State of New Jersey v. Brennan Doyle ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1733-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRENNAN DOYLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted May 22, 2024 – Decided July 23, 2024
Before Judges Currier and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 14-11-
1995.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Lisa Sarnoff Gochman,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Brennan Doyle appeals a November 15, 2022 Law Division
order denying his petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) without a hearing.
Defendant claims he received ineffective assistance from his plea counsel. After
carefully considering the record in view of the governing legal principles, we
affirm the PCR court's order.
I.
We discern the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the
record. In the early morning hours of July 7, 2013, defendant, then sixteen years
old, left his house armed with "about a foot long" knife and went to the victim's
residence. Defendant did not know the victim. He stabbed the victim multiple
times with the intent to kill her while repeatedly asking her where her car keys
were. Defendant took the keys and drove the victim's car to another town. The
victim survived.
Defendant was charged as a juvenile with delinquency for acts that if
committed by an adult would constitute first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
2; first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1;
third-degree possession of a weapon (knife) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(d); and fourth-degree possession of a weapon (knife), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
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5(d). In June 2014, defendant was transferred to adult court pursuant to N.J.SA.
2A:4A-26.1.
Defendant was subsequently charged by indictment with first-degree
carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a) (count one); first-degree attempted murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 (count two); third-degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count three); fourth-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count four);
third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b) (count five); and
fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law or other governmental
function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (count six).
On August 27, 2015, defendant pled guilty to counts one and two pursuant
to a plea agreement. In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas, the State agreed
to recommend a sentence of fifteen years in State Prison, subject to the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The State also agreed to dismiss the
remaining counts of the indictment.
On October 29, 2015, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the
plea agreement to two concurrent fifteen-year terms of imprisonment subject to
NERA. On April 5, 2016, we affirmed the sentences on a sentencing calendar.
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On December 5, 2016, the Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for
certification. State v. Doyle, 228 N.J. 425 (2016).
In December 2020, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. He
subsequently filed an amended petition and two certifications. Counsel
submitted a brief and appendix in support of defendant's petition.
On November 15, 2022, the PCR court held a non-evidentiary hearing
after which it denied defendant's PCR petition on procedural and substantive
grounds, rendering an oral decision. This appeal follows.
Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:
POINT I
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIMS THAT
COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE BY PRECLUDING THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE FOR
REHABILITATION AND BY FAILING TO
ADVOCATE ADEQUATELY AT SENTENCING.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT
[DEFENDANT'S] PETITION WAS TIME-BARRED
BECAUSE ANY DELAY IN FILING THE PETITION
WAS DUE TO THE DEFENDANT'S EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT AND THERE IS A REASONABLE
PROBABILITY THAT IF THE DEFENDANT'S
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS WERE FOUND TO BE
TRUE, ENFORCEMENT OF THE TIME BAR
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WOULD RESULT IN A FUNDAMENTAL
INJUSTICE.
II.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing
this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus.
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a
petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he
is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. To meet this burden, the petitioner must
allege and articulate specific facts, "which, if believed, would provide the court
with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J.
565, 579 (1992).
In addressing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, New Jersey
courts follow the two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See State v. Fritz, 105
N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687). "Second, the defendant must have been prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance." Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
To meet the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show
"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
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'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. Reviewing courts indulge in "a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . ."
Id. at 689. "A court evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
avoid second-guessing defense counsel's tactical decisions and viewing those
decisions under the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'" State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.
89, 157 (1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
The second Strickland prong is especially demanding. It requires the
defendant show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Put
differently, counsel's errors must create a "reasonable probability" that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different if counsel had not made
the errors. Id. at 694. This "is an exacting standard." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551
(quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). "Prejudice is not to be
presumed," but must be affirmatively proven by the defendant. Ibid. (citing
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an
evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with
an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. However, "[i]f
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the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's
analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary
hearing need not be granted." Marshall, 148 N.J. at 158 (citations omitted). A
PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div.
2023) (citing State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013)).
Furthermore, the mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the
defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,
170 (App. Div. 1999). The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only
when "(1) the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2)
the court determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that can not
be resolved by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that
an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted." Vanness, 474
N.J. Super. at 623 (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013)).
With respect to the first of these three requirements, "[a] prima facie case
is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a reasonable likelihood that his
or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the
defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Porter, 216 N.J. at 355(quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). "[V]ague, conclusory, or speculative" allegations are
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insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Ibid. (quoting Marshall, 148 N.J.
at 158).
In the context of a PCR petition challenging a guilty plea based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, the second prong is established when the
defendant demonstrates a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." State v. Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)); see also State v.
McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 30 (2012). Additionally, the defendant must establish
that a "decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
III.
We first address defendant's contention "[t]he PCR court's ruling that
[defendant's] petition was time-barred was in error and this [c]ourt should
consider the merits of [defendant's] petition because his delay in filing his
petition was due to excusable neglect and because there is a reasonable
probability that if the defendant's factual assertions were found to be true,
enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice."
Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) provides:
A-1733-22
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no petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than
[five] years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule
3:21-5 of the judgment of conviction that is being
challenged unless:
(A) it alleges facts showing that the delay beyond
said time was due to defendant's excusable neglect
and that there is a reasonable probability that if the
defendant's factual assertions were found to be true
enforcement of the time bar would result in a
fundamental injustice.
The five-year time limitation runs from the date of the conviction or
sentencing, "whichever the defendant is challenging." State v. Milne, 178 N.J.
486, 491 (2004) (quoting State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 594 (2002)). The
judgment of conviction in this case was entered on November 2, 2015. Thus,
defendant had until November 2, 2020 to file his petition. He acknowledges he
filed after the five-year deadline expired.
We thus must consider whether there was excusable neglect. To establish
excusable neglect, a defendant must demonstrate more than "a plausible
explanation for a failure to file a timely PCR petition." State v. Norman, 405
N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2009). The circumstances supporting a finding
of excusable neglect must be "exceptional," Goodwin, 173 N.J. at 594, and the
PCR "petition itself must allege the facts relied on to support the [excusable
neglect] claim." Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 577.
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Defendant asserts that the circumstances in this case satisfy the excusable
neglect exception because "due to the COVID pandemic, he was unable to access
adequately the [prison] law library." However, New Jersey did not declare a
public health emergency due to the pandemic until March 9, 2020. Exec. Order
No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr. 6, 2020). That means defendant
had more than four years prior to the COVID-19 emergency to research and file
his PCR petition.
Considering those circumstances, the PCR court concluded:
Although the [c]ourt may use its discretion in waiving
the five-year limit due to the pandemic and
[defendant's] little to no access to the prison law library,
the [c]ourt does find that [defendant's] . . . factual
assertions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel
are meritless and therefore, enforcement of the time bar
would not result in fundamental injustice.
We agree that no fundamental injustice would result to defendant by
enforcing the time bar and that defendant has thus failed to establish excusable
neglect for missing the PCR filing deadline. But just as the PCR court addressed
defendant's contentions on their merits, we too proceed to address them
substantively notwithstanding they were untimely filed.
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IV.
We next address defendant's contention his attorney rendered
constitutionally defective assistance by failing to advise him of the
consequences that a guilty plea would have on his ability to argue for
rehabilitation. Defendant's argument misconstrues the law governing waiver
from juvenile to adult court.
The pertinent portion of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 in effect in 2013 1 provided:
a. On motion of the prosecutor, the court shall, without
the consent of the juvenile, waive jurisdiction over a
case and refer that case from the Superior Court,
Chancery Division, Family Part to the appropriate
court and prosecuting authority having jurisdiction
if it finds, after hearing, that:
(1) The juvenile was [fourteen] years of age or older at
the time of the charged delinquent act; and
(2) There is probable cause to believe that the juvenile
committed a delinquent act or acts which if
committed by an adult would constitute:
(a) Criminal homicide other than death by auto, strict
liability for drug induced deaths, pursuant to N.J.S.
2C:35-9, robbery which would constitute a crime of the
first degree, carjacking, aggravated sexual assault,
sexual assault, aggravated assault which would
constitute a crime of the second degree, kidnapping,
aggravated arson, or gang criminality pursuant to
section 1 of P.L.2007, c. 341 (C.2C:33-29) where the
1
This statute has since been repealed.
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underlying crime is enumerated in this subparagraph or
promotion of organized street crime pursuant to section
2 of P.L.2007, c. 341 (C.2C:33-30) which would
constitute a crime of the first or second degree which is
enumerated in this subparagraph; or
...
e. If the juvenile can show that the probability of his
rehabilitation by the use of the procedures, services and
facilities available to the court prior to the juvenile
reaching the age of [nineteen] substantially outweighs
the reasons for waiver, waiver shall not be granted.
This subsection shall not apply with respect to a
juvenile [sixteen] years of age or older who is charged
with committing any of the acts enumerated in
subparagraph (a), (i) or (j) of paragraph (2) of
subsection a. of this section or with respect to a
violation of N.J.S. 2C:35-3, N.J.S. 2C:35-4 or section 1
of P.L.1998, c. 26 (C. 2C:39-4.1).
[(emphasis added).]
In this case, defendant was sixteen when he committed the attempted
murder and carjacking. The record shows there was ample probable cause to
believe defendant committed carjacking—an offense specifically enumerated in
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2)(a). Thus, the provision that allows a juvenile to show
that the probability of his or her rehabilitation prior to reaching the age of
nineteen substantially outweighs the reasons for waiver does not apply. In State
v. V.A., 212 N.J. 1, 10 (2012), our Supreme Court made clear that "once the
State ha[d] established probable cause that a juvenile committed an act
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equivalent to an enumerated offense, waiver [was] required and the juvenile
[was] denied the opportunity to present rehabilitation evidence." There is
nothing defendant's plea counsel could have done to avoid that conclusion. We
also agree with the PCR court that counsel's alleged failure to inform defendant
that rehabilitation evidence would not be relevant with respect to the waiver
decision was—as the PCR judge aptly described—"immaterial."
