autism diagnosis or make a best
interest finding. Plaintiff's good faith in bringing the application does not
resolve whether changing Owen's name is in the child's best interest.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion, including any supplemental submissions to the court on the issue of
Owen's autism and additional testimony should the court deem it necessary. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
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