Dcpp v. A.M.K. and H.B., I/M/O the Guardianship of J.A.B. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2814-22
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.M.K.,1
Defendant,
and
H.B.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF J.A.B.,
a minor.
__________________________
Argued January 17, 2024 – Decided January 23, 2024
1
We refer to the adults and the child involved in this case by initials to protect
their privacy. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FG-04-0044-23.
Adrienne Marie Kalosieh, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Adrienne Marie
Kalosieh, of counsel and on the briefs).
Lakshmi Ranjit Barot, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lakshmi Ranjit
Barot, on the brief).
Noel Christian Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for minor (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney;
Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel; Noel Christian Devlin, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant H.B. is the biological father of J.A.B. H.B. appeals from the
April 25, 2023 judgment of guardianship terminating his parental rights to the
child.2 H.B. contends that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(Division) failed to prove the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear
2
The judgment also terminated the parental rights of J.A.B.'s biological mother,
A.M.K. However, A.M.K. has not filed a notice of appeal from that
determination and, therefore, she is not a party to this appeal.
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and convincing evidence. H.B. also asserts that the trial judge abused her
discretion by denying his request for an adjournment of the proceedings and by
not "inquir[ing] into [his] request to relieve his counsel." The Law Guardian
supports the termination on appeal as it did before the trial court.
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that
the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the
trial judge's decision to terminate H.B.'s parental rights, her decision to deny
H.B.'s adjournment request, and her handling of H.B.'s outbursts during the
proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm these decisions.
I.
J.A.B. was born in December 2019, prematurely, weighing less than three
pounds, having been exposed to cocaine and methadone in utero. She was
placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit due to her numerous medical issues.
A.M.K. had not received any prenatal care, had a long history of substance
abuse, and used cocaine and heroin during her pregnancy.
J.A.B. has never been in H.B.'s or A.M.K.'s custody. After J.A.B. was
released from the hospital in January 2020, the trial court granted the Division
custody of the child and the Division placed her with her current resource
parents. The Division asked H.B. and A.M.K. to identify possible relatives to
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act as a resource family for J.A.B., but they did not do so until over a year into
the litigation.
H.B. was hostile, argumentative, and aggressive from the very beginning
of J.A.B.'s life. He was restricted from visiting J.A.B. without security present
when she was hospitalized shortly after her placement for breathing difficulties.
Even when allowed visits, H.B. was inappropriate with his daughter, snapping
his fingers in her face and telling her to wake up.
When the Division later attempted to set up therapeutic visits for H.B. and
J.A.B., he was so confrontational that the provider had to carry a panic button
and required a security officer to be present. On another occasion, H.B. made
unwelcome sexual remarks toward the visit supervisor, forcing the agency to
terminate therapeutic visitation.
Despite these issues, the Division worked with H.B. and A.M.K., offering
substance abuse and domestic violence services, changing visitation dates to suit
their schedules, and accommodating them even when they were late. When the
COVID-19 pandemic began, the Division set up virtual visits for the parents,
since J.A.B. was high-risk due to her respiratory issues from birth and could not
do in person visits. H.B. was required to undergo substance use screens weekly
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once visitation with J.A.B. began, but he failed to fully comply. H.B. tested
positive for alcohol on two of the three screens he did complete.
H.B. and A.M.K. would disappear for weeks or months at a time without
contacting the Division or seeing J.A.B. For example, H.B. had no contact with
the Division from May 7, 2020 to August 27, 2020, and the Division began a
formal search for the parents. When the Division finally got in contact with
H.B., he was immediately confrontational with Division workers, shouting,
cursing, and refusing to give an updated address. This sporadic contact
continued through the rest of 2020. In January 2021, H.B. was incarcerated on
aggravated assault charges in which A.M.K. was the victim.
That same month, A.M.K. identified H.B.'s adult biological daughter from
another relationship, T.B.-T., as a possible caretaker for J.A.B. The Division
contacted T.B.-T. to begin the required licensing process. Due to the inability
of either H.B. or A.M.K. to safely parent the child, the Division changed the
case goal to adoption in March 2021.
T.B.-T. began to visit with J.A.B. in July 2021. After T.B.-T. agreed to
live separately from her boyfriend, who had an Adoption and Safe Families Act
(AFSA) disqualifier, the Division placed J.A.B. with T.B.-T. on November 24,
2021 on the presumption that T.B.-T. would obtain licensure.
