State of New Jersey v. Kintaye Z. Crawford ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this
opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0480-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KINTAYE Z. CRAWFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted December 11, 2023 – Decided January 16, 2024
Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No.
21-02-0075.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Randolph E. Mershon III,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Kintaye Crawford appeals the trial court's September 10, 2021
order denying his motion to suppress physical evidence police seized during a
warrantless pat-down of his person following a motor vehicle stop. Defendant
also appeals the trial court's May 18, 2022 order denying his motion for
reconsideration. Lastly, defendant challenges the prison sentence imposed.
Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I.
In February 2021, a Middlesex County grand jury returned an indictment
charging defendant with the following: fourth-degree obstruction of the
administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (count one); third-degree resisting
arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1) and 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a) (count two); and second-
degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count three).
Defendant subsequently moved to suppress physical evidence.
We derive the following facts from the record developed at the September
2021 suppression hearing. At approximately 9:45 p.m. on November 12, 2020,
Piscataway Police Department Detective Jerry Nichols and his supervisor,
Detective Sergeant Michael Coffey, were on patrol in an unmarked police car in
the area of Hazelwood Place and West Fourth Street. Both Detectives Nichols
and Coffey were assigned to the Narcotics Bureau. Their vehicle was equipped
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with a mobile video recorder system which had one microphone that was placed
in Detective Nichols' shirt pocket.
The detectives parked their vehicle on Hazelwood Place near the
intersection with West Fourth Street. While parked, both detectives observed a
black Kia sedan without a rear license plate traveling in the southbound lane of
Hazelwood Place. The Kia approached the intersection and made a right turn.
In making this turn, the Kia failed to make a complete stop at the stop sign before
continuing westbound on West Fourth Street. The detectives began to follow
the Kia and again observed the vehicle failed to make a complete stop at West
Fourth Street and Walnut Street. The detectives subsequently activated their
emergency lights and initiated a motor vehicle stop. The detectives exited their
unmarked patrol vehicle and approached the Kia. Detective Coffey approached
the driver's side of the vehicle and identified the driver as Janiyyah M. Jones,
while Nichols approached the passenger side and identified the front seat
passenger as defendant.
While speaking to the occupants, Detective Nichols smelled a "pretty
pungent" odor of raw marijuana emanating from the interior of the vehicle.
Detective Coffey also detected the "strong" smell of raw marijuana coming from
the interior of the car through the open driver's side window and signaled to
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Detective Nichols by pointing to his nose. While the detectives were speaking
with the occupants of the vehicle, additional officers, Michael Sexton and Rob
Mercer, arrived on scene. Detective Coffey ran Jones and defendant for
warrants; neither had any. Using his flashlight to illuminate the inside of the
Kia, Detective Nichols observed a blue-green vial containing suspected
marijuana in the center console area. Officer Sexton, who had arrived as backup,
told Detective Coffey he had observed a vial of suspected marijuana in the center
console area. Detective Coffey confirmed that observation himself by looking
into the car. Detective Coffey testified the vial was in an area behind where an
elbow would rest on the center console.
Coffey went to the passenger side of the Kia to commence a probable
cause search of the car based on the observation of marijuana. Detective Coffey
approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and defendant was asked to step
out. Initially, defendant cooperated with the officers' requests. When defendant
exited the car, he reached for his waistband, which concerned Detective Coffey.
Detective Coffey grabbed defendant's wrists, and defendant was resistive.
Detective Coffey stated defendant was tensing up, moving his hands, and pulling
away. At that point, the officers secured defendant's wrists, "for safety
precautions," and placed him in handcuffs. Detective Coffey began to conduct
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a pat-down search of defendant. While Detective Coffey was near defendant's
inner thigh, he felt a "hard bulge," and he immediately identified the object as a
gun. Detective Coffey alerted the officers about the gun. Defendant then lunged
into the passenger's seat of the car, and Detective Coffey dove on top of him in
an attempt to secure the gun.
