Shelley Pritchett v. State of New Jersey ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1414-21
SHELLEY PRITCHETT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. January 30, 2024
APPELLATE DIVISION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued October 18, 2023 – Decided January 30, 2024
Before Judges Currier, Susswein and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2189-13.
Peter G. Verniero argued the cause for appellant (Sills
Cummis & Gross, PC, attorneys; Peter G. Verniero and
Michael S. Carucci, of counsel and on the briefs).
Deborah Lynn Mains argued the cause for respondent
(Costello & Mains, LLC, attorneys; Deborah Lynn
Mains and Miriam S. Edelstein, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CURRIER, P.J.A.D.
This case, arising out of a failure to accommodate and discrimination
action under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-
1 to -50, returns to us after remand. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff
awarding her compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. On
appeal, we affirmed the finding of liability and the compensatory damage award
but remanded for further proceedings on the amount of punitive damages, and
specifically, for substantial consideration of the factors discussed by our
Supreme Court in Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and the
United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996). Pritchett v. State, No. A-1956-17 (App. Div. Apr. 24, 2020) (slip
op. at 1-2, 79-84), modified and aff'd, 248 N.J. 85 (2021).
Our Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification and
modified this court's remand instructions. The Court held that when reviewi ng
a punitive damages award against a public entity, a trial court must not only
consider the Baker/BMW factors, but also needs to apply heightened scrutiny as
required under Lockley v. State, Department of Corrections, 177 N.J. 413(2003). Pritchett v. State (Pritchett I), 248 N.J. 85, 88 (2021).
Following remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court considered the
parties' briefs and oral arguments and determined the punitive damages verdict
was "reasonable" and "comport[ed] with due process" even when examined with
"heightened scrutiny." In employing a de novo review and applying heightened
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scrutiny to the BMW/Baker factors, we conclude the amount of the punitive
damages award was not unreasonable. We affirm.
I.
The facts were thoroughly detailed in our prior opinion and Pritchett I.
For the reader's ease and context for our decision, we reproduce the facts set
forth in Pritchett I.
Pritchett was hired by the Juvenile Justice Center
(JJC) in 2006. The JJC runs the state's juvenile
correctional facilities and has approximately 400
employees at any given time. Pritchett worked as a
corrections officer in a JJC facility, and, by 2011, she
held the title of Senior Corrections Officer [(SCO)].
Her duties included the responsibility to intervene when
violence broke out among inmates.
On June 8, 2011, Pritchett broke up a fight
between two inmates. As a result, she suffered injuries
to her back, knee, and neck, went on Workers'
Compensation leave, and sought medical assistance.
In the fall of that year, Pritchett's physician
noticed that an MRI of Pritchett's spine revealed
abnormalities unrelated to her workplace injuries.
Because of those abnormalities and Pritchett's physical
complaints, her physician suspected that Pritchett was
suffering from the early stages of multiple sclerosis
(MS). In a note dated September 17, 2011, her
physician wrote that Pritchett had recovered from her
workplace injuries and could return to work with no
restrictions on their account, but the doctor
recommended that Pritchett ask for additional leave
time to seek a diagnosis and treatment for her
underlying health issues and referred her to a
neurologist.
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Consistent with the physician's recommendation,
Pritchett submitted a request for unpaid leave from her
JJC position. Two days later, human resources (HR)
officers forwarded the request to the Acting Director of
the JJC, Captain Kelly Gibson, and to Pritchett's direct
supervisor, Lisa Quinto. An internal email to Gibson
indicates that HR had planned to approve the request;
however, Captain Gibson was against it. HR then
turned for support to Quinto, who, on September 27,
emailed Gibson, telling him that Pritchett's "diagnosis
is rather serious." She went on, "[y]ou may wish to
consider approving this leave through November 1,
2011. This way we can write to her now and advise her
no further leave will be approved beyond November 1
and if she is not medically cleared to return to work,
she must resign." Quinto explained to Captain Gibson,
If you determine she must return to work
now, based on the medical, there will be no
way she can return and we really have not
given her warning that management will
not approve further leave beyond a request
to extend. If she cannot return in
November and does not resign, you will
have a stronger case to take steps to remove
her and be more readily able to defend the
removal in an appeal setting. Since [it's]
only one plus month, we can give her fair
warning she must return and then if she
does not, you stand a much better chance
of winning an appeal.