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In February 2022, the trial judge held a permanency hearing. The case
goal was changed to Kinship Legal Guardianship at T.B.-T.'s request, and the
matter was moved back to the FN docket.
In April 2022, T.B.-T., her children, and J.A.B. moved out of their home
and stayed with T.B.-T.'s mother, delaying the licensing process. In June 2022,
the family moved in again with T.B.-T.'s boyfriend. Because of that individual's
AFSA disqualifier, the Division removed J.A.B. from T.B.-T.'s care and placed
her back with her former resource parents. The child remained in this placement
through the conclusion of the trial court proceedings.
The Division provided T.B.-T. with ongoing visits with J.A.B. At the time
of trial, T.B.-T. had obtained her own housing and was being re-evaluated as a
placement for J.A.B.. Both the resource parents and T.B.-T. wish to adopt
J.A.B. The Division's permanency plan was for J.A.B. to be adopted by T.B.-
T. if she were able to obtain licensing approval, or by the resource family. 3
Simultaneously, the Division was still attempting to work with both H.B.
and A.M.K. to get them psychological evaluations and other necessary services.
H.B. attended a psychological evaluation with Dr. Alan Lee while in prison. Dr.
3
T.B.-T. was no longer interested in Kinship Legal Guardianship.
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Lee found that H.B. lacked empathy and regard towards others, and opined that
H.B. could not act as an independent caretaker of J.A.B.
By late August 2022, J.A.B. had been in Division custody for
approximately thirty months. The Division changed the permanency goal to
adoption, and an initial hearing was held on November 4, 2022. H.B. was
present via Zoom from prison for the hearing, and successfully applied for a
public defender to represent him. While in prison, H.B. underwent a
psychological examination by Dr. James Loving, a licensed psychologist with
an expertise in clinical and forensic psychology. 4 The guardianship trial was
scheduled to start on March 28, 2023.
At the beginning of a hearing on March 28, 2023, H.B.'s attorney advised
the trial judge that "[a]t the appropriate time, Your Honor, I believe [H.B.] may
have an application." 5 After taking the appearances of all counsel, H.B.'s
attorney stated, "Your Honor, I believe [H.B.] does wish to address the [c]ourt
and I believe he may be thinking to no longer have my services as his attorney
any longer." The attorney continued, "He can, I guess speak to that, Your
4
We discuss Dr. Loving's findings below.
5
H.B. had been transported to the court that day by prison authorities.
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Honor, but I believe he may wish to no longer have a public defender assigned
to him."
The trial judge swore H.B. in and asked him, "Is there something you
would like to advise the [c]ourt?" H.B. replied "It's frivolous for me to be here.
I'm the only one here. She's not doing nothing. Last time we was in court y'all
didn't even let me speak." However, H.B. never asked to represent himself or
for his counsel to be relieved. Instead, he asked that he not be required to attend
the hearing. H.B. stated that he would be released from prison soon and that he
"would like to leave as soon as possible and all of this will get handled from the
street."
The judge patiently reviewed the long history of the case with H.B., who
proceeded to continually interrupt her. H.B. told the judge she was "spiteful,"
"prejudice," [sic] and "racist." The judge continued to explain why the case
needed to move forward because J.A.B. "cannot wait any longer. It's important
that she has a roadmap for her permanency and stability." H.B.'s diatribe ended.
The Law Guardian then made an application to have the judge conduct a
hearing to determine whether it would be in J.A.B.'s best interest to be placed
with T.B.-T. or remain with her current resource home. H.B.'s attorney strongly
opposed this request on his behalf, as did the Division and A.M.K. H.B.'s
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attorney argued that it was premature for the trial judge to attempt to determine
which possible caregiver should be granted adoption because T.B.-T.'s home
was not yet licensed.
Over H.B.'s attorney's objections, the judge granted the request for the
hearing, reasoning that one benefit of holding the hearing during the
guardianship litigation was that H.B. and A.M.K. could participate and have
counsel advise them, which would not occur if their parental rights were first
terminated.
The judge conducted this hearing on April 19 and 20, 2023. During the
first day of the hearing, H.B. had several angry outbursts. He repeatedly told
the resource mother that he knew her address. He also continually interrupted
the proceedings, first to demand that the guardianship trial, which had long been
scheduled to begin on April 25, 2023, be delayed for three weeks to coincide
with his alleged release date, and then to demand that he be excused from
appearing in court and attending any future proceedings, including the
guardianship trial. He stated he was making this request "as a strategic move
because it helps me."
