In Re Denial of the Application for Licensure as a Real Estate Salesperson Submitted by Marta Cunha-Corcoran ( 2024 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2488-22
    IN RE DENIAL OF THE
    APPLICATION FOR
    LICENSURE AS A REAL
    ESTATE SALESPERSON
    SUBMITTED BY MARTA
    CUNHA-CORCORAN.
    _______________________
    Submitted July 9, 2024 – Decided July 16, 2024
    Before Judges Natali and Smith.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Real Estate
    Commission, Department of Banking and Insurance.
    Tonacchio, Spina & Compitello, attorneys for appellant
    Marta Cunha-Corcoran (Joseph Compitello, on the
    brief).
    Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent New Jersey Real Estate Commission (Sara
    M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
    Dakar Ross, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Marta Cunha-Corcoran appeals from the March 13, 2023 final
    decision of the New Jersey Real Estate Commission (Commission) denying her
    application for a real estate salesperson's license. The Commission determined
    appellant failed to demonstrate the good moral character required under N.J.S.A.
    45:15-9(a) of the New Jersey Real Estate License Act, N.J.S.A. 45:15-1 to -29-
    5, because she made intentional misrepresentations in her licensure application,
    and was previously convicted of theft by deception. The Commission also
    precluded appellant from re-applying for a five-year period. We affirm.
    I.
    On July 17, 2017, appellant pled guilty to third-degree theft by deception
    contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4. At her plea hearing, she admitted that between
    July and November 2015, while employed as a licensed insurance producer, she
    submitted seven false applications for life insurance policies and participated in
    fraudulent interviews in order to ensure approval of the applications and to
    improperly obtain commissions.        She also admitted to appropriating the
    applicants' personal information without their authorization.
    Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a two-year non-custodial
    probationary term and assessed appropriate penalties.        She later entered a
    consent order with the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance
    (Department) wherein she admitted to submitting false applications,
    impersonating the applicants, unlawfully accepting commissions, and failing to
    A-2488-22
    2
    report her 2017 conviction to the Department. Based on those admissions,
    appellant and the Department agreed her conduct violated both the New Jersey
    Insurance Producer Licensing Act, N.J.S.A. 17:22A-26 to -48, and the New
    Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -30.              The
    Department imposed appropriate fines, revoked appellant's producer's license,
    and barred her from seeking reinstatement for five years.
    Appellant subsequently passed the licensing exam to become a real estate
    salesperson and applied for a real estate salesperson license. In her application,
    appellant falsely stated she had never been "convicted of a crime, misdemeanor,
    or disorderly persons offense in the state of New Jersey, any other state or by
    the federal government." In a separate question, she also falsely responded she
    never had a "professional license, certification or similar credential revoked,
    suspended, surrendered in lieu of formal prosecution, or denied in New Jersey
    or any other state." Appellant also inaccurately certified that her responses were
    true, and she had informed the Commission of any prior license revocations or
    convictions.
    During a routine investigation of appellant's background, Commission
    staff learned of her prior conviction. The Commission accordingly directed
    appellant to submit additional documentation and after further investigation,
    A-2488-22
    3
    denied her application. The Commission informed appellant that her prior
    conviction rendered her ineligible for a real estate salesperson license, and she
    also failed to establish good moral character as required under N.J.S.A. 45:15 -
    9(a).
    Appellant filed an administrative appeal of the Commission's decision.
    The Commission conducted a plenary hearing where it considered the testimony
    of an investigator and appellant.      The Commission investigator detailed
    appellant's criminal history, the subsequent enforcement action resulting in the
    revocation of her insurance producer's license, and the entry of a money
    judgment against appellant because she failed to satisfy the payment terms
    detailed in the consent order. The investigator also detailed appellant's false
    responses in her application.
    For her part, appellant acknowledged she falsely responded to questions
    in her application but explained she did so because she was "embarrassed" by
    her prior conduct.      She provided further detail regarding her personal
    circumstances at the time she engaged in the criminal conduct at issue but
    nevertheless admitted to accepting in excess of $6,000 in fraudulent
    commissions, which she returned only after the fraud was discovered by
    A-2488-22
    4
    authorities. Appellant also confirmed she was convicted of theft by deception
    as a result of her actions.
    In a unanimous vote, the Commission affirmed the denial of appellant's
    application for a real estate salesperson license under N.J.S.A. 45:15-9(a). It
    found that appellant failed to establish the "requisite honesty, trustworthiness,
    character and integrity" for licensure, and concluded her criminal conduct and
    subsequent conviction disqualified her for a salesperson license under N.J.S.A.