After defendant was secured, Detective Coffey retrieved a loaded semi-
automatic handgun from defendant's pants. Defendant was placed under arrest
and secured in the rear of a patrol vehicle. The rest of the vehicle was searched.
Marijuana was then seized from a container in the center console.
In an oral ruling, the trial court denied the suppression motion. The trial
court found the officers' testimony to be "very credible" and "consistent" with
the video of the stop. The court found the stop was lawfully based on the
detectives' observations of the motor vehicle violations and held that the
detectives had probable cause to search the Kia for contraband based on the odor
of marijuana and the plain view observation of the suspected vial of marijuana.
Finally, the trial court held the search of defendant's person was a reasonable
and lawful pat-down for weapons and that the gun was immediately identified
during that frisk. The court noted the specific and particularized reasons for the
pat-down included defendant's non-compliance with directions, refusing to
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place his hands on the car, fidgeting with his waistband, and furtive movements.
The trial court concluded that Detective Coffey was justified in seizing the gun
from defendant's pants.
In December 2021, defendant's private counsel was relieved, and
defendant was assigned counsel from the Office of the Public Defender. In April
2022, the newly assigned counsel moved for reconsideration of the trial court's
suppression decision. Defendant argued the search of defendant was not limited
to a pat-down for weapons. Defendant asserted the search was a full search, and
the video footage depicted Detective Coffey reaching into defendant's pockets,
removing items, and placing those items on the vehicle. Defendant further
argued that, even if the search was a limited frisk for weapons, there were no
articulable facts to support the suspicion that defendant was armed at the time
of the search.
The court initially observed the motion for reconsideration was untimely
under Rule 1:7-4. Nevertheless, the court considered the merits of the
arguments. It noted defendant failed to present any new case law that would
demonstrate the court's prior decision was palpably incorrect or irrational. The
court further noted the motion "merely reargue[d] the original motion."
Accordingly, the court denied the motion for reconsideration.
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Defendant subsequently pled guilty to count three, second-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun. The State agreed to recommend a custodial
sentence of seven years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility, subject to
the "Graves Act," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The State also agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges. Pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f), defendant preserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On September 30, 2022, the trial
court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to a custodial
term of seven years with forty-two months of parole ineligibility.
II.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT THE GUN WAS SEIZED
DURING A LAWFUL PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF
DEFENDANT'S PERSON.
POINT II
THE SENTENCING COURT ERRED WHEN IT
RELIED ON DEFENDANT'S JUVENILE RECORD
AND HIS HALLMARK FEATURES OF YOUTH IN
AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING
A.
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In assessing defendant's arguments related to the pat-down search, we
apply well-settled principles. We recognize that under the United States and
New Jersey Constitutions, a warrantless search by police officers is invalid
unless it is justified by an established exception to the warrant requirement.
State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319 (2023). If the State fails to prove such an
exception applies, the evidence seized must be suppressed. Ibid."When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a suppression
motion, appellate courts 'must defer to the factual findings of the trial court so
long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.'" State
v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249,
262 (2015)). Trial courts are owed deference because of their "opportunity to
hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing
court cannot enjoy." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State
v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). However, "[a] trial court's legal
conclusions . . . are reviewed de novo," and factual findings that are "clearly
mistaken" must be reversed in the interest of justice. Cohen, 254 N.J. at 319
(first quoting Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 609; then quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J.
412, 425 (2014)). If the reviewing court finds that the officers acted
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unconstitutionally, the fruits of the search must be suppressed. State v. Patino,
83 N.J. 1, 14-15 (1980).
Defendant does not challenge the initial stop of the vehicle, nor does he
challenge the search of the vehicle. After smelling marijuana, the detectives
asked defendant to get out of the vehicle so that the interior of vehicle could be
searched. Under then-applicable law,1 the odor provided the police with grounds
to remove the passengers and search the passenger compartment of the car.
Cohen, 254 N.J. at 308.
We thus direct our attention to the next phase of this encounter—the pat-
down of defendant's pants. Defendant argues the detectives did not have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion, based on specific facts, that he was armed and
dangerous, and, thus, the detectives could not lawfully conduct a frisk.