Nonetheless, Captain Gibson remained
committed to denying Pritchett's request. HR then
sought out the JJC's Deputy Executive Director for
Operations, Felix Mickens, forwarding him Quinto's
exchange with Gibson and adding that
[t]o deny leave at this point will surely
result in a removal (she has a very serious
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diagnosis) which will be appealed and not
upheld. She will not be able to return to
work (she incurred a work-related injury
which resulted in the discovery of an
unrelated personal medical condition) and
we have not advised her management will
not approve further leave. With removals
we have established a winning defense
....
November is right around the corner—
management should approve leave through
this date as the medical states—we will
write to her and say no further leave—if
she does not, or cannot return, she can
resign [or] we can initiate removal for
failure to return from an approved leave of
absence.
Pritchett's request was ultimately approved on
October 11, granting her unpaid leave through
November 1, 2011, but the approval came with the
caveat that no further requests would be granted. She
was informed that if she did not return to work on
November 2, she would be expected to resign.
On October 19, Pritchett was diagnosed with MS.
She requested additional leave time through February
29, 2012, with an expected return-to-work date of
March 1. Gibson and Quinto both denied the request in
internal emails. Upon receiving word of the denial,
Pritchett telephoned Quinto, who would not provide an
explanation as to why the JJC denied Pritchett's request.
Instead, she told Pritchett that the JJC was not obligated
to give her a reason, and then declined to put the denial
in writing.
When November 1 came, Pritchett wrote to the
JJC's HR manager, stating that she was not able to
return to work, but that she did not want to resign.
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Mickens answered the letter through Pritchett's union
representative, telling her that Pritchett would be
subject to disciplinary proceedings—which would
result in her termination without a pension—if she did
not resign by the end of the week. Pritchett submitted
an application for retirement disability benefits on
November 4.
Thereafter, on November 21, Pritchett's union
representative contacted the JJC's Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator, informing the
coordinator that Pritchett believed she was forced into
retirement against her will. The coordinator answered
that since Pritchett had already resigned, it was too late
to engage in the ADA's interactive process and advised
Pritchett to contact the JJC's Equal Opportunity Office.
When it responded to Pritchett's request for
reinstatement, that Office expressed its opinion that the
JJC "failed to engage in the interactive process . . . .
This failure to engage in the interactive process resulted
in a violation of the State Anti-Discrimination Policy."
However, the Office agreed with the ADA coordinator
that Pritchett's "request for reinstatement [was] mooted
by [her] approval for disability retirement."
....
In October 2013, Pritchett filed a complaint
against the State of New Jersey and unnamed John
Does, alleging that the State violated the LAD by
failing to accommodate her disability and
discriminating based on the perception of disability.
Following the State's unsuccessful attempts to end the
matter through motion practice, the trial court
conducted a jury trial in June 2017.
The trial resulted in the jury's return of a liability
verdict in favor of Pritchett. The jury awarded
compensatory damages totaling $1,824,911, which
consisted of $575,000 for emotional distress; $343,789
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in back pay; $472,639 in front pay; and $433,483 in
future pension benefits.
The next day, the court reconvened the jury for a
proceeding on punitive damages, during which the
parties presented no new evidence. The jury's
deliberations were brief, lasting from shortly after 2:00
p.m. until about 3:00 p.m.
The jury awarded Pritchett $10 million in
punitive damages. All totaled, the trial court entered a
judgment of $12,015,384.44 for Pritchett. That amount
encompassed $78,367.65 in pre-judgment interest;
$22,235.79 in costs; $11,824,911 in compensatory and
punitive damages; and $89,870 in attorneys' fees.
[Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 89-92 (alterations in original).]