    45:1-21.5, and the Rehabilitated Convicted Offenders Act (RCOA), N.J.S.A.
    2A:168A-2, as her actions directly related to her capacity and fitness to serve as
    a real estate salesperson.
    The Commission also precluded appellant from reapplying for a license
    for five years, "when additional evidence of rehabilitation may be considered."
    It based its decision on numerous aggravating factors, including her conviction
    and the underlying facts in which she used her clients' confidential information,
    data which would be available to her as a real estate salesperson, as well as her
    failure to show contrition.
    The    Commission       also   characterized   appellant's   testimony     as
    "disingenuous." On this point, the Commission specifically noted appellant
    failed to demonstrate "self-awareness," as she: 1) refused to concede her prior
    A-2488-22
    5
    conduct was fraudulent; 2) characterized her receipt of fraudulent commissions
    as "nothing major"; 3) claimed her fraudulent conduct was really an effort to
    assist her clients with obtaining approvals of their policy applications and
    translate for non-English speaking clients; and 4) refuted the admissions made
    in her plea allocution.
    Finally, the Commission noted appellant admitted she lied intentionally in
    her application and characterized her explanation that she was "embarrassed" as
    unacceptable. It also found she failed to engage in any rehabilitative efforts and
    noted she failed to pay in full the assessed civil fine required by the consent
    order.
    II.
    In her only point before us, appellant argues the sanctions imposed by the
    Commission are so disproportionate to the offense, in light of the circumstances,
    as to shock one's sense of fairness. Specifically, she relies on In re License
    Issued to Zahl, 
    186 N.J. 341
    , 354 (2006), and contends the Commission's
    decision barring her from applying for licensure for five years is "not
    warranted."
    Appellant acknowledges she "intentionally lied" when she failed to
    disclose her criminal conviction for theft by deception and the revocation of her
    A-2488-22
    6
    insurance producer's license to the Commission. She argues, however, as she
    "explained at her hearing she was embarrassed" to provide such information and
    "felt that the . . . Commission already had knowledge of these events" as the
    Real Estate Commission was under the purview of the Department, the entity
    that revoked her insurance producer's license.
    Additionally, appellant explains she was aware the Commission would
    conduct a background investigation and discover her conviction and license
    revocation, and, as such, contends she was "not attempting to deceive the
    commission or be untruthful as she [k]new these issues would come to light."
    Appellant argues, under such circumstances, her behavior does not warrant a
    five-year application ban. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments.
    "The scope of review in a case involving an appeal from the New Jersey
    Real Estate Commission is the same as that for other administrative agencies
    . . . ." Morgan v. Saslaff, 
    123 N.J. Super. 35
    , 38 (App. Div. 1973). "[We] have
    'a limited role' in the review of [agency] decisions." In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579
    (1980)). "[A] 'strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions of
    the administrative agencies.'" Zilberberg v. Bd. of Trs., Tchrs' Pension &
    Annuity Fund, 
    468 N.J. Super. 504
    , 509 (App. Div. 2021) (alteration in original)
    A-2488-22
    7
    (quoting In re Carroll, 
    339 N.J. Super. 429
    , 437 (App. Div. 2001)). We decline
    to disturb an agency's decision "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Seago v.
    Bd. of Trs., Tchrs' Pension & Annuity Fund, 
    257 N.J. 381
    , 391 (2024) (quoting
    Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 
    234 N.J. 150
    , 157
    (2018)).
    In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable, we must examine:
    (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
    implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
    follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
    substantial evidence to support the findings on which
    the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
    the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
    erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
    have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
    [Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. at 194
     (quoting In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 482-83 (2007)).]
    We "may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though
    [we] might have reached a different result." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Carter, 
    191 N.J. at 483
    ). "This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the
    agency's special 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at
    195 (quoting In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 28 (2007)). Furthermore, it is well-
    A-2488-22
    8
    settled that "an 'agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its
    implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to ' deference."
    In re Protest of Contract Award for Project A1150-08, 
    466 N.J. Super. 244
    , 259
    (App. Div. 2021) (quoting E.S v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 
    412 N.J. Super. 340
    , 355 (App. Div. 2010)).
    Nevertheless, "we are not bound by the agency's legal opinions." N.J.
    Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. V.E., 
    448 N.J. Super. 374
    , 391 (App. Div.
