Dcpp v. S.J. and G.M., in the Matter of the Guardianship of I.I.H.J.M. ( 2024 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1706-21
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION
    OF CHILD PROTECTION
    AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    S.J.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    G.M.,
    Defendant.
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    GUARDIANSHIP OF I.I.H.J.M.,
    a minor.
    Submitted January 17, 2024 – Decided January 29, 2024
    Before Judges Sumners and Rose.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket No. FG-09-0117-21.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (James Daniel O'Kelly, Designated Counsel,
    on the brief).
    Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Julie Beth Colonna, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
    attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
    Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance,
    Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
    the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    At six months old, I.I.H.J.M (Ivan), born in June 2019, was removed from
    the home of his biological parents, S.J. (Sarah), and G.M. (Greg), 1 and placed in
    the custody of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency.                  The
    precipitating series of referrals that led to Ivan's removal are not at issue in this
    appeal. Suffice it to say, the Division filed a guardianship complaint after its
    efforts to reunify Ivan with his parents failed.           During the Division's
    1
    Consistent with the parties' briefs, we use initials and pseudonyms to protect
    the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
    A-1706-21
    2
    involvement with the family, Ivan endured several placements, including
    relatives and a non-relative resource parent, M.H. (Melissa).
    Following the two-day guardianship trial, the Family Part judge issued a
    judgment terminating the parental rights of Sarah and Greg to Ivan. In support
    of the judgment, the trial judge issued a comprehensive oral decision, finding
    the Division satisfied all four prongs of the best interests test under N.J.S.A.
    30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, Ivan was freed
    for adoption by his then-current resource parent, J.S. (Jamie) – a cousin of Ivan's
    half-brother's father.
    A few months after the January 20, 2022 guardianship judgment was
    entered, while the parents' appeals were pending, Jamie requested Ivan's
    removal for a second time. Jamie previously requested Ivan's removal within a
    few days of his initial placement in December 2019. Immediately thereafter
    Ivan was placed with Melissa until August 2020.
    Following Jamie's most recent request for Ivan's removal, the Division
    again returned the child to Melissa's resource home where he currently resides.
    Both parents moved for a remand to file a motion to vacate the judgment under
    Rule 4:50-1. The Division and law guardian opposed the motion but consented
    to a limited remand to reopen the second part of the third prong, whether the
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    3
    Division satisfied its burden to explore alternatives to termination, and the
    fourth prong, whether termination of parental rights "will not do more harm than
    good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) and (4). In our order granting the remand
    motion, we permitted the parties to present evidence to the trial court regarding
    Ivan's status and custody and the parents to file a Rule 4:50-1 motion.
    In view of the trial judge's retirement, the matter was assigned to Judge
    Margaret M. Marley, who denied the parents' ensuing Rule 4:50-1 motion to
    vacate the judgment but conducted a multi-day testimonial hearing regarding
    Ivan's custody and status. Sarah asserted that if Ivan could not be returned to
    her, she proposed placement with E.D. (Edith), the child's paternal aunt, who
    resides in Colorado. For the first time at the hearing, Sarah proposed additional
    family members for consideration. During the hearing, the judge accepted the
    identified surrender of Greg's parental rights to Ivan provided Melissa adopts
    the child.2
    The Division presented the testimony of Frank Dyer, Ph.D., who
    conducted a bonding evaluation between Ivan and Melissa; a caseworker, who
    noted concerns about Edith because she lives far from Ivan's relatives and had a
    2
    On Greg's application, we dismissed his appeal. Accordingly, he no longer is
    a party to these proceedings.
    A-1706-21
    4
    history of failing to communicate with the Division; and Melissa, who
    confirmed she understood the difference between adoption and kinship legal
    guardianship (KLG) and wished to adopt Ivan. The law guardian did not present
    any evidence but remained aligned with the Division's plan for adoption by
    Melissa. Sarah presented the testimony of Edith and testified on her own behalf.
    The Division presented another caseworker to rebut Sarah's testimony that the
    Division failed to explore her siblings and other relatives as potential caregivers.