We include additional facts elicited during trial that are important to our
analysis of the issue on appeal. On November 1, 2013, the JJC revised its Leave
of Absence policy to state that leaves would be subject to the approval of
management and possible reasonable accommodation through the ADA
coordinator. During the trial, Dr. Mark Lazar, an expert in neurology and MS,
testified that plaintiff was "stable," "completely normal," and able to return to
her SCO job without any restrictions.
Mickens testified that plaintiff was always welcome to return to her
position as an SCO, if she received medical clearance. On the July 27, 2012
separation form, Gibson recommended plaintiff for reemployment with the JJC.
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At the time of trial in June 2017, plaintiff was working two jobs, one at a Home
Depot and another working with children in the foster care system.
II.
As stated, we affirmed the jury's verdict on liability and its award of
compensatory damages. We remanded for the trial court to review the punitive
damages award applying the Baker/BMW factors. The Supreme Court's review
of the matter was limited solely to "the standards to be applied by a trial court
when reviewing a jury award of punitive damages against a public-sector
defendant." Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 96.
On November 30, 2021, the trial court issued an oral decision, concluding
"the $10 million punitive damages award is reasonable and consistent with due
process even when viewed under . . . the Lockley/Green1 heightened scrutiny."
The trial court discussed the Supreme Court's remand instructions to "apply a
heightened scrutiny analysis to" the Baker/BMW factors, that is, (1) "the degree
of reprehensibility of" defendant's conduct; (2) "the disparity between the harm
or potential harm suffered by . . . plaintiff . . . and the . . . punitive damages
award"; and (3) "the difference between th[e punitive damages award] and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Baker, 161 N.J. at
220 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).
1
Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434 (2003).
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As for the first factor, the trial court noted we had "affirmed the jury's
findings that the defendant's conduct, specifically that of Mickens, Gibson, and
Bell was especially egregious and that this was shown by clear and convincing
evidence"; therefore, whether there was sufficient evidence to support punitive
damages had "already been determined in plaintiff's favor." The question then,
according to the trial court, was "not whether there was especially egregious
conduct . . . but how especially egregious was the conduct." The court concluded
"based on the evidence considered by the jury . . . the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct was high" because "as the jury concluded, defendant
forced a compromised law enforcement official who was unable to safely
perform her job duties to resign or retire and, unlike plaintiff, other [corrections
officers] had been granted leave in excess of the FMLA 2 time." The court also
emphasized that "[t]he defenses raised by defendant were all rejected by the
jury."
As for the second factor, the court referred to its findings regarding the
first factor, concluding: "the degree of reprehensibility is high and the harm of
discrimination suffered by Pritchett is certainly in line with the punitive
damages awarded."
2
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
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In addressing the third factor, the court recognized that the "difference
between this remedy and the maximum civil penalty of $50,000" is a "significant
difference." Nevertheless, the court found this factor was "not significant in
light of the great weight given to factors one and two," which "weigh heavily in
plaintiff's favor." The court reasoned:
The parties in their briefs and oral argument go
through various ratios for the [c]ourt to consider. No
matter what ratio is considered, it is a single digit and
does not offend due process even when viewed through
Lockley's heightened standard. Nonetheless, including
attorneys' fees and emotional distress damages which
this [c]ourt concludes is the proper way to consider the
ratio analysis, then the entire judgment would be just
over $2 million and puts the ratio just below five. Even
excluding emotional distress and attorneys' fees only
moves the ratio to 7.4, also a number that is reasonable
and satisfies due process using the heightened standard
based on the high degree of reprehensible conduct of
the defendant[] and harm of discrimination.
Therefore, the court concluded that its analysis of the factors required a
determination that the punitive damages award in this case was "reasonable" and
"comport[ed] with due process" even when examined under "heightened
scrutiny." The court stated:
[I]t is clear that the jury did not render its award based
on passion, confusion, bias judgment or bias prejudice,
or was inflamed in any way. As I stated in the post-
judgment motions, this jury was intelligent, one that
took notes, was deliberative, impartial and
dispassionate and rendered an award consistent with the
reprehensible conduct and harm to the plaintiff.