    2017) (quoting Levine v. State Dep't of Transp., 
    338 N.J. Super. 28
    , 32 (App.
    Div. 2001)). "Statutory and regulatory construction is a purely legal issue
    subject to de novo review." A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.,
    
    407 N.J. Super. 330
    , 340 (App. Div. 2009).
    Moreover, an agency has "broad discretion in determining the sanctions
    to be imposed for a violation of the legislation it is charged with administering."
    In re Scioscia, 
    216 N.J. Super. 644
    , 660 (App. Div. 1987). Correspondingly, we
    have limited "review of an agency's choice of sanction."          Zimmerman v.
    Diviney, 
    477 N.J. Super. 1
    , 21 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Zahl, 
    186 N.J. at 353
    ).
    The appropriate test for reversal is "whether such punishment is so
    disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be
    A-2488-22
    9
    shocking to one's sense of fairness." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting In re Polk, 
    90 N.J. 550
    , 578
    (1982)).
    Real estate licensees are "fiduciaries" and the Real Estate License Act
    "serves a strong public policy of the State." Graham v. N.J. Real Est. Comm'n,
    
    217 N.J. Super. 130
    , 138 (App. Div. 1987). N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(e) was designed
    "to create and maintain a commission to scrutinize in general and with care the
    character, competency, and integrity of license applicants and license holders to
    the end that in the interest of the public welfare, incompetent, unworthy and
    unscrupulous persons would be excluded from the real estate brokerage
    business." Div. of N. J. Real Est. Comm'n v. Ponsi, 
    39 N.J. Super. 526
    , 532-
    533 (App. Div. 1956). Further, the Commission is charged "with the high
    responsibility of maintaining ethical standards among real estate brokers and
    sales[people]," Goodley v. N.J. Real Est. Comm'n, 
    29 N.J. Super. 178
    , 182
    (App. Div. 1954), as well as "protecting the public from fraud, misinterpretation,
    incompetence and unethical practices," In re Pipes, 
    329 N.J. Super. 391
    , 397
    (App. Div. 2000).
    A real estate licensee is subject to suspension, revocation, or probation for
    "[a]ny conduct which demonstrates unworthiness, incompetency, bad faith, or
    dishonesty." N.J.S.A. 45:15-17(e). Similarly, the Commission "may, in its
    A-2488-22
    10
    discretion, refuse to grant or reinstate any license upon sufficient cause being
    shown." N.J.S.A. 45:15-15.
    Under N.J.S.A. 45:1-21.5, a state board of registration and examination
    such as the Commission cannot disqualify an applicant based upon a criminal
    conviction "unless the crime or offense has a direct or substantial relationship
    to the activity regulated by the entity or is of a nature such that . . . licensure of
    the person would be inconsistent with the public’s health, safety, or welfare ."
    N.J.S.A. 45:1-21.5. In making such a determination, the Commission must
    consider the following factors: (1) "the nature and seriousness of the crime" and
    the time elapsed since its commission; (2) "the relationship of the crime . . . to
    the purposes of regulating the profession or occupation regulated by the entity ";
    (3) "any evidence of rehabilitation of the person" since the conviction; and (4)
    "the relationship of the crime . . . to the ability, capacity, and fitness required to
    perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities of the profession or
    occupation regulated by the entity." N.J.S.A. 45:1-21.5(a). The RCOA, which
    applies more generally to all "State, county or municipal department[s],
    board[s], officer[s] or agenc[ies]," largely tracks the requirements of this
    provision. N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-2.
    A-2488-22
    11
    Applying the above standards, we discern no reason to reverse the
    Commission's conclusion appellant lacked the moral character to hold a real
    estate license and barring her reapplication for five years. The Commission
    properly considered the evidence before it and made the appropriate findings
    required by N.J.S.A. 45:15-15 in its decision. Its decision to prohibit appellant
    from seeking licensure for five years was not unreasonable as it was based on
    the unrefuted facts in the record establishing appellant engaged in fraudulent
    conduct for pecuniary gain and used her client's confidential information
    without their authorization, resulting in her theft conviction.
    The Commission also found appellant lacked contrition based on her
    intentional misrepresentations on her application regarding her past conduct and
    her testimony before the Commission where she minimized her prior actions.
    We are satisfied there is sufficient credible evidence in the record as a whole
    supporting the Commission's decision, Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), and the decision is
    not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    Affirmed.
    A-2488-22
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-2488-22

Filed Date: 7/16/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/16/2024