    On January 13, 2023, Judge Marley issued a well-reasoned oral decision,
    spanning more than fifty transcript pages. At the outset, the judge carefully
    canvassed the evidence presented at the initial trial, finding no reason to disturb
    the trial court's decision on the first and second prongs of the best interests test.
    Similarly, the judge meticulously chronicled the testimony adduced at the
    remand hearing and the supporting documentary evidence presented. The judge
    thoroughly explained her factual and credibility findings, crediting the
    testimony of the Division's witnesses and concluding the testimony of Sarah and
    Edith lacked credibility.
    The judge considered Edith initially had been ruled out because she failed
    to comply with the process for interstate placement, resided in Colorado and had
    never met Ivan in person, and was recently approved as a caretaker by that state
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    5
    despite the Division's concerns. Conversely, the judge noted Ivan lived with
    Melissa for sixteen and one-half months. Moreover, after the child was removed
    from her home, Melissa agreed to assist Jamie by taking Ivan "for weekends
    twice a month, from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon." The judge thus
    concluded: "So in reality, [Melissa] has been in the child['s] . . . life in some
    capacity as a caregiver for seemingly thirty-two and a half months of his forty-
    two-month lifetime."
    Citing Dr. Dyer's bonding evaluation, the judge noted Ivan appeared
    "happy, relaxed, and secure" with Melissa. The judge was persuaded by Dr.
    Dyer's findings that Ivan was "in a in a critical stage of personality formation";
    "ha[d] a very significant emotional tie to [Melissa]"; would continue to thrive in
    her home; and if placed with a stranger would be "at risk for severe personality
    disorder and emotional problems entering adolescence and adulthood given his
    previous history of disruptions."
    Turning to the fourth prong, Judge Marley expressed the court's concern
    that well-intentioned and appropriate efforts to place
    this child in the home of kin has resulted in adults
    returning this child to the Division as a result of their
    ill-prepared and poorly thought-out approach to
    accepting the responsibility of custody of a child.
    The end result is that the quest for kin has instead
    left our child in the foster care system indefinitely with
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    6
    current proposals that he be left there for an even longer
    time.
    The goal of serving and upholding the child's best
    interest and well-being have been derailed in this quest.
    This court has been presented with no expert
    opinion to suggest that the [termination of parental
    rights] will now do more harm than good than it would
    have done at the time of the [trial] court's rendering the
    termination of parental rights decision.
    The only opinion offered to this court has been a
    positive opinion about the bond between [Ivan] and the
    current resource parent.
    A resource parent who has gone out of her way
    to offer herself to this child in every imaginable way,
    whether he was in her care or whether he was in the care
    of another.
    A resource parent who has been a support for
    [the] other resource parent. A resource parent who has
    been the most stable presen[ce] in this child's life for
    the majority of his life.
    This home may very well be the most stable home
    that this child has ever experienced.
    Sarah now appeals from the January 13, 2023 judgment terminating her
    parental rights to Ivan, only challenging Judge Marley's decision on the third
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    7
    and fourth best interests prongs.3 For the first time on appeal, Sarah claims the
    remand judge failed to consider KLG with Melissa as an alternative to
    termination of her parental rights. She maintains termination of her parental
    rights will do more harm than good.
    We have considered Sarah's contentions in view of the governing legal
    principles and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
    written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Judge Marley's unassailable findings are
    supported by substantial credible evidence and are entitled to our deference.
    N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 
    217 N.J. 527
    , 552 (2014).
    Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Marley in
    her cogent oral opinion that accompanied the January 13, 2023 judgment. We
    simply add because Sarah never proposed KLG with Melissa, there was no need
    for the judge to consider the issue. Nonetheless, in her oral decision, Judge
    Marley expressly noted Melissa clearly understood the differences between
    KLG and adoption and "wanted adoption only" because "the child needs a secure
    and permanent placement and home."
    Affirmed.
    3
    Sarah's two other children are in the custody of their respective fathers and are
    not parties to this appeal.
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    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-1706-21

Filed Date: 1/29/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/29/2024