1
The search at issue predates the 2021 passage of the Cannabis Regulatory,
Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA),
N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, which added a new section in the Criminal Code stating
that neither "the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis," nor the "possession of
marijuana or hashish without evidence of quantity in excess of any amount that
would exceed the amount . . . which may be lawfully possessed," "shall,
individually or collectively, constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a
crime[,]" except on school property or at a correctional facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10(a), (c). "[G]oing forward [after CREAMMA], we anticipate that cases
involving the automobile exception and probable cause to search a vehicle based
solely on the smell of marijuana will likely be few and far between." Cohen,
254 N.J. at 328.
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Defendant further asserts that Detective Coffey was acting on a hunch based on
his statement after the discovery of the gun and defendant's arrest where he
stated, "I just got that idea that he had a gun, man . . . . As soon as I saw him, I
thought this kid probably has a gun." Further, even if the totality of the
circumstances provided the detectives with the requisite suspicion to conduct a
pat-down search, Detective Coffey exceeded the limited scope of a pat-down
search when he began removing items from defendant's pockets. Because the
search of defendant's person exceeded the limits of a permissible frisk for
weapons, it was illegal, and the gun should have been suppressed.
The State counters the trial court properly found the detectives ' initial
encounter with defendant was an investigative detention amply supported by
reasonable suspicion that defendant was concealing contraband or armed with a
weapon. The State submits the trial court properly found that the detectives'
actions were reasonable and justified, given defendant's action as he was exiting
the vehicle, and the motion to suppress should be affirmed.
In denying the motion suppress, the trial court noted:
Defendant, in this court's opinion, was non-compliant.
He wasn't so much resistant as . . . discussed during the
hearing but rather would be best described as non-
compliant.
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. . . Defendant repeatedly was fidgeting with his
waistband and was not complying with the officer's
instructions to place his hands on the car. The officers
had, as a result, . . . specific and particularized reasons
to believe that [d]efendant might . . . be concealing
contraband or a weapon, especially because they
believed that there was contraband in the vehicle.
The officers then reasonably conducted a pat
down of . . . [d]efendant at the scene to ensure that . . .
[d]efendant was not armed before the police could
continue their investigation regarding the search of the
automobile, as well as the occupants. . . . Defendant's
furtive movements created risk for the officers and
caused the officer to exercise heightened caution.
We affirm substantially for the reasons noted by the trial court. We note
when defendant exited the vehicle, he grabbed his waistband, was pulling away
from the detectives, and was not cooperative in placing his hands on the car. At
that juncture, the detectives were justified in handcuffing defendant for reasons
of officer safety. Defendant's conduct provided the detectives reason to believe
he could have been reaching for a weapon concealed in his pants. In this
circumstance, defendant's conduct was more indicative of danger and potentially
being armed than the nervous conduct of the defendants noted in State v. Nyema,
249 N.J. 509, 530-31 (2022) (citing e.g., State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 277
(2017); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990)).
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Turning to the subsequent pat-down, it is well-established under the
federal and New Jersey constitutions that the police may stop and frisk a person
if they have reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal activity or a weapon
may be found on that person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968); State v.
Smith, 155 N.J. 91-92 (1998). This standard of reasonable suspicion is less
rigorous than probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27. In the course of a
permissible Terry stop and frisk, the police are authorized to "conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing" of the person. Id. at 30; see also
State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988).
We agree with the trial court the detectives had reasonable suspicion to
perform a pat-down frisk of defendant under the Terry doctrine. Despite
Detective Coffey's statements following the arrest about his thought defendant
might have a gun, the totality of circumstances independently supported a
reasonable suspicion for the pat-down, including defendant reaching for his
waistband, flailing his hands, and pulling away from the detectives. Moreover,
we do not focus on the officer's subjective intent. See State v. Diaz, 470 N.J.
