Glenn Liou v. Ronald Lignelli ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1398-22
GLENN LIOU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RONALD LIGNELLI,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Submitted November 6, 2023 – Decided January 22, 2024
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. SC-000808-
22.
Glenn Liou, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Glenn Liou appeals from two orders of the Special Civil Part: (1)
an October 26, 2022 order dismissing his complaint alleging an entitlement to
the return of two months' rent and a security deposit he paid to defendant Ronald
Lignelli; and (2) a December 23, 2022 order denying his motion for
reconsideration of the October 26, 2022 order. We affirm.
I.
On September 21, 2022, Liou filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part
alleging that Lignelli illegally rented him a room on June 27, 2022. Liou alleged
that Lignelli did "not have a permit to rent his property" from the township in
which the residence is located. Liou alleged that he paid rent of $1,115 for July
2022 and $1,115 for August 2022 and a security deposit of $1,485. He sought
a judgment for $3,175, which represents all of the funds he paid to Lignelli.
Liou was the only witness at trial. He testified that he and Lignelli signed
a "Wi-Fi storage rental agreement," which he claimed was "a scheme" intended
to appear he was renting storage space as a false cover for an illegal residential
lease. He testified that the agreement was issued even though Lignelli did not
have a certificate of occupancy for the premises. Liou did not offer a copy of
the Wi-Fi storage rental agreement as evidence, alleging that Lignelli kept all
copies of the contract after Liou signed it.
Liou testified that he paid rent to Lignelli pursuant to the agreement and
in exchange lived at the property for two months. He argued that he is entitled
A-1398-22
2
to the return of his rent because of the invalidity of the Wi-Fi rental storage
agreement, which he argued was illegal because of the absence of a certificate
of occupancy. In addition, Liou testified that he paid a security deposit to
Lignelli. In support of this testimony, he relied on a June 27, 2022 check that
the court found was "made out to cash" and that "doesn't say security deposit
anywhere on what I'm seeing." Although the court described the June 27, 2022
check in some detail, it did not mark the check as an exhibit or admit it into the
evidence.
At the conclusion of Liou's testimony, the trial court issued an oral
opinion. With respect to Liou's demand for the return of the two months' rent,
the court found that Liou knew the Wi-Fi rental storage agreement was illegal
when he executed it, which precluded him from seeking judicial relief under the
agreement. The court explained, "[i]t seems to me that if you knew that it was
illegal, you entered into it illegally, and now you're seeking to void your end
and get your part of the bargain back after you already benefitted by staying
there, and that[] just . . . violates public policy."
As to Liou's demand for the return of his security deposit, the court found
I don't find you credible with respect to this . . . security
deposit issue, Mr. Liou, and the story just does not add
up in this context.
A-1398-22
3
....
There's no contract here that's been provided and I don't
find you credible on this, sir. I'm sorry, you have to
prove your case and I'm not convinced, based on the
proofs you provided, that the story is credible.
....
[A]nd I don't find that the check made out to cash that
has nothing in the memo is for a security deposit based
on your representations here which, again, I just don't
find it to be credible, trying to get the benefit of the
bargain then trying to get out from under on an illegal
contract in this context. . . . You do have the burden
of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence and I don't find the documentary evidence to
be convincing in any way by a preponderance of the
credible evidence nor do I find your testimony to be so
either, so I'm going to deny your application.
An October 26, 2022 order dismissed Liou's complaint.
Twenty-three days later, Liou moved for reconsideration of the October
26, 2022 order. He attached to his moving papers a copy of the Wi-Fi rental
storage agreement signed by Liou but not by Lignelli. Liou stated that he
obtained a copy of the agreement through a public records request for the file in
the Special Civil Part action in which Lignelli sought to evict Liou from the
property. He also included a document entitled "WiFi/Storage Payment
Receipt" indicating that in June 2022, $1,115 in cash was paid to Lignelli for
"utilities." The payee line on the receipt is blank.
A-1398-22
4
On December 23, 2022, the trial court issued an order denying Liou's
motion for reconsideration. In a written statement of reasons, the court
concluded Liou: (1) filed the motion beyond the twenty-day period for seeking
reconsideration of a final order established in Rule 4:49-2; (2) failed to attach a
copy of the transcript of the court's opinion contrary to Rule 4:49-2; (3) did not
cite with specificity controlling legal precedent overlooked by the trial court in
making its decision; (4) included with the motion evidence not adduced at trial,
but which he could have obtained prior to trial; and (5) failed to demonstrate an
entitlement to reconsideration of the order which was based primarily on the
trial court's conclusion that Liou's trial testimony lacked credibility.
