State of New Jersey v. Daniel C. Everett ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2488-21
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL C. EVERETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 8, 2024 – Decided January 26, 2024
Before Judges Sabatino and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 15-05-0629.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Laura C. Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This is an appeal of the denial of a post-conviction relief ("PCR") petition
without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm, substantially for the cogent reasons
expressed in Judge Janetta D. Marbrey's written opinion of March 14, 2022.
The tragic case arises out of a fatal accident in which a commercial dump
truck driven by defendant Daniel C. Everett struck the victim's car at about 2:15
p.m. on July 17, 2014. Defendant had caused three other motor vehicle
collisions earlier that day, all minor and none of them fatal. The first collision
occurred at 8:07 a.m.; the second at 11:45 a.m., and the third at 1:15 p.m. Police
officers responded to two of those three earlier accidents, but they did not
prevent defendant from resuming his driving.
Before the fourth and final accident, defendant texted his wife and
expressed concerns about the condition of his truck's brakes. His wife,
meanwhile, raised concerns in their text exchange about his mental state.
Although she did not tell him this until after the fatal collision, his wife had
noticed that he had lapsed into a "fugue state" on two recent occasions. He also
had been diagnosed with diabetes about two months earlier.
Defendant was arrested after the fatal accident and taken to a hospital. A
toxicology report detected no alcohol in his bloodstream and no controlled
dangerous substances except for Xanax, which he said had been prescribed to
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him for a work-related injury. About nine months after the accident, defendant
underwent a sleep study that diagnosed him with mild apnea.
Defendant was charged by indictment with second-degree death by auto,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), a form of reckless manslaughter. He had no previous
indictable convictions.
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the State consented to have defendant
sentenced one-degree lower, down to the third-degree range. The agreement
specified a three-year maximum custodial term, subject to parole ineligibility
mandated by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ("NERA").
In June 2017, defendant pled guilty in accordance with the agreement. At
the plea hearing, defendant admitted to the court that he had been reckless in
continuing to drive after the first three accidents. During the hearing,
defendant's attorney asked him several questions about his mental state leading
up to the accidents, referencing his text messages with his wife and her past
observations of his fugue state. Among other things, counsel showed that the
texts reflected concerns by defendant and his wife before the accident that a low
blood sugar level could have been affecting him. The trial court accepted
defendant's guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court also
confirmed with defendant that he was satisfied with his attorney's services.
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The sentencing was delayed for over a year to enable defendant to undergo
back surgery and address other health issues. He was eventually sentenced in
October 2018. In arguing for leniency, defense counsel suggested to the court
that defendant may have been suffering from chronic traumatic encephalopathy
("CTE"). Consistent with the plea agreement, the court treated defendant as a
third-degree offender and imposed a three-year NERA sentence.
In November 2019, defendant timely filed the present PCR petition. He
argues his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate
his case sufficiently. In particular, he contends his counsel should have explored
more deeply a potential medical explanation for his driving behavior. Defendant
asserted his belief that "the combination of sleep apnea and [his] uncontrolled
blood sugar was the cause of the [fatal] accident." He posits that had his counsel
been more diligent, he would not have pled guilty and instead would have gone
to trial.
After hearing oral argument on the PCR petition, Judge Marbrey issued
her nine-page written opinion rejecting defendant's contentions. The judge
found that plea counsel's performance was not deficient. Among other things,
she noted that during both the plea hearing and the sentencing, "counsel clearly
addressed [defendant's] ongoing cognitive issues." The judge deemed
defendant's claims that counsel was inattentive to his medical conditions as
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unsubstantiated "bald assertions." The judge found it reasonable to infer that
counsel, who was clearly aware of his client's medical circumstances,
strategically chose to pursue plea negotiations rather than risk advancing a
medical defense at trial. The judge also highlighted defendant's admission that
he knew his decision to keep driving after the first three accidents earlier the
same day was reckless.
On appeal, defendant presents this argument in his brief:
POINT I
MR. EVERETT IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO
CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE PRETRIAL
INVESTIGATION, CAUSING HIM TO PLEAD
GUILTY WHEN HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE
PROCEEDED TO TRIAL.
In assessing this argument, we are guided by well-settled principles. A
defendant seeking relief because of the alleged constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel must demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel,
and (2) actual prejudice flowing from that performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52
(1987). In the context of a defense that culminated, as here, with a plea
agreement, the defendant must show with "'reasonable probability'" that the
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result would have been different had plea counsel taken a different course of
action. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). Our courts afford substantial deference in this regard to strategic
decisions made by a trial attorney. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 322-23 (2005).
Applying these principles, we concur with Judge Marbrey's sound
analysis. Defendant presents no expert reports substantiating his theory that his
driving behavior on the day of the fatal crash was caused by a combination of
diabetes, sleep apnea, and an uncontrolled blood sugar. Moreover, even if he
tendered such an expert medical opinion, it would not have necessarily
persuaded a jury to exonerate his conduct, particularly given his own admission
that it was reckless to have continued driving after the first three accidents. We
must also be mindful that defendant initially had been facing a second-degree
sentencing exposure of up to ten years of imprisonment; the third-degree
sentence of three years that his plea counsel favorably negotiated was a
significant achievement.
Because defendant failed to advance a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance, no evidentiary hearing was warranted. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J.
451, 462-63 (1992).
Affirmed.
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