Discover Bank v. Sadia Tahir ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3068-22
DISCOVER BANK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SADIA TAHIR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted May 15, 2024 – Decided July 19, 2024
Before Judges Firko and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No.
DC-010515-20.
Erik Mark Helbing, attorney for appellant.
Zwicker & Associates, PC, attorneys for respondent (G.
Todd Pondish, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Sadia Tahir appeals from an April 27, 2023 Law Division order
granting plaintiff Discover Bank's motion to turnover $9,985.92 seized from
defendant's account at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (Chase Bank). The funds were
levied following a judgment against defendant. Defendant contends she and her
husband own the Chase Bank account as tenants by the entirety. Thus, because
she is solely responsible for the underlying judgment, defendant argues the trial
court had no authority to order the turnover of funds from the jointly -owned
account. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the governing legal
principles and arguments of the parties, we affirm.
The record shows that defendant married her husband, Malik Tahir, in
Pakistan in January 2014. They are the joint owners of the Chase Bank account.
It is not disputed that the underlying judgment is solely against defendant.
On July 12, 2022, $9,985.92 was levied against the Chase Bank account.
On July 22, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for turnover of the levied funds.
Defendant opposed the motion, arguing the funds in the account were exempt.
However, she did not provide any documentation to identify the source of the
funds deposited in the Chase Bank account.
At oral argument, the trial court noted there was no evidence the money
in the account belonged to one spouse or another. Citing Banc of Am. Leasing
& Cap., LLC v. Fletcher-Thompson Inc., 453 N.J. Super. 50, 53 (App. Div.
2018), the court determined it needed documentation showing the source of the
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funds comprising the Chase Bank account. The court adjourned the matter to
allow defendant to provide bank statements establishing the source of the funds.
At the next hearing, the trial court noted defendant did not present the
requested evidence concerning ownership of the funds in the Chase Bank
account. The court concluded the money was not exempt, denied defendant's
objection to the levy, and granted plaintiff's motion to turnover the funds. This
appeal follows.
In Banc of America, we held "when seeking a turnover from a joint
account, the judgment creditor has the burden 'to prove that the moneys thus
deposited are the individual property of the judgment debtor, and therefore
applicable to the satisfaction of the judgment.'" 453 N.J. Super. at 53 (quoting
Esposito v. Palovick, 29 N.J. Super. 3, 10-11 (App. Div. 1953)). In Esposito,
we held it could not be presumed "that one depositing his [or her] own funds in
a joint account in the names of himself [or herself] and another has thereby
created a joint tenancy in the account." 29 N.J. Super. at 8.
N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4(a) provides in relevant part:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all
parties, to the parties in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit. In the
absence of proof of net contributions, the account
belongs in equal shares to all parties having present
right of withdrawal.
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Under this statutory framework, the Chase Bank account funds belong to
both defendant and her husband in proportion to their individual deposits.
Further, the statute clearly provides that absent proof of their individual
contributions, it is presumed that each named account holder owns an equal
share in the funds in the account.
In this instance, the trial court gave defendant an opportunity to present
evidence to overcome the statutory presumption, but she did not avail herself of
that opportunity. Instead, she argues that another statute effectively supersedes
N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4. Specifically, defendant relies on N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4, which
provides:
Neither spouse may sever, alienate, or otherwise affect
their interest in the tenancy by the entirety during the
marriage or upon separation without the written consent
of both spouses.
Defendant also relies on our decision in Jimenez v. Jimenez, 454 N.J.
Super. 432 (App. Div. 2018). In that case, the defendant and his non -party
spouse obtained a tract of land they owned as tenants by the entirety. Id. at 434.
The plaintiffs moved to compel the partition and sale of the jointly-owned
property to satisfy a judgment against the defendant. Id. at 434-35. The trial
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court denied the motion, finding N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4 prohibited that remedy. Id.
at 435. We affirmed, noting:
We recognize Section 17.4 literally commands that
"neither spouse" may sever, alienate, or otherwise
affect their shared interests in the tenancy by the
entirety, and that plaintiffs are not [the defendant's]
"spouse." Even so, we conclude the statutory
prohibition applies to a situation where, as here, one
spouse's failure to pay his personal debts to third-party
creditors has resulted in a money judgment entered
against him alone. Otherwise, a free-wheeling spouse,
by amassing such individual debt, could detrimentally
"affect" the other spouse's interests in their co-owned
property.
[Id. at 438.]
Plaintiff argues defendant's reliance upon Jimenez is misplaced because it
involved a judgment creditor attempting to force the sale of real property to
enforce payment of an obligation against one of the co-owners. Real property
rights as between joint owners, plaintiff contends, cannot be individually
addressed without liquidating the property in question. Therefore, any
execution on that property would necessarily involve its sale, infringing on the
individual property rights of the innocent co-owner. Plaintiff argues—and we
agree—that concern does not arise with respect a joint bank account, since it is
a straightforward matter to apportion the relative ownership interests of the
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depositors without affecting the remaining funds belonging to the innocent co -
owner.
Defendant notes that the concept of tenancy by the entirety can apply to
personal property and not just real property, citing N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.2(a). That
statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] tenancy by entirety shall be created
when . . . [a] husband and wife together take title to an interest in real property
or personal property under a written instrument designating both of their names
as husband and wife." (Emphasis added).
We conclude that in this specific application, N.J.S.A. 46:3-17.4 does not
supersede the presumptive apportionment established in N.J.S.A. 17:16I-4. The
latter statute upon which the trial court relied deals specifically with jointly -
owned bank accounts. We are not persuaded that it was effectively eviscerated
by another statute dealing with all manner of personal property, including
personal property that could not be apportioned without liquidation.
Furthermore, as we have noted, defendant was afforded an opportunity to
overcome the presumption but chose not to comply with the trial court's
instructions. Her refusal to provide documentation to answer the question raised
by the trial court provides an adequate basis for applying the unrebutted
statutory presumption. In sum, we find no error in the trial court's determination
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that the Chase Bank account funds were not exempt and could be levied upon to
satisfy the judgment against plaintiff. To the extent we have not specifically
addressed them, any remaining arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient
merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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