The judge denied his adjournment request, noting that J.A.B. had been in
the Division's custody her entire life and that any delay of J.A.B.'s permanency
A-2814-22
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would only cause her further harm. Additionally, there was no way to confirm
H.B.'s release date because he refused to permit the release of his parole records
to the Division, and had previously told the judge different dates and timelines
for his possible release.
As to H.B.'s request to stop coming to court, the judge engaged in a
lengthy colloquy designed to ensure that he understood the ramifications of his
request. H.B. interrupted the judge constantly during this discussion. The judge
told H.B. that appearing in court was "the only way that you can participate in
that trial, which is the last piece of this case before this [c]ourt, for whatever
happens - - and it may be a good result for you." H.B. responded:
I promise all y'all individually. I promise, it's going to
be a great result regardless.
I don't care what none of y'all say. I don't care what
none of y'all say. You're not taking my daughter. You
can't terminate my rights.
The bitch who sit up there barren that can't have no
kids, her parental rights is terminated. I can make kids.
You don't believe me? Anybody want to find out? I
can make kids.
My rights will never be terminated. You can't do that.
Despite H.B.'s extremely disrespectful behavior, the judge continued to
tell him how important it was for him to attend court. She offered to have H.B.
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attend via Zoom from the courtroom next door, or to return to prison and attend
via Zoom there. H.B. declined these alternatives. H.B. acknowledged that his
attorney would be present at all future proceedings to represent him. Satisfied
that he was fully aware of the ramifications of his decision, the judge granted
H.B.'s request to absent himself from any further court proceedings.
After H.B. left the court, the judge heard testimony from the resource
mother, T.B.-T., Division workers, and the Law Guardian's expert, Dr. Roberta
Dihoff, who had conducted a bonding evaluation with J.A.B., T.B.-T. and the
resource family. The resource mother remained committed to adopting J.A.B.
T.B.-T. testified that she wished to proceed with licensing with the goal of
adopting J.A.B. The Division's preference at that time was for J.A.B. to return
to T.B.-T.'s care if she were able to become licensed. Dr. Dihoff testified that
it would be in J.A.B.'s best interest to achieve permanency as quickly as
possible.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge stated she was "unable to make
a decision of one caregiver over another, acknowledging that both the resource
parents . . . and [J.A.B.]'s sister, [T.B.-T.] testified to their clear desires to adopt
[J.A.B.] if she is legally free." In essence, the judge agreed with H.B., the
Division, and A.M.K. that it was premature to make a permanency decision in
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advance of a determination whether the parental rights of the parties should be
terminated. The judge ordered the Division to continue the processing of T.B.-
T.'s licensing application.
As scheduled, the guardianship trial was held on April 25, 2023. The
Division called Dr. Loving and Division Adoption Worker Billie Jo Paugh to
testify. There were no other witnesses.
Dr. Loving was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology.
He testified that H.B. was only "marginally cooperative," "menacing," and
"really hostile" during the evaluation he conducted with H.B. in March 2023.
Dr. Loving observed that H.B. had "no inkling of personal responsibility"
in regard to the current situation with J.A.B. H.B. told Dr. Loving that the only
barrier to reunification with his daughter was "the system."
Dr. Loving diagnosed H.B. with anti-social personality disorder with
narcissistic traits. He opined that "[H.B.] is perpetually getting into trouble . . .
not being able to control himself" with "an attitude here that he's right and other
people are wrong and he's going to keep doing what he feels justified to do ."
Dr. Loving also diagnosed H.B. with impulse and control disorder, which would
require him to engage in "real work" to make changes in his condition.
However, Dr. Loving explained, "it's practically impossible to envision [H.B.]
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taking those steps, taking some responsibility, and then staying agreeable long
enough to do that work. It is near impossible to see that happening."
Dr. Loving identified "severe" risks to J.A.B. if she were reunified with
H.B., considering H.B.'s history of anger problems, domestic violence with
A.M.K., and high risk of recidivism. He explained, "it's frightening to envision
what [H.B.] would be capable of if he were unsupervised with [J.A.B.] at this
point, if he were to become angry at her or angry at people around her." Finding
that H.B.'s prognosis was "extremely poor," Dr. Loving supported the Division's
goal of adoption for J.A.B.
