Stephanie Tillman v. New Jersey Department of Corrections ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3619-22
STEPHANIE TILLMAN,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted June 4, 2024 – Decided July 18, 2024
Before Judges Enright and Whipple.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Stephanie Tillman, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Andrew David Spevack, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Stephanie Tillman, an inmate at the Edna Mahan Correctional
Facility for Women (EMCF), challenges the sanctions imposed against her
under a June 5, 2023 final administrative decision issued by respondent New
Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm in part, and remand in part,
for the DOC to amplify the record and provide an explanation for the sanctions
imposed.
I.
At approximately 8:02 a.m. on May 29, 2023, while incarcerated at
EMCF, Tillman lunged at Officer Z. Robinson and spat in the officer's eye after
the officer told Tillman to stop "hopping" from wing to wing. As other officers
responded to the incident, Tillman remained agitated and yelled that she "sp[a]t
in that bitch['s] face." After Tillman was restrained, handcuffed, and separated
from Robinson, Robinson left EMCF to receive medical attention, leaving
EMCF understaffed for the rest of the day.
EMCF officers escorted Tillman to the infirmary and placed her in a
constant watch holding cell. At 8:12 a.m., a registered nurse tried to conduct a
body assessment, but Tillman refused to cooperate. Tillman was subsequently
cleared by a mental-health worker.
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At 8:35 a.m., two corrections officers brought Tillman to the South Hall
of EMCF. Tillman insisted she be taken to the Restorative Housing Unit (RHU),
but the officers told her she would be transported instead to the Critical Care
Unit (CCU). Tillman resisted as she entered the CCU, kicked her feet at officers,
and locked her legs around an officer's chair. A few minutes later, officers
placed her on the ground and in leg irons. Once Tillman stood upright again,
she refused to walk, so officers tried to carry her. Tillman then stated she could
walk on her own. She also yelled multiple times she was going to kill herself.
Based on her statements of self-harm, Tillman was transported to the
institution's hospital and again placed in a constant watch cell. Thereafter, her
leg irons and handcuffs were removed, and a doctor met with her. At 8:43 a.m.,
an officer gave Tillman a gown and directed her to submit to a strip search.
Tillman refused the search twice. Several minutes later, she refused a request
for a body assessment but ultimately permitted a nurse to conduct the
assessment.
At approximately 9:58 a.m., an officer at the hospital saw Tillman pretend
to have a seizure by throwing her body backward onto the ground. The officer
immediately requested medical assistance, and staff responded to the call. A
nurse's examination established Tillman's blood pressure, heart rate, and oxygen
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levels were normal. Moreover, Tillman promptly removed her blood pressure
cuff, stood up, and spoke in full sentences. She later acknowledged she did not
suffer a medical incident.
Based on Tillman's conduct on May 29, she was charged with the
following prohibited acts: *.803/.002 (attempting to commit assault); *.012
(throwing bodily fluid at another person); *.306 (conduct that disrupts the
orderly operation); *.254 (refusing to work or accept a program); *.708 (refusing
to submit to a search); and *.302 (malingering, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)).1
On June 1, 2023, Tillman was evaluated to assess her mental status and
the extent of her responsibility for her conduct three days prior. The evaluator
opined Tillman's "[p]lacement in RHU [wa]s unlikely to significantly exacerbate
mental health problems within two weeks, with regular mental health and
custody monitoring." Additionally, the evaluator concluded "Tillman
present[ed] as psychologically stable, responsible for her actions, and capable
of participating in [a] hearing process."
Tillman proceeded to a disciplinary hearing on June 2, 2023. She received
the assistance of a counsel substitute at the hearing, declined to call any
1
"Asterisk offenses 'are considered the most serious and result in the most
severe sanctions.'" Mejia v. Dep't of Corr., 446 N.J. Super. 369, 372 n.3 (App.
Div. 2016) (quoting N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)).
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witnesses, and pled guilty to all disciplinary charges, stating, "I lost it. I was
not okay mentally. There is no excuse for any of my behavior. I apologize. I
ask for leniency [and] combined sanctions." Based on the evidence presented,
the disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found Tillman guilty of each charge and
imposed three sets of sanctions.
Regarding the *.302, *.708, and *.254 charges, the DHO sanctioned
Tillman to: thirty days loss of commutation time; fifteen days loss of telephone;
J-Pay, email, commissary, and media-download privileges; and a referral to
Mental Health Assistance. Turning to the *.803/002 charge, Tillman was
sanctioned to: 365 days of placement in RHU; 365 days loss of commutation
time; thirty days loss of telephone, J-Pay, email, commissary, and media-
download privileges; and a referral to Mental Health Assistance. Finally, the
DHO sanctioned Tillman for the *.012, and *.306 charges, imposing: 365 days
of placement in RHU; 365 days loss of commutation time; thirty days loss of
telephone, J-Pay, email, commissary, and media-download privileges; and a
referral to Mental Health Assistance.