Super. 495, 522-23 (App. Div. 2022). Rather, under Fourth Amendment
analysis, reviewing courts apply an objective test of reasonableness to evaluate
police conduct. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016). Absent evidence of
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impermissible racial profiling or some other constitutionally impermissible
motive, the officer's intent or motive is irrelevant because the Fourth
Amendment "proscribes unreasonable actions, not improper thoughts." State v.
Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983). We further note the pat-down was directed
appropriately at defendant's outer clothing. 2
We are also unpersuaded by defendant's argument the detectives exceeded
the limited scope of a pat-down search when he began removing items from
defendant's pockets. The presence or absence of probable cause to search
defendant's pockets is a distinct issue from whether police had reasonable
suspicion to frisk his pants. First, there were no charges filed against defendant
2
The trial judge explained:
Here, following the lawful traffic stop and the
officer discovering the contraband in the vehicle, the
officer's discovery of the handgun on . . . [d]efendant
during a lawful pat down of [d]efendant's outer clothes,
the officer felt an object in [d]efendant's pants. He
identified the object immediately as a handgun due to
its shape and feel. It was readily apparent to the officer
that the object in [d]efendant's pants was a handgun,
and in fact it turned out to be a handgun. Therefore, the
officer was justified in reaching into [d]efendant's pants
to retrieve the handgun, because the handgun was
immediately apparent in the pat down of . . .
[d]efendant[].
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stemming from the search of his pockets. Moreover, the pat-down was unrelated
to the search of defendant's pockets, and detectives did not rely on the discovery
of any evidence from defendant's pockets to justify the pat-down that revealed
the gun. We therefore affirm the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
the seized handgun. Given our analysis the pat-down was justified based on
defendant's actions when he was removed from the vehicle, we need not address
whether the search was also valid as a search incident to an arrest.
B.
Defendant next argues the sentencing court weighed defendant's hallmark
features of youth against him at sentencing, and the sentence should be reversed
and remanded for resentencing to a lesser term. Defendant notes the trial court
determined N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), and (9) (risk of re-offense, defendant's
prior criminal record, and the need for deterrence) substantially outweighed
mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (defendant was under
twenty-six years old at the time of the offense) in imposing the sentence.
Defendant notes that although mitigating factor fourteen was applied because
defendant was nineteen years old during the offense, the court overly relied on
defendant's "defiant" and "anti-social" behavior during the motor vehicle stop
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and his failure to attend the pre-sentencing report interview to find the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.
Sentencing decisions are discretionary in nature. State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.
321, 347 (2019). Therefore, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones,
232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We defer to the sentencing court's factual findings
and should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).
A sentence should be affirmed "unless: (1) the sentencing guidelines were
violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not 'based
upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the
guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v.
Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth,
95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
The trial judge comprehensively considered the applicable aggravating
and mitigating factors. The court observed aggravating factor six (extent of
prior record) applied, given defendant had a "significant" juvenile record
coupled with the seriousness of the offenses including adjudications involving
weapons. The court noted defendant's pattern of defiance toward the rule of
law in view of his juvenile record, along with committing a serious offense at
age nineteen, support aggravating factor three (risk of re-offense).
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Furthermore, the court determined aggravating factor nine (need for deterrence)
was implicated as there was a clear need to deter defendant from committing
other offenses along with a more general need to deter this type of behavior in
society at large. The court further recognized mitigating factor fourteen was
applicable, given defendant was under twenty-six years of age when the crime
was committed and the prospect that he could seek help to resolve whatever
issues were causing him to disregard the law. In balancing the factors, the court
determined, based on the totality of the circumstances, the aggravating factors
"substantially outweighed the mitigating factor" and that the plea agreement
was fair and reasonable.
Appling the above principles, we discern no error in the trial judge's
consideration of the aggravating factors and mitigating factors. The trial judge
appropriately considered defendant's age as a mitigating factor. There is no
indication the court considered defendant's youth as an aggravating factor. The
court applied the facts of this case to the applicable law. There was ample
evidence in the record to support the court's conclusions.
To the extent we have not addressed any remaining contentions, it is
because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
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Affirmed.
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