During her testimony, Paugh reviewed the Division's involvement with
the family since J.A.B.'s birth in December 2019. Paugh stated that H.B. was
resistant to completing services before and during his incarceration. She also
described the difficulty in working with H.B., given his hostile behavior towards
Division workers and service providers, and unwillingness to participate in
services while incarcerated, despite their availability.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge applied the statutory "best interests
of the child" standard, which authorizes the Division to initiate a petition to
terminate parental rights if:
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(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances
which led to the child's placement outside the home and
the court has considered alternatives to termination of
parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
In her comprehensive oral decision, the judge concluded that the Division
had satisfied each of the four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and
convincing evidence. As to prongs one and two of the statutory test, the judge
found that H.B.'s and A.M.K.'s parental rights should be terminated due to their
irresponsibility and non-compliance with offered services. They were simply
not able to adequately provide a safe and healthy environment for J.A.B. The
judge cited H.B.'s heightened risk of recidivism, interpersonal conflicts, his
persistent belief that none of this was his fault, despite evidence to the contrary,
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and "most importantly, [Dr. Loving]'s uncontroverted opinion that . . . he could
not recommend [J.A.B] be placed with [H.B.]."
The judge found that the Division made reasonable efforts to arrange visits
and services for H.B., but he did not remediate the problems that caused the
removal. The judge pointed to "the harm of [H.B.'s] anger issues, hostility,
behavioral issues, potential . . . failure to have visited consistently and establish
a relationship with [J.A.B.] for that one year before he was incarcerated" as
further support for her findings under the first two prongs.
Under the third prong, the judge reiterated that services had been offered
to H.B. throughout the litigation, and he was kept informed of the case status .
However, H.B. refused to take advantage of services both before and during his
incarceration. The judge found no alternatives to adoption as neither T.B.-T.
nor the resource parents were seeking Kinship Legal Guardianship.
Finally, as to prong four, the trial judge found that termination was clearly
in J.A.B.'s best interests as she could not safely live with either parent now or in
the foreseeable future. She had never lived with her parents in her three years
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of life. Further, she had two viable options for adoption once she was given the
opportunity for permanency. This appeal followed. 6
II.
The scope of our review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental
rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420,
448-49 (2012). "Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise
in family matters," we accord deference to the trial court's fact-finding and the
conclusions that flow logically from those findings of fact. Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 413 (l998). We are bound by those factual findings so long as
they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007).
The trial judge's opinion tracks the requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a), and is supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record.
F.M., 211 N.J. at 448-49. After appraising the record in light of the findings of
fact contained in the judge's decision, we find nothing that requires our
6
During the pendency of the appeal, defendant submitted a certification
elaborating upon his relationship with his trial attorney. We granted defendant's
motion to supplement the record with this certification and have considered it in
our determination of this appeal.
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intervention. The judge carefully reviewed the relevant evidence and fully
explained her reasons in a logical and forthright fashion.
H.B.'s argument concerning the statutory test on appeal is limited to his
contention that the trial judge erred when she concluded that the Division
satisfied the fourth statutory prong, which requires the court to determine
whether termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good to the
child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). We disagree.
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4) "serves as a fail-safe against termination even
where the remaining standards have been met." Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 609 (2007). The question is "whether a child's interest
will best be served by completely terminating the child's relationship with that
parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008).
The ultimate determination to be made under the fourth prong is "whether, after
considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater
harm from the termination of ties with [the] natural parents than from the
permanent disruption of [the] relationship with [the] foster parents." In re
Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 355 (1999).
In finding that the Division met the fourth prong, the trial judge relied on
Dr. Loving's unrefuted expert testimony that it would be "frightening" to place
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J.A.B. in H.B's care because of his uncontrolled anger issues. Dr. Loving opined
that it was "practically impossible" to envision H.B. making the changes
necessary to address his many issues. Thus, permanency with H.B. was not a
viable option at the time of the trial or for the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, J.A.B. had two seemingly viable avenues of
permanency with either her current resource parents or with T.B.-T. The
resource parents have cared for the child for approximately three years, spanning
two placements. T.B.-T. is a relative, who has also remained committed to
adopting the child and to pursuing the licensing process.
Contrary to H.B.'s argument in Point III of his brief, the trial judge was
properly cautious in waiting until the licensing study of T.B.-T and her home
was completed before deciding on the specific permanency plan for J.A.B.