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In all the rigorous analysis and heightened
scrutiny and due process analysis, we can't lose sight of
the jury's reasoned judgment. But, as I said, their
reasoned judgment does, in fact, comport with due
process and is reasonable under the heightened review.
The court executed an order the same day memorializing its oral decision.
III.
On appeal, defendant asserts the $10 million punitive damages award
violates due process because the trial court did not apply the "heightened
scrutiny" standard in reviewing the reasonableness of the award and did not
consider whether the award served as a deterrent for future misconduct, a
punishment for the bad behavior, and its proportionality to the bad behavior.
Defendant also raises arguments regarding the appropriate standard this court
should use in its review of a punitive damages award imposed against a public
entity.
The purpose of punitive damages is "the deterrence of egregious
misconduct and the punishment of the offender." Herman v. Sunshine Chem.
Specialties, Inc., 133 N.J. 329, 337 (1993) (citing Leimgruber v. Claridge
Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 454 (1977)). The New Jersey Punitive Damages Act
(PDA), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17, permits recovery of punitive damages
only if the plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the
defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or
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omissions were actuated by actual malice or
accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of
persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts
or omissions.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(a).]
However, punitive damages may only be awarded if compensatory damages
were awarded in the first stage of the trial. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13(c); Longo v.
Pleasure Prods., Inc., 215 N.J. 48, 58 (2013). The PDA caps the amount of
punitive damages that may be assessed against a defendant to the greater of five
times the sum of the compensatory damages or $350,000. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
5.14(b).
The decision to award or deny punitive damages "rests within the sound
discretion of the trier of fact." Leimgruber, 73 N.J. at 456; Accord Maudsley v.
State, 357 N.J. Super. 560, 590 (App. Div. 2003). However, "[t]he PDA
envisions an active role for the trial court in reviewing the jury's
determinations." Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 109. Thus, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a)
provides:
Before entering judgment for an award of punitive
damages, the trial judge shall ascertain that the award
is reasonable in its amount and justified in the
circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose to
punish the defendant and to deter that defendant from
repeating such conduct. If necessary to satisfy the
requirements of this section, the judge may reduce the
amount of or eliminate the award of punitive damages.
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The PDA requires juries to consider the following factors:
(1) The likelihood, at the relevant time, that serious
harm would arise from the defendant's conduct;
(2) The defendant's awareness [or] reckless disregard
of the likelihood that the serious harm at issue would
arise from the defendant's conduct;
(3) The conduct of the defendant upon learning that its
initial conduct would likely cause harm; and
(4) The duration of the conduct or any concealment of
it by the defendant.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(b).]
The PDA governs punitive damages in LAD cases. Saffos v. Avaya Inc.,
419 N.J. Super. 244, 264 (App. Div. 2011). However, actions under the LAD
are excluded from the PDA's statutory cap. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(c); Baker, 161
N.J. at 231.
"[P]unitive damages are only to be awarded in exceptional cases even
where the LAD has been violated." Saffos, 419 N.J. Super. at 263 (alteration in
original) (quoting Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476,
500-01 (App. Div. 1994)). "To be exceptional, the defendant's conduct must
'ris[e] to the level of wanton or reckless conduct.'" Ibid. (alteration in original)
(quoting Catalane, 271 N.J. Super. at 501).
"In addition, there are substantive constitutional limits on the amount of
punitive damages that a jury may award." Baker, 161 N.J. at 229. Those limits
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are imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and serve
"to ensure that punitive damages awards are made through a fair process that
includes judicial review of awards." Ibid."[C]ourts must examine the substantive basis of the punitive damages
award to determine whether it is so excessive as to violate due process." Id. at
230. As noted, courts must consider the following three factors when
conducting its review:
[(1)] the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that
formed the basis of the civil suit; [(2)] the disparity
between the harm or potential harm suffered by the
injured party who was the plaintiff in the civil case and
the plaintiff's punitive damages award; and [(3)] the
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
[Ibid. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).]