This appeal followed. In support of his appeal, Liou reiterates the
arguments he made in the trial court and contends Lignelli should not benefit
from an illegal contract by retaining the rent and security deposit he collected
from Liou. Liou acknowledges he filed his motion for reconsideration late and
argues the trial court should have considered the October 26, 2022 order to be
interlocutory for purposes of the timing of the motion in the interests of justice.
II.
Our scope of review of the judge's findings in this nonjury trial is limited.
We must defer to the judge's factual determinations, so long as they are
A-1398-22
5
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Rova Farms Resort,
Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). This court's "[a]ppellate
review does not consist of weighing evidence anew and making independent
factual findings; rather, [this court's] function is to determine whether the re is
adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered at trial." Cannuscio v.
Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N.J. Super. 342, 347 (App. Div. 1999). However,
"[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We have carefully reviewed the record and find no basis on which to
disturb the trial court's conclusion that Liou is not entitled to the return of the
rent he paid to Lignelli for July and August 2022. Liou failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the existence of a lease between the parties .
Although he testified that he executed a Wi-Fi rental storage agreement, he did
not describe the terms of the agreement in detail or produce a copy of the
document. At best, Liou established that he paid two months of rent to Lignelli
for July and August 2022 and admitted that he resided in Lignelli's property
during those months. Liou did not testify that the residence was defective or
A-1398-22
6
uninhabitable, that he was precluded from enjoying the use of the space he
rented, or that Lignelli violated the terms of their agreement in any way.
Liou argued only that Lignelli did not have a certificate of occupancy for
the residence, which rendered the Wi-Fi rental storage agreement illegal. We
see no error in the trial court's conclusion that Liou did not establish an
entitlement to relief on this basis. First, Liou did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Lignelli lacked a certificate of occupancy
for the residence. The only evidence offered in support of this contention was
Liou's testimony. The trial court, however, found Liou to be lacking in
credibility. In addition, even if the court were to have accepted that Lignelli
was not authorized to rent the premises, no legal precedent required the court to
order the return of the rent Liou paid for the time he lived at the property. While
a property owner is not entitled to enforce a lease of property for which a
certificate of occupancy has not been issued, Khoudary v. Salem Cty. Bd. of
Soc. Servs., 260 N.J. Super. 79, 85 (App. Div. 1992), a tenant who is aware of
an illegal lease but pays rents and occupies the premises subject to the illegal
lease is not entitled to the return of the rent after the occupancy ceases. See
McQueen v. Brown, 342 N.J. Super. 120, 128 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that,
where a tenant has occupied premises for which no municipal rental permit was
A-1398-22
7
issued, "[w]e know of no precedent that would allow a tenant to raise an
illegality defense to his or her obligation to pay rent in circumstances w here no
evidence is presented to demonstrate that the premises were uninhabitable or,
for that matter, that the premises were even defective."). A contrary result would
bestow on Liou benefits – rent-free living space – for having knowingly
participated in an illegal contract.
Nor do we see any error in the trial court's December 23, 2022 order
denying reconsideration. We begin our analysis with the trial court's conclusion
that Liou's motion was filed late. According to Rule 4:49-2, "a motion for
rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a . . . final order shall be
served not later than 20 days after service of the . . . order upon all parties . . . ."
As the Supreme Court explained, "[b]y definition, an order that 'does not finally
determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining
to the cause[,] and which requires further steps . . . to enable the court to
adjudicate the cause on the merits[,]' is interlocutory." Moon v. Warren Haven
Nursing Home, 182 N.J. 507, 512 (2005) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 815
(6th ed. 1990)); see also Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008).
The October 26, 2022 order, on the other hand, finally determines all of
Liou's claims as to all parties. It is, therefore, a final order. The twenty-day
A-1398-22
8
time period for filing a motion for reconsideration established in Rule 4:49-2
applies.
Rule 1:3-4 prohibits the court from enlarging the twenty-day period.
Because of its late filing, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider
Liou's motion for reconsideration. Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super.
464, 469-71 (App. Div. 2019). We need not, therefore, address the several other
grounds for denial of the motion, including Liou's submission with the motion
of new evidence available to him at trial, his failure to produce a transcript of
the trial court's opinion, and the absence of citation to any controlling legal
precedent overlooked by the trial court when it issued its decision after trial.
Affirmed.
A-1398-22
9