Although a court could certainly place the child with T.B.-T even if the Division
denied T.B.-T.'s licensing application, (see N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. K.N., 435 N.J. Super. 16, 29 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd as modified,
223 N.J. 530 (2015)), the study will provide essential information to the court,
allowing it to make a fully informed decision on the child's placement now that
the child has been freed for adoption.
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The question of which placement is in the J.A.B.'s best interests is not
currently before us. However, the uncontroverted evidence at trial firmly
established that H.B. is unable to care for the child, and the judge correctly found
that it would be in J.A.B.'s best interests to be adopted by either the resource
parents or T.B.-T. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe that
terminating H.B.'s parental rights, thus freeing J.A.B. for adoption, would do
more harm than good. Therefore, the trial judge properly concluded that all of
the requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) were satisfied, including prong four
of the statutory test.
III.
H.B.'s remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extended
discussion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief comments.
In Point II, H.B. argues that the trial judge abused her discretion by
denying his request to adjourn the long-scheduled date for the termination trial.
Timeliness is important in cases concerning parental rights because of the
impact a delay or interruption can have on a child awaiting permanency. N.J.
Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 146 (2018).
Accordingly, "Family Part judges conducting termination of parental rights
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proceedings must be mindful of the need for prompt determination of the
difficult issues before them." Id. at 146-47.
Guided by these principles, we are satisfied that the trial judge properly
weighed the timing and merits of H.B.'s adjournment request against J.A.B.'s
need for permanency. We discern no error in the judge's finding that it was
appropriate to commence the trial as scheduled.
Finally, in Point I, H.B. argues that the trial judge should have "inquire[d]
into [his] request to relieve his counsel." Specifically, he asserts the judge was
required to inquire "as to whether, after colloquy, H.B. wished to proceed p ro
se" or replace his attorney. We disagree.
Parents have a right to represent themselves in termination matters.
R.L.M., 236 N.J. at 148-49. However, this right is not absolute; rather, the right
"must be exercised in a manner that permits a full and fair adjudication of the
dispute and a prompt and equitable permanency determination for the child." Id.
at 132. Thus, a "parent must inform the court of his or her intention to appear
pro se in a timely manner, so as to minimize delay of the proceedings." Ibid.For a request to be timely, the parent does not have to waive or invoke the right
to self-representation at the inception of the litigation, but must do so "well in
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advance of trial." Id. at 149. It is up to the discretion of the trial judge to accept
or reject a parent's untimely request to self-represent. Ibid.Additionally, the right to self-representation must be invoked clearly and
unequivocally. Id. at 132. Once invoked, "the court should conduct an inquiry
'to ensure the parent understands the nature of the proceeding as well as the
problems [he] may face if [he] chooses to represent [him]self.'" Ibid. (quoting
In re Adoption of a Child by J.E.V. and D.G.V., 226 N.J. 90, 114 (2016)).
Here, H.B. never asked for the opportunity to represent himself or to
replace his attorney. On March 28, 2023, his attorney advised the trial judge
that H.B. may no longer want to have a public defender assigned to him.
However, when the judge asked H.B. what he wanted to tell her, he complained
about having to appear in court and began to insult the judge. The record reflects
that the trial judge responded to H.B.'s outbursts with patience and
professionalism.
While H.B. also made remarks during the proceeding concerning his own
attorney, he never unequivocally stated he wished to appear on behalf of himself
or replace his attorney. Instead, he relied upon his attorney to represent his
interests both before and after he decided to forego any further court
appearances. Therefore, we reject H.B.'s contentions on this point.
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IV.
In sum, children like J.A.B. are entitled to a permanent, safe and secure
home. We acknowledge "the need for permanency of placements by placing
limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation of
reuniting with the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J.
Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly focuses on a
child's need for permanency, "[t]he emphasis has shifted from protracted efforts
for reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placem ent to
promote the child's well-being." Ibid. That is because "[a] child cannot be held
prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents. Children have
their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement."
Ibid.The question then is "whether the parent can become fit in time to meet
the needs of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J.
Super. 235, 263 (App. Div. 2005); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 512 (2004). After carefully considering the evidence, the
trial judge reasonably determined that H.B. was unable to parent J.A.B. and
would not be able to do so for the foreseeable future. Under those
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circumstances, we agree with the trial judge that any further delay of permanent
placement would not be in the child's best interests.
Affirmed.
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