"[T]he award of punitive damages '"must bear some reasonable relation to the
injury inflicted and the cause of the injury."'" Ibid. (quoting Herman, 133 N.J.
at 338 (quoting Leimgruber, 73 N.J. at 457)).
In addition, special consideration is given in cases involving public
entities. In Lockley, the Court stated that "the court's responsibility to review
awards of punitive damages for reasonableness is heightened." 177 N.J. at 433.
The judge in the ordinary case acts as a check on the
jury's calculation of punitive damages; in the case of a
governmental entity, when public monies are the source
of the award, the judge must scrutinize with great care
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the amount of the award to determine whether it is
proportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
[Ibid.]
In the case of public entities,
concepts of wealth and ability to pay are irrelevant . . .
because public entities do not create their own wealth
and are not driven by a profit motive. The State cannot
be deterred by an award based on its "bottom line"
because it does not have one in the private sector sense.
[Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).]
That is not to say, "however, that the deterrent effect is absent in actions against
a public entity." Ibid. "[P]unitive damages . . . constitute a stringent corrective
and potent deterrent against egregious wrongdoing by upper-level supervisory
government officials." Ibid. (quoting Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 429 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds,
N.J.S.A. 34:19-5). But because "'"public monies are the source of the award,"'"
there are "'rigorous standards for the calculation of punitive damages against a
public entity.'" Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 106-07 (quoting Green, 177 N.J. at 444(quoting Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433)).
Defendant urges this court to adopt a de novo standard of review when
considering both the reasonableness and substantive due process of a punitive
damages award imposed against a public entity. We decline to do so.
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We use a hybrid standard of review when considering an award of punitive
damages. We accord a deferential standard of review to a judge's determination
of whether the jury's punitive damages award is "reasonable" and "justified in
the circumstances of the case" under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a). See Saffos, 419
N.J. Super. at 264 (affirming a judge's decision to reduce, but not elimin ate, a
punitive damages award under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a)); Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli's
Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 390 N.J. Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 2007) (affirming a
judge's decision not to reduce an award under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a)), aff'd,
194 N.J. 212 (2008). Cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 433 (2001) (noting that in the absence of a constitutional issue, a
federal appellate court applies "an abuse-of-discretion standard" when
reviewing a trial court's scrutiny of jury award of punitive damages (quoting
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
(1989))).
However, when a party challenges the punitive damage award on
constitutional due process grounds, we review the trial court's decision as to the
amount of the punitive damage award de novo because the determination is "not
really a 'fact tried by the jury.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 353 N.J. Super. 145,
152 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437). The purpose of
de novo review in such cases is to ensure that an award is not "so excessive as
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to violate substantive due process." Id. at 153. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-
86). We accord no special deference "to a trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law." Ibid.Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the amount of the punitive
damages award. Therefore, we apply a de novo standard. Id. at 152.
Defendant is a public entity. Thus, as our Supreme Court explained in its
remand instructions to the trial court, "a more rigorous application" of the
Baker/BMW factors is required. Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 110. That is not to say
that additional steps need to be taken in the analysis; rather, defendant's status
as a public entity is but one consideration in the "holistic assessment." Id. at
110-11. Because "'public monies are the source of the award,'" trial courts need
to "be vigilant in their review of such awards." Green, 177 N.J. at 444 (quoting
Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433).
Against this framework we consider each of the Baker/BMW factors. In
discussing the first factor, the United States Supreme Court has explained,
"[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (alteration in
original) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575). Courts evaluate
the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to
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economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of
others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or
was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
[Saffos, 419 N.J. Super. at 266 (quoting State Farm, 538
U.S. at 419).]
It should be presumed, however that "a plaintiff has been made whole for
[their] injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be
awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages,
is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve
punishment or deterrence." Ibid. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419).