Defendant further argues "the PCR court did not consider that counsel
could have made [the ability to argue rehabilitation] a condition of his plea, and
that [defendant] did not know this was not a condition of his plea." This
argument once again misconstrues the juvenile waiver law. We reiterate the law
in effect did not authorize consideration of defendant's prospects for
rehabilitation because he was charged with first-degree carjacking. Any
subsequent "argument" about rehabilitation would be presented in adult court
after the waiver decision had already been made.
In these circumstances, defendant has failed to show his plea counsel was
ineffective much less that he has suffered prejudice under the Strickland/Fritz
test. Relatedly, defendant has failed to show that he would not have accepted
the plea agreement counsel negotiated on his behalf. Defendant faced an
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aggregate prison term of fifty years in prison, subject to NERA. 2 Defendant's
negotiated maximum prison term was reduced by more than two thirds. That
reduction prompted the sentencing judge to comment that had he been the judge
at the plea hearing, "[he] would not have accepted this as a just and fair
punishment and would not have accepted this plea." We conclude the "plea offer
was so attractive that it would defy logic or reason that a defendant would risk
a trial." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 377 (App. Div. 2014).
V.
We turn next to defendant's contention that his "counsel failed to argue
adequately at sentencing, resulting in a higher sentence than what could have
been imposed if counsel had been an effective advocate." Specifically,
defendant argues counsel failed to adequately argue mitigating factor four
("[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's
conduct, though failing to establish a defense") in light of defendant's "mental
health struggles, history of abuse by his father, and drug and alcohol abuse."
Because of counsel's deficient performance, defendant argues, "a wealth of
mitigating evidence was not presented." He also states that he took mushrooms
2
The judge informed defendant that carjacking is a first-degree crime that
carries a maximum period in prison of thirty years. He also informed defendant
attempted murder carries a maximum term of twenty years in prison.
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"and was hallucinating and paranoid, and took a knife to protect himself against
his father." Defendant contends that but for counsel's deficient performance, his
sentence would have been lower.
We disagree. As to mitigating factor four, defendant's counsel at
sentencing argued:
I would submit there are four mitigating factors.
Mitigating [f]actor . . . [four] the defendant was under
the influence. It's not enough to rise to the level of a
defense. We're not submitting that it was. But it
certainly is a fact your Honor should consider.
Defendant's counsel further explained to the judge that:
The reason why his recollection is hazy, your Honor
knows from reviewing this file, is that [defendant] was
under the influence of hallucinogenic mushrooms on
the night of this attack. We had discussed at length
whether or not that rose to the level of whether it was a
legal defense in this case, whether you can use the
defense of intoxication as a way to say to the State that
he's not responsible for his actions. We believe that did
not rise to the level of intoxication. This is by way of
explanation, your Honor, not an excuse. Everything I
say here now is by way of explanation.
The record thus shows that counsel made arguments concerning
mitigating factor four. At sentencing, defense counsel also addressed
defendant's history of abuse and mental health struggles, arguing:
Certainly there was police involvement at his house.
Your Honor knows from the [presentence report (PSR)]
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the type of environment [defendant] grew up in but he
had not had a prior record. He was essentially a regular
young man who on the night in question took way too
many hallucinogenic mushrooms, and what happened is
what you heard.
The PSR that defense counsel referred to states defendant "was physically
abused by his father over the years, noting that he would blacken his eyes and
punch him in the head repeatedly." The PSR also indicated defendant "was
affected by the dysfunction of his upbringing where there was substance abuse,
mental illness and domestic violence throughout his childhood."
The sentencing judge expressly referred to the arguments made by defense
counsel, stating, "[a]s correctly pointed out by his experienced and able attorney,
the incidents that involved the police before appear to have resulted from family
circumstances that occur all too frequently in our society today."
We add that defense counsel at sentencing successfully argued against the
application of two aggravating factors urged by the State: factor three, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(3) ("[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense") and
six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) ("[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal
record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been
convicted").
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In sum, we are satisfied that counsel's performance at sentencing was far
from ineffective. Moreover, defendant cannot establish prejudice under the
second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test because nothing counsel could have
argued would have led to a sentence more lenient than the one contemplated in
the favorable plea deal counsel negotiated on defendant's behalf. As we have
noted, the sentencing judge commented that he would not have accepted the plea
agreement because it was so favorable to defendant.
In these circumstances, we conclude defendant has failed to establish a
basis for an evidentiary hearing much less to vacate his convictions or reduce
the sentence imposed.
Affirmed.
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