Tillman administratively appealed from the DOC's decision, seeking
leniency, and arguing the sanctions imposed were "excessively severe and
should be modified/reduced." On June 5, 2023, a DOC Assistant Superintendent
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upheld the DHO's adjudications and sanctions. Concluding "[v]ideo recorded
evidence clearly show[ed Tillman's] violent and reprehensible conduct towards
Correctional Police Officers," the Assistant Superintendent denied Tillman's
"[r]equest for leniency" and found "the volume of disciplinary charges
accumulated in one incident d[id] not warrant any degree of leniency."
(Emphasis added).
II.
On appeal, Tillman raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE [DOC] HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
LANGUAGE AND INTENT OF N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.72
2
Under the Isolated Confinement Restriction Act (ICRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.5
to - 82.11, and specifically N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.7, "isolated confinement" is defined
as:
confinement of an inmate in a correctional facility,
pursuant to disciplinary, administrative, protective,
investigative, medical, or other classification, in a cell
or similarly confined holding or living space, alone or
with other inmates, for approximately [twenty] hours or
more per day in a State correctional facility . . . with
severely restricted activity, movement, and social
interaction. Isolated confinement shall not include
confinement due to a facility-wide or unit-wide
lockdown that is required to ensure the safety of
inmates and staff.
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AND N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.83 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS[,] AS APPELLANT IS A
VULNERABLE INMATE AND HER CUMULATIVE
DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS SHOULD BE
REDUCED OR TERMINATED.
POINT II
THE DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS SHOULD HAVE
BEEN RUN CONCURRENTLY BECAUSE THESE
CHARGES ALL AROSE FROM THE SAME
INCIDENT[].
We decline to consider Tillman's Point I argument because she failed to
present it before the initial tribunal. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)
(citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). No
compelling circumstances are presented here to warrant our departure from this
principle. But even if we considered this newly raised argument, we would
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.7.]
3
Per N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.8(a)(1):
an inmate shall not be placed in isolated confinement
unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the
inmate would create a substantial risk of serious harm
to himself or another, including but not limited to a
correctional police officer or other employee or
volunteer in the facility, as evidenced by recent threats
or conduct, and a less restrictive intervention would be
insufficient to reduce this risk.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-82.8(a)(1).]
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conclude the record is devoid of proof the DOC contravened the ICRA or that
Tillman was a member of a vulnerable population when her sanctions were
imposed. In fact, it is undisputed that mere days prior to her disciplinary
hearing, Tillman received a mental health evaluation and was found to be
"psychologically stable" and "responsible for her actions."
Regarding Point II, Tillman contends her "infractions occurred on the
same date . . . and in fairly close temporal proximity" over a two-hour period,
so "the sanctions [for the prohibited acts] should . . . run concurrently." To
support this contention, she relies, in part, on N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(c), which
provides: "[RHU] sanctions for all charges received as the result of a single
incident shall be served concurrently." (Emphasis added). The DOC counters
that Tillman's infractions constituted "multiple incidents," warranting the
imposition of consecutive sanctions.
Our review of a final administrative agency decision is limited. Malacow
v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018). "We will disturb
an agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is
'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,' or is unsupported 'by substantial credible
evidence in the record as a whole.'" Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't. of Corr., 461 N.J.
Super. 231, 237-38 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison,
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81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). When reviewing a determination of the DOC in a
matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether there is
substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited act, but also
whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed regulations adopted to afford
inmates' procedural due process. McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-96
(1995).
Next, we are mindful "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must
afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage
this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576,
584 (App. Div. 1999). Therefore, "[a] reviewing court 'may not substitute its
own judgment for the agency's, even though the court might have reached a
different result.'" In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re
Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "This is particularly true when the issue under
review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise and superior knowledge of
a particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)).
Still, our review is not "perfunctory," nor is "our function . . . merely [to]
rubberstamp an agency's decision." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.
Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010). Instead, we must "engage in a 'careful and
principled consideration of the agency record and findings.'" Williams v. N.J.
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Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower
Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in Div. of Consumer Affs. of Dep't of Law & Pub.
Safety, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
Guided by these standards and based on Tillman's guilty pleas to the
prohibited acts charged, we do not question the DOC's determination that she
committed those acts. However, we cannot discern from the limited record
before us why the DOC imposed three sets of sanctions for the six prohibited
acts, and specifically why it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent, RHU
sanctions, given its finding "the volume of disciplinary charges accumulated in
one incident." (Emphasis added); see N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(c). Thus, we are
constrained to remand this matter for amplification of the record to permit the
agency to explain the basis for the imposition of consecutive sanctions, and if
appropriate, to reconsider whether the sanctions should be concurrently served.
To the extent we have not addressed Tillman's remaining arguments, they
are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part, and remanded in part for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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