As we previously stated, "[P]laintiff presented a case from which the jury
could have found especially egregious conduct by clear and convincing
evidence." Pritchett, slip op. at 79 (emphasis added). The evidence
demonstrated that defendant was aware of plaintiff's MS diagnosis in November
2011, but failed to notify its ADA coordinator, resulting in the denial of
plaintiff's opportunity "to engage in the interactive process" required in a request
for accommodation situation. Plaintiff was forced to retire early as a result of
defendant's actions, suffering economic harm. Given plaintiff's medical
condition, she was also financially vulnerable. Upper management made the
decision to deny plaintiff's leave requests and ignored the advice of HR
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personnel. After plaintiff instituted litigation, defendant revised the JJC's Leave
of Absence policy to state that leaves would be subject to the approval of
management and possible reasonable accommodation through the ADA
coordinator. There is ample evidence to find defendant's conduct was
reprehensible and warranted a substantial punitive damages award.
As to the second Baker/BMW factor, in reviewing "the disparity between
the actual . . . harm suffered by . . . plaintiff and the punitive damages award,"
"[t]he measure of punishment [must be] both reasonable and proportionate to
the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered."
Saffos, 419 N.J. Super. at 266, 268-69 (second alteration in original) (quoting
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418, 426). To evaluate if an award is reasonable and
proportionate, courts "must recognize that emotional distress damages often
contain a punitive element." Id. at 269 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426). The
risk that an emotional damages award contains a punitive aspect is greater where
physical harm or psychological treatment is absent. Ibid.Here, plaintiff presented little evidence regarding her emotional distress.
She was not receiving psychological treatment and she did not present any
evidence that her emotional distress resulted in any medical diagnoses.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the jury's award of $575,000 in
emotional distress damages contained a punitive aspect. As a result, and guided
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by Saffos, we deem it appropriate on these facts to subtract the emotional
distress award from the total compensatory award, leaving a compensatory-
damage base of $1,249,911. The punitive damages award of $10 million is
approximately seven times greater than that amount. While we acknowledge
this is a high ratio, we also recognize that sole reliance on a bright-line ratio or
cap is "impermissible," as the ratio is only considered as part of the holistic
assessment. See Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 113. As stated, the PDA's limitation on
the amount of punitive damages is not applicable here. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(c);
Baker, 161 N.J. at 231.
Finally, as to the third Baker/BMW factor, "the difference between the
punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized" under the LAD,
the LAD provides for a civil fine not to exceed $50,000. Saffos, 419 N.J. Super.
at 269 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418); N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1a. As we stated
in Saffos, we find the comparison between the punitive damage award and the
authorized civil penalty is "not particularly helpful in determining the propriety
of the amount of punitive damages." 419 N.J. Super. at 269.
In sum, after a de novo review, we have considered the Baker/BMW
factors using the heightened scrutiny required under Lockley. Defendant's
behavior was especially egregious. Upper management behaved reprehensibly
in blithely dismissing plaintiff's request for an unpaid leave of absence to
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accommodate treatment for her newly diagnosed MS. Upper management
ignored the advice of defendant's HR personnel. As noted in BMW and Pritchett
I, this factor is the dominant factor and "[p]erhaps the most important." 517
U.S. at 575; 248 N.J. at 112.
Although the ratio of the compensatory damages award to the punitive
damages award (after subtracting the emotional distress damages component) is
substantial, we cannot conclude the award is unreasonable or disproportionate
to the inflicted injury. Punitive damages are available in an LAD action against
a public entity. The Legislature expressly chose not to impose a cap on such
damages when it exempted the LAD from the limits imposed on other actions
under the PDA. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(b) to (c). Where defendant acted with
such disregard for the LAD, the ratio is not dispositive.
After having reviewed the award with great care in light of defendant's
status as a public entity, we find the award appropriate to deter future unlawful
conduct. We are mindful the source of the damages award is public funds, but
nevertheless have considered the remedial nature of the LAD statute and the
expectation "that public officials will be motivated to avoid misconduct that
exposes the State to financial sanction in the form of punitive damages if only
because of the stigma attached to the judgment." Lockley, 177 N.J. at 431. This
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award serves the purpose of encouraging high-level officials to conform their
behavior.
Therefore, we reject defendant's challenge of the punitive damages award
on substantive due process grounds.
Affirmed.
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