Marna Lynn v. Mark Meding ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0075-22
MARNA LYNN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARK MEDING,
Defendant-Appellant,
_______________________
Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided July 22, 2024
Before Judges Sumners and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FM-02-0527-19.
Ronda Casson Cotroneo, attorney for appellant.
Cockerill, Craig & Moore, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Christine C. Cockerill, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Mark Meding appeals from a trial court order denying his
motion to vacate a final judgment of divorce (FJOD) pursuant to Rule 4:50-1.
On appeal, Meding does not identify which section of the rule he relies upon.
Nonetheless, he argues the divorce agreement should be vacated because its anti-
Lepis1 clause is unenforceable. He also contends that if the agreement is
enforceable, that he has demonstrated changed circumstances warranting a post-
judgment modification of his alimony. Finally, he argues the trial court erred
by not conducting a plenary hearing before issuing its order denying his
application. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude defendant's
arguments are meritless, and we affirm.
Defendant and plaintiff, Marna Lynn, were married in September 2002.
The parties had two children, born in 2004 and 2007. The parties divorced in
December 2018. Although he had notice of the hearing, defendant did not attend
court on the date the FJOD was entered by the Family Part. Marna Lynn is
currently the parent of primary residence. Defendant has remarried.
Both parties worked during the marriage. Plaintiff is a therapist. Between
2010 and 2015, defendant was the director of sales for a corporation with
operations in the United States and Canada. In 2015, defendant voluntarily left
his sales director position to purchase and run his own business. Defendant
1
Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980).
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purchased this business for $2.2 million, borrowing almost one hundred percent
of the purchase funds, including borrowing money from plaintiff's parents.
While the parties negotiated their thirty-one-page marital settlement
agreement (MSA), plaintiff was represented by counsel. Defendant was self-
represented. The preamble to the MSA stated, in part:
[E]ach party has had the opportunity to consult with and
be independently represented by counsel of their own
choosing, the [h]usband having reviewed this
Agreement and having the opportunity to consult with
counsel and having voluntarily waived his right to
counsel recognizing that such waiver is voluntary and
cannot be the basis for him to seek modification of this
Agreement under any circumstance . . . .
Paragraph seven of the MSA addressed defendant's waiver of his right to
counsel:
7.1. . . . [t]he [h]usband has been advised of his right to
obtain counsel with regard to this proceeding.
7.2. If the [h]usband executes this Agreement without
retaining counsel he does so voluntarily and waives his
right to counsel. The [h]usband understands and agrees
that he may not later challenge this Agreement because
he did not retain counsel.
Other MSA terms included: defendant would pay $2,500 per week in
alimony for fifteen years to plaintiff unless she got a partner who paid more than
50% of her living expenses; defendant would pay $2,500 per month and plaintiff
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would contribute $1,000 per month toward the children's 529 college savings
plan; the parties were to split the children's expenses equally; termination of
alimony would occur either upon the graduation of both children or on August
16, 2032, whichever is later; and an agreement the MSA was not to be modified.
By agreement, the parties did not exchange case information statements. Per
the MSA, plaintiff retained the proceeds from the sale of the house, totaling
approximately $156,774.76.
The record shows that in 2021 defendant withdrew over $118,000 from
the children's 529 college savings plan without plaintiff's consent. Defendant
also accumulated $116,000 in alimony arrears in 2021. Defendant did not pay
any child support after August 2021. The record further shows defendant's
defaults under the agreement coincided with his purchase of a home with his
current wife.
In January 2022, defendant moved to declare the MSA unconscionable.
He sought several areas of relief including: new determinations on alimony,
child support and equitable distribution; disgorgement by plaintiff of $356,686
in alimony; disgorgement by plaintiff of $78,387.38 in proceeds from the sale
of the former marital home; vacation of all alimony arrears; and an award of
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counsel fees. Plaintiff opposed and cross-moved for enforcement of litigants'
rights.
On March 25, 2022, the trial court rendered a detailed oral statement of
reasons that defendant: waived his right to counsel; was under no duress when
he signed the MSA; and agreed that he would not challenge the MSA later on
the basis that he did not have counsel. Finding that defendant had "no basis for
this application," the court denied defendant's motion without a plenary hearing
on March 25, 2022. The court granted plaintiff's cross-motion and entered
judgment against defendant in the amount of $212,750 for alimony arrears.
Making the appropriate findings, the court also rejected defendant's fee
application, and instead awarded plaintiff $6,100 in counsel fees.
Defendant moved for reconsideration, and plaintiff filed opposition and a
cross-motion for counsel fees. On August 5, 2022, the court denied
reconsideration and also granted plaintiff's application for additional counsel
fees incurred in opposition. Defendant appealed.
"We review the Family Part judge's findings in accordance with a
deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special jurisdiction and
expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83
(2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). We reverse "only
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when a mistake must have been made because the trial court's factual findings
are 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice . . . .'"
Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015)
(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)). We review de novo questions of law. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J.
Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial
court's decision is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex
Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v.
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Settlement of matrimonial disputes is "encouraged and highly valued in
our system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016). Settlement agreements,
including settlement agreements in matrimonial actions, are governed by basic
contract principles and, as such, courts should discern and implement the parties'
intent. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). "The court's role is to consider
what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to
apply a rational meaning in keeping with the 'expressed general purpose.'"
Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007) (quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v.
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Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 302 (1953)). "[A] court should not rewrite a contract
or grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly
bargained." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
"'[S]trong public policy favor[s] stability of arrangements'
in matrimonial matters." Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)
(quoting Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 360 (1977)); see also Quinn, 225 N.J. at
44. However, a court is "authorized to modify alimony and support orders 'as
the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case' require." Halliwell
v. Halliwell, 326 N.J. Super. 442, 448, (App. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23). A party seeking a modification of alimony and child support
obligations must demonstrate changed circumstances "as would warrant relief."
Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157; see also Spangenberg, 442 N.J. Super. at 536.
A temporary change of circumstances does not warrant relief. Lepis, 83
N.J. at 151; see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 128 (App. Div.
2009). If the moving party makes a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances, the court may order the parties to disclose information regarding
their financial status to enable the court to make an informed decision as to
"what, in light of all the [circumstances] is equitable and fair." Lepis, 83 N.J.
at 158 (quoting Smith, 72 N.J. at 360).
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We conclude defendant's arguments are wholly without merit and we
affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial court's oral opinion
denying both the original motion and reconsideration. We make the following
brief comments.
In addition to Article VII of the MSA referenced above, we highlight
Article VIII. Article VIII of the MSA is entitled, "General Representations." It
is a comprehensive eight-page, twenty-nine paragraph section of the MSA.
Among other things, defendant agreed and represented in Article VIII that: the
agreement was negotiated exclusively between the parties; he waived all right
to discovery, including the exchange of Case Information Statements; the parties
would not conduct discovery and that he relied on his knowledge of plaintiff's
finances; he understood he could not challenge the agreement later based on an
absence of discovery; and he waived right to counsel.
We discern nothing in the record which would persuade us to rewrite the
MSA or grant defendant a better deal than that for which he expressly bargained.
Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
Affirmed.
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